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- [00:00]
A
Dan.
- [00:00]
B
I'm Dan Kurtzphelin, and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
- [00:06]
C
This is one of the main problems of Putin's current economic model, and partial mobilization can spoil not only the public mood, which could be much gloomier than now, it can spoil the economy.
- [00:22]
B
There's a growing sense that Vladimir Putin is in a pretty good position as he heads into 2024. Certainly, that's what Putin wants the rest of the world to think, that he can outlast Ukraine and its supporters in the West. Yet the situation looks more complicated on the ground in Russia. And there are few people better positioned to make sense of the reality on the ground than Andrei Kolesnikov. Kolesnikov, a journalist and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has been in Moscow since the war began. Over the last two years, he's written a series of deeply illuminating pieces for foreign affairs. In December 2022, the Kremlin listed him as a foreign agent. Kolesnikov spoke with my colleague Hugh Aike earlier this week about Putin's hold on power and how Russians really view their leader in his disastrous war.
- [01:17]
A
Hello, I'm Hugh Aiken, senior editor at Foreign affairs, stepping in for Dan. This week as we enter 2024, the war in Ukraine is reaching its third anniversary. Vladimir Putin is preparing for a presidential election in March. And I think it's fair to say that for much of the West, Russia remains a conundrum. But what about Russians themselves? What do they think? How do they see this unbelievably deadly war? And what about the future of Russia? It's with huge pleasure that I'm speaking today with Andrei Kolesnikov, who has watched the war unfold from Russia itself in a series of pieces for Foreign Affairs. Andrei has, I think, done more than perhaps anyone else to explain this conundrum of Russia. And I should say it's a special privilege for me, having been Andrei's editor these past couple years. Andrei, thanks so much for joining me today.
- [02:12]
C
Thank you for this invitation.
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A
One of the recurring themes in your pieces for Foreign affairs has been the extent to which Putin has been able to create and sustain a kind of normalcy, or warped normalcy, we might say. And this comes through in some of the sociological data you have tracked since the war began. Can you just give us a picture of that?
- [02:33]
C
You're right. The word normalcy may be the main word of the year 2023, because everyone is trying to continue business as usual, let's say, in a private life, in an everyday life, and, you know, for this regime Indifference is the main tool to maintain a high level of support of Putin and his war. We're witnessing the appearance of people who, we can name them swamp people, let's say quagmire people. They simply follow the rules. They simply follow the official discourse. The simpler trying to adapt to the current situation. They're trying to find words for self justifications for their behavior. They're trying to find words which can describe the external world for themselves. So because of that, they use official discourse, they use official narrative, they use Putin's words, they use words of the state television. And that's enough for them because they have to survive this period. And now, you know, more and more people, especially it was visible before the new year. If more and more people want peace, or at least ceasefire or peace talks, because this is the expression of war fatigue, they want to return to normalcy in a proper sense of the word.
- [04:07]
A
So this is a really interesting point in that you have this memorable phrase. You use learned indifference. And it's fascinating how you describe the way the regime has inculcated this sensibility, but it has these. All these different facets. There's, of course, the repression, the growing tightening of the screws, but also a kind of economic normalcy that has been sustained. And I think it was surprising to me to read in your most recent report with your colleague Dennis Volkov, that actually, for many households, incomes have gone up slightly because of these vast social payouts. So is the regime kind of enforcing this normalcy through a kind of economic unreality?
- [04:57]
C
Yes, this regime is trying to spend money primarily on security issues, on war, on military industrial complex. But it means higher salaries for people who are working in this military industrial complex and who are moving from civil economic sectors to, let's say, war economic sectors. Yes, this economy is not healthy. This is more about state investments, more about producing something not so productive. I mean, this is economy for death, not for life. But in a short term, it works. In the short term, it provokes good attitudes towards the government. People are dying, but their families are getting more social payments because of that. And Putin pays for soldiers, Putin pays for security services, for people from army, etc, etc. And all these people, they are like a new middle class instead of old middle class, which consisted of businessmen or people who tried to make themselves just like it is always in a market economy. At the same time, we have a lot of marketized sectors which are literally saving Putin's economy. And so they are saving Putin's stability. It is the picture in a short term perspective, but we are talking about middle term or long term perspective. The situation is much worse because we are losing the very essence of the economy. We are losing people. So in that sense, demography is the main challenge for this regime. When we are talking about demography, we are talking about the future. And in the future, this country will lose a lot of. A lot of people who can work, who could be productive in a sense of a normal economy which works for life, not for death.
- [06:56]
A
I want to get to this culture of death because this seems so important in creating this new normalcy. It's also creating, as you've described, a kind of cult of death. How does this really work in Russian discourse? You have a kind of heroization of sacrifice, but also a sense that according to this social contract, as you describe it, that ordinary Russians are not themselves being asked to really make sacrifices.
- [07:28]
C
Yes, people want to live their normal everyday life just like it was before the war. But at the same time, we're witnessing the appearance of, let's say, new moral norms. And one of the norms is very archaic one, this very account of heroic death, heroization of the participation in the holy war, just like it was in very archaic societies, not in modernized society. But this is one of the pillars of new morality, let's say. At the same time, we see kind of a new unwritten social contract between population and Putin. So some of you can serve, can go to war. Physically, we will pay for it. But we will admit that you are great patriots at the same time. But not all of you can choose this option. You can stay at home. You could be simply people who are working for our victory, not more. This is your choice. We do not involve all of you into the trenches. But in exchange for that, you must support me. You must support my regime. You must go to the polling station in March 2024. You are paying with this ballot for your quiet and normal future. For how long this social contract could work properly, nobody knows. But for sure, Putin will use it during his presidential campaign.
- [09:01]
A
One of your other fascinating revelations to me was that there's actually been an increase in support for repressive and restrictive laws. You know, we from the outside would think, oh, how long will Russia sustain this ever tightening of the screws? And yet what you describe sociologically is that at least for this indifferent middle section of Russian society, they are supporting, they are going along with these crackdowns, the silencing of civil society and the all encompassing control of the state. Is that accurate?
- [09:40]
C
So people do not support actively this regime at the same time, they do not support actively any inventions, ideological inventions of this regime. Let's take, for instance, such a special term, foreign legend. So several years ago, maybe even two years ago, not so many people knew. Who are they? All these guys like foreign legends. Maybe this is Biden or somebody else. Now they know that this is the fifth column. And all those people, they undermine our consolidation, our steps toward victory. And because of that, more and more people are accusing foreign agents in this undermining of our consolidation. But this is simply also passive, following the rules and words of this regime, let's say ideological environment. At the same time, this is really, this is a process of spoiling brains and souls of the whole nation. And because of that, we are witnessing quite small but visible wave of denunciations. And sometimes its language, which is used by the authorities, could be compared with the language of Stalinism, of the situation of the late 1940s and early 1950s, in terms of rhetoric and in terms of absurdity of this rhetoric and after that, absurdity of repressions. This is not the scale of Stalinism in a sense of mass repressions, but the quality, if we can say so, of persecution, quality of punishment and sentences, as well as this above mentioned wave of denunciations. It is almost comparable with this very period of Russian history. But again, this is all because of this anticipatory obedience to the new rules which Putin has established in this society.
- [11:41]
A
Looking back over the past two years, since February 2022, there have been moments when you have discerned cracks in this system, when the social contract appeared to be maybe challenged, if not completely breaking down. And some of them in the Prigozhin uprising, I think maybe the west saw this as more of a big event than Russians themselves, although I believe you noted that it was a passive. No one stood up to defend the regime. They just watched, which is what you might expect from this passive indifference. On the other hand, the partial mobilization was quite a shock to this contract. And can you talk about that, and what would be the implications if in fact there were another mobilization for Kremlin?
- [12:34]
C
It's better to avoid further mobilization, partial or general, because there is a lack of working force in the economy, deficit of labor shortages. This is one of the main problems of Putin's current economic model. And partial mobilization can spoil not only the public mood, which could be much gloomier than now. It could be, can spoil the economy. And I hope that Kremlin understands it. And because of that, sometimes some very important persons, like Putin himself, they say that we're not going to the new wave of partial mobilization. That's enough for us to use your volunteer efforts to join the Army. And really, they rely on volunteer steps. They rely on contracts with people who want to get money for their military service. And for the moment, it works. And for the continuation of this kind of war of attrition, I guess that's enough to have these volunteers in the trenches, because there is a lack of, well, qualified officers, there is a lack of necessity for more and more people, which could be a new portion of cannon fodder. But at the same time, the society is in a permanent tension because of that, because they don't want their children, their boys to go to war and to be killed and to become killers. One of the problems of the end of the previous year was the problem of small but very vocal, let's say, protests of families of mobilized people, not professional soldiers or officers. We're talking not about, for instance, volunteers or people who are signing contracts. These people were simply mobilized in October, November of 2022. Now they're still in the fields, some of them without any kind of vacations. So the families, the wives and the mothers, they say, let them return home. Let somebody else will serve. Not our brothers, sons and fathers.
- [14:58]
A
These are presumably patriotic families. Their sons are fighting and now they're standing up. And could this become more of a problem for the regime?
- [15:10]
C
Yeah, this is the right notion. Are they against the war? They are against the service of their boys and husbands. But right now, we hear more voices from this community. Let's stop the war. They begin to understand that the source of the problem of their families is not in mobilization as such. The problem is the war as such. And this is a bit dangerous for Kremlin because the source of this discontent is not somewhere inside liberal communities or from immigrant communities. This is, let's say, the core nation, the core people, the electoral basis of Putin, at the end of the day. And they express, quite in a rude manner sometimes, their discontent with this situation. This is something new. And for the moment, I think Kremlin doesn't know how to behave in that situation.
- [16:12]
A
And already in December, when Putin gave his discussion with Russian journalists, which itself was, I guess, a demonstration of normalcy, he was continuing this tradition after suspending it a year ago. Didn't he also say then that there would be no new mobilization? This has become a kind of campaign theme.
- [16:33]
C
Yes, he said it. And again, it was one more message from his side. So here is this unwritten social contract. It works and it will continue to work in the future. So be quiet, be good citizens, be patriotic citizens, but at the same time, you can return to your work, you can return to your everyday life the same story with this very so called elections, we can name it electoral procedures. No, not elections as such. But okay, you must go to the polling stations, you must vote for me. But at the same time after that you can go to the cinema, you can go home, you can concentrate on your private problems, because that's enough for the moment.
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B
We'll be back after a short break.
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D
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- [17:59]
A
the other theme that seemed to come through in this December talk was the traditional values. And this gets into the sort of archaicism of the regime that you have written about. How far do you think the Kremlin wants to go with these attack against the private lives of people now with attacks on individual morality and LGBTQ and what are portrayed as decadent Western practices. How is this sort of serving the regime?
- [18:28]
C
When people are trying people in power, they're trying to invent new restrictions for people. The question of abortions appeared again and there was a discussion in the society and paradoxically there was kind of a resistance to new abortion laws. And Putin, I must admit, was very cautious in that sense. He said that we must be more rational in these questions and we must research the question because the problem of abortion is not so important in this society. Russia is just like the United States or France or something like that, if we're talking about the level of abortion in this country. But this topic was exploited by traditionalists, by quasi patriots, like one of the main symbolic topics. So sometimes the society can resist these interventions into their private life. There was very symptomatic case in the end of the year, so called Almost Naked party, when some stellar persons from the milieu of stars of singers or somebody else, famous fashion bloggers, they really appeared almost naked during one of the parties in one of the nightclubs in Moscow. It demonstrated how far away were for average representatives of this community. But they were punished strongly by the authorities. One guy was arrested even for some time. The organizers of this party were punished in different ways. It wasn't about criminal persecution, but they nearly lost their businesses because it is not Moral to demonstrate your naked body during the period of patriotic war. And it was a great, great scandal, just like the mutiny against Putin's regime, against the consolidation of everyone around the commander. So it's also a very symptomatic case.
- [20:46]
A
One issue we haven't talked about is in fact the civil society, the kind of liberal Russia and what has happened to it. And I think you can speak to this from a privileged position, as sometimes we think one of the last liberals in Moscow. How is your own situation as a foreign agent? And is this aspect of Putin's Russia, in a sense, has been marginalized to the point that that is not his main concern at this point? That, as you say, he's more concerned about the mothers of soldiers? Or is there still a continual, constant paranoia about opposition?
- [21:28]
C
Putin will not leave his second front, his struggle, his fight with civil society and liberal opposition. You maybe know that Navalny totally disappeared in the days of the beginning of the presidential campaign. They are afraid of his word because his word has weight. And they will continue to suppress our civil society, despite the fact that it looks like that they control everything around them. At the same time, you know, in different communities of this society, the self censuring is more important than suppression or censuring as such. If we'll take for instance, book market, this is your personal decision as an editor, your personal decision as a bookseller, whether to sell or whether to edit or publish, or sell or not to sell these books of foreign agents, for instance. There are a lot of scandals around it. And this is personal decision of every member of the society, whether you are ready to be smart enough and brave enough to publish these people to sell their books, no restrictions on it. But at the same time, I mean, a lot of people prefer quiet life and self censuring instead of continuing business as usual, just like it was before the war. Nevertheless, there are a lot of brave people here who are still continuing their work in theaters, as theater directors, as editors, in publishing houses, sometimes even in media, sometimes being blocked in a newspaper without license. You can continue your activity if you are brave enough. Just like, for instance, group of people who are working with, who were working in Nova Gazeta, which was totally blocked and prohibited. They continue to work simply consolidated around their leader, Dmitry Muratov, for instance, producing a new magazine, producing a website which is not media, but it is visible for people who want to see, want to watch, want to know additional information, want to get alternative opinions. So There are even NGOs who are continuing to work here, despite very high level of suppression. So the question is, was it possible to behave like this? You can try or you can refuse to behave like this. So in my personal situation, I'm trying to continue to live according the constitution, like free person in unfree world. And for the moment, I'm trying to write, I'm trying to broadcast, I'm trying to express my personal vision. And I'm still in Russia and it is possible to be here with some risks, to be persecuted strongly. But why not to try? Why not to test the reality?
- [24:52]
A
In that sense, one of the really interesting things that you point to in the Levada surveys is that I think, correct me if I'm wrong, but it's. Isn't it about 20% of the population is in opposition to the war. It's about the same who are strong supporters and the opposition are about the same, about a fifth. There's this large indifferent middle, but. But 20% is. Has held pretty steady. Is that correct?
- [25:23]
C
Yes, absolutely. This is kind of a balance inside the society. Around 20% plus from conservative wing. This is a figure which describes the strong supporters, aggressive supporters of the regime, the same around 20% who do not support this regime, who prefer democracy and westernization of Russia. And in the middle we see this swamp, these people who are ready to follow the official narrative, who are ready to refuse to think independently because they simply want quiet life. This construction of the society was typical for this country even before the war. Now it's more visible. But what is evident that during the military or patriotic campaigns, the different ratings of Putin, they experience visible growth, visible boost for support from this very, let's say, man in the middle, indifferent group of people. In more quiet times, Putin is not so actively supported. But now we are witnessing, let's say, the stabilization of this bad equilibrium. And in the circumstances of strong suppression in the internal front and the continuation of war is the external front, we can predict the. That something could be changed in a short term or middle term perspective.
- [27:15]
A
I'm glad you brought in this longer term perspective, because I did want to turn in the time we have left to the longer history of Putinism, which you have written about powerfully, particularly in a longer essay you did for the magazine this fall called the End of the Russian Idea. And I think one of the really interesting ways of looking at this which you have put forward is that in fact what is happening now is yet another cycle of a pattern that goes back really quite far in Russian history. And this is a cycle toward and away from the west, or you could say toward and away from a kind of Stalinization, if that is a model. And can you just talk about that pattern which in fact you trace to before Stalin, to the imperial era.
- [28:11]
C
You know, it was once fashionable to say that Putin and his team had no ideology at all, that their personal ideology was money and corruption. Turned out that that was not entirely true. Money and kleptocratic activities are very important, they do matter. But even more important is imperial and at the same time nationalistic worldview of the people who came to power at the beginning of the 2000s. People from Secret services, people who are adepts of official Russian Orthodox Church as a tool for returning to very archaic times. And I think this very war was a consequence of this kind of thinking. It was a consequence of their ideology. We will not witness any kind of war without this ideology. We will not witness this regime which becomes more and more more authoritarian and even say hybrid totalitarian without this ideology. So we will not see this mobilization of the society without this ideology. It is very archaic, but it found out in the circumstances of the 21st century, it still works. This appealing to previous historical greatness. The main pillar in this ideology is the memory about so called great Patriotic War, Second World War and our victory. Putin demonstrates that he's in a personal stance, kind of an inheritor of this great victory. This is not so. It's a hypocrisy to Compare this victory, 1945, with current unprovoked war. But for the population which is trying to find justifications and words for the justification of a current state of affairs, it works. And you know, during the last year, Putin found new words and new framework for this ideology. Traditional values, great history, imperial thinking, all the stuff. These are parts of the so called Russian idea which was very marginal for a long time, but now this is a tool for Putin to manage this country, to rule this country. And the model of his political system needs this ideology, this national imperial, messianic ideology. So there are all the elements on the table, this hybrid totalitarian regime, semi mobilized society, rent seeking state capitalism. And around all these points we have national imperial, messianic ideology.
- [31:21]
A
And another element to this which seems so striking is, and you phrased this in your piece for us, that unlike even his imperial predecessors and even Stalin to some extent, Putin is seeking an empire without modernization, a kind of anti modern empire. And this, this seems like such a striking idea when we think of Russia, even thinking of the earlier Putin years, when it seemed that there was this kind of managed democracy and you know, Russians were Allowed to get rich, to enjoy the Western economy just as long as Putin was, was in power. And now we seem to have gone to a very different point where the west is actually the enemy. And very much the war now is framed as a war against the West. This is not a war in Ukraine. Is that the case?
- [32:15]
C
Yes, this is a war with the west, with Western idea as such, with Westernism, with anchors and organizations of this west, just like NATO or European structures. And this fight is an existential one. This fight has historiosophic sense, let's say. And this is also. This model has its technological side. Let's take the model of the US and them, who were them before the war? The authorities, oligarchs, Putin's circles, Who were us? Simple average Russian people right now. Who are them? Westerners, the west as such, and who are us? We are the consolidated around Putin. This is absolutely another situation. And even people who were against Putin before this war, for some reasons, I do not mean liberal minded people, but simply people who were expressing discontent with social situation primarily, they understand now that they have to consolidate around Putin during the period of war. But I think this model is quite fragile in the middle term and long term perspective. But Putin and his elite, they behave according to the slogan of Madame de Pompadour. We do not care about the future after physical life of Putin. This is the main problem of this country and this irresponsible elite.
- [34:09]
A
We've talked about all of the things that that have stabilized the current status quo, the regime. What are the possible events that could change that? I mean, just looking at, I mean, you've described these cycles so well of history. I mean, what has been required to initiate a swing in the other direction? And would a significant change in the war itself constitute such a shift?
- [34:36]
C
I think that's splitting exclusion of resources could be one of the incentives. I mean, not only financial resources, budget resources, economic resources, I mean emotional, psychological resources of the nation. Look at this very small movement of families, of the mobilized people. This is a nucleus of a possible understanding that what is happening, what is the source of problems of these families, problems in their private everyday life? We can't rely on leads. They are absolutely important in the sense of changing anything from inside. But at the same time, as we know from Russian history, all the changes are coming from the top. In that sense, we must achieve such a combination of social and political discontent from the bottom, with discontent from above. It was kind of an environment, possible environment for future changes. But I can't say what could be the last incentive, last step towards these changes. It is evident that Putin couldn't be the initiator of this kind of changes towards modernization of Russia. He must disappear this or that way and only after that we will witness a new Russia. I do not believe in chaos after Putin. I believe in sense and sensibility and rationality of people who will fight for power in this country. And this lack of resources could lead them to the idea that they must open again, reopen their country to the West. They must begin this process of remodernization of Russia. So I'm not a supporter of catastrophic scenarios after Putin. Right now we are inside the catastrophe which is the most serious after Stalinism for this country. So there are short term problems for this regime, but long term problems which have sources in demography and lack of resources and upcoming understanding of the sense of the history historical period in which we are now. The combination of these factors could lead possible changes in this country, but not maybe tomorrow or next year. But I can say that Putin is in a stable position even right now.
- [37:31]
A
Thank you Andrei. It was excellent. To end on a somewhat, if distant, hopeful note, again, I urge readers to go to the website and read Andre's continued analysis from Moscow. Absolutely indispensable. We are so grateful for your for your courageous writing and we wish you well.
- [37:52]
C
Thanks so much and thanks for this opportunity to express my views.
- [38:03]
B
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannan, Julia Fleming dresser and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph, Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sierra and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.
- [38:36]
A
Sam.