China’s Vision for a New World Order

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Foreign Affairs Interview – "China’s Vision for a New World Order"
Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan
Guest: Elizabeth Economy
Date: July 26, 2024

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Overview

This episode features a candid and in-depth conversation between Foreign Affairs editor Daniel Kurtz-Phelan and China expert Elizabeth Economy, discussing China’s ambitions for a new global order under Xi Jinping and the implications for the United States and the world. Drawing from Economy’s recent Foreign Affairs essay “China’s Alternative Order,” the discussion explores how Beijing is constructing a toolkit of economic, diplomatic, and security initiatives intended to shift global norms and leadership, the challenge this poses to the U.S.-led international order, and what the U.S. can do in response.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. China’s Strategy for a New World Order

• Xi Jinping’s vision: China is deliberately building the “building blocks” of a new international system that aligns with its values and priorities, warning that the U.S. should not repeat past complacency (e.g., with the Belt and Road Initiative). (03:15)
• Four Elements of Xi’s Strategy:
  • Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Started as hard infrastructure, but evolved to include technology, environmental, and health components—implementing and exporting Chinese values and political norms. Also, provides military expansion opportunities like overseas bases (e.g., Djibouti). (03:55)
  • Global Development Initiative (GDI): Focused on projects aiding UN Sustainable Development Goals; promotes China’s belief that economic development precedes political/civil rights. (05:00)
  • Global Security Initiative (GSI): Seeks to reshape existing security architecture, undermining U.S. alliances with concepts like “indivisible security” (ie., the right to pre-emptive action if threatened). (05:52)
  • Global Civilization Initiative: Argues for every country’s right to pursue its own models/values without outside criticism—chiefly to blunt criticism of China’s human rights record. (06:25)

2. Global Appeal and Efficacy of China’s Initiatives

• Initiatives appear “benign” and hard to argue against on their surface, especially given dissatisfaction with the Western-led system. They’re particularly appealing as alternatives in regions where U.S.-led alliances have failed to resolve major conflicts (e.g., Middle East, Ukraine). (07:25, 09:03)
  • Quote: “On the face of it, it doesn’t sound bad. And I think that’s the real strength of China’s initiatives... very difficult in some ways to argue against. But the crux of them again is always something that advantages China and undermines the current international norms and values.” – Elizabeth Economy (07:53)

3. China's Mediation and Diplomacy

• China’s diplomatic moves in brokering agreements (e.g., Hamas/Fatah, Saudi Arabia/Iran) are seen as constructive compared to recent U.S. struggles in the region. These are cited as evidence of the GSI in action. (08:30–09:16)

4. The U.S. Role in China’s Vision

• In China’s ideal scenario, the U.S. remains a “great power” but is diminished—outside the Indo-Pacific militarily, stripped of its alliances, and sidelined from shaping international norms (“orbiting China like all the other countries”). (09:26–10:36)

5. China-Russia-Iran-North Korea Alignment

• The expanding alignment isn’t as surprising as it might seem—Economy discusses a lack of Russian domestic resistance to being the junior partner and a high acceptance of a China-led Eurasian order. She notes that future U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan cannot be analyzed in isolation from this wider bloc. (11:16–13:51)
  • Quote: “It’s no longer enough for us to be thinking about the US and China, but we ought to be thinking about how are Russia and Iran and North Korea likely to play with China if China takes action against Taiwan?” – Elizabeth Economy (13:38)

6. U.S. Policy Response and Commerce’s Central Role

• The Commerce Department has become the “tip of the spear” in U.S. China strategy, especially around technology controls and industrial policy, owing largely to the leadership of Secretary Gina Raimondo and the rising importance of the tech-economic-security nexus. (14:38)
• Need for deeper technical expertise in government to keep up with fast-evolving technology and ensure national security. (16:55–17:55)

7. Debating the U.S. Approach: Engagement or Containment?

• Economy defends recent diplomatic engagement with China as “virtually costless” and directly in U.S. interests, countering critics like Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher. (18:50)
• Critiques the idea that the U.S. should openly pursue regime change in China, calling it counterproductive both for U.S.-China relations and alliance management. Instead, the U.S. should focus on articulating a positive vision for itself and the global order, not just framing policy as “competition” with China. (20:35)
  • Quote: “I can think of almost nothing that would make our lives in the United States more difficult than actively stating that it is our objective to change the government of China.” – Elizabeth Economy (20:40)

8. Is the U.S. Containing China?

• Economy acknowledges that U.S. policy is “trying to contain certain behaviors,” such as aggression in the South China Sea and support for Russia, but should avoid the impression of containing general economic growth. (23:11–24:45)

9. Xi Jinping’s Impact: Inflection Point or Systemic Trend?

• While U.S. analysts debate how much is specific to Xi versus systemic, Chinese scholars universally see Xi Jinping as a transformative force who fundamentally shifted China’s trajectory. A post-Xi China could, but will not necessarily, revert to more moderate policies. (24:45–26:46)

10. Lessons for U.S. Strategy: Inclusion and Vision

• The U.S. needs to “seize the mantle of change” by offering an inclusive vision for world order and actively engaging countries across a broader range of economic/political systems. Overly sharp democracy-vs-autocracy rhetoric alienates much of the world and weakens U.S. competition with China for influence. (26:46–29:34)
  • Quote: “If we exclude them, we’re not talking to them, we have no shot and China just gobbles them up.” – Elizabeth Economy (28:17)

11. Comparative Weaknesses and Advantages

• U.S. should recognize both China’s ambitions and its limitations—deep domestic polarization, economic fragility, environmental and demographic challenges—but these do not preclude China’s continued pursuit of global and technological ambitions. (29:56–32:52)

12. Diplomatic Investment Disparity

• China is outpacing the U.S. in global diplomatic presence, with more embassies and consulates worldwide and better engagement of local actors—a significant gap in American “influence infrastructure.” (32:52–34:53)

13. Potential Impact of a Trump Return

• The main risk of a Trump administration is less about direct U.S.-China relations, more about neglecting the foundations that make U.S. competition possible—alliances, global leadership, industrial and technological policy. Tariff hikes could significantly alter trade dynamics, but a broader American retrenchment would likely undermine long-term competitiveness. (34:53–37:35)

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Memorable Moments & Notable Quotes

• “Let’s take action now to address the challenge that China is presenting, because it’s much more difficult to go back and try to undo what China has accomplished.” (Elizabeth Economy, 03:32)

• “The real point behind the Global Security Initiative is to transform the international security architecture.” (Elizabeth Economy, 05:58)

• “On the face of it, it doesn’t sound bad. And I think that’s the real strength of China’s initiatives, generally speaking, is that they appear on the surface to be so benign... But the crux of them again is always something that advantages China and undermines the current international norms and values.” (Elizabeth Economy, 07:44–08:27)

• “You know, the US can continue to be a great power, but within this Chinese context... The US can orbit around China like all the other countries...” (Elizabeth Economy, 09:29–10:31)

• “It is important to understand that China is much more highly polarized politically than we tend to think, and that this could have a significant drag on the Chinese economy moving forward... but Xi Jinping’s priorities will continue to be advancing the technological race, its military expansionism, his own view of what is needed for China’s security.” (Elizabeth Economy, 31:01–32:00)

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Xi Jinping’s four-part strategy: 03:37–06:43
• Appeal and traction of Chinese initiatives: 06:43–08:30
• China as Middle East mediator; GSI in action: 08:30–09:16
• How the U.S. factors in China’s vision: 09:26–10:36
• China-Russia relationship and wider ‘axis’: 11:16–13:51
• U.S. Commerce Department’s rising role: 14:38–16:31
• U.S. policy debate: stabilization vs. confrontation: 18:01–20:35
• ‘Containing’ China: 23:11–24:45
• Xi Jinping as an inflection point: 24:45–26:46
• Lessons in inclusivity for U.S. policy: 26:46–29:34
• Comparative strengths and internal weaknesses: 29:56–32:52
• U.S. vs. China on diplomatic investment: 32:52–34:53
• Potential Trump administration scenarios: 34:53–37:35

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Conclusion

Elizabeth Economy urges the United States and its leaders to take seriously China’s vision and methodical advance toward reshaping the global order—and to respond not merely by competing, but by crafting an inclusive, positive vision for the world that re-engages overlooked nations and builds long-term competitiveness and influence. The future of the U.S.-China relationship, and of world order, will depend not only on managing bilateral frictions, but on the U.S. ability to lead by example and investment, both at home and abroad.

Transcript

[A]

Dan I'm Dan Kurtz Phelan, and this is the Foreign affairs interview.

[B]

It's clear that NATO and the sort of US alliance system in Asia, they're not effective right now at managing two of the major conflicts, right, the conflict in the Middle east and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. So China has an opening to say I have something better or I have something different that ought to be considered.

[A]

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has a very clear vision for a new world order, and although the United States may disagree with that vision, it should not dismiss it, argues Elizabeth Economy in a new piece for Foreign Affairs. Economy is one of the foremost experts on China in the United States. She is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and until recently she served as the senior advisor for China at the Commerce Department. Economy stresses that if the United States wants to out compete China, it needs to offer its own vision for a new world order. It cannot simply defend an unpopular status quo. Liz, thank you so much for joining me.

[B]

My pleasure. It's great to be here with you. Dan.

[A]

Let me start with your recent essay. It was called China's Alternative Order. It kicked off our May June issue. One of the points of departure for the argument you made in that essay is, is that while there's a tendency in US Policy circles to kind of write off the strategy that China has adopted under Xi Jinping, so just to start, what is that strategy and what suggests to you that it is, in fact, gaining some traction despite some of the headwinds that China is facing?

[B]

Sure. I mean, part of the reason I wrote the piece is, as you suggest, to kind of sound an alarm bell for this administration and the next administration, that China and Xi Jinping, not only do they have a strategy in mind for reorienting the world order or reordering the world order, but they're actually now putting in place the building blocks of that strategy and that they will persist. And so we need to pay attention now or else we're going to end up in the position that we did, for example, with the Belt and Road Initiative, you know, back in 2013, when nobody really thought that was going to be a big deal. And then all of a sudden we look and Huawei now dominates all 4G throughout Africa. And the point is really, let's take action now to address the challenge that China is presenting, because it's much more difficult to go back and try to undo what China has accomplished. So what is China trying to do? I think there are really four elements to Xi Jinping's strategy in terms of really the global reordering of norms and institutions that in a way will from his perspective, I think, align more closely with Chinese values and interests and policy priorities. So the first is again the Belt and Road initiative, which he outlined back all the way back in 2013, which started as a hard infrastructure project, but then again morphed into something much more. And you had not only hard infrastructure, but you had digital Silk Road. You've had the green Silk Road, which is on environmental technologies and products. You have the health. Silk Road sort of came to life during COVID It's not even simply about China being able to be the leader in the 21st century infrastructure for the world. It's also about imparting Chinese value. So you can buy into Chinese telecommunications system or Chinese surveillance system, but you can also then get training in cybersecurity, how to monitor dissent, how to track dissidents. So it's a package really of the technology, plus the political norms and values that accompany that technology in China. So kind of a way to export China's political model as well. And then of course, you know, a move for China to begin to expand its military presence globally, also through the Belt and Road, its first military logistics base in Djibouti, on the grounds that it needs to protect its workers and its economic interests abroad. And now we see China beginning to move to develop more bases, which is a radical shift from what came before. You know, before 2010, 2011, before Xi Jinping, really, you would rarely if ever see a thinker or even a military strategist talk about China having bases overseas. It was just antithetical. That was the provenance of the United States and as a hegemonic power. So, you know, the Belt and Road really was Xi Jinping's first big foreign policy initiative, his flagship initiative, Fast Forward, and you get a new set of initiatives. You get the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. And the first one out of the box was the Global development initiative in 2021. And that is a kind of addition to the Belt and Road initiative. It focuses on more on aid, more on smaller scale projects like small scale wind farms, but it's in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. So there's healthcare, green transition, poverty alleviation. But embedded in the Global Development Initiative is also the belief that development is a precursor to human rights, to political and civil rights, so development should come first. And so embedded in all of these things, I think it's important to underscore in Every one of these initiatives, in every part of Xi Jinping's strategy, is a kind of stealth bomber that is designed to really detonate in some ways, the current priority and primacy of Western values. The Global Security Initiative, which Xi Jinping announced at the Boao Forum in 2022, has in part, very traditional values embedded in the UN Charter, like sovereignty, but then also goes on to say, support indivisible security. And that's just the idea that if a country feels that its security is threatened, it has the right to take preemptive action. So that's in this Global Security Initiative, as is the notion of comprehensive security architecture and the dissolution of the US Led alliance system. So that's the real point behind the Global Security Initiative is to transform the international security architecture. And then finally, the Global Civilization initiative basically just says that every country has its own path, its own values, its own system, and no other country has the right to criticize or to interfere in that country's system. So here too is the point that, you know, for China, it has really dislikes the criticism that it faces on its human rights practices. And so this is a way of reshaping values and norms in the international system. So that type of criticism is no longer supported.

[A]

One thing that your piece does so effectively is that it takes these initiatives that when you read about them in the language of Xi Jinping or other Chinese officials, they sound like this kind of mix of Marxist, Leninist jargon and bureaucratic blather. And it's kind of easy to write off. But you argue that they're actually quite appealing to a pretty large swath of global governments and populations. And they really tap into this dissatisfaction with the existing system that the United States, the incumbent power, has a much harder time tapping into. I mean, where do you see these initiatives and the impulses and values that underlie them really gaining traction and working for Xi Jinping?

[B]

Look, there's no one is going to argue against the Global Development Initiative, for example, on the face of it, who is going to say that China shouldn't be investing more? Who isn't going to welcome China investing more in small aid projects globally? The issue, and even with the Global Security Initiative, you know, it's clear that NATO and the sort of US alliance system in Asia, they're not effective right now at managing two of the major conflicts, right? The conflict in the Middle east and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. So China has an opening to say, I have something better or I have something different that ought to be considered. So countries may not be ready immediately to subscribe to what China is proposing. But on the face of it, it doesn't sound bad. And I think that's the real strength of China's initiatives, generally speaking, is that they appear on the surface to be so benign, very difficult in some ways to argue against. But the crux of them again is always something that advantages China and undermines the current international norms and values.

[A]

I mean, it's striking watching China and the Middle east over the past several months before and after October 7th. I mean, just yesterday you had representatives of Hamas and Fatah signing a accord in China going to brokered by China. Whether that's a real thing or not, we'll see. But there's also Chinese help in brokering or helping brokers normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran. I mean, all of this looks like kind of a constructive, benign presence in the Middle east in contrast to US policy that has struggled quite a bit to manage these contending forces over the past several months.

[B]

No, absolutely. And I think China was very quick after the Saudi Arabia, Iran deal. Wang Yi, the Foreign Minister, was very quick to say that this was an example of the global security Initiative and in action.

[A]

What role in this Chinese vision does the United States have? Where does US power fit? If they could right size the US role, what does the US global role look like in that scenario?

[B]

Yeah, I mean, I think that, you know, the US can continue to be a great power, but within this Chinese context, and I think, for example, you know, the dissolution of the US led alliance system would be a very serious knock to US influence globally. De dollarization would be a another huge knock to US influence globally. All of these things would take the United States down not even just one peg, but probably two or three pegs in terms of its overall influence within the international system. You know, beyond this, of course, China would like the United States out of the Indo Pacific as the dominant military power, alliances or not, back across the Pacific to where it thinks that the US belongs. So I think there's a role for the United States, but it's within now a Chinese constructed world order, you know, where China really is at the center. And so I think that's the way to understand it. The US can orbit around China like all the other countries, and I'm sure it would be happy to have the United States act responsibly on lots of global issues. But you know, in terms of shaping the international system, it doesn't play a big role there.

[A]

One of the really striking developments of the last couple of years. And this has really accelerated since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, is the deepening of the relationship both between China and Russia, but then also with North Korea and Iran thrown in. Some people talk about this as an axis or a new kind of bloc. How do you see the connections between them and especially between China and Russia? Is that. Has that surprised you? Has the depth of that and the seeming lack of tension, at least thus far, surprised you, given what was, I think, the kind of, you know, conventional view that there was more that would separate these powers than. Than ultimately bring them together.

[B]

So, you know, I started my life as a specialist on the Soviet Union, and I was always very interested in the relationship between the Soviet Union and China. I think I ceased being surprised at the sort of depth and breadth of the relationship in 2018 when I went to a conference, actually in Moscow, where China was the topic. And frankly, I had assumed, based on all of my study of the Soviet Union and then Russia, that there would be a lot of resentment against China, against the sort of emerging conception that Russia was the junior partner to China. But in fact, I found almost none. And I was shocked. And I thought, you know, if these scholars and these officials are accepting of this sense that at least economically at this point, Russia is in this junior position, and they are looking to China only to. To benefit from China's investment in growing trade. But they accept this position. They accept the fact that, you know, their Eurasian Economic Union is going to be basically subsumed into the Belt and Road initiative, even though Xi Jinping has presented it as, you know, partnering with. That was an important point for me at which I began to think that there would be less friction in this relationship than I had originally assumed. And I think the sort of personal relationship between President Xi Jinping and President Putin, I think also is driving this relationship. That is not to say in China, for example, there's not a lot of discontent among sort of the experts and I think other foreign policy officials there. There is a lot of discontent. And. And I've looked at this, and you can find many, many scholars who are criticizing at heart Xi Jinping's decision to side with Russia on Ukraine issue. And so it's been fascinating to me to see that there's that kind of dissent that's actually in the public, you know, domain. But I'm not surprised, frankly, at this point. Tight relationship. I am increasingly concerned, however, at this, if you want to call it an axis, but call it a soft alliance or among Iran and Russia and China and North Korea. And I think one of the things we haven't really stopped to consider is if we're thinking about Chinese action against Taiwan at some point, it's no longer enough for us to be thinking about the US And China, but we ought to be thinking about how are Russia and Iran and North Korea likely to play with China if China takes action against Taiwan?

[A]

Let me pivot for the time being to some of the U.S. policy questions. You get at this in the essay, and you have in past pieces for Foreign affairs as well. But I want to start with the time that you spent in the Biden administration. You were the key China advisor to the secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, and that was not a place where you would, in past administrations, have seen a lot of the energy around China strategy. But it really has become in some ways the centerpiece of the administration's strategy when it comes to export controls on technology and the CHIPS act and industrial policy at home. Can you talk a bit about how the commerce piece of that became so central? Why has that suddenly become in some ways the kind of tip of the spear for American strategy when it comes to China?

[B]

I mean, I think there are a couple of reasons, I will say, above all, however, it has to do with Secretary Raimondo herself, who is just an extraordinary leader in her own right and who has a very positive and proactive approach to just getting things done and to seeing the landscape and then really attacking it. And I think whether we're talking about domestic policy or we're talking about foreign policy, you know, she never takes no. It's always, how do we get this done? How do we move forward? And so when you look at sort of the full panoply of issues and initiatives, it's not simply that commerce is at the center, as you point out, of something like the CHIPS and Science Act. Right. Which is basically reinvesting in, you know, America and giving ourselves the ability to be economically competitive with China for the 21st century, along with the IRA and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. But it's also Commerce, you know, at the center of the US eu, ttc, Trade and Technology Council, the Commerce Department, leading in the Indo Pacific Economic Framework, playing in the Quad, and the Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group. So across all of the various diplomatic efforts that we have with regard to trade and investment and technology, she's also the leading player there, working with our allies. So I think part of it is by the nature of the issues that have come to the fore, which, you know, I think one of the biggest is that nexus between, you know, technology and economic and national security and commerce is a natural place to play. But the truth is that there are also other bureaucracies involved in all of these initiatives. And yet, I think because of the strength of the vision and the energy of Secretary Raimondo, Commerce has, I think, emerged as the lead agency for many of these issues.

[A]

When you look at that nexus of technology and security and economics, where are you fairly confident that we're getting things right, that we have adopted the right kinds of policies and tools and investments to change what looked like a fairly worrying trajectory not that many years ago? And where do you think we still have work to do or we still haven't quite figured out what it will take to position ourselves well in that competition?

[B]

I think this is one of those moments in time when we recognize the challenge and we've moved very aggressively to try to address it. And we really haven't had, I think, in every instance, the time necessary to think through the second and third order impacts. And I think one of the things that the Secretary has tried to do in the second half of the administration is to engage upfront with technology companies is to bring in more people to the Commerce Department that have actual knowledge of the technologies at play. Because, again, you're taking a bureaucracy that hasn't necessarily dealt with these issues. And this isn't just true of Commerce, it's true at State, at the NSC and everywhere throughout the US Government. We haven't had the need to do this, and now we are, and we have to build up our capability in terms of having the people who really know things, bringing those people together on the technology side with the national security people to understand how do you draw the line?

[A]

Another point you make about US Policy in the essay is that even as we make these investments and compete very intensively in these areas, it is very much in our interest to invest in what you call near term stabilization of the bilateral relationship. The kind of diplomacy that we saw, I guess, most clearly in November between President Biden and Xi Jinping, which is really about, you know, kind of keeping things relatively calm in the near term, even as we accept long term competition. There's another piece in the same issue by former Trump NSC official Matt Pottinger and former member of Congress and chair of the China Subcommittee, or the Subcommittee on the Chinese Communist Party, I think was the official name Mike Gallagher, arguing that we are buying that near term stabilization at too high a price. What do you think the Pottinger Gallagher critique of that diplomacy gets wrong.

[B]

I mean, honestly, and Matt's a very good friend of mine, I would say this diplomacy is virtually costless. It is so narrowly targeted and so directly in US Interest that I don't know how you make a legitimate complaint about it. If you look at the nature of the dialogues that were established, whether it's, you know, treasury on debt sustainability or, you know, macro economy, or it's the ones that we had in the Commerce Department or mill to mill dialogue, military to military dialogue, or advancing case for people to people ties, all of these are directly in US Broad strategic interest. So, you know, I would go back to Matt and, and Congressman Gallagher and, and ask them precisely how they think this set of dialogues is undermining US national or economic security.

[A]

I'm interested in your reaction to one of the other arguments in that essay by Matt and Mike, which is about how we define and articulate the objective of our China strategy. They argue provocatively that we should be clear that our goal is weakening CCP leadership and aiming for some kind of change in the, in the Chinese political system. They don't mean Iraq style invasion of China, but that we should be clear that we are trying to change the nature of government and power in China. How do you react to that argument? I guess on two levels. One, is that the right objective? And two, are they right that we should more clearly articulate that objective? Especially they would argue the Chinese think that already. They assume that's what we're trying to do. So why not be clear about it and be kind of concerted about putting such a strategy into place?

[B]

Yeah, I can think of almost nothing that would make our lives in the United States more difficult than actively stating that it is our objective to change the government of China. Not only will the Chinese be completely unresponsive to anything that we want to get done with them or anything that might require their assistance, but we will get virtually no support for that among any of our allies and partners. If secretly. We believe that China would be better off not having Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, you know, front and center. I think that's probably, you know, something that many of our allies and partners would agree with and many people in the United States would agree with. But having that as an objective and a stated objective, I don't see any advantage to that. And frankly speaking, I think the entire effort to frame US Policy toward China through a lens of competition is a mistake. It doesn't give us a sense for what the end objective is. I would far prefer and it's also, I think, probably the second point that I was trying to make in my essay, far prefer that we think about we begin from a place of thinking about the United States, what we want our position to be in the world. What we have is a vision for the international system moving forward, recognizing that many of our current institutions aren't functioning as well as we would like them to. And sometimes we're responsible for that in part. So how do we think about the transformational changes at play in climate, in health, in technology, and how do we want to reorient our institutions to address them better? How do we become more inclusive in our foreign policy? So to me, then, China becomes a subset of that. Our China policy is a subset of that. It's about our vision for ourselves and our place in the world.

[A]

We'll be back after a short break. And now back to my conversation with Elizabeth. Economy. There's this very fairly widespread view among Chinese analysts and scholars and officials that the US Is in fact set on limiting China's rise in some way, containing China, as most people say. Do you see anything to that? I mean, should we be concerned about that impression, or is that not really our problem and we shouldn't worry one way or another about whether that's a widespread impression among Chinese officials and observers?

[B]

I think at this point, it is not realistic for us to say that we're not trying to contain it. We clearly are. I think what we need to say is we need to refine the narrative to say we are trying to contain certain behaviors. We're not trying to contain China's economic growth as long as that growth doesn't undermine our national security. Right. We're not trying to contain China's the sort of expansion and wealth of the individual Chinese person. Were, you know, as President Biden has said now, the problem with that, and I believe that. Right. But the problem is that there are other people, and I would say primarily in from the Trump administration who don't believe that, who do want to contain just China's economic growth. And so I think it becomes very difficult, again, to make a credible argument to the Chinese at this particular point in time that we're not trying to contain them. I mean, we are trying to contain their bad behavior in the South China Sea. And we should, you know, we're trying to contain, through our sanctions and export controls, you know, China's bad behavior in supporting Russia. So I think I have no problem frankly saying we're trying to contain elements of Chinese behavior, elements of its policy. I think we are, and we shouldn't be afraid to say that, but I think we want to stay away from saying that. We want to contain China's economic growth and the benefits that come to the Chinese people from that.

[A]

You had been focused before many observers of China and the United States, on how disruptive a force Xi Jinping was, how much a change his leadership would be. You were writing about this back in 2013 and 14, when he was newly in power. You wrote a piece in Foreign affairs called China's Imperial President in 2014, where you talked about his power grab for himself and for the party and his rejection of the tradition of collective leadership. When you observe Chinese power and behavior over these last years, how much of this is particular to Xi Jinping and his own ambitions and leadership style, and how much of it is a deeper change in the system? I guess another way of asking this is when Xi Jinping has left the scene, either because he chooses to or because of natural causes, will we see some kind of reversion to some of the less disruptive behavior that characterized China before Xi Jinping?

[B]

I mean, I think it just depends on who comes to power after him, of course. You know, do we get Xi Jinping, too, or do we, you know, get someone more like the former, you know, Premier Li Keqiang, a more moderate person who's interested in both economic reform and a greater sort of political opening? So I don't think we can say what we'll get, but I think there's certainly the possibility that it would change back to something more approximating 2010, 2011, before Xi Jinping. I always find it funny because, as you know, there's still a debate over whether, yes, this is baked into the Chinese system, this kind of ambition, the repression, all of this is baked into the Chinese system, or whether Xi Jinping really does represent an inflection point. It's only a debate here in the United States. If you go to China, Chinese scholars will all acknowledge that Xi Jinping represents a fundamental shift in the trajectory of China. They have no confusion over the impact that Xi Jinping has had on their own lives and on the direction in which China has moved on the global stage.

[A]

So I want to go back to the very powerful point about US Strategy and vision that you make in the essay, and that's about the US in some ways, learning from China, about needing to seize the mantle of change, as you put it. You write that Washington needs to articulate and push forward its own vision for a transformed international system. And the US role within that system, one that is inclusive of countries at different economic levels and with different political systems. As you look at what the components of that push should be, what should we learn from China? What does you look at these initiatives that you were describing earlier in the broader strategy and vision of which they're a part. Should the US take from that?

[B]

I think for me the most important thing that we could do moving forward is that notion of greater inclusion with the emerging and middle income economies. I think China has been particularly effective at this in many respects. It's about bringing countries to the table which China does not, simply saying here are the rules of the game the G7 has decided, or the US and the EU and US and Japan and Korea. We've decided these things. Now please sign on to them. Rest of the world. It's about incorporating them into our initiatives. For example, the Ships and Science Act. You know, again, we tend to just look at a narrow band of countries that are going to be part of the supply chains, mostly in the Indo Pacific and Mexico. Why not include countries in Africa? Why not include more in Latin America? Something like the Indo Pacific Economic framework. It doesn't include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar. Do we want to provide a pathway for those countries to join at some point? Why not talk to their leaders and say this is what it would take? We'd love to have you be part of this. So I think to my mind there's definitely an element of we want democracies, we want democratic values to be at the heart of the international system. But I think we need to be patient with some countries and encourage them to move along that path, not exclude them. Because if we exclude them, we're not talking to them, we have no shot and China just gobbles them up. So to my mind, that is, I think one of the things that the next administration really needs to focus on. I don't think any administration has done a good job of this.

[A]

And so when you hear the kind of high flown rhetoric that Joe Biden especially likes to indulge in where he talks about the global battle between democracy and autocracy, to your mind, that's not really helpful in bringing around much of the world that is not quite as settled in its view of those questions and would like a more flexible approach that in some ways hinders us from competing with China on that playing field.

[B]

Correct? I do believe that that is the central battle or one of these central battles, but I don't think it helps us in terms of actually competing with China. We Just leave so many countries off the table. So I just think reorienting, reframing our rhetoric, I think could be very helpful.

[A]

When I look back at your work over the last couple of decades, really what is striking to me is that you were much quicker than most, not just to recognize how much of a change Xi Jinping represented, but also to see some of the less gleaming aspects of the Chinese development model and some of the weaknesses in that model, whether it's economically or demographically or societally, environmentally. Something that you wrote about before many people were focused on it. You wrote a piece in 2021, shortly before going into government, called China's Inconvenient Truth, where you focused on some of the ways that society in China was fracturing around many of these challenges. When you compare the United States to China right now, in many ways we look like we have an advantageous position, leaving aside our political dysfunction. But when you look at this contest and try to step back from the chaos of the day to day, do you think it's right to have some degree of assurance about the US Position and a kind of clear eyed view of the challenges that China is going to face as its development continues?

[B]

The way I like to think about it is that we need to be able to respond both to China's ambition and to its reality. And so on the one hand, I think it is important to understand that China is much more highly polarized politically than we tend to think and that this could have a significant drag on the Chinese economy moving forward. It is important to recognize that they have failed to deal with local government debt, with the real estate sector. I think it's important to understand all that. It's also important to understand that for our sort of top priority issues, namely the sort of technological competition, the military competition, the competitions were influenced globally, that Xi Jinping, those ambitions remain in China and Xi Jinping retains the ability to pursue those ambitions while repressing the domestic populace and its discontent. So that we can't take solace in some way from the fact that China might be struggling a little bit domestically and think that that means that China is going to reorient its economic priorities to address its social and economic ills domestically. We need to understand that Xi Jinping's priorities will continue to be advancing the technological race, its military expansionism, his own view of what is needed for China's security. So that's why I think, you know, people that say, you know, oh well, they have all these problems now, they're not going to be able to pursue the Belt and road initiative, etc. I think that's a mistaken perspective because it just aligns with what we would think would happen here in the United States. But that's not the way that China operates. It's not the way that Xi Jinping has structured the system of political control in the country. So, you know, I think we just have to understand it differently.

[A]

I was also struck by your emphasis in the essay on China's commitment to an investment in diplomacy. I mean, this is something that people in the U.S. foreign policy world have been complaining about for decades at this point. And I say this as someone who used to work for the Secretary of State. We have not exactly seen an investment in diplomatic resources and embassies and kind of global presence. And China seems to see that as extremely important at this moment.

[B]

Yeah, I mean, that's something that China has long valued. It puts people on the ground, lots of people on the ground, has more embassies and consulates than any other country in the world. And, you know, the people that serve in those countries speak the language, and they have a whole network that engages, you know, with the media, with Chinese business. It is at once both. It can be both incoherent. And many times, China's Foreign Ministry has had to do cleanup work for, you know, Chinese industry and investments that have gone awry in emerging economies. But by the same token, they can work very effectively together to transmit a singular message. And it's a relentless message, and it's a persistent message. And, you know, again, if we're not there, you know, we don't have ambassadors or Senior officials in 30, you know, embassies or consulates globally. Again, we have no capacity to have real influence there. So you have to pay to play. And we just haven't been willing to do that, I think, in a consistent manner. And I would also say it's at the very top at the White House that, you know, in contrast to, you know, how, you know, Xi Jinping, how the Chinese leadership embraces leaders from around the world at all times and gives them face, gives them respect, gives them time. You know, we had the first state visit of an African leader to the United States was President Ruto, in 20 years, right. This past May or June. I mean, to me, that speaks volumes.

[A]

So I have to ask before we close about the potential return of Donald Trump to the presidency. There's an argument that there's been a fair degree of continuity between China policy across the Trump and Biden administrations. If Trump does come back, what would change and what wouldn't and what would the consequences of that be for the US China relationship and also the long term competition contest, however you want to characterize it that we are involved in?

[B]

Yeah, I mean, I would say I think the greatest risk to US China policy is less on the bilateral front, on the US China relationship itself, although President Trump has said that he would put tariffs on somewhere between 60 and 100% on all Chinese goods coming into the United States. So that of course would would be significant shift. But I think it's less about the bilateral relationship than what might happen to the edifice of US Leadership that the Biden administration has built more broadly. That is the bigger part in some ways of our China policy. All the building blocks, the Chips and Science act, although I think that would stay. But the inflation Reduction act, the bipartisan infrastructure law. To what extent would a Trump administration think about continuing to develop really the foundations of American competitiveness, educational system, the kinds of partnerships and tech hubs that the Biden administration has put in place, again, that give us long term competitiveness but people call industrial policy? Is that something that Trump administration would support? Certainly. I think a really big challenge is going to be in terms of our work with our allies and partners. And while the Trump administration was reasonably good about working with our Asian allies and partners, thanks to people like Matt and H.R. mcMaster and Secretary Mattis, even Secretary Tillerson, they were not very good at working with our European partners and allies. And then I think that, you know, are we going to see a repeat of basically a retrenchment in US Leadership on the global stage, in global institutions, you know, pulling the US out of the Paris climate agreement, the UN Human Rights Commission, all of the things we saw the Trump administration move forward on that really diminish a sense of US Leadership on the global stage. Is that going to be part of a, would that be part of a Trump 2 administration? So again, I think it's less and I think that's why Matt can say this, it's less about the bilateral policy where I think there has been a good deal of continuity, than about everything else that actually gives us the ability to compete and have an effective China policy. Those are the things that I think are most at risk from a Trump too.

[A]

Liz, thanks so much for the fantastic piece called China's Alternative Order in our Meijun issue. And thanks so much for doing this today.

[B]

Thanks, Dan. It's great seeing you again.

[A]

Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannon, Julia Fleming dresser and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph, Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sierra and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.