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- [00:00]
A
Dan. I'm Dan Kurtzphelin and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
- [00:06]
B
You know, the paradox is on the one hand, you have the allies sort of saying this is a rift, you guys don't want to be our friends anymore. But also, actually, we do want to be your friends. We do want to have that trading relationship.
- [00:20]
A
A year into Donald Trump's second term, America's allies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to have recognized that they need a new strategy for this age of rupture, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called it. Trump's grab for Greenland, his tit for tat tariffs on Canada, his approach to Ukraine, all have opened up rifts between the United States and many of its closest partners. Kristia Freeland has for years been on the front lines of the battle for the future of the alliance as Canada's foreign minister, deputy prime minister and finance minister, roles in which she went head to head with the Trump administration on a host of fraught issues. She recently left the Canadian government to serve as a volunteer advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. As much as Freeland sees the cracks in the relationship, she still stresses the imperative of making the alliance work despite them. We spoke on the sidelines of the Munich security conference on February 15 about how to negotiate with Trump, about what Ukraine can offer Europe and to the United States, and why American allies must rethink their approach to this moment. Kristia, thank you so much for doing this.
- [01:30]
B
It is wonderful to be with you.
- [01:32]
A
We are having this conversation just before the four year anniversary of the full fledged invasion of Ukraine. And I want to talk about Ukraine for most of this conversation. Given how central player you've been both in the Canadian government and now in your new role, advising President Zelensky in the Ukrainian government, and let me just
- [01:48]
B
say, unpaid volunteer role, of course, no executive authority. I just, I don't want to overstate.
- [01:55]
A
Absolutely. Simply establishing your credibility and insight on this issue. But since we are at the Munich Security Conference, we're here a day after Marco Rubio gave his speech, a year after J.D. vance gave his rather disquieting speech to audiences here and a few weeks after your former colleague, Prime Minister Mark Carney gave his speech at Davos on the rupture, this moment of change. I'm interested in how you see the state of the order, the state of the alliance. There's a lot of angst about that here. Are you as pessimistic as Carney seems to be and as many others here are?
- [02:29]
B
I think The Rubio speech was interesting, and the reactions to the Rubio speech were interesting. You heard that Wolfgang Isinger, you know, his opening comment there after the speech that, you know, did you hear the sigh of relief in the room? That was one take, and I think one take to which I am partial, one European take was, okay, this is an olive branch. They're not gonna be beating us up so much, and maybe we're not gonna go back to normal, but maybe we're not gonna have a divorce. I think the other European take was a bit more guarded. And I've heard a lot of people say, well, actually this was the same message, but. But delivered with a smile. And actually, I think both takes are correct. It was the same message, but delivered with a smile. That makes a difference, though, when you have a partnership, but a disagreement in that partnership, it matters whether in public you're yelling and screaming at the partner versus being a bit more generous and friendly and partner like.
- [03:48]
A
So I think the fact of wanting to seem conciliatory is insecurity.
- [03:51]
B
It's a fact. Yeah, yeah. That has a meaning. I think that is significant. And, you know, I think that obviously, and the Europeans have been very, very clear about this. They believe in the transatlantic relationship. Chancellor Friedrich Meirtz's speech was powerful and important. And, you know, the United States could not have a more pro American, a more Atlanticist chancellor than Friedrich Meritz. Right. And a Republican American government could not have potentially a better partner than Friedrich Merits.
- [04:30]
A
Right. Pro business figure.
- [04:32]
B
He is a small C conservative. He used to work for blackrock, for goodness sake. He is an avowed Atlanticist. You know, in 2018, he gave me an award for working on the transatlantic relationship in his capacity as chairman of AtlanticObruka, Atlantic Bridge, the sort of premier transatlantic supporting organization. So this is a person who you should be able to be friends with if you are American. But even he was speaking about a rift. Now, he spoke before the Rubio speech. But I think what you have with the Europeans is a very strong conviction across all parties that a strong transatlantic relationship would be great to have. And you've heard that from everybody here. But also a recognition that love must be reciprocal and that if Washington doesn't want a strong relationship, Europe has to behave accordingly. And I think that recognition that the desire for a strong transatlantic relationship is maybe weaker today than it has been in the past. That remains the case. And, you know, I think we've heard Europeans talking about that.
- [05:56]
A
I've been struck in conversations here that many Europeans, Canadians, other Other American allies who are in the halls here have said versions of, look, we, some of us realized during Trump's first term that we needed to create more options for ourselves, that we can be so dependent, especially in terms on the United States, which some of us realized after the Vance speech here in Munich a year ago or after the Liberation Day tariffs were announced in all the various iterations of the trade war that followed, that we needed to do a better job of creating options for ourselves economically. But we haven't really gotten serious about it, and only now in the wake of Greenland. I think the Mark Carney speech was at least kind of symbolized this, but I think Greenland is what really drove it home for a lot of Europeans. We really need to rethink how we're approaching this moment. I imagine those conversations are happening in governments around Europe and Canada and probably in East Asia as well. As you think about options for navigating this moment and trying to create some degree of choice for middle powers or American allies without fully breaking the relationship for reasons you laid out, how would you think about the strategies that are available to both Canadians and others at this point?
- [07:09]
B
Okay, there are so many points you've touched on there. And I'm actually going to start with two phrases you said. You said American allies and middle powers. And one thing that I think is really, really important to underscore is that is a Venn diagram. That is not two overlapping circles. There are some American allies who are middle powers. There are some American allies who actually are, I would say, a great power, and that is Europe. And then there are some middle powers who are not American allies. And that is, I think, the central point. I think the notion that all middle powers, simply because of their middleness, will have the same interests is simply wrong. And so, you know, probably Canada and South Korea have a lot that we can and want to do together and have been doing together for a long time, by the way, Canada and Iran, probably fewer interests in common. I think that is a central point. And I wouldn't confuse what is a strategy for middle powers with what I think is an equally, maybe even more central question, which is what is the strategy for US Allies today? That, to me, speaking as a US Ally, is probably the central question, and it's maybe the central question in the world, because if you're not a US Ally, you kind of know where you stand, and you're maybe quite happy because you see the alliance, if not in disarray, facing a great deal of internal uncertainty. And when it comes to U.S. allies. I think actually people are settling into some pretty clear views. One is that on security, people need to take care of themselves a little more and not simply rely on the US and actually, that's a point of great agreement. That's what American presidents have wanted for a long time, and I think it's now a truth universally acknowledged. And I think that's a really good thing. I think on trade, there's more of a paradox, because the paradox is the American allies still want to trade with the US and it's not entirely clear what kind of an economic relationship America wants with its former allies. So, you know, the paradox is, on the one hand, you have the allies sort of saying, this is a rift. You guys don't want to be our friends anymore. But also, actually, we do want to be your friends. We do want to have that trading relationship. And then I think the final thing, which I think is now increasingly clear is I think people are settling on a different strategy when it comes to dealing with the Trump administration. I think the initial view with this Trump administration was that some kind of appeasement or conciliation was the right approach. I was never a big fan of that.
- [10:41]
A
You were in government at the time, and you were deputy Prime Minister at the beginning of the Trump administration. So you were.
- [10:46]
B
Trump won. Yeah, Trump won.
- [10:48]
A
Yeah.
- [10:48]
B
And you know, my experience with the NAFTA negotiations, and actually former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau continued with this approach. Our view was you need to be respectful. You need to seek areas of mutual interest. You also need to hold your ground. And my motto during the NAFTA negotiations was, we will not escalate, but we will not back down. And we really looked aggressively, energetically for areas where we could do things together, do new things together. And the new nafta, the usmca, includes some really significant, I would say, revolutionary measures that you haven't seen in previous trade agreements, like the labor value content, things supporting high wage manufacturing jobs. A very Trumpian issue. And I would give Ambassador Lighthizer a lot of credit for the creativity that went into that. We also agreed to consult and collaborate with each other in our trading relationship with China. So we looked hard for areas where we could do things together, but we were also clear that we weren't going to be pushed around. I think that was not a truth universally acknowledged initially, and I think there was actually behind it maybe a little bit of infantilization of President Trump. I think a lot of other leaders of governments kind of thought they could maybe sweet talk him and offer a few over the top compliments, but ultimately get their way. I think President Trump is a lot smarter than some of his critics give him credit for. You don't become President of the United States twice by accident, and you don't reshape the Republican Party by accident. And I think what people have realized is that approach doesn't work. And that actually, when you are faced with demands or pressure, that is unacceptable. If you have leverage, you have to be prepared to use it. And that's what Canada did in the first NAFTA negotiations. When the 232 tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum were first put in place, we considered those to be illegal and unjustified. And we also thought they were fundamentally not in interests of the US or of Canada. And so we retaliated dollar for dollar, acting together with Mexico and the EU. That was not the approach taken in 2025, but I think now, post Greenland, I think Europe has realized that capitulation didn't work. And I think the great capitulation is over. And I would say the difference between the Vance speech and the Rubio speech reflects a Trump administration that is trimming its sails a bit in response to that stronger position.
- [13:57]
A
And do you imagine that you can imagine various courses for that. One would be escalation in a way that would be quite damaging to the alliance. One would be kind of continued tit for tat in some sense here. But that in fact gets us through this period. Even if it doesn't leave, the alliance might fray the alliance, but not break it. How do you see those risks?
- [14:17]
B
I actually see neither. And I don't think there's any tit for tat going on. There hasn't been a European counterclaim on U.S. territory. Right. And I do think, you know, the do not escalate, do not back down. It's an approach that worked during the first Trump administration, and I think it's an approach that works today. And I think it is important to be respectful. It's important to say, actually this is the administration Americans have elected and we respect that and we acknowledge that. It's important to be clear about the goal, which is we think there is a win, win outcome here. And then it is important to say, if you're going to push us in ways that we think are unjustified, illegal, make claims on our sovereignty, we are not going to accept that passively. We are going to respond. And I think that certainly how the Trump administration works, but maybe this is more broadly true, is, you know, there is pushing as far as you can get to. But what I think makes the position of American allies actually particularly strong is what they are seeking, I believe is actually in the interest of the United States. And that's actually a great negotiating position to be in. Like, if what you are saying is we want to be your allies in the world, we want to work with you, you know, let's say the Greenland sort of military alliance, space, we want to be your allies. We want to maintain this partnership which for 80 years has underpinned actually the time of greatest American flourishing in American history. We want to keep on doing that. And the only thing we're saying is don't try to take over our territory. That's a pretty good offer to make to the United States. Likewise, on the trade front, the issue is we think it would be good to continue to trade with each other. In the case of Canadian aluminum, we think it would be good to continue to sell our aluminum to you, which is basically electricity in solid form. At a time when you are concerned about not having enough power to build your data centers, that's a pretty good position to be arguing.
- [16:50]
A
How do you assess the Trump rhetoric, the threats about the 51st state and meeting with Albertan separatists and all of that, is that something that, from a Canadian perspective, need to take seriously and push back on, or is that kind of noise? In this particular moment at least, I
- [17:06]
B
think you need to take it very seriously. And I would sort of put the that's just noise attitude in the great capitulation set of responses. I think that if any country makes a territorial claim on your country, the only response has to be firm, clear, immediate. And actually, I think something that has made me very proud as a Canadian, is the way the political lions in the Canadian landscape, our former prime ministers, have been so clear and so strong across party lines. You know, Jean Chretien, who is now in his 90s, was very clear right away when the 51st state stuff came out. And, you know, he had this great line. He said, you know, from one old man to another, cut it out. Stephen Harper, who's a conservative, I'm a liberal, has been really, really strong on this. And he has said a couple of times that Canada should be prepared to pay whatever price to maintain its sovereignty. And I cite him because he is not only a former Conservative prime minister, but was an MP from my home province of Alberta and very popular there. So it's a big mistake to dismiss stuff like that as noise.
- [18:28]
A
And if you take it seriously, what do you worry about? In the next couple of years, if those threats continue and are, in fact, worth taking seriously.
- [18:36]
B
I think you just have to be strong in defense of your sovereignty. And, you know, I think actually, to quote Jean Chretien again, he also likes to joke that President Trump should be awarded the Order of Canada because he has united Canadians in a way that we hadn't been united before. And he's reminded us, you know, we're not. Canada is not a real sort of heart on sleeve country when it comes to Canadian patriotism, but we've become that way, and that is because we feel the threat. And so I think, you know, I think that's what we need to do. But I do, Daniel, kind of want to say something else and maybe a bit different, which is. And I actually think the Rubio sort of shift in tone speaks to this. I think that it is a real mistake to write America off. You know, I think during the first NAFTA negotiations, part of our approach was something we called the donut strategy. And what that meant was, of course, we knew that our interlocutors were the executive, the Trump administration, and we focused on that. We took it very seriously. But we knew that America was very big and went far beyond that. And so we worked hard with Congress, we worked hard with the Senate, we worked hard with governors, we worked hard with mayors, we worked hard with unions, we worked hard with businesses. And there was sort of a sense that all of Canada was drafted into that. It was kind of like if you know an American, if you have an American client, heck, if you have an American friend, talk to them about the value of this relationship. And that is a very important approach I think everyone needs to be taking right now, because America's relationship with Canada, America's relationship, the transatlantic relationship, I would even say America's relationship with the non geographic west, of course, is importantly defined by the President Americans elect. But I think it's something that all Americans have a stake in. And part of the reason that I think it's important to say we do not escalate, but we do not back down, is to let Americans know that this relationship that you may be taking for granted is being put in peril, it's being imperiled. And to say to Americans, is that what you really want? And what I have found, and I think surveys show this very, very clearly, is Americans actually don't want to have a fight with Canada. Americans actually think it's absurd to have a fight with Europe over Greenland. And so I think if we're talking about the transatlantic relationship. It's a relationship with all of America and my own view. And look, I speak as someone who is openly, really fond of the United States. I think you guys are kind of great. And I think that it would be a mistake for us, your neighbors, allies, friends, to write you off. I really like that the line attributed to Churchill that America always does the right thing, usually after trying everything else.
- [22:08]
A
We're in the trying everything else phase
- [22:09]
B
right now, quite aggressively, creatively. But I think we shouldn't rule out that you will end up doing the right thing. And part of the reason I think we shouldn't exclude that possibility and should try to keep the door open for you to take that option is the world will be a hugely better place if America does end up doing the right thing.
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A
We'll be back after a short break.
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B
What if you could explore places in the news like a reporter does? Hello, I'm Nicholas Wood, a former journalist with the New York Times and BBC. And 15 years ago, I created the travel company Political Tours. Our small groups are led by top correspondents around the world. Later this year, we're off to Mexico to look at cartels, migrants and Trump. And then we're in Colombia and the Amazon. Come and join us. Go to politicaltours.com that's politicaltours.com if journalism is the first draft of history, what happens if that draft is flawed? In 1999, four Russian apartment buildings were bombed, hundreds killed. But even now, we still don't know for sure who did it. It's a mystery that sparked chilling theories. I'm Helena Merriman, and in a new BBC series, I'm talking to the reporters who first covered this story. What did they mean, missed the first time? The History Bureau, Putin and the apartment bombs. Listen on BBC.com or wherever you get your podcasts.
- [23:41]
A
And now back to my conversation with Kristia Freeland to turn to Ukraine. You know, it's been a dramatic year trying to follow US Policy on Ukraine. It was a little under a year ago when Zelensky was in the Oval Office being berated by J.D. vance and President Trump and the rest of the administration. How do you understand US Policy toward Ukraine at this point? Interacted with it at various points in your roles with the Canadian government. But it's been, I think, hard for many observers on the outside to understand what exactly the Trump administration is trying to do in Ukraine right now.
- [24:14]
B
You know, I think the Trump administration should speak for itself when it comes to what is their policy towards Ukraine. But I do Think that it's maybe worth talking a little bit about what is Ukraine's policy in a volatile world. And, you know, going back to the beginning of our conversation, I think in some ways we are all Ukrainians. Now. What the Ukrainians have realized in a terrible, terrible way is if you want to be a sovereign country, if you want to defend your democracy in an age of rising and aggressive authoritarian regimes, you may have to put your life on the line. You know, Zelenskyy, I really liked the speech he gave early on in the war in the British Parliament. And the way Zelenskyy used the to be or not to be. The hamlet line in the British Parliament was really, really effective. And it was effective because it's true. Ukrainians kind of had to decide, do we want this? Do we really care? And, you know, in some ways, that is the question all countries have to ask themselves. And I think it's kind of a double question we have to ask, like, do I care about my country's sovereignty? Am I with Jean Chretien, Stephen Harper, is it like, pay any price? And do I care about my democracy? And I hope that all of us will be Ukrainians that way. But what their experience also shows is it's really, really hard. You pay a huge price in blood and treasure, and they still are.
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A
You lived in Ukraine before the fall of the Soviet Union? If I have the time to write,
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B
that is correct, yeah. Yeah, I lived in the Soviet Union.
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A
You.
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B
I speak Russian too.
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A
Ukrainian heritage. So you understand.
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B
And I say the Russian part also, just because that is, you know, obviously Russia is a big part of this equation. But the other thing that has happened, I think is going to be one of the great historical legacies of this full scale invasion of Ukraine is Putin has done something which no Ukrainian national leader was able to do, and many of them even didn't seek to do it, which is fully turn Ukraine away from the Russian cultural space. That's a huge legacy.
- [26:50]
A
I've been struck in talking to Ukrainians here that there's a real kind of sense of weariness that you did not even a year ago. You did not detect it. In the same way, people who are living in cities that were relatively safe are facing much more frequent and more violent attacks. They don't have power or heat during a very, very cold winter. Many people here are either on the front lines themselves and have been for years, or have family members who are, as you look at both the kind of just economic basis of this war and the ability of Ukrainian politics, society population to sustain it. How do you. What's going to allow this to continue if, in fact, the war does continue beyond this into its fifth year, as it certainly seems like it will?
- [27:34]
B
Yeah, people are exhausted, and the attacks on the power grid have really brought the war to the home front. It's not possible to sort of live a normal bourgeois life in Kyiv and have a sense that you're not living in a country at war. And I think it is worth also pointing out these are direct, devastating, vile attacks on a civilian population. And we need to not become cynical and we need to continue to be outraged by that. Having said that, I would say a few things that are happening right now that I think are very significant. One is, as President Zelenskyy really emphasized in his speech, the Ukrainians have come up with a way of fighting the war that is really imposing a huge and horrific cost on Russia. 35,000 casualties a month, Russian casualties. And the Ukrainian casualties are much, much lower. And that is because of this drone warfare that the Ukrainians have really been driving. And I think it is important to be clear about how much Russia is losing, how hard it will be for Russia, just in terms of people to sustain this, you know, and it's. It's really horrible throwing these Russian soldiers, you know, into this meat grinder and really losing so many. I think there are signs that the Russian economy is weakening. If I think back to the history of Western analysis of this war, from the outset, we have thought that Russia was stronger than it has turned out to be, and we have thought that Ukraine is weaker than it has turned out to be. Like, remember, right at the beginning, everybody thought, all the smart people thought they will be lucky if they can hold Kyiv for three weeks, and they have now held it for four years. Something that, you know, if you look at the Russian telegram channels, that kind of. I've been banned from going to Russia since the invasion of Crimea. I was put on a Russian sanctions list. So I haven't been there. But that's kind of one way that I can be in touch with what's happening there. The Russian military bloggers, including the pro war ones, have made a lot of the fact that January 11th of this year was the day on which this Russian invasion of Ukraine has been going on longer than the Soviet Union's engagement in the Second World War when they joined the allied side. And the point that is made, and not in a flattering way towards the Kremlin, is, wow, our grandfathers, our great grandfathers, in that amount of time Got all the way to Berlin, and so far, we haven't even gotten through the Donbas. That's significant. Right. And CSIS did, I thought, a very good study of what's actually happening on the front. And they showed that the Russian territorial gains are actually less than the Battle of the Somme in the First World War. Right. And the Battle of the Somme, it is notorious for having been this stalemate where there was no movement. So, like, think about all that for a minute, right? Russia with, like, its huge resources, its huge military, they didn't get to Berlin. They're at the Battle of the Somme. So we should remember that. And then the second thing that I think is a conclusion I would draw from this Munich conversation is that has gotten through very much to the Europeans. And the other thing that the Europeans are now really not just observing, but I would say deeply internalizing, is a sense of Ukrainian strength. And the Ukrainian strength that they see, and I've heard this now from several European heads of government, is they are seeing Ukraine as Europe's shield, and they are seeing Ukraine as Europe's arsenal. And you heard that from Zelensky, right? He said we have the strongest army in Europe. The Europeans get that now. And it is not disconnected from, I like Merz's term, the rift in the transatlantic relationship. If at a time when your traditional ally is not so sure, not so sure, and you're therefore not so sure, and you need to get stronger, guess what? It turns out there is a country that turns out to be really, really good at fighting and wants to fight with you. And that is what Zelenskyy was saying. There have been a number of European leaders here who have actually been saying we need the Ukrainian military. And many of them have been saying we need the Ukrainian military in NATO, because if we need to defend ourselves, guess who is the best at doing it. So that's the shield part. But then the other element, which I think is becoming more and more apparent to people is the extent to which the shape of war is being redefined on the battlefields in Ukraine. And the historical pattern is real transformations in how war works happen not in peacetime. They happen in war. And this is the biggest war right now. And at the beginning, it sort of seemed like it was back to World War I and tanks and trenches, and now it is sort of a techno futuristic drone world. And the Ukrainians not only are good at fighting that war, but they are good at inventing that war and manufacturing the drones and developing the technology for that war. And something that The Europeans are doing, with huge alacrity, is working with the Ukrainians, trying to get from the Ukrainians production in European countries of those drones. So I would say, you know, they're starting to see Ukraine as their shield, as their arsenal. And that's a very different way of thinking about Ukraine. Right. When the war started, it was very much supporting Ukraine as a philanthropic issue, as a moral issue, Ukraine, you know, as the virtuous, innocent, vill victim. And that is true, Right. Ukraine is entirely innocent. And I think there is a moral imperative to support Ukraine. But even setting that aside, I think the Europeans are saying, wow, we need these guys. They're really good at fighting, and we're gonna need someone who knows how to fight, and they're really good at inventing the stuff that we're gonna need.
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A
And that's more important now than it seemed a year, a year and a half ago in some ways, before Trump came back into office.
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B
Hugely, hugely. And for two reasons, right? Because the Europeans see a potential threat from Putin. And, you know, I had a great conversation with Anders Fog Rasmussen, the former Danish Prime Minister, former NATO Secretary General, and he said to me, he believes there will be a credible Russian threat against a Baltic state. He thinks it's going to be Lithuania within the next couple of years. Ukrainians have said to me that in the negotiations, Russians have said to them, we actually regret starting with Ukraine. That was a mistake. We should have started in a weaker spot. Now, if you're a European, if you are a NATO country, you should take that very seriously. And that all of a sudden kind of flips how you think about Ukraine because you think, wait a minute, maybe these guys are going to be able to help defend us and help us make the stuff we need. I was at a meeting with President Zelensky and some business leaders, and I don't think he'll mind my saying this, where he showed them the personal technology he uses that he has at his fingertips to monitor, not the battlefield, the whole country. And they were dazzled. They just. They couldn't believe what he has just at the touch of a fingertip.
- [36:24]
A
If we're sitting here in Munich in a year, which I hope we will be, what's the most optimistic, plausible scenario for where Ukraine is and where the war is?
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B
Okay, I'm going to be a wild dreamer.
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A
Great.
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B
Okay.
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A
Wild dreamer. We can close on optimism.
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B
Wild dream. I really hope the war is over, and I think all Ukrainians hope the war will be over by then, and I hope the war is over. On terms of that leave Ukraine strategically viable, strategically viable from a military perspective and strategically viable from an economic perspective. And I hope that that includes EU membership for Ukraine. I hope that includes very strong security guarantees. My own view is NATO membership for Ukraine would be the best path for Ukraine and for NATO. And I thought President Zelensky made an excellent point in reminding Europeans and NATO
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A
allies it seems unlikely in the near term, I would say.
- [37:32]
B
Yeah, but I think President Zelenskyy's point was don't let Putin define the terms. And if you want a strong security guarantee, so far the only security guarantee that we know for sure works is NATO. And I do think we shouldn't leave out justice in the settlement. And the reason I say that is what I thought was a very powerful point of the Zelensky speech was we are in Munich after all, referring to 1938. And it's something that I've said to some American friends. You know, I've said be careful. You don't want to do something that feels good in the moment, but that history will regard in the way it regards Munich. And when we think about what is the right settlement for Ukraine, what Ukrainians are very mindful of is they don't want to do a deal. That means four years from now Russia launches its third invasion of Ukraine. All of us should be thinking about that, too. First of all, Europeans, it is first and foremost in their interest that there is no deal done that leaves them open to another invasion. But America should care about that, too. History will not judge kindly anyone who is party to an agreement on Ukraine, which future historians liken to the Sudetenland.
- [39:11]
A
It's a powerful note to end on. Christia, thank you so much. Really appreciate the conversation.
- [39:15]
B
Great to talk.
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A
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com this episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Ben Metzner, Mary Kate, Garrett Godfrey and Kanish Tharoor. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning.
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B
In.