Dan Kurtz Phelan (5:27)

That's a good segue to the piece. The piece is in some ways a sympathetic critique of the Biden administration's foreign policy. It tries to weigh the records, recommends some steps for the months ahead and for a second term, should there be one. Let's start with what you see Biden doing. Right. You write in the piece, and I'm quoting you here, that navigating the rough currents over the world, the Biden administration has often seemed to embody the contradictions of this dynamic, with one foot in the past yearning nostalgically for American primacy and one foot in the future adjusting to the emerging world as it is. So if you look at the positive side of that ledger, looking at three and a half years of Biden foreign policy, what do you think it's done?

Ben Rhodes (6:04)

Right. Yeah. I mean, and I think I kind of arrived, Dan, with your help. I mean, you were really good in nudging in this direction or testing this assumption. But I arrived at that vision of two feet walking in different directions, essentially, and the one that I wanted to praise and actually lay out for people, because I actually think sometimes it's hard to kind of pierce the noise of the politics of foreign policy is when they have adjusted to and absorbed the changed reality. Right. And so the examples I'd give of this, for instance, are I think they understood coming in that particularly after Trump and also the kind of longer term trajectory of geopolitics, that they weren't going to be able to dominate these big multilateral institutions and they weren't going to be able to kind of muscle major initiatives through that. What they needed to do is kind of rebuild the different islands of American alliances. Right. And so a lot of focus on making the transatlantic institutions relevant again that they were doing before Ukraine. But I think that work that they did on NATO and on key European relationships paid off when they needed to rally everybody around the invasion of Ukraine. I think probably even more interestingly, their approach to Asia has been to kind of thread together. Different groups of countries, they've really tried to create, depending on the issue, different groups of countries that could cooperate on security issues in Northeast Asia, on defense issues across this whole region, on issues around energy and investment and technology. And then importantly on technology, they have, I think, a more coherent competitive approach to China, which is they're prioritizing things. Trump kind of threw the book at China with a bunch of tariffs. Biden's kept some of that in place, but he's also focused more relentlessly on kind of high tech sector issues, using a combination of export controls and investment restrictions to try to create a bit of a lead for American artificial intelligence. And so there's a method to the trade war and regime of export controls. That's an administration kind of looking out into the future and seeing where do we want to compare to advantage. And the last thing I'd say is that I think what they've done well and Jake Sullivan is a friend of both of ours, done a lot of work with Brian Deese, who is on the National Economic Council too, and thinking about how does domestic policy interact with foreign policy. And I think the CHIPS act and the Inflation Reduction act, kind of dubiously named Inflation Reduction Act. There's your tech and climate change foreign policy in domestic legislation, because the CHIPS act kind of works hand in glove with the China policy. We're trying to build advanced manufacturing and semiconductors here in the US at the same time they're trying to compete with China. The IRA here is our approach to meeting our Paris Agreement climate targets. So those are examples on alliances and tech and domestic legislation working with foreign policy, where I see them again seeing the world as it is and trying to figure out how to reposition the United States for that.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (9:00)

And what about the other side of the ledger? You've been critical in other pieces and other things you said, and you are fairly critical in this piece, of the ways in which Biden seems to be kind of stuck in the past. America is back, as you noted, as the kind of initial slogan for his foreign policy, but that in some ways has led him to make some missteps in key ways.

Ben Rhodes (9:17)

The overall critique I'd make is that there's a certain muscle memory Obama used to tell me something that always stuck with me because it's a pretty good guide to politicians, that every politician's strength is usually also his weakness. And again, just to be fair and not just applying it to Joe Biden, that was true of Obama. Part of his strength was how calm he was and how he never got rattled, but sometimes you needed to kind of get his juices flowing, right? Biden's strength is his experience, but it's also his weakness because there's so much muscle memory in that. And the muscle memory was formed in the kind of politics and foreign policy of the 90s and aughts when the US did have this kind of primacy and there were these kind of baked in assumptions about U.S. foreign policy. And to me, Gaza is not the only area where I've been critical. But to me, it embodies a lot of the problems in the sense that after October 7, there was understandably going to be a need for solidarity with Israel. There's understandably going to be an Israeli response to such a horrific terrorist attack. But you saw a kind of reflexive, complete embrace of Israel, despite immediate warning signs. This is the most far right government in Israel's history. They were immediately making statements that foreshadowed, I think, how brutal this military campaign would be. And the administration has just not been able to adjust to that. And we're eight months into it. And what's interesting to watch is that their policy feels very conventional. We give Israel whatever military support it wants. There's kind of a pipeline, it flows. We don't mess with that. We try to work behind the scenes to get them to listen to us, and they're not, because it's Bibi Netanyahu. And that was eminently predictable because for eight years in the Obama administration, he didn't listen to us. And I was trying to figure out, well, what is that about? Why does that happen? And to me, I kind of boiled it down to three, three ways. I know it's important to think about grand strategy, but to me, actually, politics enters into foreign policy more than people would like to admit. And so to me, there are kind of three areas where I see their actions on Gaza and some other things being guided by that kind of muscle memory of American primacy of an era that maybe actually never even really existed. One is the kind of default the politics of national security are. Don't pick a fight with the Israeli Prime Minister. And anybody who's worked in American foreign policy and the nexus of that in politics kind of knows what that's about, that we're in New York. There's a primary, I think today, right, where AIPAC is spending $14 million to defeat a single member of the House. That's a piece of what I'm talking about. It's not the only one. So I think Biden and I made a point in the article. It's not just Israel. I negotiated the Cuban normalization. He did nothing to return to the Obama Cuba policy, despite the fact that that entire administration was there for that opening. I think that was largely because he didn't want to pick a fight with Bob Menendez, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee at the time, Marco Rubio. His Venezuela policy, which was inherited from Trump and was a complete disaster, Maduro was getting stronger because of all these sanctions that we put on Venezuela. He was very slow to change that. So it wasn't just Israel. I think there's a kind of congressional view of foreign policy that Biden sometimes subscribes to that limits your options for say, pressuring Israel to change its tactics. Second is maximalist objectives. And the shorthand here is the US gets in trouble, I think, when it bites off more than it can chew or it sets a goal that cannot be achieved because then you're stuck between trying to pour resources into pursuing an unachievable goal or you get embarrassed because you can't achieve your objectives. The war on terror is that writ large. And again, Gaza, you know, the Israeli objective of destroying Hamas is self evidently unachievable. And not because of them. But I think on Ukraine, in a weird way, and I mentioned this in piece, because of their supporters, there was so much triumphalism that, you know, basically Putin's going to be defeated totally and humiliated in Ukraine and all of Ukrainian territory is going to be retaken. A goal that I would love to see achieved, but I don't think is achievable. That's kind of gotten them into some trouble too. Again, not so much of their own creation, but because of, I think, the expectations imposed on them. And then the third one, which is something I've been thinking a lot about since the Obama years, and it's a bit different, is this inability to kind of look from the outside in, particularly from a Global south perspective at the US and if the Global south is increasingly kind of the swing region of the world between these different blocs, the China led bloc, us, the Russians, if we're not able to see ourselves from their perspective, we're going to fail in a lot of very important areas, including areas like climate and technology that are emerging. And I just would ask anybody in Washington to think about how our rhetoric about the rules based international order looks to a Global south audience when we're trashing the International Criminal Court because they're going after Israeli leadership or we're continuing to provide weapons to Israel over the objections of our own laws that would suggest that we should be at least pausing those shipments. So those are the three categories I created to try to kind of understand where I had disagreements with Biden.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (14:26)

There was a theory of US Influence over Israel that people in the administration laid out in those first weeks after October 7th, which was essentially, if we show this solidarity now, if we hug BB close, we will be able to influence decisions later on. As you point out, these were all people who had been burned by Netanyahu many times over the course of the Obama years and earlier in their career. I think it was Biden himself who was in Israel when they announced, against the wishes and recommendations and urging of the Obama White House, that they were permitting more settlements in 2010 or something. So it had been very personal for him. It's somewhat surprising they weren't prepared for that kind of turn in the months after October 7th. But as you try to play out the counterfactual, if you could recommend going back and finding some alternate theory of the case for those months, what might that have been? And do you think it would have gotten us to a dramatically different outcome? Or is this a case where the limits of American power, for reasons that you lay out, are just much greater than they might have been 20 years ago?

Ben Rhodes (15:29)

Yeah, I mean, first of all, I do think this kind of. I mean, they literally called it the hug BB strategy. That's not a. It seems like that would be something that people imposed on them, but that was actually their theory. And you heard this a lot in private, Dan. I'm sure you heard this. And look, I don't claim that these things are easy, but I do think, I'll be candid. I think Biden believed that Obama let himself get at odds with Netanyahu too much. And there was a bit of a. I'm going to show you that this is a better way. And again, this can sound like the Obama guy, so take it with a grain of salt. But I do think that oftentimes we can overlearn lessons of previous administrations. We did this, I'm sure, in the Obama years, too. And so I think he was almost committed to this theory beyond normal in some ways, because it was like I kind of thought we got two at odds at the Israelis. That's not how you deal with them. I know how to deal with them. You get further with them by embracing them, by being critical. Clearly, that has not worked, because I think part of what is missing is an accounting for just how extreme Netanyahu and his government have become, when I have friends, as you might imagine, Daniel, like Ben, why are you so critical of Israel? I'm always like, I just make them. I understand your concerns about some things I say, but I need you to reckon with this government, with Ben GVIR and Smotrich basically having a veto over anything the government does. Because if you think of it that way and not as kind of the Israeli government we would like to see, I mean, a lot of American policy is designed kind of with an ideal Israeli government in mind, and that's just not who's running things now. I do think things would be different. I truly believe that if the US had signaled much earlier, and look, I probably would have signaled even earlier than some people would want, that things like military assistance were conditional on the conduct of the Israeli military operation, that the US would be willing to. To vote with the UN Security Council on behalf of a ceasefire, various tools like that that you could use. I think that if the U.S. had kind of gotten there, let's say, by the end of the calendar year, when it was already apparent the scale of destruction in Gaza, and also, frankly, already apparent that there was not a theory behind the military operation, I mean, Bibi still can't articulate what Gaza is going to look like in three months, six months, or a year. I think it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for the Israeli government to continue at the scale that it was at. And so I don't know that it would have led to. It certainly wouldn't have led to peace between Israelis and Palestinians, but I think it would have mitigated the kind of extremes of this military operation and probably hastened its end by this spring. And that's a guess. So I don't presume that this is easy, but I will say that what Bibi thrives upon is the sense that there's an open spigot from the Americans and that I can do anything, including fighting with the American president, while maintaining that open spigot. And if that is turned off, that's a big problem for them. It's a big problem in their politics because Bibi relies politically on his capacity to say, see, I can do both. I can pick a fight with this guy and make my right wing happy and I can keep the relationship sound, keep the assistance flowing, which makes the center happy. I would say that the lesson I learned from the Obama years was different than hugging Bibi. It was that when you are going to differ with Bibi, you have to go all the way. And that's what we did on the Iran deal. And look, obviously Donald Trump got elected, and so that ended up hitting that buzzsaw. So that's always looming. But I think that the lesson there is that you can't get kind of caught in no man's land with Netanyahu. You either are hugging him or you're just willing to accept the full break and say, we have a different view. Our policy is going to be driven by our judgments, not yours. Because even now, you see the administration trying to kind of fit its own policy into a framework that it doesn't agree with. Because I think they would like to see this war end. But because Bibi needs this room to maneuver to say that he's destroying Hamas, we have to say, well, there's an Israeli proposal for ceasefire. Bibi himself doesn't support the Israeli proposal. Hamas somehow gets a vote. Precisely because I don't like or trust Hamas. I don't think they should get a vote when the war ends.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (19:44)

The thing that strikes me is that for all of the warranted focus on ceasefire, there's been much less on the humanitarian axis dimension, and for all the reasons you lay out. A ceasefire is complicated. It depends on negotiations in very complicated circumstances with a counterparty that has its own interests and probably wants the war to go on. For various reasons, the humanitarian access seems much more straightforward. And I don't totally understand why Samantha Power isn't sitting at the border of Gaza, just kind of waving trucks through and insisting that the Israelis get serious about expanding access. That, to me, is the part that I can't understand, even given those constraints.

Ben Rhodes (20:24)

I don't understand that either, Dan. And I'll give you an example that I think makes the point that pressure works, which is there have been one or two times in recent months where there has been an uptick, at least in the humanitarian access. One was you had the strike that killed the world Central Kitchen workers, and you had all this outrage in Washington because it was aid workers, strangely, because people knew Jose Andreas, you know, and Biden called Bibi and said, you better give humanitarian access or else. And they put out a readout to that effect. And the next day, the Israelis announced a bunch of crossings, and for a time, like stuff started to go across in greater numbers. Right. Well, that wasn't hugging him. That was showing. If you call the guy and say, we're cutting you off if you don't allow humanitarian access. They allowed humanitarian access. I think there was also a bit of an uptick around, frankly, the ICC and the ICJ week because I do think the Israelis can say they don't care, but they do care that the two kind of highest courts in the world are looking at a war crime that is expressly starvation used as a weapon of war. And, and so you're right. I think instead, and this is another microcosm of I think instead of trying to fix the humanitarian access issue where it matters, which is at border crossings, trucks getting in, they tried to build this pier, right. Which it's kind of in miniature. Why this policy is why build a several hundred million dollars pier in some complicated logistics operation to kind of suit the Israeli government's desire to have all these restrictions when you could just roll a bunch of trucks across the border for a fraction of the cost and get more aid in anyway. So I do think if the objective is on saving lives, averting famine, avoiding the war crime, of starvation as a weapon of war, you would expect to see a lot more focus diplomatically and politically on those crossings.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (22:15)

We'll be back after a short break.

Podcast Narrator (22:21)

Foreign affairs magazine invites you to join our editors as they talk to influential thinkers and policymakers about the forces shaping the world. The Foreign Affairs Interview, a bi weekly podcast, gives you a chance to hear directly from our authors as they explain the history behind today's geopolitics and how current events could shape our future. Search for the Foreign affairs interview or click the link to follow and listen.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (22:48)

And now back to my conversation with Ben Rhodes. The theory behind the Iran deal, or one of the theories behind the Iran deal, is that it could precipitate a real shift in regional order in the Middle east that you would have instead of Iran as this kind of force of chaos, Iran that had better relations with its neighbors was less of a threat to Israel, was less of a threat to the United States. You can certainly blame the Trump administration for withdrawing from JCPOA and ending limits on Iran's nuclear activity. But the reality we're in today just seems so far from the hopes of that moment in 2015 when the Iran deal was completed, we're dealing with a very different reality. When you look at stepping back from just Israel and look at that regional picture, do you see any path forward given where we are with Iran, given the focus on Saudi normalization, which seems to be the kind of thrust of both Biden and Trump regional policy right now?

Ben Rhodes (23:44)

Yeah. I mean, I think one way to think about the Iran deal that's very much in line with this piece is I think Obama was someone who saw that we were moving from one chapter to another, the period of American dominance of global affairs was ending for a lot of reasons. That's an entire other podcast. And that we wanted to kind of manage that process to preserve as much American influence as possible and to shape the next version of the world order, particularly on issues that we really cared about, right, like the rise of China, climate change, new technologies, et cetera. And so it was less about the Iran deal being a totally new order as it was like, we're going to kind of start trying to close some accounts here. What could derail us from actually doing the things we want in the world? Well, if Iran gets a nuclear weapon or if there's a war with Iran, that upends our capacity to do other things and it could be catastrophic for the region. So let's try to close this account and then yes, hopefully that can evolve into a more stable regional dynamic. If you remove the most destabilizing factor, a potential Iranian nuclear weapon, it creates some space for negotiation, not just between us and the countries, but amongst each other. We would have supported, as the Biden administration did, say, the Saudi Iran rapprochement. And I will add, by the way, Cuba was the same thing. It was not just the benefit of the Cuba deal, wasn't just that now things can improve for the people of Cuba. This is a huge open sore in our Latin America policy and it affects everything from the Venezuela policy to the border to our ability to work with center left governments down there. Let's close this account because we need Latin America for other things now. We don't want to have our whole Latin America policy be a fight about Cuba. I make that point because it wasn't that these were idealized outcomes. They were like, why are these taking up so much of our time when they're not working? These approaches, these sanctions approaches, these kind of endless conflicts that I think are rooted in. We want to talk about blob, the psychology of Iran and Cuba. Any country that embarrasses the United States, it's like we have a vendetta against that country for the rest of time. There's an incredibly outsized amount of time that has been spent on Cuba and Iran since 1959, 1979, that I think says something interesting about the psychology of the blob. But put that aside. I think right now I do believe we are on the precipice of this whole thing being on fire. Right. You've got Gaza, we're constantly trying to avoid the escalation with Hezbollah and Israel. You've got a Naval battle in the Red Sea with the Houthis. You've got the Iranians really further along in the nuclear program. People don't talk about this than they've ever been before.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (26:20)

A week or two away from breakout.

Ben Rhodes (26:22)

If that had happened, by the way, in the Obama years, people would have been losing their mind. But that seems less dramatic than the war in Gaza, war in Ukraine. So in that context, I think Justin Abraham Accords ish foreign policies, it's not going to work. You can't just make peace with people who are already your friends, which is, I mean, that's what's so strange to me. And I've been a pretty lonely critic of the Abraham Accords. But it's not because I don't support normalization with Israel. It's because if part of what you're trying to do is close some accounts in the Middle east and move on, which I think they want to do, Jake wrote about that in his peace treaty last fall. You have to deal with your adversaries too. And so I still think that the biggest, best course is beginning that process with the nuclear program with the Iranians and then if you can essentially freeze things where they are and kind of create some space for diplomacy to try to build some more durable framework around limiting the Iranian nuclear program and then focus the Abraham Accords less on deals with the Saudis, around the future of the Palestinian issue and probably candidly, a US recognition strategy for a Palestinian state that doesn't rely entirely on negotiation with an Israeli government that's not interested in that. It's going to be messy. But to me, you have to try to limit America's overextension in this region. Sometimes just, and this is, I think, a lesson of the Israeli Palestine conflict, sometimes trying and failing is better than not trying at all because you're at least kind of managing things and you're demilitarizing things. And so I'd like to see us get off the Abraham Accords alone track and try to bring in issues related to Iran and the Palestinians in that conversation.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (28:01)

Do you see this will be the last question on the Middle east as we are exemplifying the problem of American foreign policy spending too much time in the Middle east here. But the administration still seems to have some sense that it can find a path forward with the Saudis, whether that's a bilateral U.S. saudi deal or something that involves the Israelis as well. That could still, if you get a ceasefire, get you towards a two state solution, kind of turn this into an opportunity for Progress. This being the atrocities of October 7th and the war in Gaza. Do you see any prospect of that or to you are we going to return to some slightly worse version of the status quo that existed before October 7th?

Ben Rhodes (28:40)

It feels to me like we're returning to a slightly worse version of the status quo. I will say one on the Palestinians and then on Saudi, quickly on the Palestinians. I believe that there needs to be a whole new paradigm in terms of how we think about our engagement with the Palestinians, which is we kind of go to Ramal, we talk to 87 year old Mahmoud Abbas and then try to get these Arab states to fund the Palestinian Authority. And the Arab states by the way understandably are a bit tired of that because some of that money just disappears and these people don't appear to have any credibility. I think the US needs to engage the Palestinian people. There is capable leadership there, there's capable leadership in the Palestinian Authority, there's capable leadership in Palestinian civil society and actually get involved. The resources exist, there's trillions of dollars in the Arab world. We need to help find the right people to build an alternative leadership to the PA or Hamas. And I actually think that's a project where you really enlist the Arab states in design, not just in paying for it. And they may not want to do that, but I mean that's where you got to stay on top of this issue. And it's in their interest to have an alternative to a sclerotic PA or to Hamas. I think with Saudi they've really been focused on the China dimension. I think that they have been scared by the Saudis and the Emiratis who play the field and this might be a good transition to non Middle east that these guys are going to take their money and they're going to drift into the China orbit and they're joining the BRICs and the Saudis are doing some transactions in RMB and they might buy Chinese artificial intelligence. I think that's what they're really focused on. And I'm not sure the deal is the best way to resolve that because I don't necessarily trust if the Saudis say we'll use dollar for transactions for 30 years, there's nothing enforcing that. But I do get the. I have to acknowledge that that's a understandable and worthy goal. But I think it's like Turkey, right? These Gulf states are now not just Middle east powers, they're global powers, medium powers. And there, I do think there's utility in separating out the issues instead of trying to shove everything into one normalization with Israel. What does your China RMB oil transactions have to do with the Palestinians? We're trying to shove too much into one deal.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (30:51)

I think let's take the opportunity for that transition to talking about China, which in some ways exemplifies a lot of the pathologies that you were describing earlier when it comes to the way that the national security establishment approaches any problem. On the other hand, even in the Obama years, there was quite a change on views of China over the eight years of Obama's time in power. Part of that was kind of failures of some of the initial ambitions when it came to cooperation with China. And I was there as a very junior State Department official at the first strategic and Economic Dialogue, which was supposed to be this example of how the US and China could come together to manage global issues and cooperate on global issues. By the time you left and Xi Jinping had been in power for a few years at that point, and we had a kind of somewhat of a sense, not as clear as we do now, but somewhat of a sense of his ambitions and his views of governance in China, policy had shifted quite a bit. It's now become the governing logic of our entire sense of the world and the strategic picture broadly. Do you share that view that China should be at the center of the way we think about global challenges today, or is that kind of going too far over correcting too much?

Ben Rhodes (32:01)

I think it's overcorrecting too much and my own views on this have changed, and I think we have to intake new information. I remember Obama met with Xi Jinping after the Trump election. It was the last meeting they had. And he said to him, he's like, look, even if Trump had not won, the person after me was going to pivot into a harsher direction. And the biggest change in those eight years was Xi Jinping. We just had a different kind of Chinese leader who was much more assertive and much more willing to push boundaries and was backsliding on things that we would have liked to see the Chinese leadership do in their economy. I will say, because I'm going to come back to this point, we also did some good stuff with him. The Paris Climate Accord was basically started as a bilateral climate agreement between the US And China. I do believe they were sticking to their cyber agreement that we'd reached towards the end of the Biden administration. But I acknowledge that there had not been a reckoning with the fact that the CCP was. Was far from moderating, was becoming more and more aggressive, if not extreme, now, where are we today? I want to credit Foreign Affairs. You guys had a really good issue. It was really interesting to read all of these different perspectives and then also kind of challenge my own assumptions. And I work a lot on issues that interface with China. And I think we're due for a correction to the overcorrection, because here's how I'd put it. I don't think China should be the focus. I think issues that we care about should be the focus. And on some of those issues, we may have differences with China, but the objective should be driven by what we're trying to achieve, not by what we're trying to do vis a vis China alone. Give a couple of examples on artificial intelligence I've been supportive of and I write in my piece in support of this effort to kind of give US companies a lead to kind of restrain Chinese AI while we're figuring out what this technology can do. Because part of it is like, this is not new terrain and we want to be first movers in part because we have to understand the nature of AI and what it can do. That said, as I look at the technology, Dan, I don't know if you follow this. The Chinese are beginning to figure out how to get by in a world of our export controls. They're producing AI models on less computing power. They're developing their own chips. They're going to get there anyway. So my point is, the goal isn't we permanently beat China on AI. The goal is to make the best uses of AI while mitigating the harms of AI. And that means I think we're about to or should be moving from a phase of we're trying to kind of punish them and give this little lead to US companies on AI to like, okay, wait, we're all going to have this technology, we better start sitting down, figuring it out. Because if we develop a bunch of norms around AI, whether it's the existential risks of AGI, you know, the super smart intelligence, whether it's nuclear and biological weapons production using AI, whether it's pure cyber criminality around AI, if China is not involved in that, but they're developing, you know, kind of half the world's supply chain of AI, what's the point of the lead that we got ourselves? You know, and same on climate change. You know, that's the inevitable one where it's like, all right, at some point we can do our own IRA and all our own subsidies in our clean energy transition, but if basically the next 20 years is some kind of geopolitical fight over critical minerals so that who can build batteries and solar panels. That's not a very efficient way of trying to save the planet. And so the objective has to shift a bit. I think the objective became like, beat China and everything. No, the objective has to be like, we have certain goals on technology, on climate, on obviously security issues. And those are more zero sum in some cases. But I'd like to see the relationship become one of negotiation again. We don't even have to call it engagement because that sounds too soft to people. But if there's engagement and confrontation, I'd like to see us introduce a negotiation back in. And to be fair, the Biden people are doing this. I think they saw the same thing last year. They were like, this is getting unstable. And so if Biden is reelected, I think there's a huge opportunity to use that reelection as I'm not even going to say the word reset because every word for the Obama years has multiple meanings. But to explore is there something we can do together on some of these areas, even as we're going to continue to be at odds on a bunch of stuff?

Dan Kurtz Phelan (36:14)

I think the response you would hear from a kind of smarter, hawkish response. Obviously there are a lot of crude, hawkish responses to those kinds of arguments, but the smarter one is that, look, it takes two sides to have a real diplomatic negotiation and to have real, even just serious discussion of these issues. Leaving aside cooperation or a shared view in that the Chinese, lots of Americans, have laid out frameworks of managed competition and competing hard, but still leaving space for talks and avoiding the worst downsides of that. Jake Sullivan and Kurt Campbell wrote that for us shortly before they went into government. Often the Chinese say, we're going to link these issues and you don't handle Taiwan policy in the way that we would like. We're going to cut off talks over climate change, we're going to cut off mill mill ties. And getting that balance right seems really hard. And there are places where I think US Policy has to either accept that you're not going to have negotiations and talks that you'd like to have, or you're going to have to give ground on certain things.

Ben Rhodes (37:14)

First of all, I want to say on this, I understand the hawkish view. Mike Gallagher, I think, has been a thoughtful hawk on China. And I don't disagree with, say, Mike Gallagher's assessment of kind of Xi Jinping and the ccp. I wrote a book that had a huge China section that was kind of reckoning with the degree to which we had to see them for what they are in places like Hong Kong and Xinjiang Province. So the first point is I have no illusions about the kind of character of Xi Jinping or the ccp. The second thing is, however, I do believe that we risk being in a place where we're beginning to do to China what we've done to Iran, Cuba, Venezuela and now Russia, which is just. There's this ever increasing set of sanctions and pressures. And I think that is incredibly dangerous. I think the lesson, and this is where this all comes together, the lesson of maximum pressure policies is they don't work and bring about regime change. They're more likely in bringing about conflict, as we've seen with Russia and Iran and others. And you're talking about China, you're talking about a country of over a billion people. They're going to be really powerful. They're going to be more powerful than I would like them to be. I'd distribute power to the Scandinavians if I could. Right. But the point is that just because you don't like what they're doing doesn't mean you don't have to accept the reality that they're going to be there, they're going to have a claim on Taiwan, they're going to have. They're going to want to have a certain amount of influence in the world. And so I'd be willing to explore different frameworks for how you negotiate. I used to be, as a conventional American foreign policy person, like, keep everything in their own tracks. And we do. Well, you know what? I don't know if we can get a lot out of the Chinese on climate change in exchange for some export controls, on certain things, in exchange for some tariff adjustments. Why wouldn't we do that? In other words, linkages. I'm not suggesting this is easy, but I would be exploring the full breadth of the relationship through kind of negotiated processes with the Chinese. I think because of the good work the Biden administration has done with allies on some of these issues, you want to try to multilateralize discussions, too. So it's not just some US China thing where we feel like it's a test of strength. I think you can play with different formulations for when you multilateralize conversations. AI is certainly one of them where I think it'd be like the G7 talking to China and not just the US so I think we should be open to new approaches to negotiation, to linkages, to new formulations of countries. Because the stakes are so high and because I look at the current Trajectory. And I don't see that ending well. Kind of the main point of my piece is like, all right, we can all go into our corners and build our blocks and do our sanctions. We're two thirds of the way to the world war, though. It's time to kind of do a bit of a pause.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (40:12)

I think one thing that seems particularly challenging in this context is how you think about the kind of values questions as they apply to China internally especially. You've spent a lot of time with activists in Hong Kong and civil society and lots of places that are affected by the trajectory of China, including in China itself. People in the Biden administration essentially say there's not a lot we can do to shape outcomes in Hong Kong or with Uyghurs in Xinjiang. And we need to, for the sake of stability in the relationship and for focusing on the arenas of competition where we do think we can make some difference, essentially put less pressure on some of those internal issues. Not they've stopped talking about them, but in acceptance that you do need to trade that off in order to achieve some stability and competitive edge in other areas. How do you. There's obviously not a clean answer to this, but how do you grapple with that balance?

Ben Rhodes (41:02)

I have spent a good chunk of the last eight years really building relationships with people in civil society around the world through various different things I do. And that's been incredibly important. And I think it informs a lot of my worldview that's reflected in that article, kind of looking at the US from the outside in. But on the core question of democracy, I think after Biden's election, I was one of those people that was very optimistic that there would be this capacity to begin to push back against the global autocratic trend, and they were going to have the summits on democracy. All to the good. But part of what I've realized is I kind of have to wrestle with the depths of the dysfunction within democracies, not just the US we're seeing this in Europe with their elections. We're seeing it in Japan with their dissatisfaction with their government. We see it obviously somebody Brazil in Bolsonaro, unfortunately, I could go on. We're just not in a position to frame the whole world as a democracy versus autocracy clash, because before you could even entertain that we need to fix our own democracy, we are in the biggest glass house in the world. And this is not Joe Biden's fault at all. Trump and a lot of other things that have happened where our ability to go around the world and kind of tell India or China or whomever what to do in terms of their internal politics. We just look like gigantic hypocrites. And we also, frankly, I become uncomfortable with a certain kind of democracy commentary that is relentlessly just about US geopolitical adversaries. So I'm not naming any names and I've been one of them. But if you're only concerned about democracy is democracy and geography, China, Russia, Venezuela and Iran, are you really concerned about democracy? So I think first and foremost we have to see the democracy challenge as internal. And when I say internal, I don't just mean the U.S. i mean the democratic world. We kind of need to detoxify. And that involves a lot of work by the way. There's policies to that. There's policies around disinformation, around corruption, around how politics functions and how governments function. And then that doesn't mean shut up about other parts of the world. It means having reasonable expectations of what you can achieve. I think the US should speak out about individual cases or civil society issues in other countries and it should do so in a kind of routinized way. So with India, for instance, I think it's almost because we never do it, it's super dramatic. If we do, part of it's got to be like, you know what, every now and then we're going to call this out or this case out. We're going to be a lifeline for people that are on the other side of these things. I'd also like to see the US and other democracies do more to resource independent civil society, independent journalism and some of that's going to have to be outside of governments too. So I'm not suggesting walking away from that. I'm suggesting that before we kind of enter some cold war over values, the one we have to win is at home. And frankly that's the best thing we can do. You'll hear this from activists and I mean, and Navalny told me this when I talked to him from the last book. I don't need a bunch of sanctions from you. I need the US to not make democracy look bad.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (44:08)

I'm struck that as you have a president who talks about democracy versus autocracy in very grand terms and loves to give speeches about the free world and you saw this in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Perhaps this was muscle memory for Biden. And going back to these grand speeches about democracy, in fact, much of what we're doing shows a much more kind of cold blooded approach. India, which is a Very important kind of geostrategic partner when it comes to the competition with China. Wasn't that in the previous administrations there was lots of really harsh criticism of India, but there's certainly been less under this administration than before. We're negotiating what may be a true security command with a Saudi government that Biden called the pariah, or he said he would make it a pariah during the campaign. So in some ways things seem to be going the other direction. Rather in a world of blocs and geopolitical tensions, we're not seeing lots of careful focus on this, but in fact an acceptance that we need to forego some of this rhetoric just given the nature of competition.

Ben Rhodes (45:08)

Yeah, but I think it's also kind of what is the point of the rhetoric? What are you trying to achieve? And the Normandy ceremony just happened. There was a lot of. As someone who was in the White House, I can see the spin when it shows up in the. And there was a lot of like he's going to echo Reagan, you know, which is exactly what you're talking about. It's like the apex of the free world. Right. Ronald Reagan at Normandy. And yet if you dig into Ronald Reagan. Right. I always been doing some reading for this project I'm working on now. And it was a great speech Reagan gave where he talked about freedom. And the three examples he used where the US Were standing for freedom. You know, one of them was Angola where we were supporting a right wing dictator, basically fighting communists. One was the Mujahideen, basically the Taliban in Afghanistan fighting against the communists. And another one, I can't remember which Latin American country where it was like a right wing. That wasn't the value of freedom. It was what I was saying is geopolitical competition where the values argument suited us. I think there's a more interesting model that I've also been reading about a lot, which is Kennedy, where Kennedy came in with all the rhetoric, he wrote the greatest hits. He's the Rolling Stones of values rhetoric for American president. And kind of what he realized with his brother pretty early on is something that Dean Acheson had also realized, that Dean Rusk also realized that dropping these names because he met the Council on Foreign Relations and excited to be here is that, wait a second, if we don't get our act together on civil rights, I'm going to look like a freaking idiot with who's to going. Going around the world talking about freedom. And actually if you look at the Kennedy's evolution on civil rights, it was foreign policy that brought them to support the civil rights movement. I think one of the most fascinating things about John F. Kennedy is that he gave, I think, his greatest foreign policy speech at American University about rethinking the Cold War. The next day, he gave his great civil rights speech, embracing essentially the civil rights movement for the first time. I think he saw those things were connected that essentially. Wait a second. If I want to draw a contrast of the Soviets, it's not just the speeches I give in Berlin. It's whether or not I'm backing Martin Luther King here in this country. And this is what I'm talking about, getting our own house in order. And Obama at his best did this. And sometimes he also just painted by numbers. I wrote some speeches like that. But where he was at his best, it wasn't just about, like, America is America the leader of the free world? And so here's some rhetoric about democracy. It was. Is, here's what we're working on, here's how we're trying to get better here, and that's therefore what we're going to support around the world. And I think there's a lot that Biden or any American president could say about the need to detoxify the information environment, to battle political corruption, to extend equal rights to marginalized groups in ways that are actually universal. And that can then bleed into the criticisms you make of certain governments. I mean, I think one thing that's been lost on some people in foreign policy is that, yeah, some people who have been protesting the Israeli military operation, you get some anti Semitic, certainly troubling echoes there. Then you get some people who've kind of traditionally been pro Palestinian, but a lot of it is people that came of age in the Black Lives Matter movement. And they're just looking at this and thinking, wait a second, these lives don't matter as much as the Israeli lives. Why do we seem to put this kind of value on a single Israeli life that we don't on 10,000 Palestinian children? Right. And so I think it takes a lot of dexterity. But I think that the values point has to be about America from the inside out, not America going around the world and giving stirring speeches that seem disconnected from what's happening here in this country.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (48:44)

You made the point earlier that people sitting in places like the Council on Foreign Relations tend to disregard the influence of politics and foreign policy and the way that politics and foreign policy interact, shaping both of them. People will be listening to this around the time of the first debate of the 2024 general election, which is a Little bit earlier than most of us would expect or have liked, but here it is. What role do you expect foreign policy and national security concerns to play in the election and how will that shape the conduct of American foreign policy?

Ben Rhodes (49:14)

You put that really well. I mean, unfortunately, when Trump is in part of the picture, right from his perspective, foreign policy is kind of about two things. One is it's an extension of identity politics. One of the things I started to realize late in the Obama years and the kind of right wing critique of our policies, they would wrap together immigrants at the border, Iran, ISIS into some vast other. And it's not like your average Fox News your knew anything about and I don't mean this in condescending way, I truly don't because I wouldn't expect anyone to know, but had strong views on centrifuge technology in Iran, but Iran was part of the vast other and Barack Obama was not standing up to that. And frankly, I think there's some racialized elements to this. Trump kind of casts a big umbrella over a bunch of scary things and says I'll stop those scary things from happening or I'll stand up to those people. And they, by the way, tend to usually not be white people. Russia, for instance, is accepted, whereas China is not. So that may be an uncomfortable statement for some people to hear, but I think there's an otherization that MAGA does that's part of it. And then the other thing is just chaos. I think Trump's argument is going to be the world is chaotic. There's a war in Gaza, there's a war in Ukraine. There weren't wars in those places when I was president, which is not entirely true, and I'll end them. And so it's harder for Biden to defend a messy world than it is for Trump to just describe how messy that world is and to assert that he will be able to deal with it. That's Trump's strength. I think Biden's strength is this sense that I think Americans do care. And I've seen this in polling. They don't like the throwing Ukraine under the bus. I think that's why the Republicans folded on that supplemental. They don't like putting so there is this, the democracy, connecting the democracy message at home. Why Trump scared home to his kind of weird affinity for Putin and dictators. I think that's going to be Biden's message essentially that I stand for the things that Americans stand for and we need to stand for those things because it's important. I think Biden will actually get in trouble if he starts trying to defend all pieces of his record, because that's not what these debates have been about. Obama made the same mistake in his first debate in 2012. You're president, you're very defensive about things, and so you have to make big values propositions about, here's what I stand for and here's where I'm trying to go. And that's the contrast I think he needs to make with Trump. The last thing I'd say is that, and I tried to introduce this in the article, is that the stakes really are high. We say this every election, but there are two active large scale wars on fault lines that are like World War I and World War II War II fault lines. There's a lot of autocrats out there that are getting more aggressive. And so in just an intangible sense, when Trump was elected in 2016, the stakes didn't. They frankly didn't feel that high relative to where they are now in terms of the international situation. There's an ISIS campaign ongoing that's not quite as complicated as what we're talking about now. And so I do think people at least might be able to take a moment and realize, wait a second, do we really want to send this guy into that hornet's nest?

Dan Kurtz Phelan (52:23)

You watched for four years of Trump being in power, his administration, undo so many of the initiatives that you and your colleagues had spent countless hours on, and that seemed to really be kind of coming together to mark a transformation of American foreign policy. You mentioned most of these Paris climate accords, the Cuban Iran deals, lots of other things that we could dig into. Are there things that you wish you had done to Trump? Proof some of those looking back. And is there anything you'd recommend the Biden administration do to prepare for the possibility that Trump will be back in power in several months?

Ben Rhodes (52:58)

Yes, Paris was the most Trump proofed, in part because it was the most evolved in terms of the constituencies. US States had their own emissions targets, and the private sector took the message of a global agreement to transition away from fossil fuels. The capital is flowing in that direction. So Trump pulling out of the Paris agreement, while it slowed a lot of diplomatic progress, it didn't really do anything to upset the trajectory of a clean energy transition. So it was Trump proof because there are other constituencies that were invested in it. But at the end of the day, like on the Iran deal, I've had people say to me, well, you guys made a mistake in not getting that to be a congressionally approved agreement. I don't know. I don't think that was possible. I just don't think a Republican. It was a Republican House of Representatives. Does anybody think there was any Iran deal that those guys were gonna support? Sometimes you kind of gotta just deal well with the world as it is. You do what you can do. So I think when they're thinking about Trump proofing, part of what you can do is just try to over resource some of your policies to get them of momentum. Can we get a bunch of pipelines going for Ukraine aid so that at least there's a couple of years where that's kind of taken care of? Right. I think they've done that on the ira. One of the reasons they did big spending bills, you can't really. It's going to be hard for Trump to come in and turn off clean energy spending, even if he said he would. But I don't believe him because why would he want to turn off semiconductors being built here on chips act or so actually spending money is something that is harder to undo. And I think that's probably why Biden's spent a lot of money. And beyond that, you have to accept we should be mature enough as a superpower to not have these swings. And it's almost useful as an accountability measure that not everything is Trump proofed because this is a ridiculous way of doing business. We didn't do this in the Cold War. I think maybe it was the council formulation, but no, I think people took it seriously enough that there wouldn't have been a Trump in the Cold War. And I mentioned this in the piece. Nuclear war is back on the table in a way that it wasn't since probably the end of the Cold War. That should be disciplining around who our political leaders are and somehow some way, whether Trump wins this time or not, four years from now, we're going to be in a post Trump era. And I do hope that there's some capacity to kind of recenter American politics around basic propositions like we need to think about existential risk when we elect these people or select them in primary processes or have political parties that acquiesce to certain things, because I think everybody feels the same anxiety. Whatever your political dynamic even report Republicans like this is not a way to run a superpower.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (55:51)

Given the distressingly early start to this general election season, that's probably the right note to end on. Ben, thanks for the great piece. It's in our July August issue. It's called A Foreign Policy for the World as it is and thanks for joining me.

Ben Rhodes (56:02)

Thanks Jen.

Dan Kurtz Phelan (56:10)

Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on the Today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannan, Julia Fleming dresser, and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph, Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sierra, and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.