Podcast Summary: The Foreign Affairs Interview – “Putin’s Fragile Compact With the Russian People”
Host: Foreign Affairs Magazine
Guest: Andrei Kolesnikov, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Date: January 11, 2024

Episode Overview

This episode features a deep-dive conversation between Foreign Affairs editor Hugh Aiken and Andrei Kolesnikov, exploring how Vladimir Putin maintains social stability in Russia as the war in Ukraine grinds on and a presidential election looms. With first-hand insights from Moscow, Kolesnikov examines the mechanisms behind Russia’s 'warped normalcy,' the fragile social contract under Putin, shifting economic realities, changing public attitudes toward repression, and the enduring cycle of Russian history.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. The Persistence of “Warped Normalcy”

[02:14 – 04:07]

• Normalcy as a Survival Mechanism:
  Kolesnikov describes a society striving to preserve a sense of “business as usual” under abnormal, war-driven circumstances.
  • “The word normalcy may be the main word of the year 2023, because everyone is trying to continue business as usual ... in a private life, in an everyday life.” [02:33, C]
• Learned Indifference:
  Indifference is cultivated both by repression and the widespread use of official narratives, which people echo back for survival.
  • “For this regime, indifference is the main tool to maintain a high level of support of Putin and his war.” [02:45, C]
• Emergence of 'Swamp' or 'Quagmire' People:
  Many adapt passively, parroting state rhetoric to navigate daily life.
• War Fatigue and Peace Sentiments:
  “Now, more and more people, especially ... before the new year, want peace, or at least ceasefire or peace talks, because this is the expression of war fatigue, they want to return to normalcy in a proper sense of the word.” [03:43, C]

2. Economic Realities: Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Risks

[04:56 – 06:56]

• Artificial Economic Stability:
  Salaries for those in military-linked industries have risen, creating a new middle class sustained by state spending.
  • “This is economy for death, not for life. But in a short term, it works.” [05:16, C]
  • “Putin pays for soldiers, Putin pays for security services ... these people, they are like a new middle class instead of old middle class ... in a market economy.” [05:31, C]
• Demographic Crisis Looms:
  War is stripping the nation of its workforce and undermining the future.
  • “We are losing people. ... Demography is the main challenge for this regime.” [06:31, C]
  • “In the future, this country will lose a lot of people who can work, who could be productive in a sense of a normal economy which works for life, not for death.” [06:50, C]

3. The Cult of Death and the Unwritten Social Contract

[06:56 – 09:01]

• Heroization of Sacrifice:
  A new set of “archaic” moral norms revolve around the glorification of death in war.
  • “One of the norms is very archaic one, this very account of heroic death, heroization of the participation in the holy war ... just like it was in very archaic societies, not in modernized society.” [07:27, C]
• The New Social Contract:
  Most Russians are not asked to sacrifice directly; instead, continued support for the regime is exchanged for allowing citizens to carry on with daily life unperturbed.
  • “Some of you can serve, can go to war. ... But not all of you can choose this option. ... In exchange for that, you must support me. ... You are paying with this ballot for your quiet and normal future.” [08:19, C]
• Fragility of the Arrangement:
  Kolesnikov speculates that this contract will be crucial in the upcoming presidential campaign, but its durability is uncertain.

4. Growing Acceptance of Repression

[09:01 – 11:41]

• Passive Compliance:
  While few actively support the government or its ideological inventions, there is neither overt support nor resistance.
  • Eg., the label 'foreign agent' is now familiar and used to ostracize perceived enemies.
• ‘Anticipatory Obedience’ and Self-Policing:
  The state’s rhetoric -- increasingly reminiscent of late-Stalin USSR -- is absorbed by the public, producing denunciations and self-censorship.
  • “We are witnessing ... a visible wave of denunciations. ... Its language ... could be compared with ... Stalinism ... in terms of rhetoric and ... absurdity.” [10:25, C]
  • “This is all because of this anticipatory obedience to the new rules which Putin has established in this society.” [11:28, C]

5. Cracks in the System: Protests and Mobilization

[11:41 – 16:32]

• The Prigozhin Uprising and Passive Populace:
  The regime’s stability persisted through events like the Prigozhin mutiny, in part due to public passivity.
• Partial Mobilization as a Shock:
  Actual mobilization is deeply unpopular and harmful to public mood and economic productivity.
  • “Partial mobilization can spoil not only the public mood ... but can spoil the economy.” [12:37, C]
• Family Protests:
  Relatives of mobilized soldiers are increasingly vocal and dissatisfied—this discontent now emanates from Putin’s electoral base.
  • “The source of this discontent is ... the core nation, the electoral basis of Putin, at the end of the day.” [15:30, C]
• Putin's Promise:
  Putin publicly counters these anxieties with campaign assurances, promising no new mobilization and a return to routine after public displays of loyalty (like voting).
  • “So here is this unwritten social contract. It works and it will continue to work in the future. So be quiet, be good citizens, be patriotic citizens, but at the same time, you can return to your work ...” [16:32, C]

6. The Regime’s 'Traditional Values' Campaign

[17:59 – 20:45]

• Intrusions into Private Morality:
  The Kremlin and its allies push for new restrictions (e.g., abortion, LGBTQ rights), but encounter pockets of societal resistance.
  • “There was a discussion in the society and paradoxically there was kind of a resistance to new abortion laws. ... Sometimes the society can resist these interventions into their private life.” [18:44, C]
• ‘Almost Naked Party’ Scandal:
  High-profile cultural figures punished for “immorality” as an assertion of wartime values.
  • “It wasn't about criminal persecution, but they nearly lost their businesses because it is not moral to demonstrate your naked body during the period of patriotic war.” [20:12, C]

7. The Fate of Civil Society and the Opposition

[20:45 – 25:23]

• Repression Continues:
  Navalny’s disappearance and ongoing suppression of activists, NGOs, and alternative media.
  • “Putin will not leave his second front, his struggle, his fight with civil society and liberal opposition.” [21:28, C]
• Self-Censorship as the New Normal:
  Decisions to publish or participate in cultural life now fraught with personal risk, leading many to opt for quietism over confrontation.
• Enduring Pockets of Dissent:
  Some continue to find ways to work within Russia, despite repression.
  • “I'm trying to continue to live according the constitution, like free person in unfree world. And ... it is possible to be here with some risks, to be persecuted strongly. But why not to try? Why not to test the reality?” [24:27, C]
• Sustained Opposition (Polling Data):
  The anti-war minority remains steady at about 20%, matching the regime’s most fervent supporters, with a large indifferent “swamp” in between.

8. Historical Patterns and the Ideology of Putinism

[27:15 – 34:09]

• A Return to Archaic, Imperial Ideology:
  Putin’s regime has evolved from one driven by kleptocracy to one energized by messianic, imperial, and nationalist ideas.
  • “Money and kleptocratic activities are very important ... But even more important is imperial and at the same time nationalistic worldview ... this very war was a consequence of this kind of thinking.” [28:25, C]
• Memory Politics and WWII:
  The “Great Patriotic War” is central to the regime’s identity and essential for justifying current policies.
• An Empire Without Modernization:
  Uniquely, Putin’s model rejects the traditional trade-off between empire and technological/social progress.
  • “Putin is seeking an empire without modernization, a kind of anti-modern empire.” [31:24, A]
• The West as Existential Enemy:
  Domestic politics framed as a defensive struggle against the West rather than about Ukraine itself.
  • “Yes, this is a war with the West, with Western idea as such, with Westernism ... and this fight is an existential one.” [32:14, C]

9. The Fragility of the Status Quo & Future Prospects

[34:09 – 37:31]

• Stress Points:
  Resource depletion (financial, demographic, psychological) is the likely trigger for future change, not bottom-up revolution.
  • “Splitting exclusion of resources could be one of the incentives. I mean, not only financial resources ... I mean emotional, psychological resources of the nation.” [34:36, C]
• Change Comes From Above:
  Historically, Russian transformation follows elite discontent, not mass protests.
  • “As we know from Russian history, all the changes are coming from the top.” [35:29, C]
• Post-Putin Future:
  Kolesnikov does not see chaos, but expects eventual reopening and 'remodernization' led by new elites, though not immediately.
  • “I do not believe in chaos after Putin. I believe in sense and sensibility and rationality of people who will fight for power in this country.” [36:24, C]
• Present Stability is Not Durable:
  “Right now, we are inside the catastrophe which is the most serious after Stalinism for this country. So there are short term problems for this regime, but long term problems ... could lead possible changes in this country, but not maybe tomorrow or next year.” [36:55, C]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “For this regime, indifference is the main tool to maintain a high level of support of Putin and his war.” — Andrei Kolesnikov [02:45, C]
• “This is economy for death, not for life. But in a short term, it works.” — Kolesnikov [05:16, C]
• “You are paying with this ballot for your quiet and normal future.” — Kolesnikov on the social contract [08:39, C]
• “We are witnessing quite small but visible wave of denunciations. ... It is almost comparable with this very period of Russian history [late Stalinism] ... this is all because of this anticipatory obedience to the new rules which Putin has established in this society.” — Kolesnikov [10:28, C]
• “I do not believe in chaos after Putin. I believe in sense and sensibility and rationality of people who will fight for power in this country.” — Kolesnikov [36:24, C]
• “Right now, we are inside the catastrophe which is the most serious after Stalinism for this country.” — Kolesnikov [36:55, C]

Important Timestamps (selected)

• 02:14 - Warped normalcy and learned indifference
• 04:56 - Economic unreality and social payouts
• 06:56 - Cult of death and new social contract
• 09:01 - Public attitudes towards repression
• 11:41 - Prigozhin uprising and cracks in the system
• 14:57 - Families of mobilized soldiers and potential unrest
• 16:32 - Putin’s campaign themes and reassurance of no new mobilization
• 18:28 - Attacks on morality, abortion, and LGBTQ
• 21:28 - Fate of civil society and opposition
• 24:52 - Polling on support and opposition
• 27:15 - The Russian historical cycle and ideology
• 31:24 - Putin’s anti-modern empire and the west as enemy
• 34:36 - Stress points and prospects for regime instability
• 36:55 - Post-Putin Russia and hope for remodernization

Concluding Note

Andrei Kolesnikov provides a sobering yet nuanced analysis of Russian society under Putin. Despite a façade of stability, the system is propped up by repression, learned indifference, and a fragile social contract—one vulnerable to deeper social, demographic, and economic cracks. The conversation concludes on a note that, while immediate change is unlikely, the internal contradictions of Putin’s regime may eventually prompt a new period of Russian remodernization after his era ends.