Podcast Summary — The Foreign Affairs Interview
Episode: Putin’s Cannon Fodder (Nov 2, 2023)
Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan (Foreign Affairs Magazine)
Guest: Dara Massicot (Senior Fellow, RAND Corporation & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
Interviewed by: Kate Brannen

Episode Overview

This episode examines the human dimension of Russia's war in Ukraine, focusing on Russia’s approach to manpower and military culture. Analyst Dara Massicot discusses how Russian military practices, including recruitment, morale, leadership, and force sustainment, shape Russia's battlefield performance and the broader trajectory of the war. Drawing on her years of researching the Russian military, Massicot provides in-depth analysis of casualties, replenishment capacities, internal military culture, and what the West can—and cannot—truly know about an authoritarian army in combat.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Stalemate on the Battlefield and Attrition

• Ukrainian Counteroffensive: After four months, Ukraine made limited gains in the south (Zaporizhzhia), hampered by strong Russian defenses built since late 2022. (01:31)
• Russian Offensives: Russia has launched offensives around Avdiivka, suffering severe equipment and personnel losses for areas of limited strategic value. (01:31–03:06)
  • Massicot: “It just seems like they're throwing capital resources and human resources at this that they don't actually have. Like, they cannot sustain this for every 30 kilometers of Ukrainian territory that they want to reclaim.” (03:06)

2. Casualty Levels Comparable to World War II

• Russian Losses: Confirmed vehicle losses in recent offensives translate to “World War II levels of fatalities.” (03:39)
  • Massicot: “To sustain that amount of casualties in two or three weeks, we don't have recent experience with this. I mean, these are like World War II levels of fatalities.” (03:39)

3. Russian Military Production and External Support

• Production Increase: Russia’s defense industry now produces far more artillery shells, repairs armor faster, and manufactures missiles at three times the 2022 rate. (04:37)
• North Korean Support: Russia recently received ~350,000 artillery shells from North Korea (~1–1.5 months of Russian usage), which is more than the U.S. can produce in a year. (05:53)
  • Massicot: “At the rate of fire that the Russians are at, which is very high, about 10,000 rounds a day, that's a month, a month and a half... In terms of the United States, 350,000 shells is slightly higher than what we can produce in one year.” (05:53)

4. Russian Military Culture and Morale

• Toxic Culture: Despite some reform efforts pre-Ukraine invasion, Russian military culture quickly reverted to old patterns—poor communication, brutal leadership, and widespread corruption. (08:59)
  • Massicot: “They did spend about 15 years... to try to eradicate some of the brutality... And there was progress... And then they went to Ukraine and they defaulted to their old patterns.” (08:59)
• Morale and Resilience: Russian morale is poor but their baseline for "acceptable" treatment is far lower than Western standards. Units continue to function through fear and coercion rather than cohesion. (12:08)
  • Massicot: “Yes, Russian morale is poor... But they're still able to attack… There’s not this massive groundswell; everybody's going to pick up and just start walking back to the east from Moscow. That's not happening... because there's blocking battalions.” (13:09)

5. Transformation of the Russian Army

• Mix of Personnel: High casualties mean the core of prewar professional soldiers is diluted by mobilized civilians and recruited convicts—including violent criminals—resulting in widespread discipline problems and drug abuse. (14:26)
• Storm Z Units: Convicts and mobilized men are often used in "Storm Z" assault groups as expendable "cannon fodder" during offensives.
  • Massicot: “They’re using them as part of these Storm Z units… that they use to draw fire. I mean, this is sort of the definition of cannon fodder. I presume this is how they view this… it is less of a liability to me, the Kremlin, if I do this with prison labor than 19-year-old men.” (28:13)

6. Russian Adaptation and Limits of Learning

• Tactical Adaptation: Russians have incorporated some successful Ukrainian tactics, particularly with drone use, but they lack the sophistication or flexibility at the operational and strategic levels. (19:18)
• Strategic Cling: Military leaders, especially Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, seem fixated on capturing all of Luhansk and Donetsk, regardless of the cost. (20:44)
• Stockpiling Missiles: Russia has paused major missile strikes, possibly preparing a major escalation against Ukrainian infrastructure as winter hits. (20:44)

7. Mobilization: Capacity and Challenges

• Avoiding Second Mobilization: Putin wishes to avoid fresh large-scale mobilization before the March 2024 election, fearing domestic backlash. (24:02)
  • Massicot: “If it was up to Putin, and it is, he would not want to conduct another mobilization before his own election in March... it does introduce risk." (24:02)
• Training and Discipline Issues: Post-mobilization, recruits are disciplined harshly with methods reminiscent of the Soviet era, such as holding prisoners in pits. Trainers are overmatched by new, often criminal, recruits. (26:15)
• Numbers Game: Russia can, if needed, draw millions more into the fight, irrespective of quality. Large-scale manpower remains a serious concern for Ukraine. (29:10)
  • Massicot: “At this point in the war, this is like survival mode... we're going to grab bodies off the street... and then we're going to throw them in.” (00:06, repeated at 29:10)

8. Limitations of Western Analysis and Lessons for China

• Limits of Intel: Western observers misjudged Russian military effectiveness, missing how secrecy and a dysfunctional information culture crippled Russian operations. (31:00)
  • Massicot: “Whether it’s from China or Hamas or the Taliban… especially if we’re looking at authoritarian regimes… what is that military’s relationship with the truth? …That has a direct negative impact when they come into contact with the real world on the battlefield.” (31:00)
• Avoiding ‘Wishcasting’: Analysts must avoid hope-based assessments and focus on clear-eyed, evidence-based analysis—not assuming Russian collapse or enemy ineptitude. (32:55)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Russian Manpower Policy:
  “This is sort of the definition of cannon fodder… if I do this with prison labor, than 19-year-old men… is the height of cynicism. But I have to assume these kind of calculations are taking place.” (Massicot, 28:13)

• On Russian Casualties:
  “These are like World War II levels of fatalities.” (Massicot, 03:39)

• On the Russian Military’s Culture:
  “They did spend about 15 years…to try to eradicate some of the brutality…And then they went to Ukraine and they defaulted to their old patterns.” (Massicot, 08:59)

• On Morale:
  “Their baseline for what is acceptable treatment is far lower than what Western militaries would tolerate…even with their morale the way that it is, they’re still able to attack.” (Massicot, 12:08)

• On the Limits of Analysis:
  “There’s a tendency to over-focus on what’s happening in the capitals, but the real story is what’s happening in the military units, within the division, within the fleet headquarters. That’s where you can get a sense of training, capacity, cohesion, morale, corruption, grafting. That’s where all of those secrets hide and live.” (Massicot, 31:00)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Ukrainian Counteroffensive & Russian Losses: 01:31–03:39
• Artillery & North Korean Munitions: 04:37–06:49
• Russian Military Culture & Prewar Reforms: 08:59–11:44
• Morale and Resilience: 12:08–14:17
• Transformation by Mobilization & Use of Prisoners: 14:26–17:04 / 26:15–29:10
• Failures at the Start of Invasion & Adaptation: 17:23–20:40
• Mobilization Timing & Political Risk: 24:02–26:03
• Challenges of Replenishing Forces: 26:15–30:30
• Limits of Military Analysis: 31:00–33:53

Tone & Language

The conversation maintains an analytical, unsparing, but pragmatic tone. Massicot is clear, measured, and avoids overstatement, challenging both wishful thinking and simplistic narratives.

Summary prepared for listeners seeking a detailed, accurate understanding of Russian military dynamics and the strategic outlook for Ukraine.