← The Ezra Klein Show
The Ezra Klein Show
The New Right’s Very Old Vision of Men
01:43:16
A new masculinist movement has gone mainstream on the right. The prominent voices in this movement yearn for an earlier time, when men were men and women were women. Sometimes that time seems to be the 1950s, like when Tucker Carlson extols a world where men go to work and women stay at home. But sometimes it goes way farther back. The pastor Doug Wilson advocates household voting, in which men vote for their wives. And Costin Vlad Alamariu, better known as Bronze Age Pervert, harks back to the Bronze Age — specifically the ancient Hittite and Mitanni Empires. Helen Lewis wrote a recent cover story for The Atlantic about this new antifeminist backlash, which she calls “the single most important force holding together the American right.” So I wanted to have her on the show to talk about these ideas, the political program of this movement and how seriously we should take it. Lewis is a staff writer at The Atlantic and the author of “Difficult Women: A History of Feminism in 11 Fi...
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- [00:00]
A
This podcast is supported by BetterHelp. Summer can feel like a sprint. Kids home, trips to plan, routines flipped upside down. It's easy to slip into survival mode just trying to get through it. Then suddenly it's over and you're wishing you enjoyed the days just a little bit. More. Therapy can help you slow down and actually be present for the moments that matter. With BetterHelp, you can connect with a licensed therapist from anywhere on your schedule. Don't just survive this summer. Thrive. Visit betterhelp.com New York Times. If you travel deep into the New Right, what you find at the moment is a constant yearning for something very old. Not just a time when America was great, but a time when men were great. When men were men. You hear it in Kosten Vlad Alamaru, who's better known as the Bronze Age pervert. You hear it in his longing for the Bronze Age.
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B
I am here just to spread the political views of the ancient Hittite Empire or the ancient Mitanni Empire.
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A
You hear it when the pastor Doug Wilson yearns for the time before the 19th Amendment.
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C
The net effect of women's suffrage was not an advance in women's rights, but rather part of a push to replace covenanted entities like families with raw individualism.
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A
You hear it in the increasingly constant idealization of 1950s America. Why wouldn't you design a system consistent with nature? What would that look like to you? It would look like what we had before Betty Friedan wrote the Feminine Mystique, before lifestyle feminism dominated every institution in the West. There's a time when all this could be dismissed as a fringe movement on the fever swamps of the Internet. But Bronze Age Pervert is a favorite of young drum staffers. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth invited Doug Wilson to preach at the Pentagon. Tucker Carlson is. Well, he's Tucker Carlson. These are not all fringe figures, and it's not just them. It's a much broader thing on the New Right, which increasingly wants a return, is theorizing for how to create a return to very old ideas of how men should be, to very old policies that centralize the power they wield and the way society is ordered. Helen Lewis is a staff writer at the Atlantic and the author of Difficult Women, a history of feminism in 11 fights and the Genius Myth. She's just written a great cover story for the Atlantic, mapping this world. She calls it masculinism, talking to many of its key figures, trying to understand its core ideas. So I want to have her on the show to talk about it. As always, my email Ezra klein show@nytimes.com. Helen Lewis welcome to the show.
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D
Thank you.
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A
So I want to start with a clip from Scott Yener, a professor at Boise State University. That I think is a good place to start. Our independent women seek their purpose in life in mid level bureaucratic jobs like human resource management, environmental protection and marketing. They are more medicated, meddlesome and quarrelsome than women need to be without connections to eternity delivered through their family. Such medicated, quarrelsome and meddlesome women gain their meaning through the seeming participation in the global project. They are agents of the new world, but not new life. Such women are now the backbone of every left wing cosmopolitan party in the Western world. I thought that was as concise as a description of this masculinism that you've been reporting on, as I've heard from many of its subjects. So tell me about him and the view of society you understand him to be spinning out here.
- [04:19]
D
Well, you know, as you heard, it's one that's not afraid to be offensive, but the essential thesis is that it's women's role in life to have children. Modern women have been deluded instead into pursuing careers which aren't real jobs. They're not doing anything of any merit anyway, and therefore their lives will essentially be empty and pointless. But I find it quite I like my job, and I also feel that my job is equal social worth to Scott Yen of being in a think tank. Right, like he's hardly a cancer surgeon. Calm down son. I find it kind of intriguingly repellent and I think a lot of people do as well.
- [04:51]
A
One of the things I heard in that clip is an echo of the JD Vance Miserable Cat Ladies clip that went around in the 2024 campaign. We're effectively run in this country via the Democrats, via our corporate oligarchs by a bunch of childless cat ladies who are miserable at their own lives and the choices they've made. And so they want to make the rest of the country miserable too. Which I mention because I think it can be easy to look at Yener and some of the people will talk about and think, oh, this is a fever swamp right wing movement. This is when you've clicked on too many posts on X and the algorithm has found something out about you that you wish it didn't know. But one of the arguments you make in this piece is that masculinism has become a kind of unifying theory on a maga, right? That in other ways is coming apart. So defend that for me a bit
- [05:47]
D
right so you can see the splits of MAGA very obviously at the moment over the war in Iran, American support for Israel as a military ally, protectionism versus free trade. You know, there are all these interesting currents that are going on. However, if you asked, do you think feminism has gone too far? How many people in the MAGA coalition are going to, you know, are going to push back on that and say, actually, I think we should give more jobs and opportunities to women? So it is this one thing that basically everybody can agree with. Traditional gender roles are better. Equality has been a failed pursuit. It's maybe even an illegitimate pursuit. Empathy, which is feminine by nature, has been misused and is ruining our politics because women and their parties that represent them, the Democrats, feel sorry for all these underdogs who, who aren't really underdogs. They're kind of cancers on our society, like violent criminals or illegal immigrants. So, you know, there is, you know, this is a very coherent ideology. And the reason that I wanted to write the piece is I think people are now quite familiar with the idea of the manosphere and the kind of Andrew Tate, you know, these provocateurs who are creatures of the algorithm. And I wanted to say. Well, hang on a minute. Actually, there is a really serious ideological and political project here behind this. It has got people in think tanks, it's got people who are working in politics, and it has got its kind of intellectual outriders. But this isn't just some, you know, over steroided guys in tight T shirts parading around in nightclubs for the gram. These are people who want to completely restructure American life into a way that they find more agreeable, and they want to use legal instruments and political instruments to do so.
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A
What does that vision look like?
- [07:23]
D
So the simplest way to say it is that men would be the breadwinners and women would be homemakers. I mean, the kind of reference point always tends to be the 1950s, but it's a, you know, it's the very fake Pleasantville black and white picket fence version of the 1950s. Lots of families did not, in fact, live in that way. But, you know, you would do that. For example, Scott Yenner, he mentioned there one of his most controversial proposals is this idea of the family wage. The idea that you would restore discrimination back into the job market by saying it's okay to preferentially hire men, married men, it's okay to, you know, to promote them more, to pay them higher salaries. You know, what we want to do is essentially restore a traditional way of life in which, you know, men are the ones who go out and earn money, women's money. If anything, it's back to being pin money. It's kind of secondary.
- [08:07]
A
So it's worth, I think, for you to expand on that, which is to say, I think the core critique here and the core politics here, is that modernity has thwarted masculinity. The arguments here, and we're going to tour through a number of them, they shift between this, as you say, 1950s nostalgia for when you had the single breadwinner family and this. In some cases it's very Christian, in some cases it's very pagan. But this spiritual level of politics, and it seems to me to have this dimension of modernity is hollow. People are working, as you mentioned, particularly women, these bullshit jobs in human resource management and in marketing and environmental protection, and men are caged in these little offices and doing retail work that is beneath them. And, you know, Jenner, in that quote, says, agents of the new world, but not new life. There's all this emphasis on what life is, the good, the beautiful. Vitality, vitalism. Can you talk about that dimension of it, this, the spiritual cell being made?
- [09:18]
D
Yeah, I think that is part of it. Because another thing that often comes up is the idea that women are on a huge amount of anxiety medication and antidepressants. So you have this situation in which women having anything that they feel is wrong in their lives is taken as proof that they've picked the wrong course in life. And if only they would pick this alternative vision of femininity, they would be happy. And, you know, and this is part of the exchange that I had with Doug Wilson, the evangelical pastor, that this is not a new phenomenon. It was something that Betty Friedan was writing about in the Feminine Mystique. When she was talking about specifically the unhappiness of stay at home housewives, she said, you know, they're taking medication like cough drops. And the bit that I struggle with as somebody who loves reading historical novels, historical fiction, historical biographies, is that are we absolutely sure that women in 1700 were, you know, were living these incredibly blissful lives? That's not what you get from the literature of the period. In my first book, which is a history of feminism, I wrote about some of the women who wrote to Mary Stopes, who was our kind of version of Margaret Sanger, a contraceptive pioneer. And they were describing lives of despair where they had far more children than they can afford. They didn't know how to stop having any more. You know, they were exhausted by their late 30s, from this relentless tide of childbearing. But this is the kind of, you know, that has now, that era has now passed into memory long enough that it is susceptible to being, you know, revitalized by this, into this kind of tradwife vision that is, you know, sold to people on Instagram because no one can really remember what it was like to live in those conditions anymore.
- [10:48]
A
Okay, let me try to think about how to do this, because I will say that typically when I get into a literature, I think I'm a usually generous reader and I leave with more sympathy for it than I came in and I read your piece, and then I read the Last man by Charles Cornish Dale, the raw egg nationalist. I read Bronze Age Mindset, and it's one of the first times I can really remember coming out of something like this and thinking, oh, there was so much less there than I thought. Like, I just assumed people were making some reasonable arguments. But I want to try to be generous before I get into that reaction. So let me ask it this way. As you were talking to these people, as you have immersed yourself in this literature, which parts of the critique or the diagnosis of modernity and its ills and ailments did you find recognizable or find yourself responding to?
- [11:43]
D
I do find the kind of battery cage idea of humanity to be quite compelling. Um, I know that I'm sure I would. My life would be better if I took more exercise, got outside more, took a screen break, didn't doom scroll. Like, I think all of those things are reasonable. I think the American diet is hideous, particularly for lower income Americans. So not. I don't think all of those things are ridiculous. You know, and that's, that's, that's something that comes up a lot in the Last Man. The idea that, you know, elites are keeping you fat, they're keeping you low testosterone. If you don't eat enough meat, you know, like, vegans are oppressing you.
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A
Vegetarianism is a tool of social control to SAP our vitality and make us easier and more obedient as subjects.
- [12:24]
D
But it's very interesting because clearly that has caught on because Arnold Schwarzenegger made a documentary about being vegetarian and. Except he'd rebranded it as plant based. And it was all about how actually you could be an incredibly good weightlifter if you were on a plant based diet. You could have incredibly strong erections on a plant based diet. So clearly that has seeped into that discourse that there is something unmanly about not eating meat. But I think I like that book more than you did. I found it. Maybe my expectations are lower, but the thing that I found that was interesting about it was that it moved from saying it is impossible to be a man fully in a liberal democracy. There's a line in that says essentially that because of the fact that you're being kept in this rubbish jobs and you have low testosterone, all this kind of stuff, and then you get to the end and you find out, okay, so what are we doing then? And there's a bit like, well, you should chuck out your plastic chopping board. And I was just like, oh, I was sort of expecting you to advocate fascism at the end. But you've kind of. You kept it lower, you've kept it more achievable. And that's the bit where I. That was a bit where I slightly parted company from it.
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A
That's where you parted company. Okay, let me describe the argument of this book because I think it actually gets at something that I want to try to do, which is it brings up some things really worth talking about and then goes in some really wild directions. You can correct me if you feel like I am being unfair in any part of this. The Last Men is an argument that begins by saying what we need is a hormonal theory of politics. And the hormonal theory of politics is this. And this part is real. There has been, over the decades, a measurable and sustained drop in testosterone in men across a number of countries, in sperm quality and count among men across a number of countries. There's also, and this is a big topic of discussion on this side, and I think an actually important one that I wish the left would take more seriously. There has been a sustained drop in fertility rates across many, many different countries. So relatively few liberal democracies are now at replacement rate or above, if any of them are. I think Israel is. Although whether Israel is a liberal democracy is its own question. So he sort of starts there and says, look, the core of masculinity, thymos or thymos, I don't know how you say the Greek word is testosterone. This thing that Francis Fukuyama is talking about in the end of history, in the Last man, this thing that Nietzsche is talking about is just testosterone. And we are destroying testosterone and we're destroying it with endocrine disrupting chemicals that are in all the things we buy, destroying it with bad diet, destroying it with chemicals in the water. And it is creating and is maybe a sort of actual effort to create. And this is where things begin, my view, to go a bit off the rails A docile form of man who is suited for the longhouse of liberal democracy and not suited for the displays of dominance and hierarchy and the conquest and excellence that has driven civilization forward and defined man forever. And then, as you say, it kind of ends with a stirring call to throw out your plastic cutting boards and filter your water. But this is the argument. There's some stuff I actually agree with on chemicals, some stuff I'm generally worried about, and hormonal changes, and then this sense that what's really happening here is the destruction of what it means to be a man and literally the vital fluids that make men manly. That's the book, right?
- [16:01]
D
But there is an obvious overlaid political valence on this, which is that this idea that if you're high t, you're risk taking, you're possibly violent, and you don't mind about inequality. It's about the strong dominating the weak. And therefore liberal democracy is inherently feminine because it's more concerned with making sure that the weak don't suffer too much, that there are equal rights for all. So it's very easy to see how that vision of masculinity maps onto kind of maga rightism. Definitely the bit I find I just, again, when I start drilling down into the examples, I find it tricky. So young men, for example, have much higher testosterone than old men. So actually, really, are we talking about if women shouldn't be in leadership positions, maybe old men shouldn't be in leadership positions. Cause they don't have the requisite thymos either. Oh, no, you're not saying that. So actually you're just making very large, sweeping claims about men are one thing and women are another thing. That kind of stuff, you know, sort of falls apart in your hands. But I also think that. Don't you think it does speak to some people? And I think it speaks to people who have like a female boss and they resent it and they find it slightly emasculating. The kind of people who, if a woman upset them, the word bitch would be pretty close to their lips. Right? That, that's the like, how dare you speak to me like that? You know, you're just. You're just a woman. And I think that's closer to the surface in men, even men who are otherwise impeccably liberal than perhaps we sometimes like to acknowledge. So I see why this stuff does have a relatively wide appeal.
- [17:29]
A
And the person of Donald Trump in the 2024 election became a vehicle for this feeling. This guy who stood up and pumped his fist covered in blood after an assassination attempt, rather than cowering behind his Secret Service guards or a lectern or, you know, staying on the floor, this guy who would say anything he wanted to say, no matter who it offended, who did not play by the rules of feminized society, this man who kept driving forward through adversity, you know, lawsuits and electoral losses, and made his own reality around him, that Trump, for all his sedentary lifestyle and obesity and the fact that he's, you know, in advanced age and, you know, I haven't measured his testosterone, but it's probably not that high anymore. But that Trump represents what masculinity, in a way, is supposed to be, which is an effort to dominate other people in a bid to achieve greatness for yourself, your kin, your country, and liberal democracy had thwarted that until he came back and like, bust through the. And showed you could still do this.
- [18:40]
D
But it's an incredible cherry pick, isn't it, About Donald Trump, the ultimate alpha male. In the same way that, you know, this is what I find very difficult about all of this literature, is that it just implies that everybody is a kind of a doll or a princess Sparkle. Donald Trump is, at the same time, a man who wears more makeup than I do most days, a man who loves Sunset Boulevard. You know, like, you know, the man loves a musical. One of his better qualities, but you know what I mean. So those aren't the things that they're emphasizing, interior decorations. They're saying, actually. Right, exactly.
- [19:12]
A
Which I like about Donald Trump. Right. Like, I actually, I'm not dissing on him here, but so much of these people are engaged in a very Judith Butlerian level of gender performance. It is the most CIS gender performance of hetero masculinity you could possibly imagine. And Trump, I think in some ways what makes him appealing is he's got some of that, but he's got the other thing, too, because he's actually not at his core, like an insecure, thwarted little goblin.
- [19:37]
D
Yeah, I personally find that much more appealing than I do the very pompous, we're all going to have a sauna together, and us guys, but it's definitely not gay. Kind of that. Kind of that sort of very terrified homophobia that sometimes comes out of some of those communities.
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A
So let me take it here, because, again, I want to try to run through some of these ideas. I think of one of the founding fathers of this in the New Right is this guy, Bronze Age pervert. Can you describe who that is?
- [20:08]
D
He is a thinker whose real name is Costin Alemariu. He's Romanian and he has a kind of whole Persona which is about bodybuilding and eugenics and Nietzsche. Yeah, those are maybe his three favorite things. And again, it's, you know, there's a kind of almost like, I am Dracula kind of level to the hamming up the accent and stuff and that kind of stuff. So once again, this is somebody who's playing a character on the Internet.
- [20:36]
A
Yeah, it's very much the way I describe the book, which is aesthetically interesting, even if I think it intellectually becomes a bit tedious. But it has this really like Nietzsche for Gunner's quality. It's very, very, you know, like romantic poetry, but, like, filtered through 4chan lingo. Maybe it's worth. I want to play a clip of this interview he did with Michael Malice in 2024, talking about the problems of modernity.
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B
Why is it disgusting? It's because it privileges safety and near life, the preservation of life at the expense of things that are exciting and great and free you. And when I wrote this book in 2018. Sorry to keep talking. Mike, if I may, this is why you're here. But when I. When I wrote this book in 2018, some people liked it because I expressed myself directly and with humor and so on. And they said, okay, Bab, this is very nice, but is it really true? And then what happened? You know, people will say, now, I planned it. No, I didn't plan it. The pandemic happened, which basically, I think demonstrated the truth of what I'm saying in the pandemic, in my view, was a mass sacrifice of the world's youth to the desires of disgusting old people who sacrificed the youth, and also to women, frankly, especially, you know, the middle aged, sterile woman who made the pandemic procedures her whole life. It gave meaning to her life. I saw it in action.
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A
You know, I can't tell you how
- [22:10]
D
much joy it brings me to hear
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A
you with your accent say the phrase,
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B
these middle aged, sterile women.
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A
It's just so. The reason I think that clip is useful and this book, Bronze Age Mindset, got written up in the Claremont Review of Books. There are reports that most young staff in the Trump administration had read it. It had become a. Like a piece of code passed back and forth. Samizdat. The reason I think that clip is interesting is it combines the two things the book does, which is this sense that there is something more than mere life. Right. He says a preservation of life at the expense of things that are exciting, great and free with the kind of campy Provocateurism, like, oh, it makes me so excited to hear you say middle aged, sterile women. What's this idea about privileging safety and mere life over things that are exciting and great and free?
- [23:07]
D
Well, this is the idea that women, because of their lack of thymos and testosterone, are, you know, weak and empathetic, and they don't want to put themselves in situations of danger. So this is the idea that you, you know, essentially the whole world has one kind of giant HR department telling you that you're not allowed to do the things you wanted to do anymore, particularly the kind of things that young men want to do. And, I mean, I can understand why people feel like that, but I also think that, again, I just. I find a huge amount of complacency, I think, has driven it. I don't think people would be talking like that in a time when they had lost three of their eight children to a preventable disease before the age of two. You know, I don't think they would have been talking about that when, immediately after the First World War, right, When you could quite easily have lost four of your sons in a completely pointless advance two miles across France. This is an ideology that is born out of fat modernity itself, Right? The luxury that they have to play with these ever so spicy ideas are because they've never lived these lives. I don't think if you went over to somewhere that is currently in the middle of a conflict and you said to them, are you all enjoying this incredibly dangerous masculine experience that you're having? I think no. I think they'd actually. They'd like a stable food supply and peace. So, you know, it's ironic that they, you know, they talk about Fukuyama because this is what he predicted in the end of history. He said that you're gonna end up with people who are just bored, full of ennui, and they're gonna have to find things to sort of entertain themselves because they don't have the material deprivations and challenges that previous generations have. And that's what I hear when I hear that. I hear, oh, that we're all having a go at Karen's on a podcast. Isn't it so spicy? And you think, how is. What has this got to do with the Spartans? You know, this is this just fake cosplay version of masculinity that everybody is kind of indulging in. You know, these people could sign up to the army, they could go and serve in a war, and they've not chosen to do that. They've chosen to become podcasters.
- [25:02]
A
I think the larping point of that is, I think, very important because it is a bunch of intellectuals in elite competition with other intellectuals, a bunch of humanities academics. I mean, Bronze Age pervert went to Yale, was it?
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D
Yeah, he's definitely spent a few terms teaching, I think, at Emory. But this is, you know, and that's the same thing with Lomas. He was an academic. Charles Cornish dale has a Ph.D. you know, I'm. Many of my friends are academics, but I can see how it slightly deranges people.
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A
This is an elite overproduction problem, Right?
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D
It does. As soon as I was thinking about this, I started thinking about Peter Turchin's idea of surplus elites that, you know, and some of these people, perhaps they didn't fit in socially at universities and colleges, perhaps they didn't fit in politically, but they have that same kind of yearning in them to be intellectuals and to take serious, be taken seriously. And this provides an outlet for that.
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A
One thing that I find interesting about the modern right is it can't seem to decide on when its nostalgia is for.
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D
Yeah.
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A
So there's a dimension of it that's for the 1950s. I think of that as more where Donald Trump has based his remembrance of politics. And he was around for that. So fair enough. But then you have people who seem to be looking back to earlier in the country's history, but it has stretched way beyond that now, all the way. And we'll talk about Bronze Age perf hurt, which is nom de plume of one of these folks who is trying to bring back a sort of pre modern, much more directly pagan view. There's a lot of primitivism in all of this. A lot of societies filled with chemicals and endocrine disruptors. Right. It connects to the Maha movement in that way. But this question of when were human beings human? When were men men, when were women women? There actually isn't agreement on it.
- [26:51]
D
No, you're right. Somebody like Doug Wilson, Pete Hegseth's congregation founder, you know, he seems to like. He basically sort of wants to live in Salem, circa 1650. As far as I can see, the
- [27:03]
C
liberation of women was a false flag operation. The true goal was the liberation of libertine men. And in our day, this was a goal that has largely been achieved. These were men who wanted the benefits for themselves. That would come from easy divorce, widespread abortion, mainstream pornography, and a promiscuous dating culture. The early 20th century was characterized by the Christian wife. The early 21st century is characterized by the tattooed concubine. And these sons of Belial have the chaspa to call it progress for women.
- [27:31]
D
That's, you know, that for him is. Is his vision. Other people, yeah, have that vision of 1950s suburbia. Other people look to the Romans or the Greeks or the Spartans even. You know, there's a big excitement about the Spartan. Other of them take inspiration from kind of Nietzsche, which is interesting to me. Right. So Nietzsche is writing these critiques of modernity at the end of the 19th century, at which point he's making all the same criticisms about his society that they're making now. And you think, well, hang on a minute. This is a vastly less industrialized society. You know, this is before the invention of antibiotics, all of this kind of stuff. So how can this be exactly the same criticism now? And it goes in the other direction, too. So one of the things I read for the piece was this very famous essay on the longhouse by Lomez, which is constantly referred to. And his idea is that there were these matriarchal societies or there were these communal dining halls that were overseen by a den mother, and they were ruled by kind of petty bitching and backbiting and ostracism while the men were going out doing manly things. And one of the things I thought was, oh, right, that's interesting. I wonder what society he's referring to. Then I should go out and read a bit more about what these places are actually like. And he's not referring to anything. He says there's no specific historical referent. And he says, in any case, one can't really define the longhouse, lest it should lose its force to lampoon the vast constellation of social forces it imagines. And I thought, well, that's extremely convenient, isn't it? You're invoking this terrible thing that happened in history, except it didn't happen in history in any way that you can concretely describe. And in any case, you don't want to define it because it's more a vibe, really.
- [29:07]
A
But this is the grammar of a lot of this. This constant, are we joking? Are we serious? I mean, when you talk about almost any of these people, almost any of these books, it's all the ethos of the troll, where the real argument is being smuggled in gift wrapped in irony and imagery and jokes and, oh, I'm only kidding. And are you really offended such that to argue with it has a little bit of the quality of arguing with smoke? And in some ways, that is its point. One of the things Many of these screeds, say explicitly, is that they're a reaction to empiricized, bloodlessly technocratic modernity. There's an idea that to sort of cohere things into that fact based form is to force yourself into a form of argumentation that by its very nature misses deeper truths about life.
- [30:15]
D
Right. But that does get on my nerves because as somebody who spent a decade writing about feminism, the thing that you constantly got assailed with was, you know, you're just talking about feelings, you're not talking about facts. If you look at the facts, actually, they're against you. And so it's quite odd to have pivoted into an era in which apparently, no, actually we're not that interested in facts. We're actually just interested in vibes again. But yeah, I think that's exactly right. I've thought a lot about what the point of the offensiveness of the language is, and clearly part of it is about a kind of signal, like, we're all guys in here. You're cool with this, like a sort of initiation, right? Essentially, if you don't blanch at somebody using the N word in the group chat, that's it, you're allowed in the club. And, and the other thing is about this idea that you just, you trip up liberals because essentially you say, I want to sterilize retards. And then everybody goes, how dare you say the word retards. But what you've done is you've invoked a very old idea about sterilization of the unfit for breeding. And the idea would be just as abhorrent if you used extremely clinical language about it as your deliberately offensive, you know, firework language. But you've trapped your opponents at the level of kind of going, ah, ah, ah, about the exact words in which you're wrapping it.
- [31:28]
A
I want to try to, because I actually, I will say I had a really quite negative reaction to a bunch of this. The part of it that I could recognize and the part of it that I do understand why it connects to people is it is an effort to pull up ideas of the Romantics, ideas from Nietzsche into a modernity that often feels very hollow. I mean, you talked about this, I think, as battery cage modernity. And when he's talking about more than mere life, and probably when he's talking about in the book, before I get into what I don't like about the book, the thing that he is often getting at and articulating in a way that is 4chan poetic, is that there has to be Something more than this. That there has to be a way that is more authentic to be a human being, more authentic to expressing the energy of life that moves within us that we don't know how to talk about, but we do feel. And that modernity has very little language for particularly disenchanted modernity than this. And the place where the book has, I think, genuine moments of appeal and inspiration is in the channeling of that sense, which is a very old sense that there is some form of immediate experience that industrial society alienates us from.
- [33:00]
D
I mean, I think that's probably why Nietzsche is such a reference point, because you have the sense both of an intellectual who is not appreciated or known in his own time. Right. Nietzsche goes mad after seeing a horse being beaten in the street and spends the last decades of his life just sitting in a corner, his mind completely broken.
- [33:16]
A
An icon of masculinity, if there ever
- [33:18]
D
was an icon of masculinity. Massive mustache. To be fair, he did have a very impressive moustache, but, you know. But also had these delusions of grandeur. Right. He's got a book that's, I believe, literally called why I Am so Great, you know, and the idea of the Ubermensch is that everybody around you is essentially cattle and you're not. And that is like. That is every member of the kind of intellectual dark webs, theory of the universe, right? Was that, oh, there are sheeple and everybody else is them, but I alone have seen through it. So there is this inherent kind of narcissism to it about the idea of kind of being an Ubermensch that I think you really. That doesn't surprise. That's a reference point to me there. The Christianity I struggle with more. So I'm not religious myself, but I was raised in a very religious household. My parents are Catholic, my dad was a deacon in the Catholic Church, my mum was a religious studies teacher. And their practice of Christianity was, I think, an incredibly positive one. They would go and give the sacrament to the sick, you know, and they'd go and visit nursing homes, people who didn't have anyone else to visit them. They would volunteer in soup kitchens, for example. Like their idea of Christianity was one that was based around and service to other people. And I don't really see a great deal of link between that and the version of. Even in the Persona of Jesus, right? So the Persona of Jesus in the Gospels, he says, blessed are the meek. You know, he is in some ways an incredibly feminine figure, a passive one. He lets things happen to him. He doesn't storm into, you know, Pontius Pilate's front room with an AK47 and gun everyone down. He lets himself be killed to die for our sins. And therefore, there's this interesting sense that actually, Jesus is kind of slightly an embarrassment to some of these people. They've had to, in this American Christianity, particularly evangelical Christianity, had to retcon him as a much more masculine figure than the biblical record suggests. I raised this with someone, one of the pastors who I interviewed in Doug Wilson's church. And I said this. I said, it's really hard to match up your idea of this masculine, patriarchal Christianity with the Bible. And he said, oh, yeah, but remember when Jesus overturned them, the tables in the temple, the money lenders? So, you know, there again, has been a kind of attempt to go back through the Christian tradition and find the bits you like. Often these guys are more keen on St Paul than they are on Jesus, because St Paul was a preacher, he was a controversialist. You know, he was someone who had a. You know, he had literally had a divine revelation, you know, and then he was also somebody who was patriarchal. There are lines from there saying, you know, godly women should be quiet. You know, women shouldn't be preaching. So I. You know, the relationship with Christianity is also very tense. I think.
- [35:44]
A
Well, there's a desire for the order or the perceived order of the Catholic or Greek Orthodox Church, not, I think, for the social radicalism of Jesus Christ.
- [35:59]
D
Well, it's also very funny because successive popes just turn out to be a terrible disappointment to them, which is just like somebody who was raised Catholic. Just really funny. No, have we got another pope? Does he agree with? No, no, no. He also keeps saying things about the poor. Oh, gross.
- [36:13]
A
I mean, yeah, this is a practical problem, but there's this split, and I think Louise Perry was the first one. I heard her talk about this, and it's actually helped me think about this. Between the pagan side of the New Right and the Christian side of the New Right. And Bronze Age pervert is on the pagan side. And I want to go back to what you're saying about hierarchy and the Ubermensch and Nietzsche. This is a quote from his book. He writes, nietzsche never forgot that the fundamental fact of nature is inequality. And this is something these people, the followers of Heidegger and Heidegger himself to a great degree, all forget. It is madness to ask the common prefab run of man to fashion his own way, his own religion. The many find solace and meaning only in Submission. It is good that this is so and they shouldn't be made to feel shamed for it. So much of the modern idiocy is based on shaming those who would find true pleasure in submission. The long chain of being is held together by command and obedience. And this is really the core politics of this book. And a lot of these, which is that we have ended up in this Christianized liberal democracy that believes in equality and in doing are subverting and denying the hierarchical dominance and obedience structures of nature.
- [37:33]
D
Right. But when you read some of that stuff, don't you think it's a bit like how people who regress to their past lives always end up that they would have been Cleopatra, there would never have been some guy who died as a toothless peasant at the age of 12? There is a kind of belief that if they lived in these ancient hierarchical societies, they would be one of Leipz's winners. I went back through my notes from when I was reading the Last man and I have written, do we want to return to a civil service run by eunuchs? Right. Is Elon Musk ready to make the ultimate sacrifice? Because actually, that's much better if you have a professional eunuch class who are looking after democracy. No, there is loads of stuff from this period that they don't want to take back. And all of it is really predicated on the idea that, yeah, if you want to go back to Roman times, you're going to be a Roman citizen, not a slave. Right. You're one of life's winners. So that's inevitably what you would have ended up as. And the thing I kept coming back to was this thought experiment by the philosopher John Rawls, the veil of ignorance. You know, you should make decisions not knowing which side of the outcome you'd end up on. And if I said to you, do you honestly want to take your chances? If you could be any citizen in the Roman Empire at any time, or any citizen in America today, I think almost everybody would take their chances being born in contemporary America. Rather than thinking that you were gonna end up as, you know, Caligula? Probably not. You're probably gonna end up as essentially a 12 year old girl who got raped by her master every night.
- [38:50]
A
You know, sure.
- [38:51]
D
There is just this kind of. But then I think this comes back to this idea that they are special people and therefore they don't live in a society where they're able to exercise that specialness anymore.
- [39:00]
A
Sure. And this will start getting into this real discussion of masculinity. I guess the argument they would make. Let me try to steel me on this, is of course, they don't like John Rawls because we don't live behind the veil of ignorance and acting as if we do, and ordering societies, if we do, turns out to have this fundamental problem, which is that it subverts the natural way men are supposed to be, which is it is the expression of these competitive, aggressive, ambitious, even violent instincts, which maybe we didn't realize it at the time, but we now know are a potent driver of civilizational progress. And we fall into stagnation and decadence when they are thwarted. That's what I understand them to be saying when you talk to them. I mean, is that what you hear, or is that a misread?
- [39:59]
D
No, I think that's reasonable. And there is a kind of light side version of that. Right. Which is that here in the developed world, we live in aging societies, and that has profoundly shaped how decisions are made in just ways that we're only really beginning to reckon with now. I'm not sure if that's so much about gender as it is about an aging society. If you live in a much younger society, then the young people are the kind of dominant force, and they set the rules. Well, at the moment, we live by the baby boomers, social like their social conditions that they find most amenable to them. But the other bit that I think is worth taking away from that, and I don't want to dismiss all this stuff out of hand, is that I do think that there is a place in society for male spaces. I made a program from the BBC about gurus. New Gurus, it was called. And one of the things I did was I went to a Brazilian jiu jitsu gym, and I found I talked to older guys who had lived a life, and they were teaching younger men about controlling their aggression and how to channel that into positive ways. I wrote in Difficult Women about the problems of boys in school, which, again, I think are real. I think there are lots of boys who find it really difficult to sit still for eight hours, hours a day, and they are not encouraged to kind of burn off their energy. And the whole school model has been framed around this idea of the kind of good girl who sits there passively and kind of just digests information in a way that doesn't suit lots of boys. The New York Times had a really interesting report a couple of months ago about ADHD diagnosis in teenagers. And one of the things I took away from that is that lots of them don't end up on medication, that they start as teenagers in adulthood because they find a job that suits them better than being cooped up in school. Put into this box that I think is particularly restrictive for boys. You know, if we're gonna take some of this ideology, perhaps we do say that girls and boys on average. On average. Maybe there are some differences between them and that we need to be more attentive to the ways in which some bits of modern society aren't set up well for boys.
- [41:51]
A
I think it's worth dwelling on this for a minute. And I've had Richard Reeves on the show, who's written a lot and done a lot of work on this one place. A lot of these ideas have magnetized towards because it acts as a genuine, true justification for the idea of something being wrong is that there is something going wrong for men and boys. I mean, we talked a few minutes ago about falls in testosterone and sperm quality. I mean, that's measurable and strange and it's been going on for many decades now. And we should, I think, think about it and worry about it. But you also have men's wages not doing great. You have girls performing much better than boys in high school, much more likely to enroll in college. Men today are five times likelier than in the 90s. To say they don't have any close friends. They are four times more likely to die by suicide. Sometimes this can all get framed as a competitive race with girls, as if it would be fine if both genders were dying by suicide at the same rate. But that's not the way I think about it, that there is. Boys are not doing great on their own terms. And the sense that perhaps society's evolved in a way, whether that is in terms of the chemical soup and the microplastics that we're all exposed to from childhood now all the way up to the structure of school, the structure of the workplace. The idea that it has more recently evolved in a way that is not good for boys and men. It's not a crazy thought. And I think it's something worth, when you look at this data, taking seriously.
- [43:27]
D
It's not a crazy thought. I think of it differently to that which is I think that there are girl specific problems and there are boys specific problems. And then there are some problems that affect all young people, screen usage, but that you break that down and it affects boys and girls in different ways. Again, these on averages with huge amounts of exceptions. We're always talking very broad brushstrokes here. But there is some evidence I Think that things like comparing, comparing yourself to other bodies and faces on Instagram hits girls particularly harder. You know, social contagions of particular things hit girls harder. And then at the same time, you get boys who are funneled towards crypto gambling, day trading. You know, those things are more heavily peddled to men. We know that the majority of problem gamblers are men, but this comes out. I think we're still steeped in this idea that everything is a kind of neat oppressor, oppressed binary. And in the case of gender, that's, you know, there are still things in ways in which, you know, like sexual violence being a very obvious example that, you know, women are oppressed by men. But I think we can also get to this stage now where we say it's not actually a competition. A lot of times it's capitalism is doing it to both boys and girls doing unpleasant things. Right. In the service of social media companies making a profit. Girls are being shown huge amounts of very filtered images of what faces can look like. And I think we just probably need to find this slightly new, new way of talking. I try and discourage, you know, feminists from sort of framing everything in kind of men are doing this to us kind of way. And I think that the real downfall of a lot of this discussion is it's almost impossible to have a conversation about men on its own terms in lots of these parts of the right without it having to be some point women's fault. And if we could just break that chain, those conversations would be a lot healthier. And I think liberals would be a lot happier in participating in them. Right. If it can be. Actually maybe we got some bits of the COVID response wrong. Schools should have opened earlier in California. That's a conversation people are gonna be much happier to have if it's not done. Some childless cow did this to you, right? Cause at that point I'm like, I'm out. I'm not interested in what else you have to say at that point. Sorry. If you can't keep a civil tug in your head, then we won't have this argument.
- [45:33]
A
There's this interesting dimension in a bunch of these books where it does feel to me you're watching both in these books, actually, and in culture broadly, men import what has more traditionally been a huge problem for women and girls really quite rapidly, which is this obsession with unrealizable body aesthetics. Bronze Age pervert, true to the name, is known for constantly posting pictures of tanned and muscled male bodies. Raw egg nationalist Charles Cornish, Dale weightlifter Talks a lot about that in his book. There's this whole idea of the pursuit of beauty as a way of aligning yourself to higher good. This is from the Bronze Age pervert mindset in its sort of weird Internet grammar. In same way, see from all this that aesthetic physique has the most cosmic significance. And it is because of what I've said so far that aesthetic bodies are a window to the other side because they are the pinnacle of nature. The book is full of just like hatred for the obese. He keeps calling it like yeasty physiques. You now see clavicular, who is the biggest streamer of the moment. Who is this looks maxer, who has, I think, has become deranged and is clearly in a very unhealthy spiral, appearing in court, overdosing on live streaming as he has this crazy stack of testosterone and other things that have made him infertile. You're watching a mass social body dysmorphia emerge very rapidly, it seems to me, among men. And one thing I see in the stuff in the new Right, this is the one place I want to talk about this more broadly, but the one place where they seem to have an idea of self mastery or discipline for men. But it's all this homosocial weightlifting competition.
- [47:28]
D
That's the interesting thing about it, is that it's all done for other men. And you used to find people on the men's rights Internet would talk about women as intrasocial, intrasexual competition. And the fact that they were all kind of doing all these sort of things for each other. And I think, you know, I just think about that a lot, is that a lot of it is done to impress other men at the same time as I having this intense anxiety about. About homosexuality. But it also has this deep. And that quote you, you bring out has this deeper eugenic quality to it, right? If you go back and read Buck vs Bell, the famous eugenic judgment by the Supreme Court, you know, this idea of the unfit, you know, the morons, the imbeciles, and then the physically handicapped and the degenerate. You know, that kind of Nazi language. There is the idea that there are life's winners who are physically perfect and mentally acute, and then there are life's losers who are. You can even read in their features that they are subhuman. You know, that's got such a long, dark history even in America on the left as well as the right. You know, even in California, there were thousands of people sterilized for mental and Physical disabilities in the 20th century. So these are ideas that were in circulation and they could be. Again, these are not. You know, we like to think that all these things just got ruled out completely after the Second World War. Why? So many other things that you would never have thought would come back. Have come back. This idea that there are kind of. Yeah, there are sort of subhumans. You know, you find them all that so often in the kind of right wing and non discourse on things like X.
- [49:03]
A
You see it all over these books too. I mean, there's an explicit passage in Bronze Age Mindset where he talks about the problem of the Jews. And they're pallid, nerdy, you know, they've made everybody want to be these intellectual, conceptual, you know, not sort of connected to the real vital forces of being alive. And I mean, this is very old fashioned anti Semitism. And he tries to soften it by, well, when I say the Jews, I'm not saying just the Jews or all the Jews, but it's straightforward. I mean, he uses the term directly, which is maybe to say all this is very old. This is all very old. And it expresses itself as old. Right? It's Bronze Age. It's going back into Christian nationalism. It is all making this argument that modernity has taken a wrong turn. It has taken a wrong turn in all of this. Equality among men and women, among. Among people of different races and ethnic backgrounds, among the idea that people in different countries have equal worth. A lot of it is framed as like a debate about gender roles or, you know, sexual facts. But a huge amount of it is just about the past versus the present and whether or not our modern values are a betrayal of our baser and more fundamental instincts.
- [50:30]
D
I mean, that's why it's appealing, because it's saying if you are alive today and unhappy, it's because of modernity. And it may be any other number of other things, but it gives, you know, it specifically addresses itself to people who are alienated by society in whatever way it might be, and latches onto that. You know, who does someone like Andrew Tate appeal to? To go back to the kind of modern, broader manosphere? It's actually young teenage boys, right? It's actually at that period of age where, you know, you're getting all these messages about how men are patriarchs and toxic masculinity and blah, blah, blah. But you are, you know, maybe small and frightened and you don't really know if you're gonna have any friends or girls who aren't gonna want to date you. It preys on people at the most insecure moments of their life. For a long time, you know, the, the men's rights Internet was specifically aimed itself to like recent divorcees who were also absolutely primed to hear some thoughts about how women are pretty awful. And I think that is really sad because that's the bit where I find these people quite predatory. If they are taking people who have got genuine personal problems and supplying a kind of ready made bad guy for them to fixate onto, which is probably not going to go anywhere. What can you do about these things if you think that the world is rigged against you? This is funny because they all believe very much in having agency. But if you feel that the world is this gynocracy, then like how, how are you supposed to navigate that? You just, you know, you just keep consuming more of their content and kind of wallowing in your own ste.
- [52:35]
A
I'm Paul Tanorio. I cover soccer for the Athletic.
- [52:38]
D
And I'm Amy Lawrence. I cover football for the Athletic.
- [52:41]
A
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- [52:49]
D
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A
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D
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A
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- [53:25]
D
Download the Athletic app and see you there.
- [53:32]
A
We've been talking here about various essays and books written by the men of this. But one of, I think the most influential essays in the space that is also framed as more of an actionable set of policy ideas is by Helen Andrews in her essay the Great Feminization. So who's Helen Andrews and what was the argument of that piece?
- [53:51]
D
Helen Andrews writes for Compact magazine and that, you know the argument with that. It starts with Larry Summers being outed from president of Harvard in the 2000s and this is the kind of first moment really when there were so many women in academia that they had a hysterical Overreaction to his public comments that maybe there weren't so many women in STEM because, you know, just innate lack of aptitude or interest essentially. And this is portrayed as this kind of warning sign of like the feminist freakouts that are about gonna dominate the next two decades. And then Andrews goes on to make this case that you have far more female lawyers, far more female doctors, far more female academics and they are not interested in the pursuit of truth and justice and rigor. They are driven by feelings. And so in the law that will translate to the fact that they will just feel quite bad for criminals and kind of not want to discipline them and punish them appropriately. In academia it means that you stop asking hard question with uncomfortable answers and you said end up having a kind of hippie kumbaya drum circle where everybody talks about their positionality and there is obviously something there that spoke to a lot of people. I mean the reason that I wrote about it is that again I had this sense of smoke and sand. And then I tried to go through the specific evidential claims that were being made and see whether or not they stack up, one of which being that wokeness is an epiphenomenon of demographic feminization that as something to practice as a tongue twister. But the idea essentially that if you get too many women in an organization it will collapse into kind of bitching and backbiting and all the things that characterized that period of whatever you want to call that peak woke of 2020 and it was incredibly viral essay. I wrote a lot of articles taking issue with some of the things that happened in that period. I don't know if you can separate out correlation and causation in all of those times. I don't think you can ever draw a neat line which is when women in an organization get above 60%, then organization collapses. And that's kind of the claim that basically Andrews makes, which is that these bureaucracies run by women become just self perpetuating and squalid. Well go and read the government inspector or something like that. Bureaucracies have been. Kafka was onto this when it was all men. This is just equality, bureaucracy. It's just now that we have moved into a situation in which the majority of people in things like hr, university administration, they are female. That it's become. Well, hang on a minute. Just yet another sign of creeping evil feminization. The other one that got to me was I looked into the Larry Summers thing. First of all, his reported comments were very much skimming the surface of what his private emails to Jeffrey Epstein reveal his views on gender to be. And I'm not entirely confident that I want to say that his colleagues, who obviously knew him a lot better, didn't think this is a very good chance to get rid of somebody who we think might be a liability to us. Often in cancellations that I've covered, there has been something else going on, something office politicsy going on. The other thing that I found out was 2006, the year that happened, 4/5 of Harvard's tenured faculty were men. So the claim is, you know, there was a feminist backlash to the things he said, but it took place within an organization that was still at that point ruled and run by men. So it's not as simple as suddenly Harvard became a citadel of women. And therefore at that point it didn't tolerate anybody saying anything. It disagreed. There's much more complicated things going on.
- [57:20]
A
I found that essay so strange and maddening. And she was on Ross's show, which is an episode worth watching, debating that.
- [57:29]
D
But her argument, well, she was on exactly the same problem in that episode of Ross's show. She's on with Leah Libresco Sargent, and they bring up a discrimination case which she frames as being some women ejected to a kind of slightly porny poster. And it turns out to have been a pretty explicitly pornographic poster. And the woman, you know, in a very male dominated workpl experience that as sexually aggressive. Once you get to that stage with an essayist where you go, I'm gonna have to go and follow your every single citation down the rabbit hole to find out if you've really represented this or have you just, you know, have you, have you come to a conclusion first and just had this chain of stuff that lines up beneath it that to me is fatal. So I tried, you know, like you, I tried to read things with an open mind. I think she captured something important that many people felt, otherwise there wouldn't have been such a reaction to it. But I became increasingly annoyed at the vibesiness of it.
- [58:22]
A
Well, there's just this reality that the essay I think, avoids confronting in any way. So her basic argument, among other things, is cancellation is an explicitly female way of meting out punishment. Cancellation is a feminine punishment, whereas getting punched in the face is a male punishment. And so this age of cancellation just reflected the tipping point of women taking over workforces. Amongst other completely obvious questions about this. Is cancellation an exclusively female way of doing things? Or when the Trump administration went around getting people fired for saying a bad thing about Charlie Kirk after his murder or when they went around firing anybody who had used the term diversity in a grant application, was that cancellation being done by a very male dominated structure? It's constant to watch what she is describing as a outcome of female domination and to say, no, this is quite obviously what social media makes possible. And that the period in which she's talking is a period of algorithmic social media taking over as the primary communications platforms. And in this period you also have slack coming into workplaces and it creates this capacity for individual instances to be raised up to ricochet everywhere. But you can just look around, you look on the right, you look as you're noting. I mean, did the communists not cancel people? Did they handle everything by having a upfront direct discussion about their differences in which the men hashed it out and got to a true truth outcome?
- [60:12]
D
Was Senator McCarthy actually secretly a woman? This is a really big thing that we should know. But like, so even the word ostracism, right? The word ostracism comes from the ancient Greek practice of writing down people's names on a, like a stone or pottery tablet. And then they are banished from outside the city walls. That is done in a society in which women were explicitly second class citizens. You can take all the women out and people will still decide that there are sometimes ways that you settle disputes that don't involve violence. Violence. But you're right. Partly, yes. This is again, this is a correlation causation question, right? Yes, obviously things like cancellations and indirect conflict have increased, but is that just part of a wider social shift away from violence? Someone like Steven Pinker would argue that's just true. We live in a less violent society than our equivalent countries were in 1800 when people were dueling. And is that about women's entry into the public square? Maybe it is, but maybe it's also about. About a bunch of other things too.
- [61:08]
A
Here's the other thing that I found very strange in a bunch of these different books. And what you just said gets at it. They don't really try to argue normatively that the changes have been bad. So I think dueling was bad.
- [61:23]
D
Being strong.
- [61:25]
A
I'm going to make this claim and I think that the way we have gotten, I mean, maybe until very recent past, but over time, better and better and better at living in complex societies without falling into civil war with each other. I think that has been a human advance, that the kind of self mastery we have developed and the virtues of liberal democracy that became taken often for granted, even if not always followed. They Reflected progress. One thing I found strange about BAP about the Last Men, which particularly I found this flaw in, he has all this thing about how if you rub testosterone gel on men and then put them in a dominance game, they're more comfortable with hierarchy. Is that good? Am I supposed to prefer that they don't look for more win win outcomes when you slather? I don't want to be slathered in testosterone and become worse at cooperation. I have enough trouble limiting my own competitive instincts as it is. And it's in Helen Andrews piece too, that what she, in some ways, if I'm going to be maximally generous, is talking about the h r ification of modernity. And yes, in modernity you have a lot of big institutions, and as institutions get bigger, they bureaucratize, and this can be a problem. I've written a book, Abundance in Part, about the problems of institutional incentives taking over. But nevertheless, there is a dynamic here where you are trying to make complexity and scale work at a very high level. And that does require you to have rules, procedures, approaches to managing difference that are not dueling. And I bring this up both because I think it's a weakness in the pieces, but also because I think it actually gets at something that is significant here, which is the implicit vision and sometimes the explicit vision of masculinity in these books I found deeply depressing, like almost repellent. And what I.
- [63:34]
D
It's funny. Yeah, it's funny you say that because it made me think that none of these things are the things that I love about men. You know, I'm someone who's always had loads of male friends and very happily married for a decade. And some of the things I love about men are, for example, their ability to become completely nerdily obsessed with very stupid things. You know, just like that, like level of intensity, of focus. You know, I absolutely love my dad's terrible jokes that have passed into family law that we all repeat back to him. You know, there are just so many different models of masculinity that are just. I think the word I would put is comfortable. You know, that idea of the great thing that you become a dad or you follow your interests and you become comfortable with the person you are, and you just radiate that maybe, you know, maybe you are a bit weird, maybe you're into model trains, whatever it might be. That's all good. You know, you'd like to read a lot of books about the second one. All of these things are very true of many of my friends. I was just having a conversation about article with somebody who said, oh yeah, my friend's boyfriend got really into all this stuff and of course they're not together anymore. Right. So women don't want to be with anxious, controlling men. And as a result of the fact that they can earn their own wages and we have divorce, they don't have to be. So you have to find some way in which they have to put up with it. But you know, I just think if you really want to, if you really want a successful relationship with a woman, probably looks maxing is less good than being thoughtful, sending a gift occasionally. I think if you asked much, I mean, I'm speaking on behalf of all women here, always a good idea. But if you said, do you want 10 out of 10 incredibly chiseled ab boyfriend or do you want one who will have dinner ready for you when you've had a really long day out? Almost all of them, I think, would probably pick the small, thoughtful acts of kindness over stone cold hottie. I just think that's how it works. And I think that again is kind of. It's a big part of this political project. It's very difficult to accomplish if women don't have to put up with it. But what I find so unsettling about the visions of masculinity and lots of these books is they seem so anxious at the same time as calling women anxious. They seem so unsettled, so on edge. They don't feel happy, they feel stressful to me. And that's me reading them as a woman. I don't know if you had the same experience as a man.
- [65:46]
A
I'll go maybe further than you as a man who loves being nerdily obsessed with issues.
- [65:51]
D
Right.
- [65:53]
A
I think it is fair to say that a vision of masculinity has to begin at some level with recognizing that biologically men are stronger, more aggressive, just physically. And as such, masculinity in its healthy spaces and its healthy development, development has tended to insist upon self mastery and discipline. It is a way of channeling strength and competitiveness and aggression. And yes, testosterone and thymos in a direction that is prosocial, in a direction that is committed to its obligations to others, to children. I am amazed at how little there is about fatherhood in these books.
- [66:41]
D
But that's as with many eugenicist fans, lots of these people don't have kids themselves. And also while having lots of, you know, attacks on childless cat ladies, yes, lots of these people also don't have children.
- [66:53]
A
It was this one As I read more of this, and I read some of the people you had written about, this is what I mean, that I came out less sympathetic to all this than I went into it with. I had assumed that all this talk about virtue, somewhere somebody was gonna talk about what I understood to be virtue. But no, they just like the word virtues because it sounds old, and they like old things because they think it was better before. There's no virtues anywhere here. And the way you see it is in the people who are now, I think, the leading voices. You have Donald Trump, this virtuous, disinhibited, incredibly corrupt man with his multiple wives, his endless amount of sexual harassment, his inability to control himself and be decent to other people. You have Nick Fuentes. It's like incel in a basement railing against women. Unmarried, has no children, does not connect himself in obligations to others, to community, to any of the things that build the kind of civilization he claims to want. Doug Wilson, this Christian nationalist pastor, who, as you mentioned, is the founder of the sect Pete Hegseth is in. Pete Hegseth has tweeted out Doug Wilson's attacks on women voting. Doug Wilson, who has severed his Christianity from all of the humility and care and compassion and radicalism that you just read on the literal words of the Bible. I mean, where is a Sermon of the Mount in any of his work? I find it appalling. I really. This was the part that, like, I actually found myself having a more. A more emotional reaction to, like, where are any good men here? I'm not against the critique that the left did not create space for a healthy vision of masculinity. I agree with that critique, but this is so fucking warped where these people have ended up. This is a terrible vision of what it means.
- [69:04]
D
Forget to be a man.
- [69:04]
A
It means to be an adult.
- [69:06]
D
Yeah, I don't wanna live in the world that they envision, you know, And I think it's also a recipe for anxiety. You know, this idea that you have to have a woman that you control. And actually, if she does things, if she's disobedient, that's a bad reflection on you. And it's humiliating to you, I think is a recipe for both violence in relationships, but also deep insecurity and unhappiness. You should have somebody. For me, the vision of, like, equal partnerships is just that. It's so much more relaxing. You know, you have freely chosen each other, and every day you make that commitment to stay together. It's not like if one of you leaves, you'll be destitute or, you know, whatever it might be, or you're living in fear all the time. You have freely made this commitment to me that is a much more positive vision for a heterosexual relationship than the kind of thing that I'm seeing in this, which is, you know, about kind of, you know, capturing a woman and kind of holding on tight to her and having these kids that are there because essentially they're miniature versions of, know, you, you. Right, that they perpetuate your empire. You see that in the kind of Elon Musk belief that he wants to use surrogates to have like, you know, to make himself the modern Genghis Khan. I mean, man, so many of friends
- [70:13]
A
I know have like zero, one kid. Yeah.
- [70:16]
D
That's why I'm like, I'm always banging
- [70:17]
A
the baby drum because I'm like, man, civilization's gonna, you know, collapse and no big deal. Yeah, yeah. I'm like, where do you think people come from? Like some magical people, people factory?
- [70:30]
D
Where's the bit in that about how joyful it is to be raising children? You know, the idea that you are, you know, these are their own independent human beings. They're not really, you know, the carriers of your glorious surname into eternity. I didn't have a particularly emotional reaction to it. And I think. I think I've just burned out my circuits after 15 years of writing about feminism because I just feel like misogyny is so, so deep a bigotry. It's so casually indulged, it's not treated seriously. If these guys were going around saying, I don't think black people should vote, I don't think Jews should vote, it wouldn't be seen as, oh, aren't they kind of cute? And they're putting some edgy things in them. Actually even has even Nick Fuentes gone that far. Right. Whereas you can say it about women because there's an assumption that it's part of a continuum that starts with kind of stand up comics doing stuff about how their girlfriend is annoying. This is all kind of good rhombus, just battle that sex is fun. I mean, I know that these people despise me and everything about my life, and I sort of don't care because I like my life and I think it's a pretty good life. You know, there is service involved to other people. And I think that I try and think about other people more than I think about myself. And all of those things I do find a bit missing in this literature. Right. I think it's also why it's so popular now is that a lot of it is essentially self help. And that is the dominant literary genre of the age and the kind of dominant social media genre of the age.
- [71:58]
A
This is what I want to say about it because this is where I think I actually feel very strongly about it. I care about it because it is actually popular. Not necessarily some of the individual people we're talking here, but Andrew Tate clips, Nick Fuente's clips. These things are exerting a real cultural pull. And it is self help and it is self help that has been cleaved from any kind of genuine pro sociality. It is self deformation. And that I think is really dangerous. I see this in a weird way with clavicular. This lookmaxer. Here's somebody who has cleaved the desire to become maximally attractive from all the things that that desire is supposed to do for. For you.
- [72:47]
D
Right?
- [72:47]
A
He has talked about how it has made him infertile. He has talked about how he couldn't possibly have a girlfriend because of the lifestyle he now leads. It's like we have taken the urge and severed it from the purpose and so we have turned it pathological. Like I watch him and I don't think what he's doing is good for him. I don't think it's what attractiveness means. And I worry about all these young boys who are now growing up in an online environment where they're being told this is what it means to be attractive. I don't think this is what women find attractive, but it's cleaved off from all these other things that make somebody a compelling person, their warmth, their imperfections. Also, and I will say this, that I think that the idea that liberalism broadly had so little of value to say about what it meant to be a man or a boy for so long. And we created this sort of social media world and often partnered with the people running it. Mark Zuckerberg, a liberal in good standing for many years and abandoned kids into this farm of extremism. And they just created a space where any of us could thrive, where there wasn't a better competitor to it. And there's a lot going on in society, none of it's monocausal. But I really worry about this world in which this is what is passing for self help, because I think if you followed it, you would not help yourself. You would make yourself into someone much worse. And many people are. And that is a failure, not a of these trolls, but a failure of the mainstream to actually have a vision of human flourishing and self improvement that feels vital to people.
- [74:50]
D
Yeah, I think about this a lot because, you know, it's a cliche to say at this point, but for people who have lost religion, you know, you have lost a lot of community and regularity to your life and a rhythm of your life too. You know, the church in which I grew up, we had Palm Sunday and then Easter and then you have harvest festival and then Advent and Christmas. You know, there is a sense of like life's occasions being marked. There are, you know, there are baptisms and funerals, there is confession, there's a chance to kind of get rid, you know, offload your sins. There are kind of rituals within that that are probably deeply helpful to people as anchors within their lives. And while I, I, while I can't say I have personal faith anymore, I think that it is a shame to have lost those structures in life. And I don't know if there is a way to recreate them. And I don't think any of this would be happening if we weren't all essentially spending six hours a day staring at a tiny little portal into madness. And I wish I could give it up. I feel like one of those people who goes, well, of course eating meat is terrible. And they're like, do you still like burgers? I do. And that's probably also true, but with the digital world, we have essentially, essentially hooked everybody up to a little dopamine drip. And I think that the effect of that, particularly on young people who are still forming their opinions. If you look now at young men and women's political attitudes, you find this replication of young women are more left wing and young men are more right wing in lots and lots of countries now. It's a really interesting finding. And part of it, I think has to be to do with kind of sex segregated algorithmic feeds and people spending more time in segregated online spaces than they do in the playground or the local youth centre or the pool hall or wherever it might be. And those are really unhealthy things. Alice Evans has this theory, the sociologist, about young people de radicalizing each other if they can just spend enough time together. And so, yeah, I think you're right to continue to bring this back to an almost spiritual discussion, because these ideas wouldn't be so popular if they weren't filling up a lack and a feeling of ennui and alienation. And I would like those to be filled in a better way. But the starting point for that is recognizing that those feelings exist.
- [77:01]
A
One thing this whole movement takes very seriously is aesthetics. And at every level of it, from Trump himself, who is very concerned with how the people around him look, how the spaces around him look concerned in his own way, with beauty, all the way down to these people like BAP who at least put a certain conception of beauty, the physical form, at the center of their politics. One of the things that I think is interesting here is I do think they're onto at least this, which is that aesthetics has been almost an empty ground of politics for a long time. And I do think there's a hunger for more beauty in our lives, for politics to have aesthetic opinions. And so I'm curious how you weigh that. The sort of constant performance and camp of this movement, but also the kind of consistent belief that one of the problems of modernity is we've abandoned having sufficient views and emphasis on the beauty of our surroundings, our spaces, of our culture.
- [78:09]
D
That's so interesting. I hadn't ever really thought about it like that. But you're right. I think every political party now has to pay such attention to aesthetics. It's just that MAGA has an aesthetic. I'm not sure what you. If someone said to you, what's the Kamala Harris aesthetic? I'm not sure you could really sum it up, but what's the Democrat aesthetic? For a while, it was the kind of. Nevertheless, she persisted. I'm with her again. These are very female focused slogans and the kind of, you know, sort of lightweight corporate, you go girlism. But I don't. I wouldn't say that I think that the left has got a consistent aesthetic. I mean, the far left has. Right? This is why you get all these kind of mean jokes about people with blue fringes and whatever it might be and Palestine plushies and stuff like that. But the mainstream Democratic Party does not have a consistent aesthetic in the way that MAGA does. To the extent that MAGA women often look. Look a particular way. Right. And MAGA men look a particular way.
- [79:05]
A
I think about this actually a lot, and I've wanted to try to figure out how to do something about it. It does seem to me that the left has done too little thinking about its own aesthetic. One thing about the Zoramdani campaign is it had a real aesthetic. It had colors. He dresses in a very certain way everywhere. Obama, of course, you go back to the famous Hope and Change posters. You go back to that movement. It had, in its own way, an aesthetic. But one reason, I think you see a much more thoroughgoing one in maga. An aesthetic that runs through not just the candidate and their graphic design, but the things they put on Twitter about architecture, the executive orders about classical architecture and beauty. What should be in a museum is because it's fundamentally a movement about the past. And so it gives you the capacity to choose an aesthetic from the past you prefer and say that that is beauty. And I think that when you're dealing with liberalism or other forms of left ideology, or more left ideology in the American context, it's harder because you can't as naturally reach backwards. If you're so focused on critiques of the past, then endlessly you have to modernize it. So Hamilton by Lin Manuel Miranda has a real aesthetic. And what it does is it combines an aesthetic of the past into this multicultural update. So it's simultaneously honoring it and critiquing it. But that's actually hard to do. And so I think sometimes one of the reasons that the left has more trouble answering the question of what is beautiful is that the past is not a safe place for it to go.
- [80:49]
D
Go. And also that's related to optimism versus pessimism, because there is a version of that, actually. Andy Burnham here in England is now running in a by election from which he hopes as a springboard to then run for the Labour leadership and become prime minister. And he put out an advert now the soundtrack is Oasis. You know, so there's a nostalgia, there's a 90s nostalgia, but a lot of the shots were of new skyscrapers that have gone up in Manchester. And his point there is, you know, like, we are building stuff. Like, here is the place the future's being built, which I always thought would be the centerpiece of any kind of Gavin Newston, some presidential run, right? Be like, California, the place of the future. There's a bit of a problem with that, though, right? Which is that. And again, this maybe comes back to the aging society. How many people in America are excited about the future versus how many of them think it's a veil of joblessness, declining living standards, a heating planet, like, all of these things, right? Who hates Waymos, which I think are awesome, having been to San Francisco recently. Like, I felt like I'm sitting in the future. Who hates them more than taxi drivers? You know, unions. You know, who hates driverless trains more than train drivers? Unions. And so, yeah, if they want to reclaim the idea that they're going to have futuristic aesthetics, that could be kind of awesome. But they would have to also deal with the fact that many people do not look forward to the future with a Desperation to get there.
- [82:05]
A
The difficulty is for that aesthetic, that the left is very skeptical of technology, and that AI in particular has widened the that skepticism. And so if you can't have an aesthetic of the future that is in some ways sci fi y and a little technopunk, then you're not left with very much because you don't like the past, you're not comfortable with the future. Donald Trump is president in the present, and I think it's hard. But I will say I think this is one of the places where I'm most sympathetic to a thing happening in the new right, even if I don't like where they take it, which is culture is very powerful and the aesthetics of culture are very powerful. And Trump's version of it is very specific with UFC on the lawn for the 250th and Hulk Hogan at the RNC. His aesthetics, in a funny way very camp, but they're at least very central to him and his vision of politics. And we're in a much more visual culture. The way the platforms has moved is much more visual. And I don't think political movements that do not have both a visual identity and a visual perspective, a perspective on what is beautiful and what is to be culturally prized, are going to compete well in this era.
- [83:25]
D
But that's also about the left tastemaker's hatred of the middle brow. I mean, just to take architecture, right, you have to show that you are a refined person by liking brutality. And if you just preferred a nice Doric column and like a nice whitewashed, you know, whatever it might be, that's kind of basic. That's what normal people who don't know anything about architecture like. And the problem is that there are far more normal people than there are people who know a lot about architecture. And I think Trump has got that right. Trump just has the tastes of a kind of normie person, you know, he has the taste of a normal person who's got a lot of money rather than elite taste. I think there was a piece about this at the time of 2016 election, right? Everything he owns is covered in gold, which is what you kind of think, if I suddenly had loads of money, why wouldn't I cover anything gold? Whereas the thing that if you're a high net worth person who flies on private jets and reads Conde Nast Traveller magazine, everything should be muted earth tones. So his exact lack of taste in elite sense is read by normal, everyday people as he likes basic things that are easy to appreciate and nice. You know, he wants presumably he wants that ballroom to look like the Roman forum that people might have seen on, you know, on their holiday in Italy. So this is a bit about the kind of the left's hatred of. Yeah, of the middle brow and the popular and the mainstream.
- [84:45]
A
The best politics were always cringe.
- [84:48]
D
I mean, you mentioned Hamilton. You know, I love Hamilton as much as a white liberal millennial could. But I went back to see it a couple of years ago and I was like, oh, this is a barmer era cringe. And like it's. Cause it's so earnest and sweet. Sweet. And like now everything is so cynical and jaded that it's quite hard to put yourself back into the state to be able to appreciate someone who's just straightforwardly hopeful about the upward progress of America. So it does kind of read as cringe. But again, you know, just in the same way that having no shame is a very useful asset in American politics, having no sense of cringe is probably also quite good.
- [85:23]
A
I wish you could tell that to all the Democratic consultants.
- [85:26]
D
Sam. I'm Winna Liu. I write the game Connections, one of
- [86:01]
B
the puzzles from New York Times games.
- [86:03]
A
And I love horror movies, I love
- [86:05]
D
my dog, and I love trying to trick you. I'm Tracy Bennett. I get to pick the wordle word every day, which is not as easy as it sounds. A fun fact about me is that I am descended from a witch who was put on trial in St. Salem.
- [86:19]
A
New York Times games are made by people like the ones you just heard from. Go to nytimes.com games to start playing today. We've been talking about what these ideas mean for men, for their formation, for their possibilities, what kinds of grievances they emerge from. But what do they mean for women? One thing in your piece is really looking at what people who are at the vanguard of this movement are saying should be done, how the world should work. What are these people proposing?
- [86:51]
D
Well, yeah, I mean, there's a kind of suite of ideas. So no fault divorce, the rollback of that. Right. Take it back to the idea that divorce someone in the couple is to blame and they therefore get penalized. And one of the reasons that the feminist movement was very against that is that that was used to punish women essentially to, you know, to say you have been adulterous and disobedient and therefore, you know, your kids should be taken away. And I've written in support of no fault divorce. We only got it here in Britain within the last decade because I think that the one thing you need when you're trying to get through a relationship if you have kids is like really? This is, yes, this is a divorce, but this is also a co parenting negotiation. And turning that into an adversarial fight from the very start is unlikely to end well. But that doesn't fit this kind of masculinist paradigm. The Heritage foundation put out a report in January that said they wanted a kind of Manhattan Project to support families. They are against dating gaps, daycare, you know, single parent benefits. You know, there is an argument there
- [87:53]
A
for so supporting a certain kind of family.
- [87:55]
D
Right, exactly. They want tax breaks. Right. So they want the American economic system and tax system to be re geared towards being friendlier to the types of families that they think are the best ones. It's perfectly legitimate for them to make that argument. The reason that we have a situation the way that it is is that people didn't like the idea that the children of a single mother were kind of starving over a principle. So I think they'll a have an uphill argument on that. And then you get the kind of. Yeah, the wilder fringes. So Doug Wilson, who you mentioned a couple of times, you know, he has an aspiration in 200 years that he wants household voting.
- [88:30]
A
So in the fullness of time, a single woman would still be able to vote, but once she married, then her husband would vote for her.
- [88:39]
C
Yeah, well, her husband wouldn't vote instead of her. Her husband would cast the vote vote that she and her husband and household. He was representing the whole household.
- [88:50]
A
Right. But presumably he would have the power to simply decide what the household should be voting. Right. I mean, isn't he in the leadership position there?
- [89:01]
C
Yes. If they disagreed, he would break the tie. And he might break the tie by going with her desires or he might
- [89:12]
D
break the tie his way more pressingly. He also thinks women shouldn't serve in combat roles in the military.
- [89:19]
C
So women are created by God to be life givers, nurturers. That's how they're created. That's their function, that's their form, that's their creational identity. God gave them to be life for us. And you shall not take a woman who is given for the nurturing of life and turn her into a death agent.
- [89:42]
D
And now that is if I had to put my hand on my heart. I think that is also what Pete Hegseth believes.
- [89:46]
A
I'm straight up just saying we should not have women in combat roles. It hasn't made us more effective, hasn't made us more lethal, has made fighting more complicated.
- [89:55]
D
And he has an aesthetic demand for his army. You know, he wants an army of people without beards. He's very clear about this. And, and I think Donald Trump has that too. Right there was that famous reporting about Donald Trump not wanting disabled veterans in his parade. He's got a vision of what he thinks an army should look like. So there's. All of that stuff is actually already happening. You've got the chair of the Equal Opportunity Commission who has basically put out a kind of ambulance chasing lawyers ad saying, are you a white male who's experienced discrimination at work based on your race or sex? You may have a claim to recover money under federal civil rights law laws, contact the EOC as soon as possible. So there is also a hunger for using the instruments of the kind of pro DEI bureaucracy in the other direction and actually saying, well, we think it's now it's white men's turn to get treated to some of this, be treated as a protected group and get some special latitude in some of these hiring decisions. Scott Yenner wants to, for example, reinstitute male only military colleges. He thinks that having women in military training colleges again affects these kind of very manly, vigorous, slightly bullying standards. And they make everything a bit of an HR bureaucratic nightmare.
- [91:06]
A
There's also, I mean, obviously the Dobbs decision a couple of years back, which is I think significant, worth thinking about here. Some of these things feel like they're just not on the table, right? Like repealing the 19th Amendment. Doug Wilson can talk about that all he wants, but it's, I think, not going to be a demand of the Republican Party anytime soon. On the other hand, things make their way in, in weird ways. One question I have really had is does this become a real agenda, particularly after Trump? Because Trump has this quality of
- [91:39]
D
one
- [91:39]
A
way he's able to hold this very strange coalition together is he gives everybody a little bit and then he'll also happily represent the opposite. And he is such a, such individual power over the Republican Party that what he says goes the people behind him, you know, the J.D. vance's and Pete Hegsas and RK Juniors, nobody has that kind of power. And so they actually, they both are often more true believers than he is. I mean, I don't think Donald Trump is reading Bronze Age pervert or any of this stuff. And on the other hand, they have to promise more and they will have to promise more to try to pull these influencers and institutions and churches and so on into their orbit. If this was to start getting traction as actual ideas, what would that look like.
- [92:28]
D
But I think you've got to think about it. Equivalent to the campaign to end Roe vs. Wade, which while it was a kind of stretch goal of the religious right for decades in the interim, what they did was make it much, much harder to have an abortion in the states where they controlled the state houses. Right. You know, imposing regulation and legislation. There's stuff, Project 2025, for example, about making it harder to produce and distribute abortion pills. Right. You find ways that are small tweaks by imposing burdens on people that you just nudge and nudge and nudge towards your desired end state, as you say. I think it's relatively unlikely that J.D. vance is going to go in front of the American people in 2028 and say, Guys, vote for me. Well, half of you, or like women, enjoy voting for the last time. You won't get to again because it. Yeah, because it's wildly unpopular in the same way way that actually complete and total abortion bans are unpopular. But the one thing you would say about the American political system is unfortunately, it is very friendly to minoritarian ideas. It is easy to capture and for people who have got things that wouldn't pass a referendum to nonetheless smuggle them through by controlling bits of government bureaucracy that no one pays attention to by controlling state houses, for example. So that's how I see this agenda going forward. It will be through little tiny tweaks to the tax code or things like that. Right.
- [93:51]
A
And I guess it will also be through culture and through, you know, how we treat each other and what is proposed. I don't know if you read this piece in New York Magazine by Sam Adler Bell about the women leaving the maga. Right. I found it to be a very moving and very sad piece where, where all these women who were influencers or involved in right wing politics and maybe they didn't like what they felt to be the schoolmarmishness of the left, or maybe they had more Christian and conservative views and they sort of nod along and played along and even harnessed and argued for a lot of this and then woke up one day and realized that the men around them were treating them like chef and they were being cruel to them and that what was promised to them as a return to a kind of traditionalism where they were cherished and respected and would not have to be medicated and working a useless job was actually just a way of justifying not being treated with any kind of respect or consideration at all.
- [95:02]
D
Yeah, that piece really reminded me of. There's a book from the 2000s by Ariel Levy called Female chauvinist pigs. And it's about the way that women coped with working in really male dominated workforces where they were like, hell, yeah, I love going to the strip club with the guys. Because the implicit promise was, yes, there are women up on stage who we think are, you know, whores and whatever, but I'm like an honorary guy. And then there comes a moment where you find out you're not an honorary guy, actually. Oh, no, they think this way about all women. And I think it was the philosopher Kate Mann. This was her theory of misogyny, right? Was that it promised an exemption for good girls. Like, if you do things right as a woman, then actually you kind of get exempted from it. And then it finds and you know, and then you've crossed one of those invisible tripwires and you discover that, you know, you're on the outside now. And so, yeah, I read that piece and I oscillated between sympathy and. And what did you think was happening here? And I guess that's the point about the kind of semi jokey, semi ironic. You think you're all doing ironic sexism. Cause actually we live in this incredibly, you know, feminized gynocracy. And then you find out, actually, no, it's extremely unironic sexism. But also, I think the interesting thing is that what is the left doing wrong, that all of these things happen and people have direct experience of misogyny and yet they still don't feel that. That the left is for them.
- [96:23]
A
I mean, that gets into the macro politics of this one. I do think there's genuine challenges for the left here on how to sense some of the underlying alienation, grievance, upset, and find a way to meet it with something healthy, something more virtuous, and something more ambitious than this. But there's also, I think, this reality that in if. I mean, this might all be a huge political disaster brewing for the right. I have this basic theory that whichever side controls Twitter pays for it. And like, I feel it's very, very.
- [97:05]
D
It's very. Because they just can't stay normal. They just have to let themselves go and let their unchained ID all over the place. Yes. And you're right, 2010s, it was liberals kind of going, you know, you've worn a traditional Chinese dress while being Katy Per, like, kill her. And then now it's just, oh, let's do some open racism of the type that is actually extremely unpopular with the American public. At large, like right out there in the open.
- [97:29]
A
Yeah. So, you know, yes, you have like maximum probably liberal dominance of Twitter around 2020. Donald Trump is banned from the platform after the effort to overturn the election. And Democrats convince themselves in that period and of a lot of things that the public doesn't put relief and they lose touch with where a lot of voters are. And by 2024, they pay for that and it gets thrown back in their faces. And these ads where Kamala Harris is talking about gender reassignment surgery for immigrants in prisons and I mean, this all came out of very certain culture and Democrats, it led in part, it's not the only thing. I mean, there was inflation and a lot of other other causal factors, but it led in part to a pretty devastating loss. But now the fever swamp that matters is on the right and they control X and Elon Musk. I've had people on the right say to me that Elon Musk has created a huge problem for them because he didn't realize it or maybe didn't care. But it was actually the liberal moderators who were solving the right wings misogyny and neo Nazi problem for the right. And now all those people are out and Nick Fuentes and everybody else is out in public. And if the left can find an appealing politics for itself, it does have this opportunity of facing a right that has driven itself somewhat crazy and has many of the key people associated with it who are quite influential just offering, offering an incredible and almost endless series of terrible things they've said or terrible people they've associated with who, you know, normie voters in Ohio and Colorado are not, you know, that's not what they were. That's not what they were looking for.
- [99:28]
D
One of the most interesting things that anyone said to me during my reporting for this piece was when I asked Douglas Wilson about Nick Fuentes and he just condemned his language. Even. Even though Doug Wilson has called women small breasted biddies and jezebels and all this kind of stuff, but he said the other way that Nick Fuentes talks about women is very disrespectful. And then he said, I think he's a fed. Like, I think he's a federal agent. This is kind of this conspiracy theory, whatever, that Nick Fuentes is actually a kind of stealth mole for the left
- [99:54]
A
just to discuss who runs the federal government right now. Doug Wilson, like Donald Trump and Doge, just didn't manage to fire Nick Fuentes paymap.
- [100:05]
D
They didn't find him. Well, yeah, but you know, What I mean, I think this is really interesting.
- [100:08]
A
Oh, well, nevertheless.
- [100:10]
D
But no, but it is, it is kind of fascinating, right? Because I think that the Fuentes appearance on Tucker Carlson crystallized this. You have a whole movement that has built itself on basically nannying women will tell you not to say the bad words. And we're the guys who don't agree with that. And then some people say things that are, you know, Nick Fuentes, I quoted in the story, said, I think women should be putting gulags. Like Hitler put his enemies in gulags. We should do that with, with women. And you know, it's just now no one can say anything against that because that would mean you were kind of a cuck. Like you were just a kind of panty wasting HR department. Me, me, me, me, me. And it didn't matter for Nick Fuentes on sexism. It matters for him over anti Semitism because there were enough powerful people in that coalition who just went, this is our line. And that was fascinating to me was that you've made your whole politics about having no line. So how the hell is anybody supposed to now ever go back to and enforce anything? And you're right. I think there is, you know, I think about the culture war ads, you know, you mentioned there, the sex change stuff, I think the, you know, camels for they, them, which is an incredibly influential ad. I think that worked because it tapped into a sense that Democrats are focused on irrelevant issues for tiny minority groups. However, I think that the Republicans should be very mindful of the other side of that, which is Donald Trump in the middle of a huge inflation shock, oncoming gas price rising, going, I actually don't care about anything. You know, if you try in that context to rerun your culture war playbook, people are gonna say, why are you talking about the Jews? Like we're just, could we hear a bit more about gas prices, please? And a little bit less about this kind of stuff.
- [101:46]
A
I think that's a good place to end. Always. Our final question, what are three books you recommend to the audience?
- [101:51]
D
Well, I was trying to think about what novel would be kind of interesting and resonant with this discussion. So I have Christy Mallory's own double entry by B.S. johnson, an English writer of the 20th century. It is about a young, young alienated guy who discovers double entry bookkeeping. You know, the idea that for every debit there's a credit and he decides that for every slight that's been done to him, he gets now to enact one on society. So, you know, Someone brushes past him and then he gets to do something bad. And I think it really captures some of that sense of just an uncaring world and that kind of alienation. So that's my first book recommendation. My second recommendation is very exotic, and I'm very sorry. I can't think of a less Ezra Klein book, but I'm gonna try and sell you on it anyway. Nancy Mitford's biography of Madame de Pompadour, mistress of Louis XV of France. No, no, not. Yeah, okay.
- [102:41]
A
No, I'm not arguing.
- [102:43]
D
I've heard you like French royal history. I've never had you down as someone who's meant to be into it, but try it. Nancy Mitford, she was a brilliant historical biographer. She wrote biographies of Frederick the Great, of Louis xiv, the Sun King. But I think this one is extraordinary. So Louis XV is the king before the Revolution, Right? That was Louis xvi. And this is a portrait of Versailles during that period, which is where all the French nobles were cooped. They didn't go and visit their lands, and they had no idea of what it was like to live in the rest of the country. And it is this sort of sparkling anthropological study of an elite that have no idea that the shadow of the guillotine is creeping up on them. And then, my final choice, when I was researching my book on genius, one of the most insane stories that I found is about the genius spermbank. So I have brought the Genius Factory by David Plotz, which is the story of one mad eugenicist millionaire who decides that the way to solve all of America's problem is to get lots of Nobel Prize winners to donate their sperm and give it to couples to make babies. Let me just shock you. Doesn't go well. A lot of the people turn out not to be Nobel Prize winners. A lot of the people involved in it are very odd indeed. And then when the press find out, the whole thing kind of melts down. One of the only people we know who was involved with that is William Shockley, who won the Nobel Prize for his role in the invention of the transistor and later became an enthusiastic proponent of racial the of iq. So it is. It's a California story. Let me shock you. We go about that. It's a classic California tale of sperm and entrepreneurship and eugenics. Yeah. So those are my three.
- [104:15]
A
I can't believe you did that to California here at the end of the show. Helen Lewis, thank you very much.
- [104:19]
D
Thank you.
- [104:30]
A
This episode of the Israel Clancho is produced by Annie Galvin. Fact checking by Michelle Harris with Julie Beer. Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Isaac Jones and Johnny Simon. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show's production team also includes Marie Cassillon, Roland Hu, Kristin Lin, emma Keldeck, Jack McCordick, Marina King and Jan Cobel. Original Original music by Isaac Jones and Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times Pinion Audio is Annie Rose Strasser.