Loading summary
Transcript54 lines
- [00:00]
A
Dan I'm Dan Kurtzphelin and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
- [00:06]
B
The whole point of the maritime order is one country doesn't own it. If one country owned it, no one would join it.
- [00:14]
A
Right.
- [00:15]
B
It is an aggregation of what we're all willing to put up with. What's the common denominator on rules that we can all more or less follow. That's the international order.
- [00:26]
A
All of us in the foreign policy world have talked a lot about great power competition over the last decade, but no one can entirely agree on the contours of today's competition, whether it's a battle of autocracies and democracies or revisionists and status quo powers, or whether, as the realists would argue, it's just states doing what states do. Sally Payne, a longtime professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. naval War College, see something else going on. To her, the great power competition we talk about today is just the latest example of the centuries old tension between maritime and continental powers. For maritime powers, like for most of its history, the United States money and trade serve as the basis of influence, and that leads them to promote rules and order. Continental powers like Russia most clearly and China in most, but not always, focus their security objectives on territory which they seek to defend and control and expand. From this divide rises two very different visions of global order. It also, Paine argues in a new essay in Foreign affairs, explains the basic drivers of today's great power competition. But as she looks at more recent developments, Paine lays out an additional concern. The United States has long been an exemplar of maritime power, but it is starting to behave in ways that suggest a shift away from the maritime strategies that have served it so well. Paine's focus on the context between land and sea makes clear the stakes of that shift. Sally, thanks so much for joining me and for your essay in our current issue on how the battle between maritime power and continental power defines geopolitics in this era as well as past ones. It, of course, builds on work you've done for many years on this particular dynamic and, and the historical competitions where it first emerged.
- [02:20]
B
Thank you so much for having me. It is such a pleasure. It was an honor to have the print article and then this is like double honor being with you now.
- [02:28]
A
Exactly, exactly. Well, you know, as I read your work, you know, going back before this particular article, it strikes me that you're in some ways reacting to the renewed focus on great power competition in both U.S. foreign policy circles and the discussion more generally, and finding yourself Perhaps unsatisfied with the insight and assumptions and level of historical perspective that underlie that focus. So I'm curious to start. As you've watched this discussion develop and watch this renewed attention to power and competition start to redefine American foreign policy, what do you think most of us are missing about the nature of geopolitical power?
- [03:03]
B
Great powers have always been out there, and competition has always been out there. So this idea that there's something new about great power competition, it's like yesterday's coffee, which isn't that great. But if I look at me, I spent graduate school studying two big continental empires, very, very effective ones, Russia and China. And then I wound up teaching at the US Naval War College for a career. And then I was doing all these maritime case studies about Britain and the United States and how they could or couldn't leverage their navies and how other people could or couldn't. And that's where it became so clear to me from this serendipitous just having to work for the Navy, which I never expected I would, is realizing there are fundamentally different security paradigms that go with these powers that are independent of whether you think someone's a good guy or a bad guy, but with a geographical address, we've all got one. You have different security problems.
- [04:00]
A
As you watch policymakers and government people, people in senior positions or formerly in senior positions, talk about competition and talk about geopolitics. Do you think the understanding as it's shaping policy right now is roughly correct, or is it kind of missing something fundamental about how those competitions work?
- [04:19]
B
Oh, I think it's missing something fundamental. Let's talk about our country, the United States. I'm not an expert in the United States. Right. But if you look about our history, we start out as a continental empire, and Americans were all about territorial expansion. And then at the late 19th century, you get Alfred there. Mahan, who's by far the most famous person ever associated with U.S. naval War College, where I've spent my career, who's saying, no, no, no, no. That power and the position in the world is not actually based on territorial extent because Russia's really large and really poor. Other places really big. Brazil and Argentina, but you don't associate them as being a world power. So there's something else going on. And Alfred Thayer Mahan said, it's got to do with. With all the money you can make on maritime trade because it's the oceans that connect you with the entire world. It is not land transport. And, oh, by the way, Choo choo trains take up, I don't know, it's like 600 containers max. Whereas these big container ships now the big ones take 21,000 containers. So no belt road, the land part is ever going to do for you what a container ship does. So then the United States, after having a rethink with Alfred there, Mahan, and then two world wars later, we're very much into a maritime security paradigm which is instead of the United States taking over Canada, more gunboat diplomacy. See how much of Latin America you can take over. Quitting all of that going, that's a waste of money. War is burnout money, they're negative sum. Whatever you get is damaged and therefore the loser's loss is bigger than what you get because you've damaged the goods and say no, no, no. The way to do it is through international law. We all agree on things about how we're going to trade your credit card works in whatever remote part of the globe they don't cheat on the deal. And it's so much cheaper running things. And if you follow laws, it provides both the stable business environment that you need for predictability and also it makes your costs so much lower. And this has been this wealth producing era. And if you look in European history, I look at it as a maritime era from the Napoleonic wars to World War I, where there are some wars in there in Europe, but not continent wide ones. And they're mostly just trading with each other, compounding wealth and not blowing up each other's industrial bases or for the United States, tremendously profitable for us and our allies from World War II until the end of the Cold War. So what we're doing now of tearing up our alliance system and also tearing up our scientific expertise is doing our enemies work. It's profoundly frightening. And if you look how rapidly people are changing, it's incredible. A term I think is useful for thinking about this is half court tennis of my invention. So when you play tennis you really ought to think of what's on the other side of the net. You'll play the game much better. The idea is we do some pronouncement out of Washington and we don't think about what any of the follow on effects are going to be and they're going to kill us. It's going to be so profoundly bad. And Americans understand this. For football, we'll apply it to foreign policy. Football is a recreational sport. Foreign policy with nukes. We play this wrong, our world's going to disappear on us.
- [07:46]
A
I think the maritime vision of power and security. The theory of security that comes with that maritime role is pretty clear. How do you describe, you know, as maybe persuasively as possible kind of steel man, the continental view of security and power. What would a kind of Russian or Chinese strategist say making the case for it?
- [08:03]
B
Oh, for Russia and China, they are located on the big Eurasian continent. By their sheer size, they have many neighbors, most of whom they don't much like, or they're very unstable. And then if they're little and you're worried about the instability creeping over, there was no maritime world of laws and things when they are forming. You know, this is hundreds of years ago, China thousands of years ago. And so the security paradigm there is you have a really good army and anyone messes with you, you so brutalize them, they do not come back for more. So yeah, that's the security paradigm. And it's reality, not choice. Right. But post industrial revolution, where you have compounding economic growth, it opens different possibilities. And if you deal with people by international law, it's just so much cheaper.
- [09:01]
A
I mean, you mentioned Alfred Thayer Mahan, your predecessor at the US Naval War College. I think about another theorist of geopolitics and that kind of early period in the early 20th century, Harold Mackinder, who talked about the importance of Eurasia, of the continental landmasses in some ways, some sense a battle between Mahan and Mackinder.
- [09:19]
B
Yeah, Mackinder's an interesting man. He's a Briton. His seminal articles written I think in 1904, so just it places him in history and he's looking at railways transforming things. And he thinks, well, Russia with this interior position, how can Britain influence that? And he's missing, actually. Yeah, you're right. Russia can defend itself. And if you're going to try to invade Russia, that's a true mistake. But rather he's missing that. It's these exterior lines of communication by oceans. That's where all the money is to be made. And if the Russians could ever clean up their own commercial laws to make it something other than a mafioso, I'm throwing you out of the sixth floor window because I don't like what you just told me at the table. If they could get beyond the shakedown way of doing stuff that goes way back. It goes all the way back to the Mongol Empire when they were the tax collectors of the Mongols. They've been shaking people down for a long time. But you make a lot more money if you play by laws.
- [10:18]
A
We talk a lot in the foreign policy world, as you of course know about the international order or the rules based order that's being probably dismantled as we speak. But when we look back to the kind of Post World War II development of that order, and especially the post Cold War, it seems in some ways like it was trying to build maritime power principles into the way the international system functioned. Right. It made everyone able to exist as a maritime power because there were rules of trade and everything else.
- [10:45]
B
It's not going to be dismantled. The United States may decide that it wants to leave it, which would be an incredible way to really injure our own national security. The United States has decided our allies are not so good. We treating them like enemies by doing these ruinous tariffs on them. And the reorganization is so rapid, the fighter jets that they no longer want to buy from us, losing all those markets. Brazil is going to sell sorghum straight to China because the Chinese aren't going to buy ours. And there's this reorganization, like there's the Baltic, Nordic eight within the EU that are all small, but they're thinking very deeply of what the security structure looks like. It will take Europe. I'm going to make it up 10 years to reorganize it. They will. We won't be part of it, so they will be stronger and we won't. When I talk about continental maritime powers at Naval War College, the first assignment in the strategy department is Thucydides. The man's been dead for over 2,000 years. He's talking about continental and maritime strategies. It goes back a long way. And this development of a rules based order, it used to be done through empires, right? Roman Empire, Roman law. So this rules based order is not going away. It's an evolution. Think of all the institutions that have been built since World War II. I mean, this is the great legacy of the greatest generation in the West. These are the people who suffered through World War I as young people, the Great Depression, as people your age. Ish. And then had the sorrow of being the strategic leaders of World War II. They decided institution building was the way to go. And that legacy remains and it will continue to remain. And yet it has its ups and downs. And the United States is being incredibly foolish right now. Whatever problems Americans think they have, they're misidentifying the solution.
- [12:52]
A
How do you see the Chinese reaction here? Machenta seems, as I read your work, your peace in Foreign affairs and elsewhere, a really interesting case in that it has struggled to become a maritime power, even as it seems to recognize some.
- [13:02]
B
Of the advantages of it, it's understanding there is a maritime rules based order. And the reason I say it's maritime is because we all connect with each other by sea. And also the cables, the information cables that provide the information run under the sea. This is a maritime order. Now all the countries there aren't islands, there's hardly any country that can be maritime. Japan and Britain and the United States has these really long borders with Canada and Mexico. If they ever go really hostile in a way that's very threatening to us, game over on maritime stuff. But this rules based order, that's maritime. It means if you all gang up together, you can deal with the bullies, us included. If our country becomes a bully because we're big, but we're not bigger than everybody else. So China could also join this order. This was the great hope and they're not interested. I suspect they want to build a Chinese based order and China as the central kingdom and run it all through bilateral relations that run through Beijing. But they're not nice to their neighbors. It's basically, we're big, you're small, and just do what you're told. And then they have these long borders which if everything goes to whatever and there's some major global war, you better believe their enemies will be infiltrating everything under the sun over those borders. Right. And the Ukrainians have shown us how the little things like drones can really wreck you. And so it's such a tragedy. China was doing so well by joining the party. Russia would do so well if it would only join the party. And now we're exiting the party. It's a mistake.
- [14:56]
A
How do you assess Chinese strategy under Xi Jinping? And especially since Donald Trump has come back into the presidency.
- [15:02]
B
When I look at China, it has three pillars of legitimacy. Historically at least, this is what I think. Others can disagree. One is ethical rule. And that's where the communists just cleaned up on the nationalists. Right. Well, that's gone because they're just all known for corruption these days. Another one was economic prosperity. Boy, did Deng Xiaoping deliver on that. And his successors. It's been the miracle of China joining the maritime order. Compounded growth has been great. Well, that's done, particularly since Xi Jinping is going to spend all his winnings on his foreign policy agenda. And the third one is territorial integrity. And that's where he's at and that's where Taiwan comes in. I think they want to maintain the monopoly of the Communist Party rule. And so they've now got an educated Enough populace where the normal thing is people want to have more say about their lives. The answer is they aren't going to do that. And then that's all the crackdown. And so to me, it's a dead end. It's a tragedy. It's not going to make China great. If it continues, it'll probably lead to some really big wars. And then the great question on these big wars, you can just see them as they're gathering. Oh, another leader who's taking down his country, Benjamin Netanyahu. You look at these gathering wars with people who are not thinking about the next generation. That's what a states person does. But they're thinking about me staying in office.
- [16:22]
A
I noticed that you left Vladimir Putin out of your rogues galley of leaders. I assume he was meant to be there.
- [16:27]
B
No, he's definitely, he's obvious.
- [16:29]
A
As you've watched Ukraine, do you see that as a harbinger of further attempts at territorial condos to come? Has there been some change in norms around use of force?
- [16:37]
B
Oh, okay, let's go for concepts I promised. So one is maritime continental, one continental alcoholic is looking at territory is what you really want. So that's why I want Taiwan or I want Greenland, whatever it is. And maritime is. No, it's all about making money from trade and reducing transaction costs through laws that we can more or less adhere to. Another one is limited and unlimited objectives. What's an unlimited objective? An unlimited objective is when your adversary is going to vaporize you at the end of the day, or they are at least minimum, it's going to overthrow your government. Okay, a limited objective is something different from that. So you can go back to Bismarck, it's I want these two provinces and then it's over. And the Danish government or the Austro Hungarian government are still going to be in place at the end of the day. So if your adversary has unlimited objectives and you compromise with them, you are setting them up to come back for the kill. So it's very important in your assessment of others is to determine where it's at. Okay, Vladimir Putin, I believe. And then you have to keep reassessing because no one knows for sure. Right? You're not in his head. I believe has unlimited objectives for not only Ukraine, but many countries in Europe and probably for the liberal democratic order itself. I also believe that China has an unlimited objective vis a vision liberal order. Now their counter argument would be, hey, you've got an unlimited objective against us because you don't like dictatorships. But it's important to Understand that? And it means that compromising with these folks on serious stuff is dangerous. You need to be very thoughtful. On the other hand, backing them into a corner is also insane because the one who's on the losing side, their last thing is going to be a nuke. And that's the problem. So all the wonderful political scientists who think they've got deterrence covered, they're wrong. A cornered dictator will use it as their last item. And you think we're going to be rational after that happens and then what happens? So we've got irresponsible leaders all over the place. So irresponsible leader A does nuke. What do you think irresponsible leader number two is going to do? It's going to be over. Another framework I think is really helpful is thinking about the tactical level. The operational level and the strategic level comes from warfare. At the tactical level. You have a tank, it has certain capabilities. It shirts so far something of whatever caliber is needed to take it out. You have a little tank unit and that unit has certain capabilities. But then you want to apply it to a military operation. This is the operational level, which is either a battle or a campaign. And then you're going to be having tank units and air units and all these different things. And then you're going to have an operational objective. Presumably it's going to be take that hill or prevent somebody from taking that hill, something of that level. So tactical level, operational level, what's the strategic level like? Why are you sending tanks in the first place?
- [19:52]
A
If I apply that set of questions to some of the avowedly continental powers that you address in the piece, maybe Russia and Iran being the first of them, it seems, you know, you argue persuasively that they would be more prosperous and probably more secure today if they had followed their rules based system and kind of taken part in this order in a cooperative way. Why didn't they? I mean, if you look at the choices that those leaders made, they're not complete idiots. What were they doing? Was it geography?
- [20:17]
B
Complete idiots. They're continentalists. They want to stay in power. Right? Look what people are willing to do to stay in power. It's really hard to transition from continental to maritime if you're in a really rough security environment. And most of these place these leaders, they're dictators, they have really extensive political police, secret police to keep themselves on the throne. They, they personally, well, may not be better off by joining the maritime order. And so it takes civil society and others to make it happen. If you think about.
- [20:56]
A
So it's a tension between national interest and the political imperatives for the leader in that case.
- [21:00]
B
Yeah, they're at the operational level and it's all about them.
- [21:04]
A
There's a sense in much of the American foreign policy community at this point that it was a mistake over certainly the 1990s. And also maybe going back even further to the initial opening to China. No, I mean really going back. This is about China specifically. There was this sense that the US should support China's rise and engage with it diplomatically, economically, that it would become more of a maritime power in some sense and that would ultimately be good for the order and for us. Do you think that was a mistake? Was it inevitable in some sense that China would make this turn?
- [21:37]
B
I think, well. And you can make the parallel argument about Europe hooking its energy supplies to Russia. Same idea is surely they'll join the party and of course that's not who they are. But I don't think you would have known conclusively that's not who they are without trying it. And then if you don't try it and do it, you will never have the political will to counter it.
- [22:00]
A
We'll be back after a short break.
- [22:05]
C
Are you a federal employee living in the US or overseas? The Foreign Service Benefit Plan, or fsbp, invites you to explore our health benefits during open season from Nov. 10 to Dec. 8. FSBP covers federal civilian employees in the U.S. and abroad, including many executive branch federal employees. If you're looking for stress free health insurance, FSBPs offer alternative benefits, offer perks like reimbursement for 50 massages, chiropractic treatments and acupuncture visits, up to $75 per visit. To learn more about the Foreign Service Benefit Plan and check your eligibility, visit afspa.org openseason. For the past 30 years, American Foreign policy has been bold and transformative, attempting to reshape the world. But the failures of the war on terror, the rise of China, and a shift to multipolarity globally all suggest that a new approach is needed. In First Among US Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World, Emma Ashford challenges how we think about American foreign policy. She proposes a return to a more pragmatic, realist set of strategic principles and argues that the United States must fundamentally reconceptualize its first role in the world, from global hegemon to shared leadership. First among Equals is available now from Yale University Press in print and ebook.
- [23:43]
A
And now back to my conversation with Sally Payne. You did some of your early historical work on the Sino Russian relationship going back deep into history, do you see the current Sino Russian relationship as an enduring one or do you see kind of deeper tensions there that will ultimately upset it?
- [23:59]
B
Oh, they're enduring neighbors. China's gonna eat Russia's lunch and it probably already is. And we're not privy to what all these deals are, but China and Russia are neighbors forever. The Russians treated China terribly when they were in the driver's seat. And. And if you think the Chinese have forgotten that, come on. No, they haven't. But Russia, it's great. Sort of having them pinned in this conflict with Ukraine, which also pins the west and just feed Russia enough to bear all the costs. And then China can go empire build near where it is. And then it's quite enjoyable for China to watch the west tear itself apart as much as possible. And the United States has been very helpful in this endeavor. But it's really bad news for Russia. And now there are gas shortages and things. And it's unclear how much control Putin really has over Siberia.
- [25:00]
A
Can you imagine China taking territory from Russia in the Far east in the next couple decades?
- [25:04]
B
Oh, easily. But this is the rules based order. It means the fundamental principle that endured for a long time was, was just because you're big, you can't devour small countries. That sovereignty is. The most fundamental principle of international law, is that you have sovereignty over your own territory. But if you go into wars. Right, the territory changes. And Vlad the Bad decided he wanted to try a war. Ukrainians relieved him of many of his strategic bombers. Right. That he can't make more of. We don't know what his deterrent looks like. China's building up a huge nuclear force which we always think it would be used on us, but there are other possibilities. Yeah, it's a mess. It's much better to trade with each other than to get into this. And so when we run these tariffs on other people, we aren't thinking, how much does wrecking their economy matter to them? A lot. So that means you're going to get quite a reaction from doing it. So you need to get beyond the half court to think about the other court. And Americans need to stop tearing each other apart. We're all on the same boat. When it sinks, whether you like the other party or not, we shall sink together.
- [26:19]
A
I mean, Japan seems like an interesting and distressing echo. When you look at this shift in the early 20th century, before World War II, you argue that Japan had prospered under a maritime trading order. And then suddenly made this continental term. And what in the Japanese case drove that shift?
- [26:35]
B
We passed the Holly Smoot tariff or the Smoot Hawley Tariff, whichever way you want to call it. Holly and Smoot decided that for the Great Depression the solution was tariff walls. And we need America first protecting us jobs. And so. Right, except what do you suppose everyone else is going to do when we cut off our markets? The Japanese go, well, we need an empire. No choice. So they invade Manchuria. And you could argue that that's the beginning of. And it's in 33 that Hitler comes to power. We've tanked their economy. Clever us. And it's not just the west in general goes protectionist, sets the hothouse conditions for World War Tariffs is not the solution.
- [27:21]
A
In a sense, you're taking away the maritime path to power. You're taking away the maritime order as an option for those powers and they're resorting to continental strategies.
- [27:29]
B
Yeah, it's a disaster. As opposed to figuring out working together to end the Great Depression, people learn a lot more about economics by the time World War II was over. What was necessary. It's called how to fix all of our economies. If you want to fix your economy at the expense of somebody else, they'll react.
- [27:50]
A
I mean, one thing that is really striking in reading your historical account of the maritime order and maritime power is the ways in which we're seeing threats to maritime trade.
- [28:00]
B
Right.
- [28:00]
A
Threats to the open seas, whether that's in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea or we saw enormous portions of world trade shut down by the Houthis, who are not exactly a highly capable outfit. And that's leaving aside tariffs and everything else. Do you worry about this kind of end of sea maritime security being part of this driver?
- [28:21]
B
Oh yeah. It's because the rules are breaking down. This is what Americans are failing to see is if you have the rules, people like Houthis don't try certain things. You know what traffic rules. Most of us obey most of them. Right. I get it that people are fooling around on speed limits, but they aren't mostly wildly above speed limits. They're mostly within norms. If everyone on one bright day decided they were just going to do whatever, there's no police force that could deal with all of it. And so this is the problem with the breakdown of the rules based order. It's not going to go away. It's just it's going to be weakened in other parts, it's going to be stronger in other areas, it's going to.
- [29:01]
A
Be Weaker, you make a persuasive case in the piece that at the core, the rules based order was really about building in maritime principles that all could at a certain point join, all could enjoy the gains of that order. We see that coming apart in lots of ways. What are the consequences of that, that decay of the rules based order, if that does in fact continue?
- [29:23]
B
Well, the rules based order is about how we interact with each other. And primarily how we interact is through trade. And as the rules break down, that means that when you sign contracts in certain parts of the world, who knows if they're going to be honored? It means that you don't have institutions, go to institutions where you can go, well, we got this problem and that we could resolve it internationally by adjusting rules on a very specific topic that goes away, right? And then you're into, oh my trading block. We can come up with a few rules for this. And instead of having one stop shopping of just one form of rules that everyone understands what they are, all of a sudden you're doing all these bilateral deals against each other. It's much more expensive, tremendous amount of overhead. And then the real breakdown is when people really want something and they decide someone doesn't want to give it and they decide they're going to come in and take it. And that's when you get wars. So it's very consequential. And the unraveling starts at one level and then it unravels to the other level.
- [30:36]
A
Can you imagine Europe becoming a true geopolitical actor, really shaping international order? What would that look like?
- [30:43]
B
It already has shaped the international order. You think the United States did it all? The whole point of the maritime order is one country doesn't own it. If one country owned it, no one would join it. Right? It is an aggregation of what we're all willing to put up with. What's the common denominator on rules that we can all more or less follow? That's the international order. And a lot of bright minds in Europe have been instrumental in negotiating this, as have some Americans. But lately we're having a tantrum. It's like the Americans are having a tantrum and doing a self timeout of the global order. It makes no sense. It's unprecedented in US History to make this little sense.
- [31:28]
A
The other disquieting historical parallel that comes up in your piece and in your work on this is the run up to World War I, when you saw powers embracing continental strategies in ways that became, as we of course know, disastrous. I mean, that seems like, another lesson to heed here. If you look at that history, what worries you? And what would you. What are the right warnings to take from that?
- [31:48]
B
Oh, yeah. Well, a, everyone's fighting their own separate wars. And even though it's broadly two alliance systems, because everyone has different war objectives, there's no way. You can't get out of the alliance because it got ruined by yourself, but you can't settle the war because whatever your minimum objectives look nothing like your partner's minimum objectives. There's just no way to get out of this thing. And it goes on and on and on. And then you have very operationally minded leaders who are thinking, we're just going to send more kids at this, and just killing a whole generation of young men across Europe. It's horrific. But, yeah, what worries me is leaders just being operationally focused instead of, why are we doing this? What's the purpose? And for me, it's the next generation. It's making things better for them. Like, what else is there? And not just the kids in my country, but human beings more generally. And I don't mean that means I have to sacrifice everybody in my country. No, that's not it. But make it better. If you come up in strategy with win win strategies, others will join. If you make it zero sum, which is continental on a good day, because continental is actually. It's not just, I get everything, you get nothing. It's no, we fight about it, ruin the thing, and therefore it's negative sum. Where now China's after a negative sum, world order, Russia's after one, and somehow we think it's going to get better if we join it. And then our allies are going, we're crazy. And so Europeans have to organize together because they're dealing with Putin. And it's obvious. But we need to fix. Well, we need to fix ourselves at home. And that involves talking to each other.
- [33:48]
A
Sally, thank you for all of this. You have a really singular way of illuminating some of the deeper forces that shape the kinds of conversations and kinds of problems we're thinking about every day. So thank you for the piece and for this conversation. I can't say it's a cheery one, but we appreciate it.
- [34:04]
B
I really appreciate being here, and I urge Americans to engage with each other, be honest and forthright. That's what I've tried to do. It doesn't mean I'm right. But then I'm eager to hear the counter argument of what have I got wrong? And let's together take our best ideas and forge a way forward. Thank you for having me.
- [34:30]
A
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com this episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Ashley Wood, Mary Kate Godfrey, and Conish Tharoor. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning.
- [35:05]
C
Sa.