E (18:23)
Well, thanks, yeah, thanks for the easy questions, but there's I'd say two things to start with. One, the greatest single risk right now is the unintended consequences or a failed execution of attacks. That one or the other side wants to carry out, I have no doubt. And basically that Dana and Mark's analysis of the region, I really don't. I have really very little to quibble with, shockingly. But the point is, when each side decides that they're going to signal with the use of force, you always run the risk that you're going to hit the wrong target. So even the intention is one way. The execution may produce something not at all intended. That's what I think we saw on Saturday. Dana put it well, Hezbollah tried to run away from their own attack because they understood this kind of was, was not the intent and they feared what the Israeli response was going to be. Israel chose to respond in a way that was designed to still demonstrate unmistakably, you crossed a line, we will cross a line. We will attack within the. In Beirut, but we'll do it in such a targeted, limited way that we're signaling you what our intent is and the question, and Dana was raising this, and I think Mark was as well. Are we at a point where Iran is going to try to do something that fits that same methodology? The methodology of we have no choice because we have been embarrassed, we've been humiliated by the way our own proxies can't see us doing nothing in response to this if we are to retain them as proxies quite the same way. So there's multiple reasons why they want to use that methodology, Meaning we are making a statement, but we're doing it in a way where that turns us into maybe around, but not a war. The question is how good are their options for being able to do that? Even if they intend to keep it limited, will they hit the targets they intend to? From an Israeli standpoint, if there are impacts within Israel, it depends what's been hit, it depends if people die. Even highly symbolic targets where there's very few casualties is likely to again produce a kind of response in kind. If I thought this was a science, I would be much more relaxed. I'm not so relaxed because it's not a science. And I'm uneasy about the unintended consequences or the poor execution in a sense of the operations that they carry out. So that's where I think there is a risk. So that's number one. Number two, in terms of Gaza, one thing that nobody has mentioned, and I say this with a little bit of hesitancy, but I also say it having some appreciation of the psychology of the Prime Minister of Israel and summit Israel in a strange way, if you're going to find A way to end this war, especially since you. For a long time, Bibi has said total victory. Now, total victory is a slogan. It's not an objective. When he was speaking to the Congress for the first time, I actually heard him define it. He said, we have to dismantle their military capabilities and they can't be in control of Gaza. Now, the irony is that's actually something that both those are actually achievable, and they may not be that far from achieving them. But he probably still wants to do this in a way where he has symbolism of, look, Israel has re established itself. It's again demonstrated to the region and to the world that it can do the kind of things militarily that nobody else in the region can. This fusion of intelligence and operational capability. Nobody can do what we do. And it's a way of re establishing the image of Israeli power. There is a concern, I know, in Israel, about the fear of the loss of Israeli deterrence, but it's not just that. It's a sense that our power was always seen and greatly respected and feared. And because of more than 10 months in Gaza against Hamas, the image of Israeli potency has eroded. So we need to do things that allow us to redemonstrate that we are who we've been. No one can do what we've done. And in a sense, had they just stopped with the targeted killing of Shakur, my own view is they would have already succeeded in that. The combination of what they did in Hodeida to carry out an attack 2000km away on very short notice, and again with a very interesting kind of operation that sent a message, and then you're able to get effectively the number two guy in Hezbollah, a guy who, by the way, from an American standpoint, played a role in 1983 in the killing of 241 Marines. There's no real concern here, but the Israelis get him in the Hezbollah stronghold. They know where he is very precisely. And as I think Dana said, you know, the combination of both Hezbollah and Iran are going to be completely preoccupied with looking internally who penetrated us, who's the betrayer? Where are the spies? They're going to be consumed by a lot of that. This would have been enough. But I think the chania brings you back to October 7th. It brings you back to the Israeli mindset that we're going to get everybody who in one way or the other was responsible for October 7th. If you're thinking about finding a way to end this, you begin to try to present an imagery of Israel being successful again. And I have a feeling that's part of what explains this Haniya they could have gotten at any point. Why now? And doing it in Tehran, I mean, it's. Yeah, you. Look, we can do what nobody else can do. The problem with it is that if you really want to end the war in Gaza, you really aren't trying at the same time to trigger a broader war in the region. And I think the Haniya move is one that I think creates a risk that ultimately, I'm not sure the Israelis really want to be absorbing, but I think they. They've in a sense, opened it up. I. I don't think. And I'll here, I'll pick up what Audrey said. If you were interested in getting a hostage deal soon, you would not have done this. This is not something that makes a hostage deal more likely. It makes it less likely. It doesn't mean you'll never be able to come back to it, by the way, because in the end, the Hamas will make its own calculus. Sinwar will make his own calculus. And he may have some reasons, especially with Dave gone. He may have some reasons. 15,000 Israeli troops in Khan Yunis right now can't be an accident that there's that many there, unless they think that they're not that far from getting him. Maybe he has his own reasons to find a way to get a reprieve. But I think the point is, in the near term, Iran, Hezbollah will say, no way any deals with Israel right now. And even Hamas, for its own reasons, even Sinwar, for its own reasons, will probably say, wrong time to do a deal. So from a hostage standpoint, this is, I would have to say, it's concerning from the standpoint of winding down the war in Gaza immediately, no deal. But if it puts Israel in a position where you approach the hostage issue from a slightly different perspective, the Biden administration's approach has been based on a strategy that says we'll get a hostage deal, that will produce a pause, that will allow us to take care of the humanitarian situation in a structural way, and it will allow us to do the Saudi normalization deal that will end the war. So it's. The ending of the war is derivative of a hostage deal. You can actually look at it in an entirely reverse manner where effectively, Israel says we've achieved what we needed to achieve. The US Commits to doing everything it can to prevent the smuggling or the diversion of reconstruction materials. So Hamas cannot reconstitute itself, and Netanyahu is in a position where he can claim we succeeded. Hamas can't reconstitute itself. It's not in control of Gaza. There's now an approach internationally on an interim administration in Gaza. We are ready now to say we'll end the war. Of course they have to release the hostages. It's a way, it says you end the war to get the hostage release as opposed to you do a hostage deal to get an end to the war. I wouldn't discount this as a possibility, especially in this three month period when the Knesset is out of session and Bibi has less to worry about in terms of whether or not his government could be brought down.