B (3:59)

Thank you, Dan. Great to be here. So I think I'd give three reasons. I mean, just very briefly, I think first is his ability to establish ideological dominance. And he has managed to convince large sections of the Indian population that he is the best embodiment of India's long term national interests. Every other political party, he would argue, is either a symptom of a decaying ancient regime, dynastic rule or something, or caught up in very short term sectional interests of region, caste or something. So he's occupied that kind of nationalist imagination, big transformation. The second, he's presented himself as a kind of embodiment of the consolidation of Hindu self consciousness and Hindu nationalism. I mean it's evident in the grammar of pretty much everything he does, this agent of liberation from a thousand year history of subjugation. And the third, I think it is worth reminding is that he heads one of the most powerful and best organized political parties in the world, that there is a kind of organizational aspect to the way in which they can mobilize voters, which is actually quite unprecedented. So that's, I think, at that ideological level. I think the second thing I think to be said, that he. He has sold this kind of idea quite effectively, that he has enabled India's state capacity to expand in many effective ways. The Indian economy may not be doing as well as the government sometimes claims, but compared to many of its peers, it's a competent record. But the sense that there's a kind of modern technological leap the Indian economy can make, whether it's industrial policy, whether it's in digital infrastructure, whether it's literal real infrastructure, is quite palpable, and then undergirded it by a welfare coalition. Talking of themes that people had not talked about in Indian politics before, sanitation, gas, connections to women, drinking water. And I think the most striking measure of his success is that by all accounts, women seem to be voting for him more than the opposition. So he's really occupied that modernist space as much as that kind of Hindu nationalist space, I think, quite powerfully.

A (6:23)

And just to expand a bit on the Hindu nationalist element, which is, I think, what much of the outside analysis of his government focuses on. Do you see that as, you know, the discussion of that, that, that you are very well aware in the United States, understanding the depth of it, the nature of it, or there kind of elements of it that we miss when we're observing it from afar, I mean,

B (6:46)

I think it's a difficult discussion to have, I think, for the following reason. You know, I think the discussion tends to veer between either complete catastrophism and alarmism. Right. I mean, India is just going to fall apart tomorrow. And honestly, it's very hard to experientially make that case immediately. On the other hand, the reaction to it is also a kind of complacency, that somehow this is some kind of fringe element that in some senses will work itself out, but India will more or less kind of remain as it is. I think the sensible attitude to, in a sense take is that, look, we know from the history of these kinds of nationalism that as they consolidate more power, they become more dangerous. And they combine two elements. One is prejudice against minorities, external nationalism, and the second is deepening authoritarianism. And I do think there is a little bit under appreciation of the degree to which both of these elements are now play in Indian politics. And certainly the authoritarianism, making it the default mode in which the Indian state operates, I think is definitely increasing.

A (7:54)

And say a bit more about how you see that authoritarianism playing out, because as we watch this Vote unfolding over coming months.

B (8:01)

So very simple measures, curtailing civil liberties, certainly freedom of expression, freedom of journalism, academia, civil society, greater control over the information order, increasing use of state power to target opposition leaders. Most of the so called anti corruption cases. It's not a pure coincidence that they are against opposition leaders. And the coincidence isn't that they are the only ones that are corrupt. Getting the judiciary in some senses to sign off on the fundamentals of the Hindu nationalist imagination. So there are all of these signs you can see. But we can talk about others as well later.

A (8:40)

Ashley, let me go to you to focus on some of the external facing elements of Modi's time in government. I think this is a moment when there's lots of talk of India's global power. We've seen these moments before but this seems to be true for just kind of a new, new level. It of course hosted the G20 last year. And there's lots of pride when you're in Delhi about, about, about that. There's a sense that India's moment has kind of arrived in various ways. Let me ask you a two part question here. To what extent do you think that sense of triumphalism or optimism is warranted? And then second, to what extent is that a result of changes that this government has made to foreign policy as opposed to kind of continuity across, across governments of different parties in India?

C (9:21)

So let me try and answer the second question first Dan, and then we'll answer the question of whether it's warranted. So I think this government represents in one sense an important continuity with India's foreign policy past, which is India has always looked at the world as the arena that has to be made safe for its own economic development at home and its eventual rise as a great power. That has been an objective going back to 1947. And Modi has pursued that same objective I think more or less consistently in line with what his predecessors have done. But I think there are four other changes that have come about in India's foreign policy. Some of which involve style, some of which involve substance. The first is a dramatic upsurge in self confidence. Sometimes that self confidence is not necessarily anchored in a material reality as Pratap alluded to, but that self confidence is there all the same and it is really striking. The second is the prominence of personality. Now India has always had larger than life figures. Jabarlal Nehru strode the international stage in a lesser degree. Indira Gandhi did that in her time. But I do not think we have seen before such a astute use of governmental machinery to project the personality of Prime Minister Modi both on the domestic stage and on the international stage. I don't think his predecessors really had that kind of political acumen to do that in a way that he has done. And so the G20 event, for example, that you alluded to, Dan, almost gave the impression that it was Modi's event rather than a G20 event. I mean, he was truly the dominant personality in that whole process. The third, and I find this particularly interesting and it ties with the questions of Hindu nationalism that you and Pratap just spoke about is the increasing articulation that India must be treated as a unique civilizational state rather than as a liberal state. And I think the, the argument there is that India will pursue certain objectives in its domestic politics and must not be held to account by some universal norms because its particularity, its unique culture, et cetera, justifies creating a carve out for the way India conducts itself. And this has become very prominent under Prime Minister Modi and is worth paying attention to. And the fourth and last element I would flag is the almost naked conviction with which global cleavages have to be exploited for India's benefit. Now all nations exploit the cleavages that exist in their environment. Some do it more apologetically than others, but I think in India's case it has become quite transparent. And many Indian political leaders have had no compunctions in arguing that this is all about self interest and not necessarily tied to it, to the achievement of any universal goods, which India was very careful to do in the past. So even when pursued policies are tied to the achievement of some universal aims, and I see that less prominent in Modi's foreign policy.

A (13:21)

Alyssa, let me go to you and would welcome your thoughts on some of the points that Ashley covered. But I also wanted to focus a bit on the US India relationship specifically. You, of course, spent time helping manage this relationship with government. I think you were out of the State Department shortly before Modi came into power. But I think if you, you know, if we were to go back to 10 years ago and consider what the relationship might look like, especially under a democratic administration here and Prime Minister's Modi government, you know, there was a visa ban on him for a period of time. There was lots of focus on his time as chief minister of Gujarat and the treatment of minorities during that period. Are you surprised by the course of the US India relationship over the past 10 years under both Trump and Biden? It's been, I think, one of the strongest relations of kind of cross parties that we have, and there's a strong bipartisan consensus. Now, would that have surprised you if I told you that 10 years ago? And to the extent it does, what do you think accounts for that?

D (14:19)

I don't think I'm surprised by the idea that there continues to be a strong bipartisan consensus, but I do think that the depth of the relationship as it has evolved between New Delhi and Washington over, let's say, the past half decade, that has deepened in a way that I'm not sure I would have predicted, particularly with the redevelopment of the quad under the Trump administration and the carrying that forward in the Biden administration. India and the United States have had a long history of ties, friendly ties, but not close ties. Right, the estranged democracies, to quote Dennis Cook's wonderful title. And I think it was always hard to find space for India on the US Foreign policy agenda, or rather space for India in the middle of the radar screen for the US Foreign policy agenda, to mix metaphors. And I think that time has passed. I think that it is now clear that India does have an important role to play in Asia globally with the global south, and the depth of the ties with Washington, with the United States reflects that. It doesn't mean that there aren't still a long laundry list of irritants in the relationship that continue to mean that it's not smooth sailing. That's certainly the case on the economic side. It continues to be the case with a number of areas where, for example, you mentioned and Ashley mentioned in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This is not an area where India has decided to stand up for territorial sovereignty and has looked to make good use of an opportunity to assure its own energy security by procuring oil and gas from Russia during a time when I think many countries, including the United States, would have seen this as an important moment to stand up for the importance of territory and not invading neighboring countries, which is an issue that India cares a lot about, given its own concerns for China. I think we are probably likely to see continued strong bipartisan consensus on ties with India in the future, regardless of whoever comes into office in the United States next year. But I think there may be differences in the way that different administrations might approach different aspects of the relationship on the economic side and on the side of the question of values. And we may want to come back to that as a separate conversation later. But I do think part of what has happened is that India has simply become more important globally. It is now the world's Fifth largest economy. It is an important area for countries that are interested in investing. This is a huge growing market. It is also a potential place for relocating manufacturing. That story is not quite where Indian policymakers would like it to be but it's certainly at a time of de risking and trying to move global supply chains increasingly to other areas outside of China. There's a great opportunity there for India and I think you're going to continue to see great interest in India on the economic side.

A (17:40)

Let me linger on the Russia, Ukraine question, the point that you raised. I mean in India you hear kind of two different explanations for India's reaction to the war and continuing relation with Russia. One is look, you know, Russia's been a long standing defense supplier, an important counterweight to China. You know, there are lots of reasons why India needs to be kind of careful about this. And so you know, be patient and give us some time as we, as we make some of these shifts. There's also a kind of more cynical cold blooded one which is look, this is not really our problem and if we can get cheap oil and maintain these relationships without having to make choices, that's good for us. I'm curious what you see as the real driver of, of India's response to the war. And if you think I mean the, the Washington's fairly tolerant, been fairly tolerant of this. I don't think it's become a huge irritant in the relationship. Do you think the US posture towards this is the right one?

D (18:32)

I don't think it's become a huge irritant. Ashley has also written a bit about this too. He may want to chime in. It's, it's not a huge irritant but it certainly has given some people pause. This is in arena again. India has concerns about territorial sovereignty. So you'd think as a matter of global principle this might be a space to up and say invading your neighbor is not what we do. But that has not been India's modem. It's now. It's true that Prime Minister Modi has said publicly now is not the time for war. And so people point to that public comment rightly as his intervention in calling for a de escalation or some change from the current situation of conflict. But that of course hasn't really unfolded in any way. And again I think India is playing a very real politic hand here in energy security. It's very true has long been important for a country that has 1.4 billion people ever increasing energy needs. The economy has returned to fast pace of growth. So all of these comments make sense logically, but it is certainly the case that this is not India deciding to stand with countries that are against invading neighbors.

C (19:53)

I agree with everything that Alyssa said, but I would anchor that in the argument I made earlier, which is India has become much more self confident, is much more willing to very transparently anchors choices and self interest. And from a perspective of self interest, it sees the relationship with Russia as being very important for multiple reasons. There's the long standing emotional attachment because the Russians supported India consistently during the latter Cold War in a way that we did not do. But beyond emotion, there is a judgment that India cannot afford to let the Russians get closer to the Chinese than they already are. And they believe that if they cut off ties with Russia, then it essentially leaves Russia unmoored and free to tighten that relationship with Beijing, which is to India's disadvantage. And I think the Indians exaggerate their influence over Moscow's choices on this question. But as long as they believe this to be the case, they're not going to be cutting ties to Moscow or chastising it for what it's doing in Ukraine anytime soon. And the last and equally important element is that India has a different vision of world order from the United States in that India genuinely wants to see a world order that will be configured through multipolarity. And they want the Russians to be present there as one of the Poles. And they think that joining in any campaign that essentially destroys Russia as one of the poles is to the long term detriment of India's grand strategy in foreign policy. And this has multiple implications for us, which I don't think we've quite fully grasped. But the point is they do want to see Russia as a great power because they believe that they have an affinity with Russia that serves their interests and so pushing back against the Russians for all the reasons that Alyssa identified, which are important reasons like respect for sovereignty and so on and so forth. At the end of the day, just take second place in competition with all the other objectives.

A (22:09)

And Ashley, let me stick with you on the question of China. You wrote a piece several months ago warning American policymakers and observers not to expect India to do too much when it comes to US Tensions with China, especially in a kind of Taiwan scenario. But as you do look at India's concerns about Chinese power and evolving response to it, how would you characterize it and to what extent do you see convergence with American policy and American strategy in Asia?

C (22:38)

So I think there is one important element of convergence, which we should not overlook, right? Which is both Washington and New Delhi have a clear objective of making certain that Beijing does not become so overwhelmingly dominant in Asia or globally that it essentially chokes off space for all other countries, including and especially India. So on that count, there is strong convergence, but that convergence is embedded in a reality that is a little more problematic and often not paid attention to. The first element is that India is a much weaker state in comparison to China. India is a much weaker state when you compare itself to the United States vis a vis China. And that imposes real limits on the degree to which India can push back against the Chinese. The US can do what it wants because it's the more powerful state. India does not have that freedom of that freedom to exercise its options. The second is simply geography. India is uncomfortably close to China in a way that the United States is not. And therefore, while India benefits from a certain competition between the United States and China because it increases Delhi's maneuvering growth, it also does not want to see the US And China come to blows, because if they do, then that imposes very uncomfortable choices on India. India will have to then pick and choose sides. And the one thing that has been quite consistent in Indian foreign policy is the refusal to pick and choose sides in ways that end up alienating the other. So competition, yes, but nothing that involves a serious conflict that puts India in a position where it has to come down clearly on the side of one player or the other. And those are the limits, I think, to India's partnership with the US That I think we need to recognize.

A (24:44)

We'll be back after a short break.

B (24:48)

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D (24:50)

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B (25:12)

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C (25:14)

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A (25:16)

Eduardo and now back to my conversation with Alyssa Ayers, Pratap Banumeta, and Ashley Tellis. Pratap, I'd love to go to you on the foreign policy questions, and you're welcome to react to both the Ukraine and China comments that Alyssa and Ashley have made. Just I want to pick up a third point that I think Alyssa mentioned, which is this idea of India as the kind of leading country of the global south. And I think, you know, some of this, there's some substance of this, some of this is kind of opportunistic but to what extent do you see that as a real serious element in Indian foreign policy going forward? And to the extent that it is, there is substance to it, what exactly does it mean?

B (26:01)

So I think two things. One, if I may just preface it by picking up on one thing Ashley said because it's related to the global south point, I think, which is Ashley put India's objective as we should not put ourselves in a position where we have to take sides. There's a different way of putting this which is that the way in which India sees the superpowers thinking of world politics, its assessment has been that they think of corner solutions in world politics, which is to say this is a zero sum game. There is a real concern, given the history of the United States both with China and Russia, that it would be a catastrophe for the world if it came to the point where the world had to choose between one or the other. I mean, nobody's going to come out a winner of this. So the more positive way of putting Ashley's point is that India's view has been let's try and throw cold water over conflict rather than in some senses push the world into a precipitous corner solution. Now this point is related to the point about the global south because that's where most of the global south is. The United States is not realizing the degree to which that's the preference for the global south, that if there is the Russia, Ukraine contrary, it's collateral damage in Africa. So you don't want precipitous conflict even though you should stand up for the principle that no country's sovereignty should be violated, particularly in the way Ukraine's has. And so there is a kind of ideological positioning I think in global politics which is really, I think quite an opportunity for India. And I think in that sense it is, I think quite aligned with the objectives of the South. Having said that, there is a question somebody asked which is we are in a world where everybody is anointing themselves the leader of something or the other. And the question is, who's following? Brazil is also the leader of the global South. South Africa is in a sense doing things. So I think the south is united by a kind of affinity that we don't want a precipitous great power conflict. And India sees itself as playing a role in that. But whether it can actually effectively lead countries in a coalition, I think that's an open question.

C (28:32)

I would add one more point to that because I think Pratap is absolutely right. But in recent times India's championing of the global south has been motivated equally by the fears that it doesn't want to give China sort of free reign over that community. Right. The Chinese, through their investments over the last 20 years, have made huge inroads in terms of influence. And India wants to pry the Gobis out to the degree it can away from Chinese influence and domination. And so that only is one more variable that pushes India in that direction.

A (29:09)

Pradab I was just also going to reflect on the differences in the conversation on Israel and Gaza that you hear in India. And then in contrast to much of the rest of the global south and the kind of Brazilian or South African or I think probably sub Saharan African, sympathy for the Palestinians and criticism of Israel is certainly not shared in Delhi from the government. There's a kind of greater acceptance, I think, of the Israeli war.

B (29:37)

No, no. And it's the flip side of the acceptance of Russia. Right. I mean, so and the United States is in this bind. Right. Which is technically the same principle should apply on both. So I think it just proves Ashley's point that it is playing, in a sense, realpolitik and the US Picks up on it in one case and not on the other.

A (29:57)

Alyssa, I want to go back to you on the values question that you briefly alluded to. You had written in a piece early in the Biden administration, I think it was in March 2021 that shoring up US support for India's democracy will be easier said than done. The Biden administration will need to put values back into the US Indian relationship without severing the strategic ties that have flourished over the past two decades. I think as you look back over the last three years, what's striking is how little the US Administration has seemed to do on that front, that it's been fairly quiet and fairly restrained when it comes to any criticism of India's domestic actions. Is that the right way of characterizing it? And would you push for more? Is there anything more that can be done to address some of the issues that Pratap mentioned earlier in the conversation?

D (30:46)

Yeah, I think this comes against the backdrop of a moment in the Trump administration when it became pretty clear that values no longer had any role in bringing India and the United States closer together. And I ask all of us to remember that indelible moment when President Trump had visited India during his tenure as president and the riots were underway in New Delhi and the president said that he talked to Prime Minister Modi and everything was fine. That moment really made it clear that this was not something that was on the agenda for the Trump administration in any way. And I think the Biden administration has been carefully trying to figure out how best to raise and cocoon these questions. The Biden administration, as you can see in a number of its different bilateral relationships, prefers to take challenging diplomatic conversations into the diplomatic channel and not the kind of public castigation channel. Although it is certainly the case that the Biden administration's regular reporting, the State Department's human rights reports, reports on international religious freedom, all of these reports that the State Department works on on an annual basis, have been pretty frank in where they see challenges to rights, to liberties, to Indian civil society. And so that continues to be something that is on the U.S. state Department's the foreign policy agenda. But it's not the first thing that anybody says publicly when they do meetings or press avails together. And I think that is likely the Biden approach to preserve the ability to have tough conversations in private.

A (32:45)

When you look at, I realize that the assassinations of Sikh activists in Canada and the attempted one or plot in the United States are allegations that the Indian government still denies at this point. But it does seem striking looking at those, that it reflects a real sense of kind of confidence or impunity when it comes to some of these questions, even when they spill over to North American soil. It just seems like a kind of striking demonstration of where the relationship is on that front.

D (33:12)

I have to believe that this is a topic that is coming up in the private channel. I just can't believe that it wouldn't be.

A (33:18)

Pratap, as you look at this set of issues, is there anything that you think outside actors can or should be doing differently? Or is this, you know, this was always thought to be kind of core to the U of A Cindy relationship, but perhaps we're just in a different reality and there will not be this kind of values component in the same way.

B (33:37)

I mean, I'm actually very skeptical that there will be the values component. I think partly because, I mean, frankly, the US's authority in the world has eroded so considerably. I mean, I think that is a background fact that has to be taken for granted. I think the Indian government reads it that way. I mean, I think that's the important point here, that that's how they understand I think the world to be. I mean, I do think the kind of moral pressure that, you know, people to people, civil society, recording of what's going on, providing a channel for actually documenting, I think in a sense that's important. But I do strongly feel, I've said it at CFR forums before, that if this becomes a tool of American geostrategic policy, it's actually a disaster for democracy. And I think America has not yet found a way of disentangling its commitment to democracy and human rights and its geostrategic aims. And if you keep Netanyahu close, I mean, Mr. Modi looks much, you know, better by comparison.

A (34:36)

Let me ask one more question to each of you and it's what, what you expect to change in a, in a third Modi term, assuming we do get there. Murtab, I'll start with you. Do you imagine a kind of Hindutva domestic agenda that is kind of energized or focus shifting elsewhere?

B (34:51)

I mean, I mean, I think it's an, I don't think it's an either or. I think the agenda is going to deepen because they want to consolidate the cultural gains. So just to give you a small example, after the consecration of the Hodia temple, now there's a demand to return not just two other major temples, Kashi and Matra, but about 4,000 other shrines. And there is a lot of local activism on that ground. So this is an agenda to in a sense, change the default cultural common sense and so that consolidation will continue. How much repression will be required for that and how much violence it produces, that's I think an open question. But I don't think we should be in any doubt that the Hindu nationalism consolidation agenda will continue. It's not simply election related.

A (35:37)

Ashley and Alyssa, anything on the foreign policy or US India front that you would focus on as perhaps a change or an acceleration in a third term? Ashley, I'll start with you.

C (35:49)

So I think the important point that Pratap made, which needs to be appreciated, is that on all these issues there are no either ors that confront the government. So there will be, for example, a consolidation of all the elements of Hindutva in the last two terms that will go into the third term as well. But it'll also be accompanied by a doubling down on the initiatives to increase India's economic growth and so on and so forth. Because they do recognize that making India a developed country, making it a great power, is very important for the recrudescence of the Hindutva agenda itself. So even as you push on the nationalist element, there will be other elements which we would very much welcome. Right? A deepening of economic growth, openness to the world, et cetera, et cetera. Let's hope all that comes about. But that on the foreign policy front, I see again an intensification of exactly the same kind of policies that we saw in the second term, which is there's going to be a deepening of what Indians call multi alignment, which is deepening relations with many powers. The US Will continue to be the most important country that India engages in. I don't see any shift on that count. And all the efforts that India and the US Are currently making beyond the state to state level engagement in the area of technology, in the area of society, to society ties, research and development, innovation, all that will continue apace. So because at the end of the day, India's circumstances are not going to change dramatically in this third term. There's still going to be a China problem. There's still going to be an ambition to build global multipolarity. There's still going to be a desire to elevate India's prominence at the high tables of global governance. All these are perennials which are not going to disappear. And in all on all those issues, the US Matters very much to India. And so I see the doors essentially staying open for the deeper partnership.

A (37:54)

Alyssa, let me put that question to you, but also just add a Trump spin to it. With the reelection of Trump, would a second Trump term change anything in the relationship?

D (38:04)

Let me pick up on the economic piece, just so we make sure that that's in the conversation. I think one of the things that surprised me about the Modi government's approach to its economic ambitions with India is the extent to which the idea of make in India, right, this plan to help increase the percentage of manufacturing to the Indian economy, which itself was the same plan that the previous Congress led coalition government had had through its national manufacturing policy that ended up becoming transformed into something that was much more focused on the next round of these production linked incentive packages accompanied by an increase in tariffs. So what you've seen is a desire for India to become an increasingly important part of global trade through building greater manufacturing at home. And yet it is looking to do this not by deepening its integration, but rather by putting up more barriers to protect and help its domestic manufacturing sector succeed. And that creates challenges for our bilateral conversation. It has thus far not resulted in the big bump in manufacturing that India has seeked to have. And that in itself is a challenge because India does need to create more jobs for this very large demographic, this youth bulge that needs to find gainful employment. It's hard to get the precise figures on unemployment. The official stats say, I think India's unemployment is now something close to 3%. The CMIE numbers put it closer to 8%. India needs to create more jobs, and that's been a priority for successive governments. The way the Modi government is going about this now has shifted a bit. So what would I expect to see change with the Trump administration? Well, I certainly was surprised when the Trump administration came in and identified steel and aluminum imports from India as a challenge in our relationship, because nobody ever talked about that before. It might have been a challenge for our bilateral econ relationship with China, but certainly this was not on the India agenda. And yet India was Among those top 10 countries that received a set of tariffs as a result of the steel and aluminum imports in the United States. I think that what we might see change with the Trump administration, an increased focus on the use of tariffs in retaliatory ways, in ways to fight back for unrelated foreign policy developments. Who knows what they might be? But that was something that characterized the Trump administration's approach to statecraft and economic statecraft. And I think we would be likely to see a walking back of even publicly noting the importance of a strong civil society, the importance of talking about democracy. Democracy, and the importance of democracy as part of the inherent warp and weft of the U. S. India relationship. I just. That was something that was not on the Trump administration's agenda. And I imagine that all of that language and prioritization, even if it's taking place in the diplomatic channel behind closed doors, would probably disappear.

C (41:23)

And I would add one more thought to that, to that list that Alyssa identified, and that is immigration.

D (41:31)

Yeah.

C (41:32)

India is an important beneficiary of U.S. immigration policies. Right. And so, given what we know about Trump's proclivities on immigration, I don't think India will be immune.

A (41:43)

Pratap, let me give you the last word.

B (41:45)

Yeah, I think to end with where we kind of began, which is I think if India can maintain a decent growth trajectory, you know, 7 to 8% for about 10 years, that actually is its single biggest foreign policy asset. It allows it to negotiate all kinds of pressures, multipolarity, great power, competition. And I think that's going to remain an important focus. I mean, that is the conduit through which India, I think, is going to manage the world.

A (42:18)

That's a good note to end on, Ashley. Alyssa Pratap, thank you so much for this conversation. I'm eager to get all of you to write on multiple topics that we've discussed today as we we go into this third term. So I will bug all of you that about that in the future, but for now, thank you so much. Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on Today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannan, Julia Fleming dresser, and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph, Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sierra and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts, and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.

C (43:17)

Sam.