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- [00:00]
A
I'm Dan Kurtzphelin and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
- [00:06]
B
We assume that Mojtaba understands the business of the Supreme Leader's office. So he's probably, at least in terms of being an effective manager, probably the best candidate because he's already an insider. He already knows where the computer files are. He already knows where the keys to the cabinets are, that kind of thing. He knows how to do the business. That's our assumption.
- [00:27]
C
The reality is that Iran isn't just looking to end this war. It's looking to end this war with guarantees. The Gulf states could call President Trump and say end this war, but you know, no one is really talking about what those guarantees are. And the reality is that Gulf Iranian relations after this war will be very broken.
- [00:51]
D
I'm Daniel Block, senior editor at Foreign Affairs. Dan is away this week. For about two weeks. U.S. and Israeli forces have bombarded Iran. They have targeted Iranian military and nuclear sites. They have slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top Iranian officials. They have even sunk an Iranian vessel deep in the Indian Ocean. Iran has responded by hurling missiles and drones at targets in the Gulf, Israel and elsewhere. In what has become a surprisingly broad and sustained retaliation. US President Donald Trump has promised Iranians some kind of regime change. But that will not be so simple. Iran has declared Khamenei's son Mojtaba to be his successor, a move that seems to double down on the old order. In this two part episode, I spoke with leading experts on the course of the war, the future of the Iranian regime and the upheaval and uncertainty in the wider region. First, Afshan Ostabar, an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, explored how the Islamic Republic has been reshaped by the attacks and what it would take to truly dismantle the regime. Then Sanam Bakil, the director of the Middle east and North Africa program at Chatham House, discussed the widening remit of the war and how it has abandoned the assumptions and hopes of many Gulf countries. Afshan, welcome to the Foreign affairs interview.
- [02:26]
B
Yeah, thanks so much for having me.
- [02:28]
D
I just want to start by reminding listeners, given that events are developing quickly on the ground and in Washington, that we are recording on Tuesday afternoon. But you are working on an article that will be out in Foreign affairs probably this week on Iran's future, and I think your argument will be relevant no matter what happens in the next few days. And the article's argument basically is that even if the Iranian regime emerges from this conflict greatly weakened, it will still be very dangerous. Could you tell us why?
- [02:58]
B
So I think that the important thing here is that if the regime survives intact without compromising in any sort of serious way, that's to say if they survive the war, the main sort of leaders and stuff that we have now are more or less unchanged. And the war is basically finished by the US Meeting its, its. Its operational objectives, meaning destroying Iran's drones and missiles and navy. Then what you're going to have is a regime that is broken, weak and poor and has very little military wherewithal to change its situation. Right. It can't restore deterrence in any meaningful way. It can't restart its nuclear program very easily, and it can't restart its drones and missiles very easily. It may try to do all those things, and over time, it may do those things, but in the meantime, it's going to be broke, it's going to be poor, and it's going to be angry. Right? We have to remember that Moshe Bel Khamenei, the new supreme leader, should he sort of remain the new supreme leader after the war, that his father was just killed, right? And I believe his mother was just killed, or at least one of his father's wives was. Was just killed, right. So he's lost family members, personal family members in this war. If, if you have that combination of. Of a guy who sort of seeks vengeance, revenge for the death of his father, combined with a regime led by the IRGC whose whole business has been sort of vengeance and resistance, then I think you have a recipe for a very dangerous country, right? One that could turn to terrorism, one that could sort of work behind the shadows to get back at their enemies over the short term or over the long term.
- [04:51]
D
I want to talk just a little bit longer about Moj Taba. Why do you think the regime coalesced around him?
- [04:58]
B
It's a good question. We don't actually know that much about Mojtib Al Khamenei. I mean, he's kind of a mysterious guy. He first emerges in 2009 in the crackdown on the Green Movement, which was a popular movement in support of a presidential candidate. And he's known. He pops up in 2009 as an associate of the IRGC and as somebody
- [05:20]
D
quickly say, the IRGC stands for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and it's probably the most powerful institution in Iran. Is that fair to say?
- [05:29]
B
Yes, certainly. When I speak of the regime in Iran, I speak of the unelected centers of power, and there's really only Two meaningful centers of power in the regime. There's the Supreme Leader's office, which itself is an institution, and there's the irgc, which is a military above all, but it's really a foreign policy actor, a strategic actor, and a domestic actor as well. So Moshe Bel Khamenei emerges in 2009 as an associate of the IRGC and is prominent in the crackdown against protesters. And that's. And ever since then, there's been this, this idea that he is sort of the IRGC's guy, that he is the favored candidate of one wing of the regime. And that seems to have been the case, and that seems to have been what promoted his eventual appointment. Because for the irgc, the main danger is now that the Supreme Leader has died, you have a sort of collapse of the other half of the regime. Right. And so the irgc, being the most powerful institution within the regime, can either hope to advocate for a new supreme leader that, that it can work well with and that won't challenge its place in the Iranian system, or it can back somebody that will challenge its place in the system. Right. And so a reformist candidate like Hassan Rouhani, who the former president or some of the younger candidates that were put out there were put out there because they were reform minded, meaning they had sort of more pragmatic views of Iran's potential relationship with the West. But the irgc, I think above all was going for self interest here. And Mojtabh, for whatever reason, seems to be the guy that they feel will be, will help preserve their self interest the best.
- [07:30]
D
So President Trump demanded a say and who Iran selects as its next leader. And I think it's worth mentioning that he was quite unhappy with the choice of Mojtaba and both he and Israel have threatened to kill him. It's also worth mentioning that I don't think we've seen proof of life of him yet, could well be alive. But I think worth mentioning that let's say that the US and Israel eventually do kill Mojoba, either now or in the future. What might the regime do then?
- [07:57]
B
Well, I think they would do something similar. They would pick a guy who's the next best thing to Mojtoba. I mean, you're right, we haven't seen proof of life. There's some suggestion that Mojtiba could be injured and may have been injured in the same attack that killed his family or his father and his wife. So he may be alive, he may be injured, he could be killed tomorrow in an Israeli strike. We don't know. He may not, you know, belong for this world, but if he, if he does, you know, not make it very long or through the war, then they're going to turn to somebody else who I think is going to more or less sort of fulfill the same promise that Mojtiba was in the sense that he's a status quo candidate. That's what the IRGC is going for, right? Is a continuation of the status quo. And what they don't want, want to do is have a candidate that's going to drastically change things. So whomever it is, it's going to be somebody. If the IRGC has any say at least, and they do, since they're the most powerful institution remaining, whoever it is is going to be somebody that preserves what's left and isn't really trying to drastically change things.
- [09:11]
D
So what if they kill that person too? What if in effect the US and Israel just keep, it's killing whoever takes up the role of Supreme Leader.
- [09:18]
B
If they kill enough people,
- [09:21]
D
you're going
- [09:22]
B
to end up with, with a candidate that's different. But I don't, I don't think that's an effective way of let's say getting the candidate that you want. Right. And that might be, well, we'll just keep killing these guys until they pick somebody whom, whom we like. Because even if you outwardly like them, the Supreme Leader is not, doesn't have any inherent power. Right. The power given to the Supreme Leader is the power of the Constitution of Iran. But that power is supposed to reside in his religious authority. Well, Ali Khamenei, when he was first elected in 1989 as supreme leader, had no religious authority and it took him a decade to build up the power that he had. And how did he get that power? He created close linkages with the irgc. The IRGC is what created that power base for him. So the only reason why the Supreme Leader has a power base today is because of the loyalty of the irgc. So it's very unlikely that you get a Supreme Leader whom the IRGC doesn't like that's somehow able to have any meaningful power. You could get a young person or a very old person who thinks differently from the Supreme Leader, is a reform minded person, likes the United States, whatever, but the supreme, but the IRGC and the security forces have enough ability, at least in the early years to shape that Supreme Leader's behavior in a sense that you know, in effect that the, that that Supreme Leader isn't likely able to drastically change the system. Right. Because all the Supreme Leader can really do is manage the operations of the regime. And if, if you know your workers that have all the guns and all the missiles and all the bombs and all the, the clubs, if they don't want to do what you want to do, you're not likely able to convince them to go in a different way.
- [11:12]
C
Way.
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B
Right. So the IRGC has coercive power. The Supreme Leader has religious power. But in, in the current context within Iran, that religious power really is not meaningful. The vast majority of Iranians don't care about the Supreme Leader. So it really only matters in terms of creating a, a mechanism through which the Islamic system can be seen as surviving and the Islamic Revolution can be seen as continuing.
- [11:43]
D
So you were talking a little bit before about how when the elder Khamenei became Supreme Leader in 1989, he faced this kind of tricky task of consolidating power, and he had to really work to do that. This transition is now happening in the middle of a war. How hard do you think it might be for Mojtaba or whoever the Supreme Leader winds up being if Mojaba is indeed killed to amass control?
- [12:05]
B
I don't think that any Supreme Leader will amass the same amount of control as Ali Khamenei, at least not within a decade or two. They have to sort of create a cult of personality that, that transcends their actual role. And that's what Khamenei was able to achieve. I think most of it will be more competent than other people precisely because he was kind of a right hand man to his father. Right. And like I said, the Supreme Leader's position is not just that individual position, it also leads an entire office. And that office is in itself a very complex institution. It has its own intelligence service, it has its own security service. It controls billions of dollars of the Iranian economy. It's a big landlord, it's a tremendous institution. And so while we do not know, we assume that Mojtaba understands the business of the Supreme Leader's office. So he's probably, at least in terms of being an effective manager, probably the best candidate, because he's already an insider. He already knows where the computer files are, he already knows where the keys to the cabinets are, that kind of thing. He knows how to do the business. That's our assumption. Whereas if they chose an outsider who is new to the office of the Supreme Leader, they would have that much more to learn before they could get up to speed. So in that case, there was also Sort of an expediency, I think, to the choice of Mojitabh, where he can hit the ground running and really sort of, I think, prevent much degradation of the Supreme Leader's office, at least in terms of a management institution in the short term.
- [13:46]
D
So as I've been thinking a lot about the succession process and the Supreme Leader's office and what comes next in Iran, I've been mulling over a great piece you wrote for us in January called How the Iranian Regime Breaks. And one of the things you said in it is that if Iran experiences a coup of some kind, there's a good chance it will originate among the regime's younger mid ranking officials. And you argue that the reason for that is that these officials, unlike their superiors, haven't fully benefited from the regime. They have yet to get rich. The regime has lost quite a bit of power over the last couple of years. How do you think this conflict affects their calculus?
- [14:25]
B
Well, I think it's kind of interesting because in a lot of ways Mojtva is from the younger generation. And so you are having at least this initial turnover where now the Supreme Leader is a Gen Xer instead of a boomer, for example. Right. And so that's I think important because it suggests on the one hand, a continuation of the status quo, but it also suggests preparation for the future. Right. A preparation for a generational shift within the leadership. Now the younger generation within the IRGC in particular is just like Mojtaba, kind of mysterious. We believe we know some things about them and there's a lot that we don't know. And one of the things that we know about them is that they were kind of the engine. They were the people on the ground fighting the wars that made Iran a real impressive regional power. Right? From from 2003 through Iran's intervention in the Iraq war, all the way through the Arab Spring until the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Iran had this really impressive rise where it seemed like anything that the Islamic Republic got into, it ended up besting its competitors, right. It outlasted the United States and Iraq, it outlasted the Arab sort of states in Syria, at least up until the very end. It, it outlasted Saudi Arabia and the UAE for the most part in Yemen, it was the, the most important outside power in Lebanon. Everything was going great, right? And, and the younger generation were the guys that were fighting those wars, but also seen the success, right. If the Islamic Republic is kind of like a 47 year old startup, these guys were the Ones that saw the stock, you know, just go sky high. But they're also the guys who had yet to make the riches, had yet to get command, had yet to sort of really benefit from that regional power. And instead that stock price collapsed as Iran's regional power collapsed right in the midst of their careers. So these guys are living in this kind of very strange universe where they've, they've. They've experienced both the highs and the lows of what the Islamic Republic can, can offer, but they haven't tasted any of the fruits. Whereas the older generation, which is still in power, who are mostly the first generation of the revolution, that's to say, these are the guys ever since 1979, that have been leading things. These guys are still holding on to power. Right? And so there, I think, still is a capacity, whether it's in this conflict or, or, you know, down the road in, in, in the short term or even in the medium term, that you're going to have a generational change. And that could be either just a totally natural kind of either attrition or through a retirement of the olds, or it could be through some sort of coup or something like a soft coup. And I think that will be really interesting if that happens. We're going to have that generational shift one way or another, unless the Islamic Republic disappears. And as a political entity, we're going to have that change. But I think the more sort of crisis that the Islamic Republic is in, the more likely you are to have those internal coups. But I will also say this, and this gets back to sort of how I started this. The answer to your question, that we've already had one part of what that coup would have looked like, and that would have been sidelining Ali Khamenei and choosing somebody younger to replace him. Right. And so we've already had that, which to me is kind of the most really important part of the coup. I think the rest of it is something that's going to sort of trickle down. So in many ways, I think we're already experiencing that coup. It just may not be a coup that happens like a coup, but it could just be something that happens sort of over time as a process.
- [18:28]
D
One of the things I remember you grappling with when you thought about what the implications of a coup would be or even just a changing of the guard, is whether the successors, the new people who took charge of the regime would be theocratic or whether it would transition to a more outright military dictatorship. What trajectory do you think Iran is on? Right now?
- [18:51]
B
Well, I think we're closer to military dictatorship than anything else. And even in the military dictatorship kind of theory, I always want to emphasize that, at least in my arguments, the Supreme Leader would always be there. Right. The IRGC needs the Supreme Leader as, as a, as a sacred totem for the regime, as a lightning rod for regime criticism. It's just a useful conduit, it's a useful symbol. But what I envision in terms of a military dictatorship or, or let's say just a more military controlled authoritarian state is one in which the Supreme Leader is no longer a check on IRGC influence, but rather just a facilitator of that influence. And I don't know where we are, frankly, with Mojtaba. He. I don't think he'll be a Czech because I don't think he'll have the power to do so. I do think he'll be a facilitator, at least in the short term, but we'll see sort of over time, you know, if, if he's able to grow into this or not. The other aspect here is not whether they would be theocratic or something else, but whether they could abandon some of their kind of pan Islamist ideological agenda in favor of a more Iranian sort of nationalist perspective. Right. And the Iranian nationalist perspective is something that is shared much more broadly within Iranian society than the Islamist perspective. And so they've, they've, the IRGC and the regime have flirted with this in the past during their wars with isis, even the ongoing conflict with Israel. They've resurrected Iranian pre Islamic Iranian mythological heroes and stuff like that for propaganda. So they're flirting with this to try to get people on the, on their side. I mean, people don't really buy it, but they're flirting with it. So the younger generation was always seen as a little more flexible in this regard regard, a little more willing to sort of lean into Iranian nationalism and not kind of the pan Islamism that Ruhala Khomeini sort of instilled in the early Islamic Republic. But right now it's early days. I think it is. It's really impossible to see where it goes. But I think that's certainly one of the things that I'll be looking for and other people be looking for is how much Mojtaba embodies a generational shift or how much he just embodies kind of a retention of the status quo.
- [21:23]
D
What might those possible shifts combined with the fact that they're under continuous US and Israeli bombardment mean for Iran's willingness to negotiate with the United States, particularly over its nuclear program, its missile program, its network of regional proxies.
- [21:40]
B
You know, if, if you adopt a different mindset, it lets you be a little more flexible just in general. Right. If the Islamic Republic really wants to survive and regain any sort of strength, then the smartest, best thing to do is to compromise with the United States. Its missiles and its drones are really not that useful. I mean, they're useful for kind of punching back, but they're not a deterrent anymore. They're not going to win Iran wars. They might help it survive, but they're not going to win at wars. They're not going to improve its economy. So on the one hand, you could imagine them just going down the same old road and just trying to sort of hold on to everything they have and, and be sort of uncompromising and unflinching like they've been. But you can also imagine when things, either through the immense pressure that's being exerted right now on them through this war, or even afterwards in a more sort of post war setting where things cool off that they could begin to wrestle with, with compromise. And frankly, you know, compromising on the nuclear program is sort of a no brainer when, when all of your nuclear facilities are basically under rubble right now. Right. Compromising on missiles and drones is a little more difficult because especially now that we've, now that the US And Israel have destroyed much of Iran's military and its air force, Iran doesn't really have anything left, you know, so it's going to want some military capacity. So it's going to be difficult to give those things up. But it could, it could compromise on the nuclear program, especially if that compromise leads to something that improves Iran's economy. Right. That, that reduces sanctions or, or opens up bank accounts that, that have been frozen, that sort of thing. I think that's more possible now with Ali Khamenei out of the way than it was before. But I don't think that possibility is, is tremendous because remember again, to get to the how our conversation started, these guys are going to be bitter, they're going to be humiliated. And compromise, compromising is something that they're probably not going to want to do.
- [23:57]
D
I remember you wrote an article for us in June entitled How Iran Lost and your argument was in some ways that the regime got too aggressive, it overextended itself and that's what led Israel to decimate its proxies, kill off senior commanders, destroy its air defenses, which in turn opened the regime up, as you were saying, to exactly the kind of attacks we're seeing now. I take it from what you said that you think the regime is still prone to, and maybe in fact right now is making the same mistakes.
- [24:28]
B
Oh, absolutely, absolutely. I mean, this is, this has always been the problem for the Islamic Republic has been hubris. This is, you know, the problem for a lot of authoritarian systems, but this has certainly been the problem for the Islamic Republic is that they, they took all of their victories, which were victories only in the zero sum sense in Iraq, in Syria, in, in Lebanon and Yemen. It saw all of those sort of, all of those conflicts that it kind of emerged from as, as real proof that their way of doing things was leading to real success. But what they weren't really thinking about was how fragile those experiments were in Iraq or Syria or Lebanon and how vulnerable they would be to a greater power if a greater power wanted to, to decimate them. And October 7, the October 7, 2023 attacks was when Iran's clients really crossed a red line. Right? And, and this, this fight that Iran had been courting with Israel and even with the United States was, was finally sort of becoming a reality. Right? And so even though Iran felt like it could, it could harass Israel, it could coerce Israel, it could surround Israel with, with drones and, and, and, and proxies and, and militants, it, it felt like it was, you know, part of a inexorable historical fact that they would eventually succeed and be victorious over Israel, but they didn't really contend with what if they won't be, you know, what if they fail? What if Israel decides to go to war with them? And that's exactly what happened, right, is they, they, they picked a fight that they couldn't win and that fight got well beyond their control. And it's, it's continued to build up until the current conflict. Right. And so the way that I look at, at the Islamic Republic is that it sees itself as, you know, a little guy sticking up to bullies, right? That this is its own sort of internal, you know, mythology that they are fighting this kind of David versus Goliath battle, but it turns out they're not actually David, right? And Goliath is really strong and Goliath is much more powerful than they are. And so they picked a fight that they can't win and they've been losing steadily for two years now. And it doesn't seem like they're any closer, that they don't really have any capacity to punch back in any way that's that's meaningful and can change the reality.
- [27:09]
D
Thinking about slightly bigger players, more Goliaths, as you put it. One thing that you mention in your piece for this week is that China helped Iran get its missile capabilities back online after America and Israel attacked Iran in June. There's also been reporting that Russia, which is another Iranian partner, has helped Iran target US Forces during this war. My question is, one, what else might China and Russia do to help the regime going forward? And two, what might they do to help it recover?
- [27:40]
B
Well, there's all sorts of things that they could do to help it recover. I mean, especially China. But I think what is, I don't know what is. What should be glaringly obvious to the Iranians is that neither Russia nor China are going to go out of their way to stick up for Iran, that Iran is very much on its own. They might do things at the margins. So China's selling Iranian chemicals and ingredients in order to create solid fuel for its missiles. Russia perhaps giving Iranian intelligence on first strikes. You know, these are, these are kind of, you know, like giving somebody, I don't know, a Kleenex when they're outside in the rain. You know, it's, it's sort of a gesture, but it's not really going to change their fundamental situation, right? And so Iran, if it emerges from this, if the regime emerges from this, they're going to be approaching Syria or China and Russia and asking for help, but from a much, much weaker situation where they have much less leverage and much less to offer, right? They're basically a basket case. And so it really will be dependent on what China or Russia decide they can invest in Iran. And if Iran's even a good investment. The other thing here, and this is really important, is that China and Russia both balance their relationships with Iran, with the other side of the Persian Gulf, with the Arab states, particularly with, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. And so they never gave Iran anything that could immediately change, let's say, the balance of power between, between the Arab states and Iran. And if anything, they, they were much more favorable to the Arab states. And that's because the Arab states have a lot more money. They're far less of a problem. They have just as much oil to sell as Iran does. And so they are, they are useful friends. They're predictable friends. Iran is an unpredictable friend. And it's. Its utility is, is only so much as you decide that you want to kind of have a spoiler in the Middle East. And so now Iran has really wrecked its relationships with the, with its Arab neighbors. And those Arab neighbors are going to be much more cognizant of anything given to Iran that might help aid its missile program or its drone programs in particular. Right. So you can imagine that even if China and Russia want to give Iran anything to help it build back its military, that you're going to have calls from Abu Dhabi and from Riyadh. If not, you know, direct visits that are basically going to imply, hey, we, why don't you do that? Or why don't you not do that rather, and instead of giving Iran those things, why don't you give us those things? Or how about we just, you know, invest in this part of your country, that part of your country, and you just pretend Iran doesn't exist. I think it's going to be very hard for Iran to repair those relations quick enough in order to rebuild through China's help. There is, of course, always the possibility that China sees value in Iran as something that consumes the energies of the United States. Right. And so if China wants to split, let's say, America's attention from the South China Sea, then, then empowering Iran, building Iran back up in terms of a military power, helping facilitate its missile program or giving it air defense, any of those things, helping it, you know, build an air force, any of those things would, of course, I think, be problematic from, from a U.S. policy perspective and could, you know, lead to another conflict or a worsening of conflicts if a conflict happens again. So Iran could be utilized. But I think it's. It's a more difficult prospect for China or Russia to pursue right now, given tensions with the Arab states.
- [31:37]
D
We've been talking about politics at a pretty high level, which is to say governments. I want to flip that a little bit and talk about Iran's people. They're obviously in a very difficult situation. On the one hand, the regime is brutal and extremely unpopular. On the other hand, their country is being bombed by two foreign powers. Been a lot of civilian deaths. I think 168 Iranians were killed when what seems like a US missile, I hit a girls school. How are Iranians enduring this war, and how do you think it will affect their relationship to the regime?
- [32:11]
B
Well, it's, it's very difficult to say. I mean, one, you have to remember that, that Iran's Internet is still out. Right. Communications with the outside world are still very limited. So the, the amount that messages get out are pretty small. And it's, it's very difficult, I think, to know how people are living through this moment. But I think at the very least, we can imagine what they're going through. And even if they want the regime to fall and they want it to collapse, and they may have been happy about this war at the outset, they're having to endure sleepless nights where bombs are falling all around them. They're having to deal with civilian structures being hit, smoke in the air, sulfur in the air. You know, their. Their kids crying in the other room when, When. When these things happen, that's got to be, you know, discombobulating, I think, and very sort of difficult to live through. Right. So, you know, psychologically, I think it's. It's a very sort of challenging place for them to be in. And I think it'll be that much more challenging if, when it's all said and done, the regime still stands and still has the power to oppress the people, because not only will they have endured all of that, it wouldn't have led to what they had hoped it would lead to. Right. And that will be, I think, really gutting and disheartening for, at least for those Iranians that wanted to see the regime fall, which I think is. We don't have good polling, but probably a majority, if not a large majority. But you also have Iranians who support the regime, and they're not a small part of the country. Like even a generous view that, let's say they're 30%, that's still a lot of people. That's, you know, around 30 million people that. That would support the regime. They are probably both suffering just as much as. As other Iranians and. But also taking greater pleasure in Iran's retaliation and probably really hoping for the regime's survival. Right. So when it's all said and done, I think if the regime stands, you'll have the supporters of the regime that will really feel empowered. You know, they will feel that they have survived. They'll feel that there's a moral victory here. And the. The people who don't support the regime will be really discouraged and exhausted, and the social split, I think, will be, you know, that much more sharp between the two. And it could lead to lasting tensions. It could lead to unrest, it could lead to violence, it could lead to retaliation. You could have a regime sort of retaliatory campaign where they arrest people, kill people that they feel, you know, supported the. The war in some respects. It could be socially destabilized in a lot of ways, but I don't think there will be sort of a definitive kind of outcome. What I don't think you're going to see is sort of a rally around the flag kind of dynamic among those people who don't support the regime. They may lose trust with the United States, they may lose trust with Israel, they may even be angry at the United States and Israel, but they're not likely to back the regime as a result.
- [35:44]
D
Do you think that they might rise up, as Trump has asked of them, and try and take down the regime
- [35:52]
B
without some effort by the US And Israel to pave the way for them by eliminating the personnel that would take to the streets in counter protest operations? I think it's really unlikely for them to come out because, remember, they just came out in January and they got mowed down by these forces. Right. And even though the US And Israel are hitting intelligence buildings, IRGC buildings, there's an element of the IRGC known as the Basij, which is a popular militia, which is sort of the regime's kind of main conduit for counter protest operations. And they have bases all throughout, you know, urban spaces in Iran and neighborhoods. Their bases are being hit too. But, but the people aren't dying. You know, they're not going to work, they're not showing up. And so instead they're just, you know, camping out in parking lots, they're going into civilian buildings and every night they are going down neighborhoods Enchanting, you know, to the people, don't come out of your homes, you know, or else we'll crush you. They're also sending out text messages to Iranians saying, don't come out of your homes. So the, the Iranian people have no, no, I think obvious pathway to a regime change. They can't just take to the streets and take over things. What would they take over? Who would lead them? Who would replace them? Right. Which buildings would they take over? Which ones are important? They don't know. You know, they could all gather and take over, you know, a police department. And that just leaves them vulnerable to, you know, to regime forces because they're all concentrated. They know that they're leaderless. They know that they don't know how to get from A to Z, let's say, of Z's regime change. And so unless there were boots on the ground, let's say, maybe not in large numbers, but even in small numbers that were sort of leading them to what a regime change would be, that is to say, seizing government buildings and institutions, seizing telecommunications, eliminating Basij and irgc, and even police units and battalions that are used for crushing dissent. Unless that happens, I think it's really unlikely that Iranians come out on the streets, at least not in the midst of war while bombs are falling. And if they come out after the war, they're likely to get mowed down again. Assuming the regime has retained that capacity to crush dissent, what do you think
- [38:36]
D
it would take to have regime change? Is it kind of, I think, as you're suggesting, US Boots on the ground or some other set of boots on the ground in order to provide more of the support protesters might need or in order to do the work of destroying the government themselves?
- [38:53]
B
I think there's three scenarios that are the most likely. One is external regime change, where you have a foreign military, the United States, Israel, that does exactly what I said, takes over government buildings, kills and captures important leaders, takes over telecommunications, takes control of main avenues and streets, and then starts to empower different people to take charge of the country.
- [39:19]
C
That's.
- [39:19]
B
That's an extreme scenario, right? That's what we had in Iraq in 2003. That's what we had in Afghanistan in 2001. That's by no means a panacea, right? Just because you change the regime doesn't mean the regime's dead, as we found out in Afghanistan. But it's the only way that I think an external party could do it. The other is that you have the regime itself or factions within the regime that turn against it. Right? And in this scenario, you could see that there's elements of the security services that could be irgc, they could be police, they could be the regular military who decide, okay, listen, the people in charge are leading us down this ruinous road. We're in war after war. We're broke. We've appointed a new supreme leader who's not going to help us get out of this mess, but it's just going to double down on the policies that got us here. We need to take, you know, the law into our own hands. We have guns, we have organization, we have leaders, and we have training. And we know what to hit, what to take and how to do it. Right? And so you can have that.
- [40:24]
D
You.
- [40:24]
B
This would be a. A coup, right? But a coup based on factions of the security forces that want to back and be supported by a popular uprising, right? And this you can have at any time. Anytime there's people in the street or even if this coup happens and they say, come out on the street, it can happen, right? It could have happened in January. It did not. It could happen tomorrow. It could happen two years from now or five years from now. That's always a possibility. But that takes ambitious, you know, at least mid career officers who want to change their system from within and want to take that risk. And it also takes organization and some ability of luck. Right. So you could have like, let's say a young officers rebellion that could lead that kind of regime change. And then the third kind of regime change is just the regime change of time. Right. And that's the one that I think is certain. The Islamic Republic is certain to fall at some point in history. Whether that's 10 years from now, 50 years from now, 100 years from now, it will be gone. And I'm pretty confident about this. Just because the majority of Iranians are moving so far away from what the Islamic Republic stands for and have been consistently, you know, over the last few decades. That I think is sort of the surest way of doing things. But that is a regime change through gradual reform where gradually a new supreme leader, a new military commander relaxes these policies, changes those policies, amends these policies with the west and slowly disentangles the Islamic Republic from the mess that it's in now. But that could take a generation, it could take two. I don't know. But to me, those are the three sort of main possibilities. And then there's any number that exists within that spectrum.
- [42:19]
D
The last question I want to ask you as we think about the future of the Islamic Republic is about territorial fragmentation. Trump has said that Iran's map will, quote, probably not look the same after the war ends. I know he's flirted with generating a Kurdish insurgency. Obviously Trump says a lot of things, but how serious do you think the risk of Iran breaking apart is?
- [42:44]
B
I think it's serious in, in the sense that there's obviously some talk within, let's say the White House or within Israel of maybe generating, you know, ethnic insurgencies in order to weaken the regime even further. Right. And, and the reason to do this, you know, you can see a clear logic for it. It wouldn't be to overthrow the regime because there's, there's really no scenario where Kurdish militias who operate on the border of Iraq and Iran somehow march all the way from the mountains, you know, into Tehran and, and take over that city. City. It's just, it's not going to happen. They don't have the numbers, they don't have the social legitimacy outside of the Kurdish areas. They don't even necessarily have that legitimacy inside some Kurdish areas. Right. So they are, they are pretty small compared to what you would need in order to really topple the regime. But if the regime is weak and an ethnic insurgency is able to be ignited through, let's say, pouring weapons in, maybe training militia members, maybe giving them intelligence on IRGC positions and border guard positions, or even, let's say inserting special forces, either Israeli or us, to help them kind of retake some of the territory in their areas, the one sure thing that's going to happen is it's going to instigate a fight with the central government. And so what you're going to have is an element of civil war or at least a counterinsurgency war that, that the government of Iran would be fighting against, let's say a Kurdish insurgency. You had this in 1979. You had this before 1979, during the Cold War. You also had small ethnic insurgencies with the Turkmen population in north eastern Iran and with the Baluch in southeastern Iran. These are different ethnic groups. So, but in all of those cases, the, the central government won. And, and the reason why the central government wins these fights is because even within these ethnic regions, the idea of ethnic nationalism is, is a really diffused and muddy idea. Because most of the Kurds, most of the Azeris who are Turkic speaking Iranians, most of the Turkmen and even the Baluch or the Arabs who live in southern Iran all share an affinity for some cultural aspects of, of, of Iranian culture, especially the Kurds and, and, and the Azeris who are, you know, two of the larger sort of minorities. And so for them, the, the desire is not always necessarily to be not part of Iran, but rather to have autonomy within their regions, to teach their languages in schools and, and to do some of their sort of folk festivals and things like that without kind of central government pressure against them and also to, to have a little more say in how the, the, the government works. Because these are kind of, at least especially the Kurdish areas. They're, they're poor, they're impoverished, the central government doesn't give them much, so they have a lot to ask for. But I think the situation where you have, let's say ethnic insurgencies that are distracting and maybe for a time, fragmenting the Iranian state in order to weaken it, in order to make it so consumed with internal issues that it can't turn its attention to external influence,
- [46:29]
A
that
- [46:30]
B
is certainly a possibility, right? And you can see why some, let's say in Israel might want to pursue that as a tactic or as a strategy. Because above all, for them, what really matters is Iran's external activities, right? They want to make sure that Iran is no longer working with proxies around Israel. And if Iran is consumed with its own problems, then you know from sort of a realist and very cold hearted political calculation that that could be good for Israeli security.
- [47:03]
D
That was Afshan Ostevar, associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. After the break, we'll speak with Sanam Vakil, director of Chatham House's Middle east and North Africa program on how the war is throwing the Gulf states into turmoil.
- [47:30]
E
What if you could explore places in the news like a reporter does? I'm Nicholas Wood, a former journalist with the New York Times and BBC. And 15 years ago I created the travel company Political Tours. Our small groups are led by top correspondents around the world. Later this year, we're off to Mexico to look at cartels, migrants and Trump. And then we're in Colombia and the Amazon. Come and join us. Go to politicaltours.com that's politicaltours.com May 14
- [48:01]
F
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- [48:40]
D
And now to my conversation with Sanam Vakil. Sanam, welcome to the foreign affairs interview.
- [48:46]
C
Thank you so much for having me, Daniel.
- [48:49]
D
And just to remind listeners, we're talking on Tuesday afternoon, but right now, the Arab Gulf is still experiencing an onslaught of attacks from Iranian forces. The UAE, for example, has faced over 1,000 drones and missile strikes. One of Bahrain's water desalinization plants was damaged. Still, so far, these states have done a decent job of intercepting Iranian projectiles, and the civilian casualties have been relatively minimal. How long can the Gulf manage to withstand Tehran's assault?
- [49:21]
C
That is a really good question. I think first of all, it's worthwhile saying that the Gulf states collectively and independently lobbied President Trump to pursue other pathways. And really they prioritize avoiding this war. I think they processed that they were going to be on the front lines, but of course, they're surprised by the persistence and the scale of Iran's assault. And it's also worthwhile remembering that these diplomatic efforts were supported by almost all countries across the Middle East. And in Fact, many Gulf countries, and specifically Oman and Qatar, were sort of leading the mediation efforts that were underway. So, you know, how long can they go on? I think, you know, obviously the Gulf states are caught in a very difficult moment right now. Their reputation as safe havens for commerce, for. For trade, for tourism have all been compromised. They have borne the brunt of Iran's retaliatory attacks, and those attacks have far outweighed their expectations, including targets on infrastructure, port, consular facilities. And their citizens, I think, are really bearing the brunt of these strikes. With the noise and the interceptions taking place almost every day since the war began on February 28, the Gulf States have shown an amazing amount of restraint as well as resilience. They are performing quite well from a defensive perspective, but the reality is they're worried about declining interceptors, and so they're trying to secure further stocks. They are worried that, obviously the length of the war can disrupt their economies further. And we've seen Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar exert force majeure in terms of energy exports, for example. And the ripple effects of this war will continue long after the military dynamics come to an end. We've also seen Europe and the UK Try to step up and offer more defense, a capability to support the Gulf states. And that's been very important because the Gulf states have also felt quite frustrated that the United States appeared to focus and prioritize Israel's defense, and they left the Gulf quite exposed. So, to be specific, they can hang on, but the implications are going to be far ranging, and they're deeply worried that at any moment, President Trump will call time on this war and leave them again holding the bag and bearing the consequences of perhaps leaving behind a weakened Islamic Republic, but one that is still standing. And the consequences of that system will be hard to manage. And alternatively, a protracted war will also be very difficult for them.
- [52:37]
D
Got it. So, thinking a little bit about what you were saying in terms of the amount of damage that they're taking and the relationship that might have with the United States, I want to start on that theme by asking. It seems as if part of Iran's calculation is that if they do inflict enough pain on the Gulf countries, the Gulf governments will lobby the United States into stopping the conflict. Do you think this strategy is going to be effective?
- [53:06]
C
Well, Iran has certainly tried to spread the cost of this war, this cost of Israel, Iranian war on Iran, beyond Iran. They have wanted as many countries and citizens as possible to feel the weight of this war. So it's not just borne by Them, it's a reflection of their defense weakness and the fact that they don't have too many cards to play. I think the problem really is that certainly the costs are being borne globally. Gas prices are going up. We've seen a huge spike on Monday. We're seeing insurance and shipping costs go up. Obviously, tourism to the region is going down. There are going to be all sorts of economic cascades that we're not yet even seeing. But the reality is that Iran isn't just looking to end this war. It's looking to end this war with guarantees. The Gulf states could call President Trump and say, end this war, but no one is really talking about what those guarantees are. And the reality is that Gulf Iranian relations after this war will be very broken. Normalization between Iran and the UAE and Saudi Arabia had progressed quite significantly from the time of the strikes on Saudi oil facilities and when Abu Dhabi was targeted in 2021. So things had progressed. There was no sort of resolution of mistrust. There were still differences and difficulties in the relationship. But after this onslaught, it's very hard to see how the Gulf states can return to the status quo ante with Iran.
- [54:51]
D
How long do you think it will take for the region to recover?
- [54:54]
C
I mean, that's the $10 billion question. Gulf states are slowing down energy production because of these strikes. This is just one sort of example that shows that there's not going to be a quick rebound. Why are they slowing down energy production? Not just because their facilities are being targeted, but there is a backup in the Strait of Hormuz. There is just a small number of ships that are exiting the straits every. And so Iraq, as well as other Gulf countries have to slow down production because there are nowhere for these ships to go and they can't offload the oil onto these ships. So I think what's important to sort of stress is that clearly there wasn't sufficient planning for the known unknowns or the unknown unknowns that were to come from what was expected to be a sort of quick and sort of decapitating war on Iran.
- [55:54]
D
So you were just talking about how this is going to complicate the Gulf's relationship with Iran and some of the normalization efforts that were happening there. Iran, of course, didn't launch this conflict. The United States and Israel did. And I know Gulf officials have expressed dismay both that Washington didn't give them a heads up and that US Officials didn't heed their warnings that an attack on Iran would spark a regional conflict. How do you think this might affect the Gulf's ties to the United States.
- [56:23]
C
Well, this is a tricky one, but important to unpack. On the one hand, of course, this showcases the limits of Gulf strategy in managing or mitigating conflict in the region. They tried to directly lobby and encourage diplomacy. That clearly didn't work. They also tried to directly manage their ties with Iran, sending their officials to Tehran. They committed to not allowing their territory to be used for strikes. And effectively that strategy also didn't work. They have been completely brought in in a, I think, unprecedented way. They look incredibly vulnerable. And while they're marshaling an effective defensive operation and all, all of the states are performing very well. It showcases the fact that they're stuck effectively. Their geography is their destiny. And for so many years they've supported U.S. containment efforts of Iran that failed. Then they tried the diplomatic outreach. That also didn't work. So what is on the horizon? I think in the short run, the Gulf states have no choice but to double down and shore up their defense based relationships with the United States. What does that mean? They need to build up their defense capabilities and the US is in the strongest position to do so. But beyond that, I fully expect the Gulf states to pursue a sort of portfolio approach. And for quite some time they've been developing defense and security ties with other countries in the region or beyond. Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan, for example, and it's suggested that Turkey might enter into that relationship. The UAE has strengthened defense cooperation with South Korea and also with India. So I imagine that there will be many more of these minilateral arrangements that are built to help bolster Gulf defense capabilities. And then secondly, I also think that there will be, and I hope that there will be greater GCC wide alignment on integrated air defense as well. But what the Gulf states are very conscious of and want to be careful with, and this is why they haven't entered this war in an offensive way. They do not want to be seen to be supporting Israel's destabilizing regional behavior. And I think this nuance needs to be understood so that it is appreciated beyond the region. They see Iran as a destabilizing force across the Middle east, but they also see Israel as a destabilizing force in the Middle east and they feel very caught between. So that is the biggest challenge for the Gulf states. How to manage these two aggressive states that continue to destabilize in different ways. And ultimately they want to return to prioritizing their national interests, their economic diversification plans and their visions, and build back that reputation as a safe haven for tourism, commerce, investment and beyond.
- [59:49]
D
I was actually just thinking about Israel in part a piece you wrote for us in October. It's a great article and it's entitled the Middle east that Israel has Made and it argued what you just said now, which is that Israel's increasing regional aggression is prompting neighboring states that once regarded Israel as a potential partner to view it as a dangerous and unpredictable actor. It seems like from what you said, that this war is going to amplify that trend. I want to get your thoughts on what that might mean for, say, efforts to normalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia or to otherwise expand the Abraham Accords.
- [60:27]
C
I mean, I think the big sort of question after this war is where does that leave the Abraham Accords, particularly when the UAE was hitting almost double compared to Israel? And that, you know, I've heard from Emirati officials as very shocking. You know, the nuance in threat perceptions, I think oftentimes is not appreciated outside of the Middle east, but I think it should be at least understood. It's not that states or leaders in the Middle east don't say, see benefits of normalizing with Israel there. There's much to gain in terms of trade, defense cooperation, technological benefits and beyond. But particularly since October 7, I think that Gulf states, you know, very much see Israel as having overextended itself militarily in Gaza, obviously there is a renewed campaign in Lebanon, and obviously Gulf states do not support Hezbollah or Hamas or beyond that. But they see this increased military aggression as destabilizing. And those destabilizing military activities have blowback, politicized their populations and create frustration and sort of tie leaders hands. More broadly, Palestinian sovereignty, statehood, particularly since the war in Gaza, has become a political issue in the Middle east. And so normalization predicated on sidestepping conflicts I don't think is going to be the way forward. I think Arab states are thinking much more broadly about conflict management, about regional security, about sovereignty. And maybe over the coming months, if not years, there will be broader discussions about how to provide security for all states in the region. Qatar was struck last year by Iran and Israel, and that sort of punctured this view that they would be insulated from a country that they were managing diplomacy for and supporting peace negotiations on behalf of the United States as well. And I think there's a longer tale. This sort of debate began last year after the strikes on Qatar. There is this sort of sense that having American military bases in the region were meant to insulate the Gulf states from strikes and these kind of destabilizing activities. And I'm not suggesting by any means that they're going to force out the United States from the region. But there is just much more growing public awareness and discussion that these bases haven't protected the Gulf. The US hasn't protected or insulated the Gulf from such strikes. And perhaps actually there's been increased blowback on the Gulf states as a result.
- [63:42]
D
We've been talking a little bit about things happening to the Gulf states, the pressure it's coming under from outside powers and the fact that they are in some sense trans trapped. I want to flip it around. Is there any leverage that the Gulf has over the United States or over Iran?
- [64:01]
C
Well, I mean, I think first of all, we have to be abundantly clear that this isn't just happening to Iran. Of course, we could say that the war that broke out on February 28th didn't really have the legal justification or no case was built for this war on Iran. And the Gulf states are aware of that. But Iran one is, has agency, has spent decades building up its nuclear program, has a asymmetrical ballistic missile program and drone program. And I think what has been the biggest issue for the region is its support for non state actors across the Middle East. And so, you know, it's important to acknowledge Iran's role in all of this. And there's deep frustration across the Gulf, across I think the whole of the Middle east, that Iran hasn't made the necessary concessions. I mean, in every round of negotiations, they're still negotiating to negotiate and wanting a framework and not understanding the immense pressure and the consequences not just for themselves, but for the region writ large. But certainly if you flip the deck around, certainly the Gulf states do have a degree of leverage on the United States or the Trump administration in particular. The Gulf states supported President Trump's campaign, more or less. They were quite keen to have President Trump back. They felt like he favored the Gulf and that deal making and pragmatism and transactional interest was something they could work with. And let's not forget that President Trump came to the Gulf last May and he promised that the days of regime change and forever wars were over. And he did say that the US Wasn't in favor of chaos anymore, but was in favor of commerce and that the US Was done with dealing with terrorism and that relationships would be built on technology. And the Gulf states bought into that and then they paid in, they invested huge amounts of money in the United States or at least committed to. So yes, they do have leverage. And in the broader geopolitical game that is playing out between the United States and China, obviously the Middle east is very much in play. China is an economic actor in the region. China has comprehensive strategic partnerships with five Middle Eastern states, many of whom are in the Gulf. And if the United States wants to turn the tables around and become the economic actor in the region, it needs to be much more of a stabilizer and not a sort of supporter of perpetual conflict. And for the Gulf states, the US Continues to underwrite Israeli campaigns in the region and that is perceived to cause clearly destabilizing effects for them.
- [67:08]
D
So if you were advising Gulf governments to put you in that unfortunate position, what would you tell them to do right now when it comes to the United States and managing their relationship with Washington?
- [67:21]
C
Well, not unfortunate. It's also fortunate, actually, because I think that there is a lot of room to maybe have impact. I think first of all, the number one thing I would say to GCC states is that obviously they need to have a much more pragmatic dialogue and mechanism to manage their own internal conflicts. Going into this war, there was a rift, if you will, between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over misinterpretation of things that had happened in Sudan and Yemen, and that had gone quite off the rails. And this war has actually at least led to one phone conversation that we published, you may know of, between Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the President of the uae. So that's positive. But more broadly, there needs to be more dialogue, deep confliction and a acknowledgement of what GCC security interests are. There's still divisions, of course, on how to align on policy, but I think that would be number one. Two, it would be about managing the the panoply of regional conflicts, not just bilaterally, but multilaterally. The GCC as a mechanism can be more effective in prioritizing GCC interests. And I would start with Yemen, which to me is an acute crisis that we continue to not pay attention to. But more broadly, beyond that, obviously integrated air defense is an area where I would suggest that Gulf states continue to make progress and maybe accelerate that progress. Working together more closely, sharing intelligence, I think is a useful way forward. We'll build trust over time. Obviously they have to upgrade and integrate their systems, and that is costly. But I think after this war, perhaps that will be seen to be worth it. And then more broadly, I do believe that a portfolio approach to security, defense and economic ties definitely need to be pursued, meaning that if The Gulf feels certainly the US Remains primary security partner, continue to develop and double down on their relationships. That's clearly number one. But in tandem to that, because obviously the United States and its domestic trajectory is one that is also uncertain, requires them to develop relationships beyond the United States. The Gulf states collectively and individually are pursuing path of strategic autonomy. They want to assert themselves as middle powers and they need to be much more assertive in managing regional conflicts and not just leaving everything to the Trump administration A, but to the United States and General B, because clearly there are divergences in how conflicts should be managed and Washington doesn't have the capacity or the interest. And ultimately, as I've written for you in the past alongside my colleague Dalia Dasa K. It's time for the Middle east to manage the Middle East.
- [70:46]
D
You mentioned Yemen and I want to actually talk about Yemen for a little bit because one of the things I've been surprised by is that the Houthis in Yemen have not joined in this conflict. Other Iranian proxy groups, specifically certain Iraqi militias, also haven't joined. I'm curious to get your sense as to why that is.
- [71:06]
C
Well, I mean, it's only a week and plus into this war. It's March 10th, it's 11 days effectively. And this war by all calculations is certainly going to be longer than last summer's 12 day war. Early estimates were four to five weeks. President Trump is suggesting two weeks. We sort of have to see when the off ramps develop. But Iran's strategy has been to, you know, obviously hold some of its assets and responses back. And I think the Houthis are a part of the cards that it has in its back pocket. You know, there's a debate as to why the Houthis are not going all in. I have that with my colleague in Chatham House, Farel Muslimi, who works on Yemen and knows the Houthis well. And he says, well, the Houthis have no stake in this war. They're not going to come out in support of Iran. They have to figure out what they would come out to advocate in support of themselves. There's no military activity in Gaza, so they might expose themselves unnecessarily. And unlike other proxy groups in the region, the Houthis have not been decapitated. Hezbollah has been decapitated. Some of the groups in Iraq have, of course been pushed down. Iran has been decapitated. And so the Houthis are looking to retain their capabilities. So that would certainly expose them. I also think that obviously the Houthis are a Check on Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Gulf. Holding the Houthi card back or using the Houthi card as leverage is much more about potential dialogue that might be taking place among the Gulf states in Iran rather than the Houthis themselves. But you know, if things escalate and we go beyond the sort of prognosis of weeks to something longer, I would imagine that there would be pressure on the Houthis to resume sort of strikes in the Red Sea and in the Babel Manda. And that would, of course, carry over the costs on energy and maritime security and shipping far beyond the Straits of Hormuz.
- [73:28]
D
So thinking about your points on escalation and then thinking about escalation on the Gulf side, one of the things that I understand to be true is that the UAE has substantial economic power when it comes to Iran, that Iran is in some ways dependent on the UAE for its economy to function. Why haven't we seen the UAE fully exercise that leverage yet? And are there other avenues the Gulf has that it can use to exercise influence over or put pressure on Iran?
- [73:59]
C
Well, the UAE is certainly Iran's economic lung. And since reconciliation or normalization began, the UAE has helped Iran by not just re exporting, but by providing Iran with a lifeline under sanctions. I think a few days ago there were suggestions that the UAE would try to sanction or freeze Iranian assets in the uae. And of course, there's a huge Iranian population also there. I think part of the reason why that hasn't really proceeded is it would compromise, of course, the UAE as a safe haven at the same time. And that would set a precedent, I think, that the UAE wouldn't want to carry through. But certainly, certainly there is leverage over a longer period of time. And it's, I think, an opportunity when this war ends where the Gulf can use its leverage. Maybe not positive leverage in terms of development or investment, which was being used prior to this war, but negative leverage to hold back assets and to prevent Iran from accessing trade and its resources abroad.
- [75:10]
D
Can you just quickly tell listeners what the UAE status as a safe haven means and why that's so important for the country?
- [75:17]
C
Well, the UAE has for a long time, I mean, been a place where investors from around the globe have engaged in commerce and economic activity and trade. The UAE hosts countries and individuals from all around the world, not just Iran, but from Russia, Ukraine and many countries countries. And being able to do business in the UAE has been very important for the UAE's reputation as a global hub, a networked part of the order as well. But of course it has drawn attention to maybe some dodgy activities that have taken place in the uae, sticking with
- [76:01]
D
the theme of escalation and the situation just getting worse. Earlier on, Afshan and I were discussing the risk that the Iranian state might collapse, fracture, or at least be greatly weakened. I don't need to tell you that instances of state collapse in the Middle east have produced all kinds of disasters. Refugee crises, drug crises, insurgencies. If this war does end with the Iranian state seriously diminished, what are the risks to the region?
- [76:31]
C
Well, I think that's what the Gulf states are most concerned with right now. They are facing a scenario where the United States will call time on this war and it's the day after that they're much more concerned about. They are worried that a weakened, wounded Islamic Republic could be left there to fester for quite some time, kind of like Saddam hussein after the 1990 Gulf War. But there are other worse scenarios to consider. A serious scenario after the Arab Spring or a Libya scenario for the Arab Spring. So they're very concerned that they will be bearing the cost of the economic price of this war where Iran will continue to be sanctioned, not offered any sort of lifeline in terms of rehabilitation or trade or development, if you will. And over time there will be internal unrest across Iran that could develop organically or could be instigated externally. So all of these scenarios, as the regime might struggle to survive or become enmeshed in internal fighting, will have spillover. Iran is a huge country with 90 million people and surrounded by many neighbors. And so the humanitarian economic crises will again be borne by the region. And using the Iraq analogy, of course, Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991 was sanctioned, militarily exposed and divided in no fly zones. And that crisis was left to fester for quite some time. And the Gulf states had no ties with Iraq. They supported containment, but again they bore the price of the 2000, which they collectively lobbied against.
- [78:32]
D
Before we conclude, I want to turn to Iran itself. In February you co wrote this really great piece for us called Iran's Divided Opposition and I encourage everyone to go read it. And you argued that the infighting among Iran's opposition factions, as well as their general lack of organization, makes it difficult for them to challenge the regime. Has the opposition taken any steps to overcome these barriers since the war began?
- [79:01]
C
I wish, I wish. But unfortunately this war did not take into account the facts on the ground in Iran and the conditions in the diaspora. In a way, the war moved faster than the so called Iranian opposition and the Iranian people were ready for. There has been some bridge building among Kurdish groups. Monarchical groups remain fierce and sort of steadfast in their support for Reza Pahlavi. The Mujahideen Khalq is marching to its own beat. There, you know, might emerge a coalition of internal and external groups. That's ultimately what's needed. But I deeply worry that the emergence of some cohesive group is coming a bit late in the game. And this is all happening while the Islamic Republic is fighting for its very existence and still remains quite fierce, has a monopoly of violence and sees this war as deeply existential. So is going to do really anything it can to stay united and survive this onslaught.
- [80:16]
D
Sanam, thanks for joining me.
- [80:18]
C
Thank you so much for having me. Daniel.
- [80:26]
A
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com this episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Rachel Powell, Mary Kate Godfrey, Rose Kohler and Kanish Garu. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning.
- [81:04]
D
In.
- [81:05]
C
It.