China’s Vision for a New World Order - The Foreign Affairs Interview

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Foreign Affairs Interview – "China’s Vision for a New World Order"
Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan
Guest: Elizabeth Economy
Date: July 26, 2024

Overview

This episode features a candid and in-depth conversation between Foreign Affairs editor Daniel Kurtz-Phelan and China expert Elizabeth Economy, discussing China’s ambitions for a new global order under Xi Jinping and the implications for the United States and the world. Drawing from Economy’s recent Foreign Affairs essay “China’s Alternative Order,” the discussion explores how Beijing is constructing a toolkit of economic, diplomatic, and security initiatives intended to shift global norms and leadership, the challenge this poses to the U.S.-led international order, and what the U.S. can do in response.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. China’s Strategy for a New World Order

Xi Jinping’s vision: China is deliberately building the “building blocks” of a new international system that aligns with its values and priorities, warning that the U.S. should not repeat past complacency (e.g., with the Belt and Road Initiative). (03:15)
Four Elements of Xi’s Strategy:
- Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Started as hard infrastructure, but evolved to include technology, environmental, and health components—implementing and exporting Chinese values and political norms. Also, provides military expansion opportunities like overseas bases (e.g., Djibouti). (03:55)
- Global Development Initiative (GDI): Focused on projects aiding UN Sustainable Development Goals; promotes China’s belief that economic development precedes political/civil rights. (05:00)
- Global Security Initiative (GSI): Seeks to reshape existing security architecture, undermining U.S. alliances with concepts like “indivisible security” (ie., the right to pre-emptive action if threatened). (05:52)
- Global Civilization Initiative: Argues for every country’s right to pursue its own models/values without outside criticism—chiefly to blunt criticism of China’s human rights record. (06:25)

2. Global Appeal and Efficacy of China’s Initiatives

Initiatives appear “benign” and hard to argue against on their surface, especially given dissatisfaction with the Western-led system. They’re particularly appealing as alternatives in regions where U.S.-led alliances have failed to resolve major conflicts (e.g., Middle East, Ukraine). (07:25, 09:03)
- Quote: “On the face of it, it doesn’t sound bad. And I think that’s the real strength of China’s initiatives... very difficult in some ways to argue against. But the crux of them again is always something that advantages China and undermines the current international norms and values.” – Elizabeth Economy (07:53)

3. China's Mediation and Diplomacy

China’s diplomatic moves in brokering agreements (e.g., Hamas/Fatah, Saudi Arabia/Iran) are seen as constructive compared to recent U.S. struggles in the region. These are cited as evidence of the GSI in action. (08:30–09:16)

4. The U.S. Role in China’s Vision

In China’s ideal scenario, the U.S. remains a “great power” but is diminished—outside the Indo-Pacific militarily, stripped of its alliances, and sidelined from shaping international norms (“orbiting China like all the other countries”). (09:26–10:36)

5. China-Russia-Iran-North Korea Alignment

The expanding alignment isn’t as surprising as it might seem—Economy discusses a lack of Russian domestic resistance to being the junior partner and a high acceptance of a China-led Eurasian order. She notes that future U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan cannot be analyzed in isolation from this wider bloc. (11:16–13:51)
- Quote: “It’s no longer enough for us to be thinking about the US and China, but we ought to be thinking about how are Russia and Iran and North Korea likely to play with China if China takes action against Taiwan?” – Elizabeth Economy (13:38)

6. U.S. Policy Response and Commerce’s Central Role

The Commerce Department has become the “tip of the spear” in U.S. China strategy, especially around technology controls and industrial policy, owing largely to the leadership of Secretary Gina Raimondo and the rising importance of the tech-economic-security nexus. (14:38)
Need for deeper technical expertise in government to keep up with fast-evolving technology and ensure national security. (16:55–17:55)

7. Debating the U.S. Approach: Engagement or Containment?

Economy defends recent diplomatic engagement with China as “virtually costless” and directly in U.S. interests, countering critics like Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher. (18:50)
Critiques the idea that the U.S. should openly pursue regime change in China, calling it counterproductive both for U.S.-China relations and alliance management. Instead, the U.S. should focus on articulating a positive vision for itself and the global order, not just framing policy as “competition” with China. (20:35)
- Quote: “I can think of almost nothing that would make our lives in the United States more difficult than actively stating that it is our objective to change the government of China.” – Elizabeth Economy (20:40)

8. Is the U.S. Containing China?

Economy acknowledges that U.S. policy is “trying to contain certain behaviors,” such as aggression in the South China Sea and support for Russia, but should avoid the impression of containing general economic growth. (23:11–24:45)

9. Xi Jinping’s Impact: Inflection Point or Systemic Trend?

While U.S. analysts debate how much is specific to Xi versus systemic, Chinese scholars universally see Xi Jinping as a transformative force who fundamentally shifted China’s trajectory. A post-Xi China could, but will not necessarily, revert to more moderate policies. (24:45–26:46)

10. Lessons for U.S. Strategy: Inclusion and Vision

The U.S. needs to “seize the mantle of change” by offering an inclusive vision for world order and actively engaging countries across a broader range of economic/political systems. Overly sharp democracy-vs-autocracy rhetoric alienates much of the world and weakens U.S. competition with China for influence. (26:46–29:34)
- Quote: “If we exclude them, we’re not talking to them, we have no shot and China just gobbles them up.” – Elizabeth Economy (28:17)

11. Comparative Weaknesses and Advantages

U.S. should recognize both China’s ambitions and its limitations—deep domestic polarization, economic fragility, environmental and demographic challenges—but these do not preclude China’s continued pursuit of global and technological ambitions. (29:56–32:52)

12. Diplomatic Investment Disparity

China is outpacing the U.S. in global diplomatic presence, with more embassies and consulates worldwide and better engagement of local actors—a significant gap in American “influence infrastructure.” (32:52–34:53)

13. Potential Impact of a Trump Return

The main risk of a Trump administration is less about direct U.S.-China relations, more about neglecting the foundations that make U.S. competition possible—alliances, global leadership, industrial and technological policy. Tariff hikes could significantly alter trade dynamics, but a broader American retrenchment would likely undermine long-term competitiveness. (34:53–37:35)

Memorable Moments & Notable Quotes

“Let’s take action now to address the challenge that China is presenting, because it’s much more difficult to go back and try to undo what China has accomplished.” (Elizabeth Economy, 03:32)
“The real point behind the Global Security Initiative is to transform the international security architecture.” (Elizabeth Economy, 05:58)
“On the face of it, it doesn’t sound bad. And I think that’s the real strength of China’s initiatives, generally speaking, is that they appear on the surface to be so benign... But the crux of them again is always something that advantages China and undermines the current international norms and values.” (Elizabeth Economy, 07:44–08:27)
“You know, the US can continue to be a great power, but within this Chinese context... The US can orbit around China like all the other countries...” (Elizabeth Economy, 09:29–10:31)
“It is important to understand that China is much more highly polarized politically than we tend to think, and that this could have a significant drag on the Chinese economy moving forward... but Xi Jinping’s priorities will continue to be advancing the technological race, its military expansionism, his own view of what is needed for China’s security.” (Elizabeth Economy, 31:01–32:00)

Timestamps for Important Segments

Xi Jinping’s four-part strategy: 03:37–06:43
Appeal and traction of Chinese initiatives: 06:43–08:30
China as Middle East mediator; GSI in action: 08:30–09:16
How the U.S. factors in China’s vision: 09:26–10:36
China-Russia relationship and wider ‘axis’: 11:16–13:51
U.S. Commerce Department’s rising role: 14:38–16:31
U.S. policy debate: stabilization vs. confrontation: 18:01–20:35
‘Containing’ China: 23:11–24:45
Xi Jinping as an inflection point: 24:45–26:46
Lessons in inclusivity for U.S. policy: 26:46–29:34
Comparative strengths and internal weaknesses: 29:56–32:52
U.S. vs. China on diplomatic investment: 32:52–34:53
Potential Trump administration scenarios: 34:53–37:35

Conclusion

Elizabeth Economy urges the United States and its leaders to take seriously China’s vision and methodical advance toward reshaping the global order—and to respond not merely by competing, but by crafting an inclusive, positive vision for the world that re-engages overlooked nations and builds long-term competitiveness and influence. The future of the U.S.-China relationship, and of world order, will depend not only on managing bilateral frictions, but on the U.S. ability to lead by example and investment, both at home and abroad.

Transcript

A (0:00)

Dan I'm Dan Kurtz Phelan, and this is the Foreign affairs interview.

B (0:05)

It's clear that NATO and the sort of US alliance system in Asia, they're not effective right now at managing two of the major conflicts, right, the conflict in the Middle east and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. So China has an opening to say I have something better or I have something different that ought to be considered.

A (0:28)

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has a very clear vision for a new world order, and although the United States may disagree with that vision, it should not dismiss it, argues Elizabeth Economy in a new piece for Foreign Affairs. Economy is one of the foremost experts on China in the United States. She is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and until recently she served as the senior advisor for China at the Commerce Department. Economy stresses that if the United States wants to out compete China, it needs to offer its own vision for a new world order. It cannot simply defend an unpopular status quo. Liz, thank you so much for joining me.

B (1:09)

My pleasure. It's great to be here with you. Dan.

A (1:11)

Let me start with your recent essay. It was called China's Alternative Order. It kicked off our May June issue. One of the points of departure for the argument you made in that essay is, is that while there's a tendency in US Policy circles to kind of write off the strategy that China has adopted under Xi Jinping, so just to start, what is that strategy and what suggests to you that it is, in fact, gaining some traction despite some of the headwinds that China is facing?

B (1:37)

Sure. I mean, part of the reason I wrote the piece is, as you suggest, to kind of sound an alarm bell for this administration and the next administration, that China and Xi Jinping, not only do they have a strategy in mind for reorienting the world order or reordering the world order, but they're actually now putting in place the building blocks of that strategy and that they will persist. And so we need to pay attention now or else we're going to end up in the position that we did, for example, with the Belt and Road Initiative, you know, back in 2013, when nobody really thought that was going to be a big deal. And then all of a sudden we look and Huawei now dominates all 4G throughout Africa. And the point is really, let's take action now to address the challenge that China is presenting, because it's much more difficult to go back and try to undo what China has accomplished. So what is China trying to do? I think there are really four elements to Xi Jinping's strategy in terms of really the global reordering of norms and institutions that in a way will from his perspective, I think, align more closely with Chinese values and interests and policy priorities. So the first is again the Belt and Road initiative, which he outlined back all the way back in 2013, which started as a hard infrastructure project, but then again morphed into something much more. And you had not only hard infrastructure, but you had digital Silk Road. You've had the green Silk Road, which is on environmental technologies and products. You have the health. Silk Road sort of came to life during COVID It's not even simply about China being able to be the leader in the 21st century infrastructure for the world. It's also about imparting Chinese value. So you can buy into Chinese telecommunications system or Chinese surveillance system, but you can also then get training in cybersecurity, how to monitor dissent, how to track dissidents. So it's a package really of the technology, plus the political norms and values that accompany that technology in China. So kind of a way to export China's political model as well. And then of course, you know, a move for China to begin to expand its military presence globally, also through the Belt and Road, its first military logistics base in Djibouti, on the grounds that it needs to protect its workers and its economic interests abroad. And now we see China beginning to move to develop more bases, which is a radical shift from what came before. You know, before 2010, 2011, before Xi Jinping, really, you would rarely if ever see a thinker or even a military strategist talk about China having bases overseas. It was just antithetical. That was the provenance of the United States and as a hegemonic power. So, you know, the Belt and Road really was Xi Jinping's first big foreign policy initiative, his flagship initiative, Fast Forward, and you get a new set of initiatives. You get the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. And the first one out of the box was the Global development initiative in 2021. And that is a kind of addition to the Belt and Road initiative. It focuses on more on aid, more on smaller scale projects like small scale wind farms, but it's in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. So there's healthcare, green transition, poverty alleviation. But embedded in the Global Development Initiative is also the belief that development is a precursor to human rights, to political and civil rights, so development should come first. And so embedded in all of these things, I think it's important to underscore in Every one of these initiatives, in every part of Xi Jinping's strategy, is a kind of stealth bomber that is designed to really detonate in some ways, the current priority and primacy of Western values. The Global Security Initiative, which Xi Jinping announced at the Boao Forum in 2022, has in part, very traditional values embedded in the UN Charter, like sovereignty, but then also goes on to say, support indivisible security. And that's just the idea that if a country feels that its security is threatened, it has the right to take preemptive action. So that's in this Global Security Initiative, as is the notion of comprehensive security architecture and the dissolution of the US Led alliance system. So that's the real point behind the Global Security Initiative is to transform the international security architecture. And then finally, the Global Civilization initiative basically just says that every country has its own path, its own values, its own system, and no other country has the right to criticize or to interfere in that country's system. So here too is the point that, you know, for China, it has really dislikes the criticism that it faces on its human rights practices. And so this is a way of reshaping values and norms in the international system. So that type of criticism is no longer supported.