Podcast Summary: The Foreign Affairs Interview

Episode: How the Past Shadows China’s Future
Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan (Editor, Foreign Affairs Magazine)
Guest: Odd Arne Westad (Historian, Scholar of Cold War and Chinese History)
Date: January 1, 2026

Episode Overview

Daniel Kurtz-Phelan welcomes acclaimed historian Odd Arne Westad for a deep discussion about the historical forces shaping China’s present and future as a world power. Drawing on Westad’s expertise in Cold War history and Chinese foreign policy, the episode explores how historical analogies illuminate—and sometimes mislead—current policy debates, especially around U.S.-China relations, global multipolarity, and the potential for major power conflict. Central to their conversation are the echoes of pre-World War I Europe and the ways both Western and Chinese leaders interpret and deploy history in their policymaking.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Faulty but Instructive Cold War Analogy

• Multipolarity vs. Bipolarity:
  • Westad argues that, unlike the Cold War’s bipolar structure, today’s global order is increasingly multipolar.
  • Quote: "I think the Cold War parallel… is still a faulty and to some extent dangerous analogy… The great powers of today are competing within the same international economic system. [06:43, Westad]"
• Economic Integration as a Key Difference:
  • Unlike the Soviet Union’s self-isolation, China is fully integrated in the global economic system, making containment much more complex.
• Lessons, not Templates:
  • While leader-level engagement, mutual respect, deterrence, and arms control from the Cold War era are instructive, today’s systemic complexity demands different approaches.

2. What Drives Chinese Strategy?

• Regional Predominance, Not Global Domination (at least for now):
  • “They want to become the predominant power in Eastern Asia and… the Western Pacific. I see much less evidence… of China having any kind of deliberate… strategies to become a globally dominant power, replacing the United States.” [11:41, Westad]
  • However, “for great powers, appetite sometimes increases with eating… The fact that China doesn’t today have a uniform strategy for becoming globally predominant is not the same thing as [saying] China wouldn’t move there over time if given the opportunity.” [11:41, Westad]
• Consistency, With Intensifying Ambition:
  • The essential aims have remained stable over two decades but capabilities (military, tech, innovation) have grown faster than predicted.

3. Xi Jinping as a Historical Actor

• Continuity over Personalism:
  • While Xi’s style and stress on China’s global significance are notable, he’s operating along a historical trajectory, not reshaping it single-handedly.
  • “Comparisons between Xi and Mao I sometimes find a little bit ridiculous… their commonalities are relatively limited.” [15:46, Westad]
• Qing Dynasty Parallels:
  • Xi is compared to Qing emperors Kangxi and Qianlong, facing rapid domestic growth and the challenge of managing diverse neighbors—history that Xi and his advisors are likely keenly attuned to.

4. The CCP’s Use (and Abuse) of History

• Public Narrative & Legitimacy:
  • Xi frames current CCP rule as the fulfillment of a long Chinese historical arc, selectively emphasizing continuity while downplaying disruptive periods.
  • Notable quote: “He [Xi] is quite consistently stressing a much longer period of fulfillment… I don’t know that there is any other Chinese leader, including Mao, who has been that preoccupied with linking what he is doing to the Chinese past.” [20:50, Westad]
• History as Policy Driver:
  • The public mythology around the "century of humiliation” and reunification priorities, particularly regarding Taiwan, shapes both internal and international postures.

5. History as Analogy: Dangers and Uses

• Careful Application, Avoiding “False Analogies”:
  • “[Using historical analogies]… can never be 100% or even 70 or 80%. There are always differences. But… it is really, really important that the past matters.” [25:11, Westad]
  • Policymakers often wield historical reference for self-serving arguments (e.g., “another Munich,” “another Vietnam”), highlighting the need for rigorous historical thinking.

6. The Most Resonant Analogy: Pre–World War I Europe

• Multipolarity, Weakening Hegemon, Globalization Under Strain:
  • Today resembles the early 1900s as the U.S. role wanes (like Britain), multipolarity rises, and globalization breeds both cooperation and conflict.
  • “These are, in my view, sort of structural elements that existed in the world [then and now] which have a lot in common.” [29:48, Westad]
• The China–Germany Parallel:
  • China today echoes imperial Germany’s rapid ascent, difficulty reassuring the world about its intentions, and perception that incumbent powers seek to contain it.
  • “What the British were saying was… ‘Little Hans, if you stop growing, everything would be okay.’...That was Germany was told… The problem was Germany’s growth.” [32:43, Westad]
  • On the U.S. side, the risk is undermining the very order it created, mirroring Britain’s strategic retreat pre-World War I.

7. Taiwan as a Global Flashpoint

• A Balkan Powderkeg?:
  • “Taiwan is… like Alsace, Bosnia, and Belgium rolled into one.” [36:41, Westad]
  • Chinese sense of urgency is rising: fear of shifting Taiwanese identity and the need to demonstrate regional preeminence raise risks for conflict.
  • “If you can’t even reunify your own country, then you would never have the kind of position that Chinese… have been striving towards.” [39:48, Westad]
  • The parallels to 1914—structural tensions plus possible black swan events—are troubling.

8. The Russia–China Relationship: An Unstable Alliance

• Rapid and Surprisingly Deep Partnership:
  • Russia has subordinated itself economically to China, while China—under Xi—has prioritized this alliance more quickly than Westad expected.
  • “I don’t think we have another example from history… where one great power so willingly hands away economic advantages to a near neighbor, even if that near neighbor is a de facto ally.” [47:45, Westad]
• Long-term Risks for China:
  • Associating with a declining, embattled Russia (like pre-WWI Germany and Austria-Hungary) could entangle China in foreign crises, notably in places like the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula.
  • “In the longer term… there is no end of trouble with regard to this.” [49:28, Westad]

9. Lessons for American Policy

• No Quick “Reverse Kissinger”:
  • Splitting Moscow and Beijing is not currently feasible; realpolitik options are limited until global conditions change, particularly until the Ukraine war ends.
• Stabilization as a Goal:
  • Both China and the U.S. have reasons to lower bilateral tensions to focus on core disputes—a priority reminiscent of Cold War détente, beneficial to avoid every grievance becoming existential.

10. How China Sees the U.S.—and Vice Versa

• Distorted Perceptions, Volatility:
  • Chinese policymakers are wary of American unpredictability, especially under Trump. Fears of American decline are overstated yet influential.
  • There's risk that misperceptions could lead to strategic miscalculation in a crisis.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “For great powers, appetite sometimes increases with eating.”
  —Odd Arne Westad, [00:05] / [11:41]

• “I see much less evidence… of China having any kind of deliberate… strategies to become a globally dominant power, replacing the U.S… [But] the fact that China doesn’t today have a uniform strategy for becoming globally predominant is not the same thing as [saying] China wouldn’t move there over time if given the opportunity.”
  —Odd Arne Westad, [11:41]

• On Xi and History:

  • “He is quite consistently stressing a much longer period of fulfillment… I don’t know that there is any other Chinese leader, including Mao, who has been that preoccupied with linking what he is doing to the Chinese past.”
    —Westad, [20:50]

• On the Pre–World War I Analogy:

  • “I think again, we have to warn here, there are no exact similarities… but there are very striking parallels.”
    —Westad, [29:48]
  • “Taiwan is… like Alsace, Bosnia, and Belgium rolled into one.”
    —Westad, [36:41]

• On the risk of entangling alliances:

  • “Just like… Germany up to World War I… China is moving closer and closer to a de facto alliance with a decrepit empire on its own doorstep, namely Russia.”
    —Westad, [36:41]

Key Timestamps

• [00:05] — Opening: Appetite increases with eating; China and great power ambition
• [03:08] — Multipolarity vs. Cold War analogies; dangers of wrong historical parallels
• [06:43] — What can (and can’t) we learn from the Cold War; limits of analogy
• [11:41] — China's current strategy: regional focus, risks of expanding ambition
• [15:46] — The role of Xi Jinping: overemphasis on individual vs. structural factors
• [17:30] — Qing Dynasty lessons for Xi and the modern CCP
• [20:50] — CCP/ Xi’s strategic use of Chinese history for legitimacy
• [25:11] — History as analogy: benefits and pitfalls in policymaking
• [29:48] — The Pre–WWI European system as the most relevant historical analogy
• [32:43] — Parallels between China's predicament and pre-1914 Germany; perils on both sides
• [36:41] — Taiwan as a powderkeg; structural parallels to 1914
• [39:48] — Why Taiwan matters for China’s legitimacy and regional stature
• [47:45] — The speed and surprising depth of Russia–China alignment
• [49:28] — Westad’s warning: in the long run, alliance with Russia may be “very, very bad for China”
• [54:12] — Limits of American policy to exploit splits between Moscow and Beijing
• [56:43] — Chinese perceptions of American politics, unpredictability, and policy debate
• [59:23] — Closing: Dangers of dangerous analogies but also dangers of not learning from history

Takeaways

• History cannot be used as a blueprint, but its structures, cycles, and echoes are vital for understanding present risks and opportunities. Westad’s nuanced approach advocates for a careful, critical application of historical perspective—not least to avoid sleepwalking into a preventable conflict.
• The similarities between the early 20th century and today—multipolarity, globalization, rising and incumbent power friction—should urge policymakers on all sides to avoid fatalism and escalation, especially over flashpoints like Taiwan.
• China’s regional focus, alliance with a declining Russia, and self-mythologizing under Xi carry both opportunities and looming dangers—particularly if ambitions and anxieties combine at a moment of crisis.
• The U.S. should not overestimate its ability to engineer splits among adversaries, but should prioritize stabilization and nuanced understanding of Chinese and Russian perspectives—grounded, as Westad argues, in thoughtful engagement with history.