← The Foreign Affairs Interview
Loading summary
Transcript61 lines
- [00:00]
A
Dan. I'm Dan Kurtzphelin and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
- [00:06]
B
We talked about Spain and we could add maybe Norway and Slovenia, but frankly speaking, most European countries are united in their ambiguity. They don't like this war. Some have actually even recognized that it represents a violation of international law. But actually, none of them, apart from those few that I've mentioned, have condemned it.
- [00:28]
A
When it comes to the Middle east crisis, I mean, honestly, I think the Europeans have very little to offer. It was the German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said, I mean, what would a handful of European frigates, a few ships do in the Strait of Hormuz that the mighty US Navy cannot solve?
- [00:45]
C
I'm Chloe Fox, deputy editor of Foreign Affairs. Dan is away this week. Just a few weeks after its opening salvos, the war in Iran is already going global. Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, stranding oil tankers and causing energy prices to skyrocket. Donald Trump has asked European partners to help restore freedom of navigation. So far, they have largely rebuffed his requests for military assistance. But as the economic pain mounts, their resolve will surely be tested. Europe's difficult position is indicative of a dilemma the continent's leaders have faced since Trump's return, whether to marshal their resources and will to push back against Trump's coercion or to give in to it in 2025, according to the political scientists Natalie Tocchi and Matthias. Matthias they chose wrong. Instead of insisting on bargaining with the United States as an equal partner, Tochi and Matthis wrote in a recent essay in Foreign Affairs, Europe reflexively and consistently adopted a posture of submission. But this year, Europe seems to have begun to stand up to the United States. In January, it strongly rejected Trump's posturing over Greenland. Now, with Washington pressuring European countries to support its war on Iran, Europe may have no choice but to assert itself. I spoke with Tochi and matthis on Tuesday, March 24, about the choices facing Europe in the age of Trump. So we're going to talk a lot today about Europe's role in geopolitics. We're going to talk about the transatlantic relationship and we're going to talk about your brilliant essay in the January February issue of Foreign affairs called How Europe Lost. But I actually, before we kind of get to some of those bigger things, I want to start with a really concrete thing and I want to start with March 3, the beginning of this month, when German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz visits Donald Trump in the White House. This is three days after the US And Israel launch strikes on Iran. And Mertz is there sitting with Donald Trump and kind of sitting quietly as Donald Trump goes through various European countries, who's on his good list and who's on his bad list. Your essay in Foreign affairs talked about kind of European submission. And I wanted to ask you guys if that moment felt like another example of European submission. I want to know how is it received in Europe? And especially three weeks prior, Mertz had just given a speech in Munich and published a piece in Foreign affairs that talked about European self assertion and European unity. And here he was, just three weeks later, sitting next to Donald Trump and not speaking up for Europe. So let's start there before we kind of go into everything else that's happened this month.
- [03:34]
B
Okay, let me launch into this. I think clarity, Chloe, that the tragedy really of that moment, as I see it, is that it wasn't only, quote, unquote, yet another moment of European submission, but it was actually, I think, also the risk of a moment of a European betrayal of itself. Right. Because one thing is to basically say, hey, what is the smartest way to deal with Donald Trump? Is it flattery? Is it silence? Is it standing up? Okay, big debate that has been going on in Europe over the course of the last year or so. But in that particular moment, it wasn't just, let's flatter Trump. It's not just, let's just kind of go along with his policies, in this case the war in Iran. It was actually Trump sitting beside the German chancellor, lashing out against another European country. Right. That is lashing out against Spain because Spain had the audacity of basically saying, we, we actually think that this is an illegal war and therefore we refuse the use of military bases, Spanish US Military bases. And Merz said nothing. Right. And of course, then the drama after that moment continues because apparently there was no conversation between the two. I mean, Merz said that he had tried to reach Sanchez, but kind of had his wrong mobile number, which is kind of really weird. Right. In any case, the point is that this conversation, bilateral conversation, did not happen. And the two only met after several days when there was the last European Council meeting. And you could see from some of the pictures taken of that handshake just how tense it kind of was. Right? So this was not just a moment of submission, of flattery, which, as I said, and maybe we can get into this, is it the smart or not so smart strategy to adopt towards Trump? This was flattery and subjugation that essentially met kind of stabbing, a little stab, but nonetheless a stab in the back of another European country.
- [05:53]
A
Yeah. In a way, the Iran crisis is very unfortunate. Right. So when. When Natalie and I wrote our essay about European submission and how Europe lost, 2025 was very much a year like that for the Europeans where, you know, they struggled on all fronts. They were constantly in reactive mode. And I feel like the Greenland crisis and the moment that Davos, the Europeans found their collective stride a bit. And so they're moving ahead on trade, they're moving ahead on defense. I mean, they're putting all these things in motion to become more independent of the United States and U.S. protection. And I think the Iran crisis then throws this wrench into all of this because it creates this massive uncertainty. Again, Europe has no real way of influencing this conflict, but it is going to be in the front lines of the receiving end of the damages, whether it's economic, whether it's refugees, anything like that. And I think at the very beginning of this conflict, it was incredibly hard for Europe to find a voice that was united. Right. And so the reactions were all over the place. And I think merits kind of miscalculated a bit, because, of course, that moment coincided with his visit to the White House. And no European leader has really, truly figured out how to deal with these kind of Oval Office press conferences until, I would say, the Irish Teso on St Patrick's Day, because Donald Trump, the American president, did a very similar thing with the Irish Prime Minister and kind of pushed him a bit on how useless Keir Starmer was and how he was no Winston Churchill and that sort of line. And very gently, but very firmly, I think the Irish TSO pushed back and said, actually he's been very good for Irish UK relations. He's a great man, he's reliable. And he started kind of praising him, and he did that on many other things as well about Europe's way of life, the European economy, and sort of taking out the kind of stereotypes that have taken hold under the Trump administration. And that seems to be a more effective way. That said, I agree with Natalie that that was not the German Chancellor's finest moment when it came to standing up for Europe.
- [07:58]
B
But, you know, I mean, just to. Sorry, just to pick up on this. So I think that what is just so almost shocking about the course of the last year is that by now there is evidence that is beginning to accumulate. Right. So whereas a year ago, there was, I think, a legitimate question, and, you know, Matthias and I actually posed ourselves this question like, you know, maybe flattery is the way to go. And by the way, this is actually what many Europeans were hearing from American friends, particularly, let's call them the sort of Trump adjacent, right? And what they were hearing is you've got to flatter him. And so, you know, we take our friends seriously and that's what we did. So I think a year ago, there was a legitimate question whose answer could have been the smart thing to do is to flatter. Now, there has been a year of evidence, and what we have seen over the course of this year of evidence is that when we have flattered and bent the knee, we have just received kind of slaps in return, right? When we have had the audacity of either, as Matthias's example here in the case of the Irish US Moment and sort of standing up for Starmer, or simply when Europeans kind of say, no, right? When Spain, going back to the earlier example, says, no, actually, you cannot use our bases. When the US folds over Russia and suggests actually lifting sanctions on Russia over the course of the Ukraine negotiations, and Europeans say, no, we are not going to lift our sanctions when over Greenland a coalition gets together and puts together Arctic endurance. Now, in each and every of these moments, actually, the result has been that the world has not fallen on our heads, that many of the threats that Trump has made have turned out to be empty threats, right? Trump threatened a trade embargo on Spain. Now, to the best of my knowledge, there has not been a trade embargo on Spain. So evidence suggests that when we stand up, actually, it kind of works, right? And when we bend the knee, it kind of doesn't. And so even if a year and a bit ago, there was a legitimate question of what is the smart thing to do? Now, surely there's evidence that suggests what the smart thing to do. So then the next question in my mind is, so why is it that we don't do it consistently? Why is it that that Greenland moment that Matthias was referring to, actually, I don't think it even ended with Iran. I think it ended with the Munich Security Conference and Marco Rubio's speech and the sense of, oh, we're so reassured, because he's only just kind of talking about we, the white and Christian west, and it's all going to be fine.
- [11:05]
C
I want to come back to that in a second, but first, just to stick with your point on Spain for just a minute. So in early March, Spain denied the US permission to use its jointly operated bases to strike Iran. Is it. I can see somebody making the argument, is Spain actually the test case that proves that standing up works or did Spain get away with it? What happens if everyone does what Spain did?
- [11:28]
B
Well, I think. I don't know what Matthias thinks about this, but I think that Spain has indeed more leverage than other European countries, not because the others are bending the knee and Spain isn't, but because actually, I mean, to use a Trumpian language, actually, Spain has quite a lot of cards when it comes to its bilateral relationship with the United States in terms of trade. It's actually not very dependent on the US at all in terms of energy. It has gone further than most other countries on the energy transition, which comes back to one of the points that Matthias and I made in that piece that actually accelerated on the energy transition is in Europe's security interest. Spain has done this more than others. And so now, in the midst of another energy crisis, actually, Spain's prices are significantly lower than that of countries that are far more dependent on fossil fuels. Spain, of course, has the luxury of not being on the front line. So actually, in security and defense terms, there's more of a quote, unquote, need of the US Vis a vis Spain than the other way around, because it would actually be quite convenient for the US to be able to use Spanish bases in the way in which it uses, you know, Italian bases and German bases and Greek bases. Right. How exactly is the United States defending Spain? Well, I mean, you know, Spain has the, you know, fortune in this respect of actually not being on the front line with Russia. So actually, I think the Spanish story tells us that Sanchez is able to stand up also because, not exclusively, I think, also because actually Spain has reduced or it's lucky enough not to be as dependent on the United States as other European countries are.
- [13:20]
C
Before we kind of go even further back in kind of the timeline, which, you know, Munich was just last month, but it feels like ages ago. I want to ask quickly about the Strait of Hormuz because, Matias, you brought up the Irish visit to the White House, and that was right around the same time, like March 16, March 17, that a bunch of European countries kind of stood up and said, we're not going to send ships into the Strait of Hormuz to help secure oil tankers as Donald Trump asked them to do. So did you see that as a sign of unity that's now happening?
- [13:56]
A
Right. I mean, I think there's a very clear NATO minus US Line that nobody is getting seriously involved in clearing the Strait of Hormuz as long as active hostilities continue and this active war goes on. Because, again, they weren't consulted on this war. Right. I feel. But that's only happened in the sort of second half of March where this line came together. Because in the end, I mean, so a few quick things, right. I think France is kind of in the middle of Spain and Germany when it comes to responding to the U.S. right. I think it's hard lays where Sanchez's is, but it's also a nuclear power and I think cares way more about European unity and kind of managing this relationship than Spain has to worry about. And clearly Germany is much more dependent on the United States for its trade. And of course Eastern Europe is worried about Ukraine. But when it comes to the Middle east crisis, I mean, honestly, I think the Europeans have very little to offer. Right. It was the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said, I mean, what, what would a few, a handful of European frigates, a few ships do in the Strait of Hormuz that the mighty US Navy cannot solve? That said, I think they want to be constructive. I think they want to be part of a diplomatic solution. And I think, you know, if it comes down to some sort of solution where the Strait has to be secured after some sort of ceasefire, I think they'd be happy to help, just like they've been active in the Red Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean and so on. But there, I just don't think they want to, they can take the risk. Don't forget, this is an incredibly unpopular war, right, in Europe. It's not particularly popular in the United States, but it's way less so in Europe. And really the only European leader who is an open cheerleader for this is Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, which puzzles many Europeans, especially even many Americans, because they're like, wait, hang on a minute, isn't he some sort of chairman of an alliance of 30 plus countries and he's now openly cheering for a war that clearly a lot of European leaders would have, first of all wanted to be consulted on and second, didn't think was a good idea.
- [16:07]
C
Now, if Trump is going to frame Europe's kind of refusal to help out in the straightforward muse as some kind of betrayal, Natalie, I'm especially interested because I feel like you've been such a critic of kind of European responses given how much is at stake for NATO interests, for US Commitments to Ukraine, to potentially new tariffs now that new tariffs are kind of being drawn up and worked on after the Supreme Court ruling. I'm curious, how would you want European leaders to stand up to Trump without triggering a blow up? How do they do this so Firstly,
- [16:40]
B
I would say that I find it a very useful comparison in my own mind to think back at how we reacted in 2003 over Iraq and think about today, Iran, because I actually think it has quite a lot of lessons to offer. So actually, back in 2003, this was the quintessential moment of European division. Far more divided then than we are today. Back then, there was at least a sort of three layers of division. There was a division between core European countries. France, Germany stood against uk, Spain, Italy, of course, UK back then was still in the European Union in favor. So big split within back then EU at 15. Big split between how then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld defined it as a difference between old Europe and New Europe. It was only months before countries in Central and Eastern Europe acceded to the European Union. This happened in April. The Treaty of Accession was signed in April of 2000, 2003, then they eventually joined in 2004. So this new Europe in the making split from Old Europe. And then, of course, there was the sort of transatlantic division. Now, what was, I think, really interesting about that moment is that the trauma of that division actually galvanized collective action. That was exactly the moment in which what then became known as the E3 EU plus 3 started negotiating on the Iranian nucleophile. So, you know, France, Germany, UK together with a high representative for the European Union, together with Russia, China, initially, Bush administration very cautious about it. But by the time we get to the end of Bush 2 and into Obama, actually the US embraces this. Basically, revolution kindles itself, so refines unity through collective action. And this was also, I think, a moment of European identity. You know, we're for soft power there for hard. You know, we're for multilateralism. We're there for unilateralism. So even if in juxtaposition to the United States, there was a sense of European identity and a sense of European collective action, actually, if you compare it to today, we are far less divided today than we are back then. Yes, we talked about Spain, and we could add maybe Norway and Slovenia. But frankly speaking, most European countries are united in their ambiguity. They, as Matthias was saying, don't like this war. Some have actually even recognized that it represents a violation of international law. But actually, none of them, apart from those few that I've mentioned, have condemned it. And they are also fairly united, let's say, in going back to the Hormuz question, in knowing that actually there isn't a military solution to this one. Right. And that the Strait of Hormuz fundamentally will be reopened when the war ends. And they kind of don't really have a dog in that fight, right? So they're actually less divided now than they were in the past. But that greater unity is not actually spurring a sense of European action. Now, granted, very difficult to think of European action on Iran now, but the point is that there's no idea of a European action elsewhere in the Middle east, right?
- [20:16]
C
Is that a political problem or is that an institutional EU problem?
- [20:21]
B
I feel, and this comes back again, I think, to the main thesis of the piece that we wrote with Matthias on foreign affairs. I feel that the main reason for this ambiguity is that many European governments are increasingly, in a sense, polluted by, injected with nationalist far right ideas that are not fundamentally different from those in Washington. And when you have basically, not to give a sort of far right example, but to give a center right example, that is both the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz as well as Commission President von der Leyen being really rather explicit in saying, well, kind of international law is not a useful thing framework to understand this war. You're like, whoa. I mean, this is a European leader saying this, right? I mean, it is really quite shocking, right? And I don't think that it's possible to understand this without actually thinking through the impact that increasingly nationalist ideas are also having. You know, the impact that they are having in Europe as well.
- [21:31]
C
Matthias, do you see that happening as well?
- [21:34]
A
I mean, I do think it's a political problem, right. I mean, I think there is in Washington, D.C. especially in the United States, this sort of bit of a misunderstanding about Europe, right. And Europe is not up to this or that because Europe cannot become a superpower like China or the United States. And the reality is it doesn't want to. Right? I mean, I think what the Europeans are focused on, especially since the second Trump administration, and this is the most outspoken in Germany with the Merz government is building up its own defenses, not through the European Union institutionally per se, but doing this nationally. And of course, the EU plays a role when it comes to financing, when it comes to coordinating, when it comes to industrial policy and things like that. But the goal here is to deter Russia from future attacks. The goal is not to project power in the Middle east or in the South Pacific or anything like this. So, I mean, actually, if you ask Europeans, do you want to become a superpower? The overwhelming answer will be no. Right? We like our way of life, but we do want to have some sense of order in our space, the space that we Control. And so they're concerned. And that's what you often see this European leaders will express concern and so on, because in the end, there's not much they can do about the Middle east right now. And there is zero appetite, as Nathalie says. And I think they see this much clearer to do anything militarily because there is no military solution to the Strait of Hormuz. And if there was one, surely again the mighty US Navy would figure it out before having any help from European navies.
- [23:11]
C
So in terms of European interests and kind of where the European focus is, that came into pretty stark relief in January when Trump threatened to annex Greenland. You guys referred to this a little bit already, but when that happened again just two months ago, Europe kind of scrambled and held the line pretty effectively, it seems like, including threatening huge economic retaliation of their own. And the crisis kind of fizzled out at Davos, which we can get to too. But I wanted to ask you guys, how does the Greenland crisis compare to the crisis now in Iran and Europe's response? And do you think that Greenland was a genuine turning point in how Europe is thinking about how it can act collectively? Were you encouraged by what you saw in January?
- [24:01]
A
The misunderstanding about Europe is that somehow it can't act. It can. When it doesn't act, it's because there's division among member states. I mean, what the EU has built up in geoeconomic tools since 2017, really since 2019, the first von der Leyen Commission is astonishing for in European Union that was based on a peace project, free trade rules, the liberal order, all that stuff. So they have this anti coercion instrument. It is a bazooka if they're willing to use it.
- [24:31]
C
And so I think this is just to clarify, this is a trade tool, right?
- [24:36]
A
This is broader than trade. This is basically allowing the commission broad leeway into punishing malign actor, right? Somebody who's bullying you, somebody's corusing you. So this could be denying them access to investment. This could be cutting off trade, this could be tariffs. They literally, once the commission has the green light from the member states, they can do quite a lot of damage, Right? And I think that is something that would definitely spook markets, would spook investors, would spook American businesses. But that's one element of the Greenland crisis. So they held the line, they pushed back as hard as they could, but they were also terrified at the same time. And let's not forget the American president caved when there was enormous pressure from the markets. So you could think of European unity combining with bond markets, stock markets, that made him think twice. The difference between Greenland and the Middle east is Greenland is sovereign European territory. Right. I mean, I think that's a very strict line. It's one thing to negotiate about slightly higher tariffs. It's one thing to grudgingly agree to spend more on defense that you were even thinking, even though you're already planning on increasing it, because that's good for your own defense. Right. And it's one thing to turn a blind eye to your democratic principles. But when you know if you're going to criticize the US Government for whether it's independence of the judiciary, whether it's the independence of the media, that it's just going to backfire. Right. So you could say these things are pragmatic. But when it comes to Greenland, I mean, if we now see the detailed planning the Danish Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign affairs had put in place, the cooperation with the French and the UK is that they took this deadly seriously. Right. What's different from the Iran crisis is that they are, you know, again, bearing the brunt when it comes to gas prices, oil prices, fertilizer. I mean, all the second and third order effect that we now starting to see. But here they actually have, apart from offering mediation efforts. But they, they have very little to, to influence this present because at the same time, and that's something we haven't talked about, they still rely on American intel support and American support in broad terms in Ukraine. Not only. What have I missed?
- [27:00]
B
So I think that if one thinks of Greenland, I mean, I kind of tend to think of this as kind of, you know, we have different cases by now. We have, let's say three or four cases. So there's the Greenland case, there's Ukraine, there's Venezuela, there's Gaza, there's now Iran. And actually, I think the Greenland cases is probably the gold standard in this respect. I mean, I think this has been the case in which there has been greatest clarity and both normative commitment. Hey, this is a red line. Territorial integrity, sovereignty, like no way. And a sort of unity over it, obviously with some countries more involved than others, but, you know, unity. Interestingly, going back to our far right point, including by far right parties, right. You basically had Jordan of the race national, you know, you have the AfD. I mean, you have kind of like real sort of hard right, fascist fascists basically saying, you know, a little bit too much. Right. So, you know, there's also this question of both unity between countries as well as a general Consensus within countries and a willingness to plan, to act, to show resolve. Now, it is true that obviously what made Trump back down was, you know, getting spooked by the markets, but the markets reacted the way they did because Europeans signaled that they were willing to stand up. I don't think that the markets really care whether Greenland belongs to Denmark or to the United States. Right? Had Europeans folded, had they signaled that, hey, you know, fine, impose more tariffs and it's all going to be, you know, actually, markets probably would not have reacted the way they did. And so markets reacted the way they did because they thought, oh, my God, these Europeans are reacting trade, war, trade, war, and therefore we get spooked. So I actually think these things are very closely connected. So to me, the green and case is really a kind of gold standard, which would should tell us quite a lot about how we should be reacting. I kind of put Ukraine in a mid middle category. I think that there has been a European willingness to say we stand up for Ukraine, even if Washington basically is in cahoots with Moscow. However, I also think that basically Europeans have been bending over backwards to try and keep Trump on side. Now, you could say, well, you know, they still need US Support, but the truth of the matter is that the United States no longer provides that support, right? I mean, with the exception of, well, firstly, it no longer provides military assistance, full stop. There's still the intelligence sharing that goes on and the US Weapons are bought by Europeans for Ukrainians. So there's no support. Support in that sense. So in a sense, the US Abandonment of Ukraine has already happened. Now, you could make the argument Trump could go the extra mile and also suspend intelligence sharing. And that, of course, remains an issue which mitigates how far you can basically just kind of say no and step to one side and we can deal with it. But I think that probably had there been a little bit more standing up again, probably the world would not have fallen on our heads. And then I think we have the cases of Venezuela, of Iran, now, of Gaza, in which Europeans have been, in my view, slightly kind of of, you know, losing their soul over all of this. And they've been doing this either because they have followed a very, I think, shallow strategic logic. You know, Venezuela down, Iran down, it means Russia down, which means good for us. And I think as the Iran war especially is demonstrating, actually this is quite good news for the Kremlin, right, for all sorts of reasons, from oil prices going up to interceptors going down to international law being completely shattered. So I think it has been strategically rather shallow. And then we come back to this norms point. If we are not those norms, who are we exactly? You know, what is, you know, who are we as Europeans? Right. I find it really troubling when I have my own prime minister going to parliament and you're in Italy, Just so
- [31:56]
C
our listeners know I'm in Italy, my
- [31:58]
B
prime minister is Giorgia Meloni and she goes to parliament and she says two sentences, one after the other, yes, this is a violation of international law, referring to Iran. And you're like, yeah, yeah, indeed, second sentence. And we neither condemn nor support it. Now, once upon a time, you know, when there was a recognition that there was a violation of international law, the automatic next sentence would have been and therefore we condemn it. So I think there's this sort of abdication of norms which basically implicitly endorses a survival of the fittest, you know, predatory powers left, right and center. Which I don't think that as Europeans, we supported these norms because we were nice people. We supported these norms because they were fundamentally in our interest. And so I think it is also really rather short sighted to think that somehow you can end up being a predatory power yourself.
- [32:56]
C
We'll be back after a short break. Trying to stay on top of what's happening in a 24.7world of news can feel, well, frankly, overwhelming.
- [33:12]
A
That's why we launched our new podcast, the Spillover. I'm Sebastian Mallaby.
- [33:15]
C
And I'm Rebecca Patterson.
- [33:17]
A
We want to highlight the most important global events each week and think through not just what they mean, but also the second and third order effects.
- [33:25]
C
Exactly. And we have a special opportunity for our Spillover listeners. Sebastian.
- [33:30]
A
Yes, we do. Starting March 18 through April 1, you have a chance to win a copy of my latest book, the Infinity Machine.
- [33:38]
C
All you need to do is head to cfr.org giveaway and submit a question to be answered right here on the spillover. Ask us anything you're curious about, from geopolitics to policy or financial markets and
- [33:52]
A
economics or related to my book. You can ask us a question about technology or AI. Again, that's cfr.org giveaway. We'll be picking five lucky winners. Winners to receive a copy of my book and get their questions answered by us. Sounds like a pretty good deal, I'd say.
- [34:08]
C
So tune into our episode on April 8th to see if you've won. And don't forget to subscribe to the Spillover wherever you get your podcasts. The world doesn't wait. Neither should you. At Indiana University's Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies. Nearly 96% of graduates are are employed in service or continuing their education within six months. With programs in international studies, foreign languages and global policy, and faculty who are active voices in the field. You won't just learn about the world, you'll be ready to work in it. Take the next step. Apply today@hls.in. May 14th through 17th, Independent brings together over 100 artists for a four day art fair in New York. Among the highlights, Comme des Garcons will present more than 20 recent semi unique selections created by the house's founder, Ray Kawakubo. This will be the first New York presentation of its kind in nine years. See why the New York Times calls Independent an art world institution and discover what's next in contemporary art. Visit independenthq.com to learn more and book your ticket today. All right, so Natalie, I did want to pick up on one point because with the comparison to the 2003 and the Iraq war, at that point everyone gave the US Access. Everyone in Europe gave the US Access to their bases. Right. And I'm curious, I don't know if you guys have seen Celeste Wallander's piece that she did for Foreign affairs mid-2025, but it was called beware the Europe you wish for. And she literally laid out the scenario in which Europe withholds access to bases for European military operations to include in Iran. So she kind of predicted that this could happen. And with your kind of assessment that Europe is becoming more about hard power and less about the ideals that it used to be. I'm just wondering how you think of this both for the US Interests going forward, if you could put on a little bit of what this means for the US side. And also is it so bad if Europe is asserting itself in this way and actually denying access to US bases and kind of standing up for itself with that hard power, even if it's not going to make the references to international law as strongly as you want them to?
- [36:43]
B
Well, firstly, I would say a major difference. I think it goes back to a point that Matthias was making earlier about and coordination. So when we used to live in the world of the liberal international order and the transatlantic bond, even when there were these very virulent actually transatlantic disagreements, as there were over Iraq, there was consultation, there was coordination, even if then the end result of this was, hey, no, there was a profound policy disagreement, but actually there wasn't major political rift, I would say. I mean there was a policy cleavage more than a political Cleavage. And what I mean by this is that I think on the one hand, fundamentally, the social contract that kept the transatlantic partnership alive over the decades was still standing. And I think on the one hand, it rested on a policy recipe, right? I mean, there was a give and take both on security and beyond security. So I think that this narrative of the US Provided security and Europeans didn't pay their bills. I mean, of course, as we know, there is some truth to it, but it never was the whole truth. I mean, there was a lot in it for the United States as well, including the fact that when the United States did things that actually Europeans did not fully agree with, that is invading Iraq, they didn't really stand up to the United States. So there was an overall policy social contract which held, and I think politically there was another little magic word which now has been shattered, which is trust. I think the real harm being done in the transatlantic relationship now, as I said, is not one of policy disagreement. It is not one of even the possibility or even the probability or the reality of a US Disengagement from European security. But it's rather the more than thought, but the increasing certainty that there's a US Betrayal of Europe and Ukraine and Greenland are really probably the most obvious cases that speak to this. And so if this is a story of betrayal, then trust is broken. And if trust is broken on the one hand at the political level, and if the policy social contract no longer holds, why on earth right now? I personally think that this is a relationship which had certainly over the decades been extremely beneficial to Europeans, and who am I to say whether it was beneficial to Americans, too. But I think that if the United States is in the powerful place that it is in the world still today, it's also because of this. And that, I think, is being. I'm not sure whether it's irreparably damaged or not, but I think there's a very real risk that once trust is broken, it's extremely difficult to reconstitute.
- [40:03]
C
Matthias, you made the point earlier that Europe can act and that it's a misconception to think otherwise. And it's kind of becoming clear the leverage that Europe has over the US still more and more with, for instance, Russian assets that are held in Europe, and so that the US can't unilaterally lift sanctions on Russia without Europe's approval. So any bargaining chip that Donald Trump thinks he has has to get approved by Europe now with, with Middle east operations and with Iran, Europe holds a lot of leverage there. Matthias, you've written a lot about the kind of the market leverage as well of Europe. Do you feel like Europe is starting to assert that leverage more? And is there a shifting kind of sense of its own power?
- [40:47]
A
I mean, I think in the beginning of 2026, and I think the Greenland crisis and Donald Trump's speech at Davos kind of galvanized this. You could kind of sense Europe charting its own course. Right. More so without, you know, actively consulting the United States, without doing this together. Right. So whether it was, I mean, recently they signed, very recently they signed a trade deal with Australia. Right. I mean, think about the trade deals that they've signed. Mercosur, India, Australia, these are things, I mean, India started in 2000 or Mercur started in 2000. India, like ages ago, like Australia. New Zealand was like 2017 within six months. Donald Trump has managed to kind of give a certain urgency to the Europeans to act. But I think when it comes to defense, and because you don't see this right now, because of the capabilities are in there immediately, but the amount of money, if you think about Germany by the end of the decade, will invest or will spend the same amount of money on defense as France and the UK combined, right. That's going to transform the kind of the way Europe thinks about defense, the way it can act. And I think Germany has fundamentally kind of changed its mindset on this, and that happened with merits on election night. So I think you see this happening, and I think in the end, the future of the transatlantic relations has always been a much more equal relationship. But then you'll indeed, like Celeste Wallander pointed out last summer, you will have a Europe that will occasionally be a kind of tough love friend and say, hang on a minute, no, you're not getting our bases. We don't like this is for your own good. Right? This is going to backfire. This is going to completely demolish stability that what exists in the Middle East. This is going to have an impact on energy markets. And so think twice before you do this. And I think that's something, I mean, a colleague of mine pointed out it's kind of like the traditional scenario where a husband and a wife are married and they're having a child, and the husband says, you know what, why don't you stay home and take care of the kids and then you can go back to work five years later, and then five years later she's ready to go back to work and suddenly the husband doesn't like it because he's gotten used to the wife taking care of all these things and just, you know, making his life easier. And now the wife. No, actually, I want to go to work. I want to get my own life again. And I feel like that's where Europe and the US Are right now. This is my colleague's comparison, not mine, but it's a little bit like they're now having second thoughts. Right. Many people around Washington, D.C. is like, wait, hang on a minute. You know, when they actually starting to do it, the US doesn't like it. And I feel that's a bit the moment where we're at right now. Right. And so that's, that's something to think about because, I mean, what's the main difference between China and the United States is that the United States has allies everywhere. Right. And it has access, it has bases,
- [43:42]
B
it has global power, or at least it used to.
- [43:44]
A
Or it used to. Yeah, it used to have very, very solid alliance network. And so I think the most optimistic future for the US Is a transatlantic alliance where Europe pays roughly half, where it mostly takes care of its own neighborhood. And when it comes to broader threats in the world, they actually coordinate and speak truth to power, both of them, to one another. But I'm not sure that that's the future that this administration has in mind, per se.
- [44:16]
C
Since you brought up German rearmament and how much that Germany is spending on modernizing its military and investing in its military. I did want to come back to a big part of your piece for Foreign affairs, which was what you guys called the Trump trap. And it's kind of the power and influence that far right political parties in Europe have and how Europe's, by adopting a position of submission with Trump, inadvertently created more power and more leeway for those far right parties in Europe to gain influence, which then undoes the European integration projects. So you kind of describe this catch 22 phenomenon. I want to talk a lot about the far right parties. I need kind of an update from maybe you, Natalie, on kind of what's happening around Europe in the far right parties. What's changed in the past, especially three months as the kind of the conditions with Greenland and Iran, war and everything, if that's changed this dynamic. But I also want to ask with Germany, Liana Fix, Matthias, one of your colleagues, wrote an article for us about the kind of perils of German power and what will happen if Germany has this big rearmament and then the AfD, the far right party in Germany, comes to power. So I'm wondering how do you think about this and the risks, risks of kind of European power and far right.
- [45:37]
A
So, I mean, we've been begging the Germans for the last 15 to 20 years to rearm, to do more, to spend more, to finally get rid of their ridiculous rules on debt and debt breaks and constitutionality and black zero budgets and lack of investment in infrastructure. And they're now finally doing it. So I am, for one, speaking as a Belgian citizen as much as an American citizen, but as a Belgian, very comfortable with Germany doing what it's doing. And I think we should keep encouraging it. And I do think the scenario Liana Fix is describing in the March April issue, 2026 issue of Foreign affairs is still an unlikely one. Right? It's something that could be. I like to think of it as an exercise for graduate students at sais, where Nathalie and I both teach less. So as something realistic, I mean, the only scenario I can see the AfD play a role in a future government is as a silent partner in a minority government led by the cdu, where they cooperate on things like domestic policy, immigration, things like this, but don't get a veto on foreign policy. Honestly, I have a hard time Even imagining the AfD coming to power at all because it does seem, especially in western Germany, they seem to have a hard ceiling of 20, 25%. I can't see them get to 30, 35. Of course, you know, people said that about Marine Le Pen 10 years ago as well. But again, it seems to me Marine Le Pen is going more the direction of Giorgia Meloni than she's going the direction of viktor Orban. The AfD would have to fundamentally change, it seems to me, if it wants to ever come to power, but by doing so it would also become much less of a threat. But the idea that a rearm Germany will get the AFD in power thanks to the encouragement of Donald Trump and will then invade Poland, I think is still a sort of fanciful scenario that I wouldn't worry too much about.
- [47:40]
B
So I think to add just one point to this German question and then onto the rest of the far right, I think that the problem has less to do with, hey, what happens if the AfD comes to power? I mean, I tend to agree with Matthias on this one, but I think there is a structural question to be addressed. You know, Matthias earlier was mentioning the fact that by 2030 Germany will be spending more than France and the UK combined. Now, is that a healthy situation regardless of who's in power in Berlin? Right. In a sense, it brings back the German question with a vengeance to Europe. And especially in a context in which the United States is disengaging from European security, I think in structural terms, it raises questions. Now, of course, it's a question that has an obvious answer. There should be more European integration on defence, right? So there should be an embedding of this rearmament effort by different European countries within a European setting. And that kind of contains and mitigates, if not eliminates, the structural risks. Now, why is that not happening? And this is where we circle back to this broader far right problem, because I actually think, you know, going back to Chloe, your question of, you know, are we still in the Trump trap when it comes to the far right in Europe? I guess on one level you could say, well, actually, you know, 2026 gives us perhaps a slightly more hopeful sort of view on this. We are living in a Europe in which Giorgio Meloni lost a major referendum, a constitutional reform referendum that would have run the risk of seriously limiting the independence of the judiciary. We have had a few elections, both local and national. The liberals won in Slovenia. In the local elections in France, the rass en blomant national did not do as well as many thought. And coming back to our earlier conversation, there has been a certain, certain discomfort, including by far right parties, because Trump has been just kind of so over the top. Right. So I think if we're just zooming in on the far right, we could actually tell a sort of slightly more sort of hopeful, optimistic story. I think that the main Trump that we're still in the main trap, that we're still in the Trump trap that we're still in, is still one in which the center right in, in Europe is increasingly adopting a far right agenda. Why is it that Mertz is so in cahoots with Giorgio Meloni? Why is it that Mertz. I'm just. I don't want to just pick on Merz, but I think he's just the most obvious example, given that we were talking about Germany. Why is it that actually he's been standing against that European framing of, you know, national rearmament questions?
- [50:53]
C
So, you know, what has he done explicitly, specifically to do that?
- [50:58]
B
I think it's more what he hasn't done. I think it's more when it comes to defence, what he hasn't done. So there hasn't been support for major European funds? Yes, indeed, there's 150 billion in loans. But frankly speaking, if you compare it to the broader national rearmament effort, it's still a very marginal share. So on the one hand, it's what he hasn't done. And what he has done, which takes us kind of slightly away from defense, is supported a very sort of explicit deregulation under the guise of bureaucratic simplification, agenda rowing back on key legislation, particularly when it comes to climate, when it comes to digital under the guise of this is about competitiveness, but I think implicitly explicitly running the risk of actually spurring a process of European disintegration. And he's been very much in support of this. In the European Parliament, there is already an alternative majority between the far right and the center right, the European People's Party. So to me, the trap that we're still very much in is this increasing pollution of the entire political spectrum beginning, you know, with the center right of far right agendas.
- [52:20]
C
I'm curious, as we kind of look to the future, is there a model for other European countries to follow? Spain has been so different in its approach to the U.S. it's been so different on migration and some other issues. So I'm just curious, if you see is there is who's doing this the best in Europe right now, what would you like to see serve as a model? Because it sounds like it's not Germany right now.
- [52:45]
A
It's not any of the three countries. I think it's smaller or medium sized countries that have an easier, have an easier time. I mean, I would like to see in many ways the eu, I feel like the commission on the trade side and some on sanctions and things I think has played its hand pretty well. But it's been held back by member states, like, like not allowing it to play this role and you know, saying, well, make a deal or like basically tying its hands if you want. I mean, we're in a moment now where I feel the big things that President Trump wanted from Europe, the Europeans have done, right? So it's now up to Europe to say, well, a deal is a deal, you know, no more further tariff threats. You know, like it'll take us a bit longer to implement it because, you know, we can't just do an executive order. We have to go through the legal processes and that's just how Europe works. And you know that they can finally start on a more positive agenda. Right. Because it seems to me what the Europeans are also confused on is what is the Trump administration's China policy, right? What is in the end the Trump administration's policy? What's the end game in the Middle East? They just simply don't know. So it's very hard to come up with A kind of coherent policy. If you're constantly get things thrown at you that you didn't expect. I mean. Yeah. To come back. What Natalie was saying earlier in this foreign affairs interview is that Spain is in a way uniquely placed Right. When it comes to energy, when it comes to trade, when it comes to defense. You can't generalize it. I feel like in the end, Italy has also stayed out of the of the drama. But to me, the main division has been Spain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other. And Natalie is absolutely right. And Merits and Meloni are finding each other also because I think Merits is realizing or.
- [54:43]
B
Or they even call it an axis here in Italy. And I shall say no more.
- [54:48]
A
Merits is right worried that this time next year you'll have a far right person in the Elyse in Paris and that you'll have very little to work with there when it comes to European integration and so on. So I think that's also there's a pragmatic side to Merits, of course, is a center right party who has a whole domestic agenda. Right. So I mean, I would hope that Europe will focus much more on building up its own strength rather than in constantly being in response mode to Donald Trump. Because I still think in many ways a lot of these threats seem empty and he tends to move on to the next thing.
- [55:30]
B
Yeah, I mean, on this question of the model, I actually think that I'm not sure we have a model, but I think we are beginning to identify ingredients of a recipe. And let me make this point, actually, not just for Europe, but also for the United States. And I think that we can identify four ingredients so far. And the point is then kind of building this into a recipe. The first is there needs to be delivery on policy. I mean, going back to Spain, it kind of helps if your economy is growing 3.6% like for, you know, three years running. It helps to then say, and this is why we're legalizing 500,000 migrants. Right. So there needs to be policy delivery. And I think that's one key ingredient. So in a sense, you know, there's a sound Sanchez piece of the recipe there. You know, you need to have charismatic leadership and that's definitely in short supply in, you know, in and across Europe. And not only. So there needs to be a kind of mum dami sort of zest to this. Right. And I think that's another second key ingredient. I think the third key ingredient is courage. I think that if you think about leaders like, well, actually, you know, Zelensky, to name the obvious one. But I would also add, you know, someone like Mette Fredriksen, the prime minister of Denmark, her popularity, I mean, she was not actually doing that well. Her popularity started, you know, rising once again, actually, as a result of the Greenland moment. Right. And so I think courage is another key ingredient. And lastly, and probably actually most importantly, again, because it's in very short supply, I think authenticity is absolutely critical here. In his kind of weird way, Trump is kind of authentic. And I think the problem that many other leaders have is that they don't come across as being authentic. You have at times, you see something there. I've become a big fan of James Talarico, who won the Texas primaries for the Democrats. And he is someone that definitely sounds extremely authentic when he speaks. And I think the ability to break through to audiences, maybe even unlikely audiences, if actually it sounds like you believe in what you're saying. And I think, as I said, all this somehow needs to coalesce into a recipe that kind of makes sense and tastes good. But I think we're beginning to identify certain ingredients.
- [58:15]
C
Matthias, since you brought up China, I just, I want to end on the note that, you know, one of my favorite things about talking to foreign affairs writers a few months after their piece comes out is so often we get to say, look at all the things that you suggested happened that did happen. And so you guys talked, touched on this a little bit earlier. But in your piece, you know, you said that you wanted to see the mercoser deal closed, you wanted the India Free Trade Agreement to happen. That happened. There was kind of like a check mark. And it seems like a month after your piece came out, the European leaders listened and they read it. They read it. They got a lot done. One thing that was in your piece, though, that I haven't seen much about is kind of you suggested that Europe really needs its own China policy that's independent of the United States. For too long, Europe's been kind of just following along, and I'm curious if you've seen any developments to the contrary there. Is Europe closer to coming up with a coherent China policy, especially with the war in Iran? I've heard some people argue that Europe's going to end up buying a whole bunch of Chinese renewables because nobody wants to be this reliant on gas prices. So this could be a boon for the Chinese renewable industry. Is that something you see happening and is there a risk of that happening?
- [59:29]
A
I mean, Europe is torn, right when it comes to China. On the one Hand, it is a partner for cooperation when it comes to climate change, when it comes to renewables, when it comes to energy. It remains a very important market for European exports, and it remains a source of foreign direct investment. But at the same time, China is advancing so quickly that it's now, I mean, overwhelming Europe partially due to the U.S. tariffs between the U.S. and China, that it's looking for other markets that are not American to sell its stuff. And of course, the obvious alternative to the U.S. that's a big chunk of the world economy with a little rich consumers is Europe. So it's a very careful balancing act. It's also not. I mean, in the end, I think the Europeans and especially the European Commission were much more comfortable with the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, which had a very clear line vis a vis China, that they were then said, you know, you can pivot with us in that way and, you know, we can do this together. We can have a global steel alliance for, you know, excess capacity and raise our tariffs together vis a vis countries that overproduce. And that way we protect our own industries. You could do this when it comes to export controls, when it comes to technology, when it comes to chips, all that stuff. Right. So now they're basically forced almost by this, you know, ambivalent China policy of the Trump administration. One day he wants to make a beautiful deal, the other day he wants to raise tariffs. But they also are collateral damage in this whole US China war.
- [61:07]
B
Right.
- [61:08]
A
Because they're now realizing when the Chinese threatened to cut of the Americans from rare earths and critical minerals, they cut off the whole world. Right. I mean, not the whole world, but they include the Europeans, they include all of NATO. Right. And so then they need the Americans to negotiate. So I think it, it has less led in the first three months of 2026 of the Europeans. That's saying pivoting to China and kind of like making up what they're no longer getting from the Americans. But it's making them realize that they, that they need to reach out to, you know, what Mark Carney calls the middle powers of the world. Anything that's not the US and whether it's Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India. Right. South Africa, Latin American countries where they are moving full speed ahead in coming up with alternative suppliers when it comes to all these critical inputs, so they can keep building this. That said, what they cannot afford in Europe is a tariff war between the EU and China. Right. So they will do it. The, the watchwords in Europe always are targeted, proportional. Right. Gradual and, and, and through, through diplomacy. And, but so, I mean, I, I, I imagine if the relationship between the US and the eu, especially in economic terms, worsens, they will have to examine this relationship again. But let's not forget the big elephant in the room is still Chinese support for Russia and Chinese support. I mean, the whole sort of axis of upheaval. When it's Iran, North Korea, Russia and China, the Europeans know that they cannot fully trust the Chinese as a counterpart. So at least with the Americans, there is Hope from a US point of view that come 2029, there will be a more reasonable Republican or a Democrat in power in the White House that they can do business with it, more transactional, less emotional. Right. And all that stuff. And the Europeans have moved on from this. But in China there is no such prospect, right, of having a more acceptable leadership or a more acceptable regime in China that could deal with in the future.
- [63:15]
B
Yeah, I agree. I mean, I think that the struggle that Europeans are in is learning to think about China with their own heads rather than thinking the North Star, that is the United States says A. And so we're kind of going to say and do A minus. Right. So the US Says decoupling and we say de risking. And maybe de risking is a good policy. Right. But the point is that we came to it through a route which at the moment is not available because as Matthias says, what is US Policy on China? But I don't know. And so Europeans have to think about China with their own heads and it's not thought. Right. I mean, because it doesn't have an illusion to it. Because on the one hand, yes, indeed, if you want to decarbonize, you have to actually, you know, work with China, buy whatever Chinese solar panels. But if you want to decarbonize, you also want to protect your own green technologies at home. And if you think about security, yes, obviously, inevitably you have to think about, you know, ways of, you know, well, you can't basically be, you know, at war and in conflict with everyone at the same time. And you need to prioritize. And Russia is more of a threat, obviously, than China is. And obviously now there's this question of US betrayal. So we can't have, have open fronts everywhere. But at the same time, we cannot not see that Russia and China are increasingly on the same page. So, you know, whether we're looking at it through an economic lens, a climate lens, a security lens, it's not an easy debate to have. But I think the point is that we need to have it by thinking through what our own interests are rather than just thinking about what does the US Want and we'll just do a little bit less. And actually going back to the family analogy, I guess I'm a little bit more pessimistic than Matthias in thinking that maybe this is just husband and wife sort of coming to terms with the fact that the wife's going to go back to work. Maybe I would put it in a slightly more dramatic way. This is about a separation. This is about a divorce. But maybe after a divorce we can become good friends. Right. And we can maybe even have Christmas together for the children.
- [65:50]
C
This is the co parenting, the friendly co parenting model.
- [65:54]
B
Right, Exactly. You know, so, so maybe when it comes to China, this period in which Europeans are forced to think with their own heads and, you know, understand what the trade offs, what the pros and cons are, are going to ultimately, you know, lead to Europeans having a policy on China. And then when, you know, the US Ends up in a different place politically, we can work together on that. Right. But not as a triangle, not as a Europeans doing less than the Americans, but Europeans acting on the basis of what their interests are.
- [66:29]
A
Natalie, I prefer Gwyneth Paltrow's term conscious uncoupling.
- [66:33]
B
Okay, I can live with that. Yeah. Separation, not divorce.
- [66:39]
C
Natalie and Matthias, thank you so much for joining me today. That was really a wonderful discussion and I'm really looking forward to whatever you two write next.
- [66:48]
A
Thanks for having us.
- [66:49]
B
It was a real pleasure.
- [66:56]
A
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com this episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Ben Metzner and Kanish Tharoor. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning.