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The Foreign Affairs Interview
Bonus: How the War in Gaza Is Reshaping the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
00:37:27
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- [00:00]
Dan Kurtzpelin
Dan I'm Dan Kurtzphelin and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
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Lisa Anderson
This was obviously an intelligence and moral surprise and trauma for Israel, but in some respects the same can be said for the Biden administration.
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Dan Kurtzpelin
Hamas's attack on October 7 shocked the world and upended the status quo in the Middle East. With no end in sight to the war in Gaza, much remains unclear what Israel's endgame is. Who will govern Gaza when the fighting ends? How the last two months have reshaped the Israeli Palestinian conflict? To talk through these questions, I was recently joined by Lisa Anderson, Salaam Fayyad and Amos Yadlin for a Foreign affairs live event. We discussed the Israeli strategy, whether Hamas can actually be destroyed, and whether there is any hope for a return to a peace process. Thanks so much and welcome all to this Foreign affairs discussion. Marking the release just a couple of days ago of our January February 2024 issue, we wanted to use this occasion to bring together a few authors who have contributed some of the notable pieces both to that issue of the magazine and to foreign affairs.com since October 7th and since the start of the war in Gaza, in the hopes that they can shed some light on how we got here and where we are, but also more importantly on how we might go forward and how some of the key decision makers in governments and institutions can constructively shape those outcomes. I believe all three of them are fairly well known to most of you. Joining the discussion today we have Lisa Anderson. Lisa is a professor of International Relations at Columbia University. She was previously the President of the American University of Cairo, as well as Dean of Columbia School of International and Public affairs, and she is most importantly, the Middle east book reviewer for Foreign Affairs. Next we have Salaam Fayyad. Salaam is now a professor at Princeton. He was previously the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority from 2007 to 2012. Before that he was Finance Minister, as well as a longtime official at the World bank and the imf. And last but not least, Amos Yadlin. Amos is a former general in the Israeli Air Force. He was head of military intelligence in Israel from 2006 to 2011 and then went on to head Tel Aviv University's Institute of National Security Studies and now runs his own consultancy called Mind Israel. Thanks so much to all three of you for joining me today and for your contributions to Foreign affairs in recent months. I want to start by posing versions of the same question to all three of you about the strategy of key actors in both the war now unfolding and the broader conflict of which it's a part. I think, you know, the idea here is to. To try in a way that I think has been strikingly difficult as the war unfolds, to lay out clearly what the objective is, what means each actor is employing to achieve that objective, and what kind of theory of success that suggests that the chosen means can get them to the desired end. So, Amos, I'll start with you. We've heard various Israeli figures say that the objective is the destruction of Hamas. You articulated a version of that in your recent essay for the magazine called why Israel Slept. That has a military dimension, but as with any real war aim, it's of course it's a political objective. Ultimately, what exactly would that look like in practice? And how is the current Israeli approach meant to yield that result? And I'm interested in both your assessment of how the current leadership thinks of that, but also how you would assess it and whether you think it's viable.
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Amos Yadlin
Yeah, the 7th of October is a huge trauma for the Israelis. And there is 95% support for the government goals that are 3, not to destroy Hamas, not to eliminate Hamas, but to dismantle Hamas, to dismantle Hamas as a governance and to demilitarize Hamas as a military, as an army. The Israelis look at Gaza as a neighboring state that attacked Israel, that killed 900 innocent civilians, kids in front of their parents, parents in front of their children, raped 14 years old girls and kidnapped many of them. And Israel see it as if this is Nazi Germany attacking a neighboring country. So it should be destroyed not as a retaliation, but as never again never let a Palestinian entity or Palestinian state having a military that can do it again, by the way, going back all the way to the Oslo Akum, which spoke about demilitarize Palestinian state or Palestinian entity. So this is the first goal. The second goal is to bring back home once again kids, mothers, elderly, Holocaust survivors and soldiers and female soldiers that were taken to Gaza. This second objective was not there in the beginning. In the beginning it was like we lost 1400 people, another 250. But destroying Hamas is more important. As we speak today, the two objectives are in the same level. The Israeli public opinion, listening to the stories of those who came back from Gaza, put this objective of bringing back the hostages in the same lab. The third objective is to return those who leave the Western Negev, the kibbutzim, the towns that are now without their residence because they don't want to live and to be exposed to another attack. Are they close to achieve the objectives? No, they are not. And this will take time. I look at the time I called my friend John Allen, General Ellen, who led the coalition against ISIS and Hamas for us is like ISIS to you. The only problem is that ISIS was not supported by one country from the world. Hamas is supported by many. Turkey, Qatar to be mentioned too. And Israel is fighting not with a coalition of 85 states like John Allen led. We are basically fighting alone with a support of the United States of America. And the people of Israel are really appreciating President Biden, moral support, financial support and military support. So it took 18 months to take back Mosul and Raqqa. And Mosul and Raqqa was not with underground city, were not equipped with the best Iranian weapon, and it was not close to Texas or to Maine. It was far away and most of the fighters were Iraqis and there were not 240American refugees. So the IDF is working slowly.
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Dan Kurtzpelin
That's a bracing place to start. Salam, let me turn to you. I should stress that neither Mos nor Salaam speaks for their respective leadership, so they both have held senior positions in the past. Salaam, let me split a version of that question to two parts. Given the split in Palestinian leadership, what do you see as Hamas's theory of success in the current conflict? Is it working? And second, is the Palestinian Authority playing any active role here? And if so, what does it say?
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Salaam Fayyad
Thank you very much and thanks to you for convening this webinar to Foreign Affairs. First, before I address that directly, brief comment on the objectives as perceived from the Israeli side. Three of them dismantle return hostages and Israeli citizens to border areas from which they were evacuated not only around Gaza, but also in the north as well. If we were to begin with the last objective, I think it's obviously achievable, but it requires something other than war. Because to really have that kind of peace and tranquility, whatever security arrangements there are need to be underpinned by political accommodation understandings for that to be sustainable. The difficulty I have actually is with the first one dismantling Hamas. And that's not the way in which that objective was first stated by the government of Israel. It was first projected as to destroy, eradicate. All of this was used and even if that objective was subsequently restated watered down a little bit. But to me, regardless of the formulation here in terms of attainability, what we are looking at ranges from the highly unattainable or impossible to be unattainable. So obviously we all can agree in terms of eradication of Hamas as a political movement with an ideology is out of the question, but the lesser stated objectives actually to me are unattainable. The war has been going on for more than two months and to this day there are still rockets launched from Gaza into Israel. And if we all can agree that end of the day, regardless of what happens, there will need to be form of political accommodation to underpin peace, security, stability alone. But like if we, for example, go back to the escalation round of escalation of 2014, some of what we heard at the beginning shortly after October 7th, coming out of Israel is not that different from what we had coming out of Israel in 2014, similar objectives and all. But it ended up being every time a case of kicking can down the road. I fear that this is what's going on right now. I was hoping that the release of captives would carve out enough diplomatic space for there to be some movement to come to view as to how to really get out of this, including on our side. Because it has been my view for many, many years that actually factional rivalries underlie much of our own inability to really get to the point of being able to achieve our stated objectives. Which brings me to your question as to Hamas and personal authority. Personal authority found itself in the me that aftermath 10-7- helpless, not able to do anything of consequence, and maybe even not able to say much of anything that resonated with people. But one thing for certain, I personally predicted that the PA would come under severe, severe political pressure, thereby weakening it a lot more, even beyond the very feeble status it really got to before October 7th. So that's where the PA is. What I have seen actually as a perennial source of weakness for our national movement, historically not the product of the last 20, 30 years, but actually for many, many decades now, actually faction rivalries. I mean, this is not something new and it's been failure to redefine the way not to suppress pluralism, but to actually manage it effectively. Finally, given all of what I've said, I see it as a priority to really do everything that's possible to bring this war to an end today, before tomorrow, before day. After all I see happening right now, beyond what has happened so far, is more killing, death and destruction was going to really make it even more difficult to really get to the thereafter and really do the healing and getting out of this and getting to better, more for everybody that we all must be really focused on.
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Dan Kurtzpelin
Let me go to Lisa for the US dimension. Lisa, you obviously don't speak for the Biden administration. But what is your assessment of their theory of the case here? Obviously it's become strained in the last few days as you've seen more of a divergence between Israeli statements and those coming from the administration. But, but do you see a coherent theory of the case? Do you see that changing in this moment?
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Lisa Anderson
I actually think part of the problem for the United States is that there is not a coherent theory of the case. If you will keep in mind that ever since the Obama administration, the United States has wanted to pivot away from the region, wanted to think about China, wanted to think about Russia, so forth and so on. So I think part of the difficulty is that this was obviously intelligence and moral surprise and trauma for Israel. But in some respects the same can be said for the Biden administration. This was not something they expected as Jake Sullivan's famous foreign affairs observation, that the Middle east hadn't been as peaceful as this in years published days before October 7th. So I think part of what we're seeing in the Biden administration is surprise and kind of scrambling to figure out what to do. And I think a sort of very personal Biden affinity for Israel, a sense that Israel has long been a solid ally of the United States and therefore in its time of difficulty, needs American support. So weighed in pretty unconditionally in supporting Israel in its response to October 7th. And I think it's therefore a second surprise to find that neither internationally nor domestically is that as clear cut a position as the administration thought it was. So now not only are they trying to figure out some longer term way of thinking about the region as a whole, they would still like it to be something they don't have to worry about. But also now managing being relatively isolated internationally in the support for Israel, as the United nations, the General assembly vote suggested. But even this turning into a fairly raucous and uncomfortable debate within the United States, which clearly was not something they anticipated. So at this point, I think you still see an administration that's really grasping at straws to think about how to manage into a situation which obviously everyone thinks would be more desirable to be thinking about political solutions than military. You know, in a sense, I really think we're seeing an administration that's not thinking strategically yet.
- [15:09]
Dan Kurtzpelin
I want to turn to what Salaam referred to as the day after question momentarily, but almost let me first go to you very quickly for your assessment of the meaning of the significance of the global outcry over civilian casualties in Gaza especially, and the increasing signs of some Tension between Washington and the Israeli leadership. Do you see that as a strategic problem for the Israeli offensive? Is that a strategic liability at this point?
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Amos Yadlin
No doubt that there is different views in Jerusalem and in Washington about the way of achieving a common goal. And it is a common goal to dismantle Hamas, to destroy Hamas, to eradicate Hamas. Whatever term you choose. I choose dismantle. But they use the same phrase. Why they use the same phrase? Because this go against the American interest in the Middle East. Whoever want to state solution don't want to see Hamas there. Hamas is against two state solution. Hamas is not recognizing the Oslo accord. Hamas is not denouncing terror. Hamas is not recognizing Israel. So we are sharing the same goal. However, the Americans, the Biden administration want us to do it quickly without collateral damage and without humanitarian crisis. I don't know if the US have ever done it this way. I already spoke about 18 months campaign against ISIS. I will not mention 20 years in Afghanistan. I will not mention seven, eight years in Iraq. And once again I will not mention Dresden or Tokyo. Okay. You cannot destroy an enemy that is willing to use his own citizens as human ship. The ceasefire can be achieved tonight. Tonight if Senwar will bring back the hostages, put them on the pickups and send them to Egypt, this can bring a ceasefire. If you want to blame somebody that there is no ceasefire, it's Senwa and not anybody else. So the war will continue until Senwar will be destroyed and his organization will be destroyed. And if the President of the United States will decide that continuing with this war is against the interest of the United States and he want Hamas to survive, I guess he have leverages to stop Israel.
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Dan Kurtzpelin
Salon Let me go to you. Feel free to respond to anything Lisa or But I'd also, I think it'd be useful to get your kind of, you know, the one minute version of your proposal for the day after. And you know, I think you first wrote that in Foreign affairs about six weeks ago. The extent to which you see that becoming more or less likely given events in the six weeks since you wrote it.
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Salaam Fayyad
I'll do it in half a minute and I'll use the other half to maybe respond and comment on what Thomas said about the objectives of war and his assessment that it would need to take 18 months or so to get to the objective of dismantling Hamas. Let me say if the objective that binds all of us is peace with stability, questions how to achieve it. I personally believe that the object that is spent in Hamas is not attainable however many months this is going to really take. Hamas has features that combine both being a non state actor with being a state actor. If Hamas were completely not a hybrid, a state actor, you could think of a scenario like in other wars. What brings the war to an end? Total destruction of the country brings countries to surrender. Well, if you have non state features as part of who you are, your identity, things change dramatically. Unlike Daesh, which actually is a combination of fighters coming from all over the world, Hamas is an integral component of the Palestinian fabric of society there. So you could conceivably see find a family where you have somebody who is Hamas, somebody who has different affiliation, somebody who has nothing to do with factions, with guns, with anything. Again, this caricature of Hamas and acting the way it is, using civilians as human shields and all human shields that we will be talking about are their own families. I think we really need to think about that a little bit. But more to the point of how much longer can this or should this be allowed to continue before the objective of this mantic Hamas is achieved? At the current rate, just doing a simple extrapolation ahead to do the swim allies, we're looking at basically 200,000 Palestinians perishing. Let's just be clear on what another 20 months of this hell is going to mean. It's going to mean 200,000 skills at the current rate that's going on right now. Is this just simply collateral damage that can be dismissed knowing at least as far as I'm concerned, that the objective as stated is not attainable to begin with. Might as well begin today on hostages. He also mentioned that Unison war could end the war tomorrow if he were to put the hostages and truck center to Egypt or Israel or something like that. The United nations had before the Security Council draft resolution, everybody kind of looked at ceasefire component of it without really looking at what else it contained. That resolution actually did not talk about permanent ceasefire. First of all it talked about humanitarian ceasefire, but beyond that it called for the immediate and unconditional release of hostages. That's the language and the resolution. And yet that resolution was not allowed to pass. So unfortunately that was actually missed. It's important to really try to look and find ways as part. And here I come to your question as part of really helping towards bringing the war to an end. My idea about what to do and how to really manage it in the day after, and I hope this comes sooner rather than later, as I'm sure we all can agree what the leadership should do is to actually immediately convene a meeting for all the secretaries General of all Palestinian factions and put them all around the table. And this is how you lead. You have all points of view represented. And this body is going to lead the Palestinian people and transitionally is going to govern through reconstituted, reconfigured pa. One that is product of consensus, a government that is consented to by this committee of the whole, so to speak, and that is going to, you know, a government formed this way of consent of everybody can be available to go to Gaza immediately without the stigma of it being seen as coming to Gaza on top of an Israeli tank or something like that. Why? Because it's product of consensus.
- [22:30]
Dan Kurtzpelin
We'll be back after a short break.
- [22:33]
Salaam Fayyad
Did you know that Foreign affairs has an app? Customizable settings allow readers to listen to professionally narrated audio of articles, create playlists,
- [22:41]
Lisa Anderson
save your favorite articles, resize text, read in night mode and more.
- [22:46]
Salaam Fayyad
Just search for Foreign affairs in your
- [22:48]
Lisa Anderson
app store and start reading wherever you are.
- [22:51]
Salaam Fayyad
Download the app today.
- [22:57]
Dan Kurtzpelin
Lisa, let me go to you with a two part question. First, you know, you've seen various proposals for governance of Gaza in the wake of this, whenever that comes. A lot of those include some role for regional governments, including Egypt, which you've written about for Foreign affairs, as well as Saudi and Qatar and the UAE and others. Do you see any willingness, any prospect on the part of those governments that they would actually take part in that? And then second, as you look forward, do you see Mose had mentioned the normalization discussions between Saudi and Israel, following on some of the other normalization deals in recent years. Do you see any prospect of a return to that? Will that still be a kind of major regional dynamic or has this really put an end to that for the time being?
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Lisa Anderson
Well, first, let me just remind everyone that the American experience in Afghanistan and even with ISIS was not in fact a success. And so the idea that you can spend 20 years trying to destroy a social movement and and obviously leave the country the social movement, that is to say the Taliban political movement, reappears. So how we understand the sort of historical examples I think we should be careful with ISIS is may not be operating in Iraq, but certainly operating all over the Sahara. So these are very hard to address militarily. And I think that's part of what this debate is about as far as the regional investment in the future of Gaza. I think again, keep in mind that most of these governments are thinking not only about any kind of popular view of what they should be doing, but their own stability and longevity. And at this point Certainly there is absolutely no incentive for any government in the region to step up and say we're going to help what would seem like bail out the Israelis. So everybody is going to sit on the sidelines for the foreseeable future. There's just no incentive to do that. The Egyptian government, I think, is so far threading the needle by saying, on the one hand, permitting pro Palestinian demonstrations and so forth, which they don't ordinarily permit, and yet at the same time saying that there is an absolute building a wall so that no Palestinians can be, as we say, pushed into the Sinai. I think there's a lot of popular sentiment that's sympathetic to the humanitarian challenges of living in Gaza right now in Egypt, for example. So I think the building the wall is a principled, if you will, pro Palestinian position, but it's not that popular a pro Palestinian position right now, because these are people who are seeing themselves mirrored in this kind of oppressive and violent environment. So I think for the Egyptian government, they're in a somewhat difficult position. But I wrote in that piece that I thought all of these governments will see opportunities to secure what I call crisis rents. And the Egyptians are already being offered more money from the World bank and the IMF and so forth and so on. So I think they're seeing how do they as a regime, as opposed to a country, benefit from this. And all of the governments will do that, but I don't think they will they have any interest at all in even entertaining imaginary hypothetical regimes for Gaza that may come later, but at this point, no. And as far as the Saudi Israel arrangement, I think that's pretty backburn at this point. Again, the Saudis have no incentive to pursue this at this juncture and some incentives not to. So they'll just again sit on the sidelines, see what develops, see what might be in their interest at some point. But there's nothing that they there's no reason for them to offer anything. And that will be true, I think, pretty much until there is a pause in the military operations.
- [26:58]
Dan Kurtzpelin
Mohsen Salam, I want to go to each of you just for one minute, let's say, on whether a return to some kind of peace process is possible or kind of political horizon for the Palestinians, as it's often said in the wake of this, whether you think that's at all feasible and what it would take to get there. I suppose in almost case that would mean change in the prime minister's office in Israel, among other things, but very quickly, almost. Do you see any prospect of that in the wake of this, it was
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Amos Yadlin
very difficult before and it is almost impossible now as long as Hamas is there. And if you haven't seen, if you haven't saw, look at the Khalil Shkil last poll. The Palestinians support the 7th of October and Israelis are paying attention. And the fact that the Palestinian Authority is corrupt, weak and the people are not support, the Palestinian people are not supporting it. Last election was 2006 and those who don't remember, Hamas won. So this is on the Palestinian side and on the Israeli side, the prime Minister, his government survival depends on two radical extreme right wing parties that even to say Palestinian assault is out of a question. And if you look to the long run generation ahead, I think, and I was always thinking that the two state solution is the Mesolush. However, the gaps today between the two people, between the two leadership cannot be bridged. So the process can be renewed. If Hamas will not be there reaching a solution. We need a different education in the Palestinian Authority that people will look into peace and stability. And I fully agree with Salam. This is what we have to get. And not to the terrorists that want to kill the Israelis and to remove them from the river to the sea into the Mediterranean. And this is the majority of the Palestinian people, unfortunately.
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Dan Kurtzpelin
Salaam, any prospect you see, let me
- [29:11]
Salaam Fayyad
say that actually in terms of the objective, the ultimate objective of attaining peace, I mean there's no disagreement. I mean to think that that's around the corner now and the immediate aftermath, unfortunately we can't even say aftermath because the horror is still going on after October 7th is a stretch. Not that there was a solution around the corner before October 7th. Part of the reason why we continue to go into this cycle actually. And again, this is just like the latest in what could be repeated. By the way, unfortunately, if history tells us anything, look at the previous rounds of escalations from 2006 onward is getting more difficult, more difficult up to where we are now. We definitely need a process that is credible. You know, that the people look at and say, oh okay, yeah, it's not going to happen tomorrow that we're going to get where we're going, but we are on track that looks to be credible compared to everything that we have seen before. That's the kind of thing that I really am talking about. And the effort here, I'm the first one. I mean I always was an advocate of looking into the mirror and asking question, what is it that we persons need to do to assume full agency in our own Liberation. That was always my position to remain so. At the same time, look at the government in Israel is absolutely right. Some elements sitting on the current government in Israel are opposed not only to the idea of personal state but even to the existence of this very feeble personal authority as it is. So a lot has to happen. My idea is to really how do we make out to exist something that is stronger, more representative, more legitimate, more viable to be an instrument of A bringing the world to an end and B if supported by a process that is credible with international backing and support can actually change the reality and the trajectory of the disaster we are on right now. Finally, on money and reconstruction and all I agree with which you said the task is just like enormous money is an issue. I know that for sure. But it's not the issue to be honest with you, unless there's something that really gives potential donors confidence that they're not really putting in their money only to see whatever it is that's done with the money destroyed or something else happening that's not going to happen. So I think we should be seized first on political accommodation. What do we really need to do in order to put together a polity that actually can inspire confidence? And then the technical stuff comes in. What I mean when I say reconstituted, reconfigured, I mean re enabled enablement of the PA politically. That's what's really required. And that can happen very quickly by the way. That can happen very quickly if there is dual. I hope that happens.
- [32:06]
Dan Kurtzpelin
Amos, let me go to you. I think it's kind of particularly front of mind for people whether Israeli leadership will see the need to go after Hezbollah and materially change its Hezbollah's capabilities just given the evacuation of people from the northern border as well.
- [32:21]
Amos Yadlin
Yes, intelligence assessment especially on intentions of federal organizations or leader at all are now has a very low credibility. But I'm still risking to say that Nasrallah doesn't want a full scale war and so is the Iranians. President Biden helped them to decide by the two don't. But there was another don't for Israel. Don't escalate. The US is busy in the great power competition with China. They are supporting Ukraine against Russia and another war in the Middle east after Afghanistan and Iraq is the least desirable goal for any American administration. So what happened in the north that Hezbollah decided to support senor on the minimum needed symbolic attack and they attacked Israel. But they restricted their attack to zero to five kilometers, about five anti tank missiles a day, 1020 rockets half of them from Palestinians in Lebanon and two or three Palestinian terror teams that were killed on the border. But this basically caused the leaving of 60,000 Israelis on the northern border. And Israel cannot go back to the 6th of October situation in the north. So Nasrallah is exchanged fire with Israel and Israel is exchanged fire with Nasrallah. On the lowest level, escalation can happen first by mistake of one of the side that will cause casualties that will bring the ladder of escalation up. But the problem is how to remove Hezbollah from the border. We will try to do it diplomatically, but as Theodore Roosevelt have said in 1909, you need a big stick in the air if you want to succeed in diplomacy. And Israel will have to look at it because we are not going back to the 6th of October when Hezbollah is on the board.
- [34:52]
Dan Kurtzpelin
Salam, let me go to you to close. You're welcome to address the regional escalation question, but also I think it's worth saying something about the west bank here.
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Salaam Fayyad
You know, regional escalation, I viewed it, like many, as low probability in terms of really big time escalation. However, I always considered it and still do to be, yes, low probability. But if it were to happen, it could be devastating. So it certainly cannot be ignored. The fact that the analysis has so far turned out to be right in terms of the escalation not having the large scale and all should not really get us to really be too sanguine about that not happening. And we really haven't said anything about Yemen and what's happening there at sea and all not only by mistake but by calculation. Maybe something like large scale could happen. Regardless of the calculus that really goes into this. Iran was mentioned. I don't think there is really time to get into this, but sooner or later I think the whole region really needs to be looked at through the prism of what is possible to achieve by bringing in elements of creative diplomacy to really get to the point of regional order, some accommodation that can underpin stability once that is really attained, because minus that, we're going to really continue to go into cycle after cycle of violence and wars that definitely bring nothing but zest of people in the future.
- [36:21]
Dan Kurtzpelin
I wish we had much more time. Lisa Salamous, thank you so much for joining me today. Thanks for the work you've done for Foreign affairs in recent months and thanks to everyone for joining. We will certainly continue this conversation in the magazine and I hope in conversation in the coming months. Here at the Foreign affairs interview. We are so deeply grateful to our audience for tuning in to each episode. We are taking a short break for the holidays, but we'll be back with a new episode on January 11th. You can find the articles that we discussed on Today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannon, Julia Fleming dresser and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph, Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sierra and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts, and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. Thanks again for tuning in.