Podcast Summary: America Can’t Escape the Multipolar Order

Podcast: The Foreign Affairs Interview
Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan (DKP)
Guest: Emma Ashford (EA), author of "First Among Equals"
Date: December 4, 2025

Overview

In this episode, Daniel Kurtz-Phelan sits down with Emma Ashford to discuss the end of America's "unipolar moment" and the practical realities of a multipolar world order. Drawing from Ashford’s new book and recent Foreign Affairs essays, their conversation explores the limits of American foreign policy, the debates over unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and the necessary adaptations for the United States as it faces rising competitors, shifting alliances, and the burdens of global leadership.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The End of Unipolarity and the Multipolar Reality

• Recognition of Multipolarity in Policy Circles
  • Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s explicit mention of “multipolarity” signals a shift in American policy discourse ([02:19]).
  • EA is surprised to hear such candor from a high-ranking official, noting that most identify the end of unipolarity with voices like Mearsheimer, Putin, or Xi—not the U.S. Secretary of State ([02:19]).
• Relative Decline vs. Absolute Power
  • American absolute power remains strong, but the margin over rising powers like China has narrowed ([04:24]).
• Unipolar, Bipolar, or Multipolar?
  • Debate over whether the world is shifting towards unipolarity, bipolarity (U.S.-China), or a more complex multipolar environment ([04:24]–[06:18]).
  • EA argues for “unbalanced multipolarity”: US and China are preeminent, but “lots of middle powers, regional powers... really impact world affairs” ([04:24]).

2. Restraint, Overreach, and the Challenges for U.S. Foreign Policy

• The Urge for Restraint
  • Following failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, calls for a more restrained U.S. global role grew stronger ([07:52]).
  • EA: “Restraint is having a moment… but America is increasingly facing a world of constraints and competition.” ([07:52])
• Biden & Trump Foreign Policies
  • Biden administration’s Afghanistan withdrawal marked a brief period of restraint, but Ukraine war drew the U.S. back to “indispensable nation” status ([07:52]–[09:12]).
  • DKP notes political backlash to restraint, especially in Afghanistan, points to public enthusiasm for aiding Ukraine — although that support declined over time ([09:12]–[09:56]).
• On Ukraine
  • EA largely supports Biden’s approach in arming Ukraine without direct intervention, but warns of “triumphalism” and advocates for seizing negotiation windows to avoid endless conflict ([11:38]).
  • Memorable analogy to the war on terror: “The goal posts shifted… from regime change to nation building and onwards” ([11:38]).

3. Spheres of Influence and Realism

• Trump’s Approach and Spheres of Influence
  • Trump “has an intuitive understanding of how power works” despite not being steeped in IR theory ([13:52]).
  • Accepts that U.S. cannot control all regions at a reasonable cost; spheres of influence “emerge pretty naturally when great powers compete” ([13:52]).
  • U.S. has long claimed a sphere in the Western Hemisphere—Monroe Doctrine in action ([15:46]).
• Show of Force in Venezuela and Beyond
  • U.S. naval and air actions near Venezuela seen as show of force, not a full bid for regime change ([16:45]).
  • EA: “I also think he’s very prone to… using military force without thinking…” ([16:45]).
  • Reference to Trump’s limited strikes on Iran as a template for future actions ([17:50]).

4. The Right and Wrong Ways to Adapt to Multipolarity

• Comparing Biden and Trump Approaches
  • Biden administration saw multipolarity as something to resist, tried to recreate a bipolar world of democracies vs. autocracies ([19:02]).
  • Trump’s administration is better suited for multipolarity, notably in military burden-shifting to allies, but uses “unilateral” and often damaging economic policies ([19:02]).
• Alliances and Splintered Blocs
  • On both U.S. and rival “axis” (Russia/China/Iran/Venezuela) sides, there are limits to integration—most ties remain transactional or bilateral, not fully unified ([24:07]).
  • EA: “There is a grain of truth… but what I’m also struck by is the limits of these partnerships.” ([24:07])
• Strategy for Navigating Rivals
  • America should avoid pushing adversaries closer; sanctions and isolation can force rogues into deeper cooperation ([25:47]).
  • Example: sanctions on Russia led to new shadow logistics that evade U.S.-led controls ([25:47]).

5. Allies, Burden-Sharing, and Proliferation

• Defense Spending and Hedging
  • Allies are starting to take U.S. disengagement seriously—hedging and contingency planning are real and growing ([27:54]).
• Nuclear Proliferation Risks
  • Proliferation risk may rise (South Korea, Poland possible examples), but proliferation might be manageable and preferable to “great power nuclear competition” ([29:32]).
  • EA: “I am still fairly willing to make that trade off: a little nuclear proliferation in exchange for a lower risk of great power nuclear competition.” ([29:32]–[31:39])

6. Ukraine Security Guarantees and Negotiations

• Efficacy of European Security Guarantees
  • Realist skepticism: Europe promises much, but willingness and capacity to follow through are weak ([33:17]).
  • Guarantees become a pretext to avoid negotiations rather than empowering Ukraine ([33:17]).
• Path to Ending the War
  • Negotiated settlement would involve partition, monitored ceasefire, arms limitations, and potential EU integration for Ukraine; trust remains the stumbling block ([36:53]).

7. The China Challenge

• Prioritization and Avoiding Overreach
  • U.S. should prioritize Indo-Pacific, but “lean in” judiciously and avoid militarizing on a scale that sparks war ([39:28]).
  • Need for economic engagement, not just military presence ([39:28]–[41:21]).
• Taiwan Policy Ambiguity
  • Restraint community’s consensus: arm Taiwan for self-defense, but recognize limits of direct U.S. intervention; “Taiwan is… if not indefensible, certainly indefensible at a reasonable cost” ([42:01]).

8. Resources, Energy, and Geoeconomics

• Energy as a Geopolitical Lever
  • EA skeptical of “rare earths” as a chokepoint; sees energy as more important ([43:53]).
  • Global energy flows reflect multipolarity—states hedging, working around sanctions, engaging with gray markets ([45:48]).

9. The State of the Foreign Policy Debate (“The Blob”)

• Diverse but Unsettled Discourse
  • Policy debate is more vibrant than five years ago, but consensus elusive ([46:16]).
  • EA: “To me, the debate… has become more vibrant over the last few years. I do not think, however, that we have achieved anything approaching a new consensus yet.” ([46:16])
• What Should the New Consensus Be?
  • Ashford advocates “realist internationalism”: focused, pragmatic, interests-driven; less forward-leaning militarism, more economic engagement ([48:04]–[49:28]).
  • Supports “burden shifting” in Europe and new economic institutions post-tariffs ([50:32]–[51:54]).

Notable Quotes & Moments

On the Changing Debate Over Multipolarity

• EA on Rubio’s multipolarity quote:

  “I've spent much of the last few months giving book talks...I start the talk with that quote...the most common responses are John Mearsheimer, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping...almost no one gets it right… The notion that American policymakers would accept it, that was...very surprising.” ([02:19])

On Restraint and the Limits of U.S. Power

• EA:

  “What everyone will tell you is it was probably the right thing to get out [of Afghanistan], but we did it in a bad way... pressures in favor of a more restrained foreign policy are still there.” ([09:56])

On Ukraine and Goalpost Shifting

• EA:

  “We started out saying, well, we're going to prevent Ukraine from falling to Russia, we did that...then at some point it became, well, we can't negotiate until Ukraine is in a better position...analogous to how they shifted in parts of the war [on] terror, right from regime change to nation building…” ([11:38])

On Spheres of Influence, Realism, and Trump

• EA:

  “If he is sort of a realist, he's a crude realist, but it's there. I think the spheres of influence notion is thus appealing to him not because he thinks we should give parts of the world to Russia or China, but because he recognizes...spheres of influence emerge pretty naturally when great powers compete.” ([13:52])

• On U.S. policy in Western Hemisphere:

  “The one place America has never declaimed the notion of spheres of influence is the Western Hemisphere...we get more influence there than anyone else does.” ([15:46])

On Biden and Trump Admins Responding to Multipolarity

• EA:

  “The Biden administration had a strategy that was almost explicitly designed to reject multipolarity...Trump’s administration is better suited to multipolarity… But...the area where they have been most problematic is in the economic space—massive tariffs placed on friends and foes alike.” ([19:02])

On Proliferation as a Trade-Off

• EA:

  “A little nuclear proliferation in exchange for...a lower risk of great power nuclear competition...seems like a fairly worthwhile trade-off.” ([29:32]–[31:39])

On The Lack of Consensus in U.S. Foreign Policy

• EA:

  “The debate...has become more vibrant over the last few years. I do not think, however, that we have achieved anything approaching a new consensus yet...” ([46:16]) “A stable new consensus would be a more interests driven, pragmatic nationalist foreign policy...that works for Americans.” ([48:04])

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [02:19] – Multipolarity enters U.S. policy discourse (Rubio quote)
• [04:24] – Debate over polarity: unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar views
• [07:52] – The push for restraint in U.S. foreign policy
• [09:56] – Afghanistan withdrawal; political difficulties of restraint
• [11:38] – Support and limits in the Biden administration's Ukraine approach
• [13:52] – Trump’s realism and spheres of influence logic
• [15:46] – U.S. persistent influence in the Western Hemisphere
• [16:45] – U.S. show of force in Venezuela: regime change risks
• [19:02] – Comparing Biden and Trump’s handling of multipolarity
• [24:07] – The limitations of both new Western alliances & the “axis”
• [25:47] – How overuse of sanctions prompts adversary convergence
• [27:54] – Allied hedging and burden-shifting dynamics
• [29:32] – Nuclear proliferation: risk, reality, and implications
• [33:17] – Realist doubts over European security guarantees for Ukraine
• [36:53] – Contours of a possible Ukraine settlement
• [39:28] – Crafting a competitive, non-escalatory China strategy
• [42:01] – Taiwan, strategic ambiguity, and the limits of U.S. intervention
• [43:53] – Energy, rare earths, and the real geoeconomic levers
• [46:16] – State of foreign policy debate: vibrancy without consensus
• [48:04] – Ashford’s case for “realist internationalism”
• [50:32] – What real “burden shifting” in Europe should look like

Tone & Language

Throughout, Emma Ashford is frank, analytic, and pragmatic, often using comparisons to historical episodes or analogies from recent policy failures. She takes little at face value, underscores constraints and trade-offs, and avoids ideological posturing. The discussion is lively, nuanced, and challenges mainstream Washington assumptions.

Conclusion

Ashford and Kurtz-Phelan’s conversation depicts a United States confronted by a world it cannot shape alone. Ashford argues that both the Trump and Biden administrations have struggled but for different reasons: Biden’s team clings to old dividing lines and alliances; Trump’s policy sometimes matches reality but overreaches economically and is impulsive militarily. The episode concludes with a call for a genuinely interests-driven recalibration – “realist internationalism” – that matches American goals with global realities rather than American aspirations with global dominance.