C (2:50)

Can I ask you to read a short passage of that that you start your article with? Would you mind reading that for Us?

A (2:56)

Sure. I think this is the heart of the speech. Let us not cast blame on the murderers. For eight years, they have been sitting in the refugee camps in Gaza, and before their eyes, we have been transforming the lands and the villages where they and their fathers dwelt into our state. Let us not be deterred from seeing the loathing that is inflaming and filling the lives of hundreds of thousands of Arabs living around us. This is our life's choice, to be prepared and armed, strong and determined, lest the sword be stricken from our fists and our lives cut down.

C (3:30)

Tell me why you chose to start your article on what's happening in Israel today with that passage, and also why it's so important in Israel.

A (3:38)

What Dayan said was the gist of understanding that on one hand, we should realize that there is another people on the other side of the border and some of them within Israel as well, and that they have their own story of defeat, that they want to revenge, and that we should realize it and we should come to terms with that. Dayan's answer was just to be strong and prepared and never look, you know, never turn away from watching the other side. And if you do that, then our life will be cut.

C (4:13)

Is it your sense that the vision, he sort of lays out that knowledge or that awareness of the other people? I think it's your argument, really, that today's Israeli leadership has lost sight of that and that maybe more broadly, Israeli society has. Is that fair to say?

A (4:28)

Of course. I think that Diane was right in both his arguments. First of all, that we need to pay attention to. To the Palestinians, even though at that time they were not called by that name. But that doesn't matter. We should realize their story. We should know it. We should learn how to live with them. On the other hand, we should be prepared that, you know, there are some bad people out there who want to transform that loathing and anger into attacks on Israel. And if we forget that, then we lose twice. And I think this is what happened in Israeli society In the past 15 years or so, especially since Benjamin Netanyahu's return to power in 2009. Look, what most of the time Israelis cared about was prosperity, real estate prices that were going up like crazy, huge economic success both in high tech and in natural gas discoveries offshore that turned Israel into an economic tiger. And the conflict was seen as something that exists. But Netanyahu time and again argued that Israel could prosper without peace, could prosper without dealing with the Palestinians, that we should not really pay attention to them and at best we should manage the conflict.

C (5:40)

Yet your sense is that this sense of security, prosperity, safety, sort of normality or Western style comfort and progress was illusory in a sense. And that was proven on October 7th.

A (5:55)

That's obvious. But you know, even before October 7th, since early last year, the formation of the new Netanyahu government is second comeback. We're leading a very strong far right coalition aiming at reforming Israeli society and especially weakening the judiciary and weakening other democratic institutions. Throughout that period, there were repeated warnings of an imminent war. Because the argument laid out by the Defense minister, Yoav Gallant, and by several of the intelligence chiefs was that the enemies, Iran and its several proxies and supporters around Israel, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza and to a lesser extent in the west bank, are reading these signs as signs of weakness and that they are preparing to hit Israel when it's torn apart, when there is disquieting the military over the threat of some of the reservist pilots and special operations officers not to serve if Israel becomes an autocracy and loses its democracy. But even those intelligence chiefs in the military warnings, they were not focused on Hamas. Hamas was seen as a tamed, quieted organization that runs Gaza and wants to live not in peace, but and kind of mutual deterrence with Israel. And Israelis saw Gaza and they saw themselves in the mirror, that the focus of Hamas was to turn Gaza into a more economically developed area and to improve the standard of living for the Gazans, which was apparently not the case. But they were able to fool. So if we go back to Dayan, they were able to hide their loathing and animosity towards Israel and prepare this attack, which they did at least for two years. And there are signs that it went back even longer because they dug hundreds of miles of tunnels underneath Gaza. That takes a long time. But Israel ignored it. And for Netanyahu, Hamas was a counterbalance to the idea which he loved, which is the Palestinian state, the two state solution. And he argued that by strengthening Hamas and allowing Hamas more economic development and, and to get funding, with Israeli approval, to get funding from Qatar to run its operations, to run its social services. Now we know that it was to run its military buildup as well, although that was less known at the time. But Netanyahu argued even publicly that strengthening Hamas is good for the Israeli right wing cause because it prevents a two state solution.

C (8:31)

How would you describe Netanyahu's political standing now? You've written recently that what he's running is becoming less A government and more a regime. What do you mean by that?

A (8:40)

Netanyahu years ago laid out a vision of not only, you know, preventing a Palestinian state or improving Israel's global stance while ignoring the Palestinians or preventing war. He was never keen on going to war or using force. He's always had very tense relationship with the brass. He doesn't like them and they never liked him. His main political opponents were former military chiefs like Tzak Rabin and Ehud Barak. And even today Benny Gantz, who's in the cabinet but is appears to be his main rival. So that was one aspect. But I think what was more important to Netanyahu was reforming Israeli society in two ways. One which succeeded was to turn Israel from a semi socialist culture. That was how Israel was built when many things were nationalized, workforce unionized. When Netanyahu arrived to the scene in the mid-90s, it was already changed, but still Netanyahu pushed Israel to be a more capitalistic, American oriented kind of society, and I think it pretty much succeeded in that. The other aspect was to change the social and intellectual conversation to be more nationalist, more conservative and less liberal. And he argued for years that the way to do that was to have right wing media, which he succeeded in establishing over the years and in changing the academic discourse and what he called replacing the elites.

C (10:14)

What would it mean to replace the elites and what sort of effect would that have on governance? What's the sort of plan there?

A (10:22)

What the Netanyahu government has been trying to achieve is to silence critics. They don't like to be criticized, they don't like the protest. They blame the October 7th massacre on the protesters rather than on themselves. And you know, the Supreme Court in Israel, which has been the target of right wing criticism for many years, in Israel, we don't have a constitution. And the Supreme Court was the only custodian of human and civil rights in Israel. And this was anathema to the right wing because first of all, they allowed the right of hearing to Palestinians in the west bank and Gaza. And although most of their appeals have been rejected, the vast majority still they gave some relief to Palestinians in the west bank and Gaza. But even more so, look, Israel is by no means an equal society between Jews and Arabs. But whatever equality the Arab society has been able to achieve was supported by Supreme Court decisions. And the same is true about upholding liberal values and secular lifestyle as opposed to living by the Torah and by a more religious and conservative lifestyle dictated by rabbis. And this was anathema to the right wing and they saw an opportunity to do away with the Supreme Court independence once and for all. Now this goes back also to the legal advisory system and to the civil service and the military establish and the police. And the idea was to overtake all of these institutions and turn them into more politically oriented and politically run organizations. That was the heart of the coup. Now, since the beginning of the war, the coup legislation was stopped. But now with the war effort dwindling and most reservists out, they're trying to first to prevent the protest from being a mass protest by using police brutality against the protesters. They replaced the chief of police in Tel Aviv, the main protest hub, and appointed someone who is trying to please his political masters by using more force against the protesters to deter many people who don't want to get hit by water cannons or by horses, because they're

C (12:41)

trying to prevent a revival of what was happening last year. Yeah, where there were these mass protests,

A (12:46)

the other thing is to show that dissident should be outlawed or at least pushed away. So at first, the government, with the support of the legal advisory system and the Attorney general hit very hard on anti war criticism in the Arab society. There have been arrests, hundreds of indictments, shaming campaigns against these people, and prevention of protests and demonstrations in the Arab society. And now with the war effort slowing down a little bit, they turned against critics from the mainstream. For example, the Minister of Education is in charge of the Israel Prize, the highest civilian award that is given in Israel every year. And usually it's given to intellectuals, to academics, to writers, to people like that, to people with special contribution to society. A week ago or so, the Minister declared that this year there will be no prizes for any intellectual achievement, only for, you know, social support and courage during the social, civilian courage during the war. This was weird. And after a couple of days, one of my competitors broke the story that one of the people who won was supposed to be given the prize was Eyal Waldman, a high tech entrepreneur who lost his daughter and his fiance in the October 7th massacre. And he was chosen because of his huge achievements as an entrepreneur and an industrialist in Israel. But he's also a very fierce critic of Netanyahu. And he blames Netanyahu for the murder of his daughter and his fiance. And the Minister decided so, in order not to have Waldmann given this honor, to call off the Israel Prize altogether. This is like, you know, you demolish the institution in order not to give the dissident any recognition. And there are several other incidents like that. So clearly what they're trying to do is to delegitimize and to push away from the public sphere anyone who's critical of the prime minister and make it into a kind of a personal autocracy that is very much supported by the more conservative and religious parts of the Israeli Jewish society. This is replacing the elites. If the elites are against Netanyahu, so we would not give them a prize because they're against us. So you're politicizing everything. And my question when is the point when a legitimate government, democratic elected, becomes a regime which is less legitimate? And I think that once it demolishes one after another the democratic institutions, the liberal institutions, the freedom of speech, and they say it publicly, they're not trying to hide behind anything anymore. They're saying it out loud. So that's when they lose their legitimacy and become an Netanyahu regime rather than democratically elected Israeli government.

C (15:46)

It sounds like the process that critics of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban have described in Hungary over the years.

A (15:53)

In Hungary, in India. I just read the piece in Foreign affairs about the new election campaign, the coming election campaign in India, and just copied and pasted paragraph after paragraph and sent to one of my colleagues to show that we could just change the name and describe the same process in Israel. Obviously, it's much, much smaller than India, but the process, the idea that the leader is more important than the institutions, is the heart and the core of the Netanyahu coup and the policy of this government. In the past year, it's been interesting

C (16:28)

to watch the way that the Biden administration has been occasionally critical of Israeli conduct, but it hasn't really done anything to pressure or coerce Israel into changing its conduct in Gaza, which has been, you know, the subject of a lot of criticism with a high level of civilian casualties. Has that surprised you? And what sort of leverage do you think the United States has? If Biden wanted to pressure or even coerce Netanyahu, do you think he could? What would be the pressure points?

A (16:59)

Well, first of all, I was not surprised, because if you go back to American Israeli relations since 1948, even before the establishment of the state of Israel, I describe it as a gamut of interests that for Israel, the key issue has been the Palestinian issue. And it goes back to President Truman's recognition of the nascent state of Israel 11 minutes after Ben Gurion reads out this declaration of independence against the policy of the State Department and the advice of his Secretary of State Marshall. And it goes on over the years. You know, when Israel spoke to Arafat, he was invited to the White House. When Israel fought with Arafat, it was Persona non grata, et cetera, et cetera. So this is not different now. And we go back when Israel wants to do business with China and the US tells it to stop, it has to stop because that's the American paramount interest. Or before that it was the Soviet Union. And there's an area in between in which the Americans are willing to listen to Israeli concerns about Iran, about Syria, about the Houthis and so on. But the final word is in Washington, and this is no exception. Obviously, the Americans have influenced the Israeli conduct of the war. They pressured Israel into giving more humanitarian or allowing more humanitarian aid into Gaza. They stand at the back of the mediation efforts to release the Israeli hostages and bring them back. And they're pretty much involved in running the war day to day. But there are two important issues in which Israel is totally dependent on American support. One is diplomatically. The US veto in the Security Council allows Israel to fight the war because there was in the last vote there were 14 to 0. 0 was the Americans support for it was I think 13 to 0. Britain abstained. But there was a huge support over the world to an immediate ceasefire and the US vetoed it, which means that it allows Israel to keep fighting. And the other thing is that the US has been the key supplier of Israel of munitions and weapon systems during the war and took some of the burden, like for example, fighting the Houthis or blockading the Israeli shipping or shipping to and from Israel in the Red Sea. This is unprecedented. There has never been such support from day one. And such close coordination and cooperation. Where they differ is the day after Biden wants to resume, or says he wants to resume, the peace process. And the two state solution Netanyahu is against serves both of them politically. Netanyahu wants to solidify the Israeli right wing base behind him. Biden has issues with Democratic Party's progressive base and specifically in the state of Michigan, that is crucial to his reelection and where there is a strong Palestinian and pro Palestinian community, as we know. So it serves both of them to fight each other over that, but it doesn't really affect the daily conduct of the war.

B (20:16)

We'll be back after a short break.

D (20:20)

Join foremost thought leaders, policymakers and industry executives at Sarah Week, the world's preeminent gathering on the future of energy and geopolitics in Houston, Texas on March 18th through 22nd. Sarah Week offers timely dialogue on today's multidimensional global energy transition. And how it is reshaping the future of international relations. With participants from 85 countries, it provides insight into the future through the windows of markets, climate, geopolitics and technology. For information and to register, please please visit Sarah week.com that's C E R a week.com.

B (21:04)

And now back to my colleague Justin Vogt's conversation with aloof Ben.

C (21:09)

Let's go back to some of the themes you were discussing earlier. I'm curious, what is it like to run a news outlet in Israel right now, especially one like Haaretz, which is often quite critical of the government?

A (21:21)

First of all, it's not the first time that we run a newspaper, a news organization during war. It happens every several years here in Israel. I think this was different than previous rounds because Israel was attacked severely, which since the second intifada has not really happened. And also we felt it in the newsroom. One of our reporters was hiding with his family in their home in Nahaloz, in the same kibbutz of Roy Rotberg until his father, a former general, came to rescue them with some regular fighters. One other guy had to rescue his son from the music festival. That was where there was a massacre. We have several people here, grew up in the kibbutzim near Gaza. And although their immediate family members were saved, all of them lost friends, family members as casualties or hostages. And we had a large contingent of the newsroom was called to reserve. So we felt it much closer than any round of conflict that I can recall. That was the first time. And also, you know, like everybody else in Israel, we were shocked by the events of October 7th. We did not, we wrote, some of us have written that Netanyahu's policy is leading to disaster. But, you know, it's one thing to write it and the other thing is when the disaster comes, you know, we're the only ones in the Hebrew media that, you know, that caters most to the Israeli public that bother to report on what's happening in Gaza. The other media more or less relies on, you know, the IDF reports and describing it from an Israeli standpoint. And when they see videos from Gaza, you know, it's like a gap, Gazans saying nasty things about Hamas or robbing the humanitarian aid trucks and stuff like that. You know, we're the only ones who interview people in Gaza. It's difficult to report from there. Obviously, we don't have reporters on the ground. And not everyone in Gaza is willing to talk to an Israeli reporter, even if it's an Arabic speaker or a Palestinian. Israeli Reporter. So it's challenging. We have to rely on the syndicated media that we have with the New York Times or the Guard or wires. But we insist on publishing what's happening on the other side. We're the only ones who bother to report the number of Palestinian casualties as reported by the Hamas Health Ministry in Gaza every day. Most of the other media ignores it. They see it as only an Israeli story.

C (24:00)

And that really shapes the way the Israeli public sees this conflict.

A (24:04)

Yes, it's not the first time, but this time it's really shocking because the intensity of the fighting was, you know, the last time it was like that was 50 years ago, 40 years ago in Lebanon. And bear in mind that when northern Gaza was bombed from the air In Tel Aviv, that is, I don't know, 50 miles to the north, we heard the bombings in Tel Aviv. So imagine what it was to hear it from Gaza. But people in Israel could not pay attention. You know, we were attacked, we were slaughtered, we were raped, we were invaded. And that's why there is very little pity or interest even in what's happening to the Palestinians.

C (24:46)

And this, of course, is one reason why this idea of reviving land for peace, two state solution, is just not a message that that audience is going to be receptive to. We have in the current issue of Foreign affairs, the same one that in which your article appears, there's an essay by Martin Indyck, who's a veteran US diplomat, had been the ambassador to Israel, had been the envoy for the peace negotiations. One of the things he suggests is that Biden should try to address the Israeli public sort of in a speech or some sort of media appearance to try to go around Netanyahu and speak directly to the Israeli people and not necessarily try to sell the two state solution, but explain his vision of the day after revitalized Palestinian Authority running Gaza and, you know, cooperation from the Arab states. What do you make of that idea? Is that something that's conceivable? And would the Israelis listen?

A (25:40)

Look, it's not going to happen tomorrow. We have first to get the hostages back. And there has to be some proof that Hamas is not going to, you know, to come back to rule Gaza even with a diminished force after the casualties that they are suffering by the idf. Look, in the past, whenever Israel was attacked, the public shifted to the right and the immediate response was just to hit them as hard as possible. And then after a couple of years, people rethought the future and were willing to listen or to be prodded into listening to the ideas of peace process. And it happened after the Yom Kippur War in 73 that eventually led to peace with Egypt that is still holding. And then the first intifada leading to Oslo and the second one leading to the Gaza disengagement. Clearly today the right wing idea that Oslo and the Gaza disengagement were wrong and that any territory given away by Israel has just been turned into the launchpad of the next attack on Israel, clearly that is the mainstream idea. And the other problem is that unlike Sadat, the leader of Egypt in the 70s, who had big organized, very old country behind him, we don't have that kind either of a state to negotiate with or over a leader who could speak on behalf of the entire Palestinian people and bring them to the table. What I think Biden and in a different way Netanyahu are trying to achieve is to make MBS Mohammed bin Salman the ruler of Saudi Arabia as kind of a custodian, that he would play the role of Sadat, that he would, that he would make peace with Israel and Israel would give something that would be negotiated to the Palestinians to justify it. Now, two weeks before the October 7 attack, Netanyahu was standing on the podium at the United nations saying that we're on the cusp of making peace with Saudi Arabia and the Palestinians don't matter. And the Saudis did not deny it at the time, but now they're saying that a Palestinian state is a precondition for their peace with Israel. So clearly the Palestinian state idea, and I think this is also the heart of Martin index argument, the Palestinian state idea is back at the table after being absent for about a decade. And clearly when you look forward, at least from my perspective and obviously Martin's, that's the only solution that can be found to have better coexistence and more peaceful and prosperous lives for both Israelis and Palestinians. There are many black swans here. Will Hamas remain the same after the war and still steadfastly refuse to any accommodation with Israel? Or they would have or different Hamas leadership would have second thoughts. Would Israel have second thoughts after proving that it can defend itself? There are many, many questions out there and clearly it's all tied from Biden's perspective. It's clearly tied with his own reelection campaign. Clearly that's where his attention is focused now and will be even more so as the year goes by. And clearly Netanyahu would like to wait him out and see if Donald Trump and the Republicans are back or whether he would have to deal with a revitalized Biden administration after the election.

C (29:06)

Let me close by asking you a question. I don't know really whether you'll have an answer for it, but I'm going to ask anyway. You've painted a pretty grim port portrait of what's happening in Israel for someone with your point of view and your political values. The title of the article is Israel's Self Destruction, and that kind of captures the sentiment. Let's say you're a Foreign affairs reader or a listener who broadly shares your vision of a more democratic, more liberal, more sustainable, maybe in the long term, Israeli democracy. Are there any signs that you could point to that would be reasons for hope or optimism or, or even if not, are there areas within Israeli society where one might look for those sort of green shoots in the future?

A (29:51)

Well, I believe that first and foremost, the protest movement that came from nothing since the beginning of last year was a big surprise because many of the organizers of the protests were people like Eyal Waldman, people who were totally globalized and totally Americanized, were entrepreneurs and their companies were on Nasdaq or just sold to some bigger companies and they felt at home anywhere in the world and just turned back inwards and fought to preserve and sustain Israeli democracy. And when the war began and the government was totally dysfunctional, they just organized the entire welfare support and social support system for the evacuees from the border communities in Gaza area and in the north. They organized equipment for the reservists. They became the de facto shadow government. And that's warming because it shows that people care. It shows that people don't say, okay, we can, you know, we're on Nasdaq so we could just live in Palo Alto. And I think that that's a kind of civil patriotism that was lacking or was latent for many, many years. And, you know, we hope that the protests will resume and that a new government would turn back from destroying the liberal values and liberal institutions in Israel.

C (31:16)

Alouf, I think we should leave it there. Thank you so much. This has been a great conversation. I knew I would learn a lot, and I have. You've reminded me of a lot of things that I know, but I've forgotten, which is almost always the case with people who really know their stuff. Thank you so much.

A (31:34)

Thank you.

B (31:41)

Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannan, Julia Fleming dresser and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sierra and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed formed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.