Loading summary
Transcript27 lines
- [00:00]
A
Dan I'm Dan Kurtzphelin, and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
- [00:06]
B
It is irresponsible for us to send our military, our people, to the battlefield without defining a political goal, which is a description of the day later.
- [00:18]
A
There's no end in sight to Israel's war against Hamas in Gaza. But even as fighting rages, questions abound about what happens when it finally stops. Will Hamas survive, if not as an organization, then as an ideology? What type of leadership will be needed on both sides to broker a lasting peace? To explore these questions, I spoke to Ami Ayalone. Ayalon began his military service in 1963 and went on to lead Israel's navy and then the Shin Bet, its internal security service. The task for Israel, he argues, is not just addressing the security failures that preceded October 7th. Even more important is offering a political future that both Israelis and Palestinians will support. Amit, thanks so much for joining me today and for the piece you wrote for Foreign Affairs a few weeks ago, which was called why Netanyahu Must Go. I should start by noting for listeners that we're having this conversation on Wednesday, November 15, since it's likely that the situation on the ground in Gaza will change quite a bit in the coming days. But I want to start by asking you about the kind of Israeli theory of victory in this current military offensive. My sense is that, you know, outside observers, even those quite sympathetic to Israeli objectives, have a hard time really explaining that theory of victory. You know, if the objective is to destroy Hamas, how you know, is that is, is that really possible? What's your sense of. Of what the theory here is?
- [01:38]
B
First of all, we have to understand in the war that we are fighting today, which is against this case, Hamas. Hamas is not a state, is a terror organization, and nobody will rise a white flag. So the idea of decisive military victory in the battlefield has no meaning. So we have to do everything in order to try as soon as possible, to discuss the day after. The day after is a political good. When we send our youngsters to war, it is said to say, but many of them will not come back. And I'm not mentioning the Palestinians. We cannot do it without defining a very clear political goal. Otherwise, I'm not sure that we shall be able to recruit the support of the Israelis if we shall not understand that it lead us this war and the idea of destroying military wing of Hamas and its political leadership, which are very rational in military terms, if it does not lead us to a better future. So I'm not sure that the Israeli society will stay behind this war and second, of course, the international community. So what is missing for me is what is the description of the day after now, in our case, everything is politics. Our cabinet decided three weeks ago that they will not discuss, they will not say anything. It's a formal cabinet resolution. They will not say anything on the day after. So there is no political goal. So you can do it. Each of the round of violence that we have faced during the last 15 years, because the idea was to maintain the status quo. But now that it is obvious that the whole political concept and the policies that was led by Netanyahu of managing the conflict, not to try to solve it, but managing or the nonsense of shrinking the conflict, collapsed. So I think that it is irresponsible for us to send our military, our people to the battlefield without defining a political goal, which is a description of the day later.
- [04:21]
A
Do you think that members of the current government have their own political definitions of victory? Does Netanyahu do some of the ministers further to his right? Is it a problem of agreement or that they just don't have an idea of what that should be?
- [04:33]
B
No, they decided not to discuss it because they do not agree. The moment that they will start this debate, the coalition will fall apart. Netanyahu will lose all his, you know, messianic, radical, fundamental Jewish supremacy concept. And within the Cabinet, Gantz and Gary Eisencot do not agree to, you know, going on with occupation and controlling Gaza, etc. Etc. So the only decision that they had to accept in order to join the cabinet was to accept, you know, as a political decision of sending Israeli IDF to the battlefield without defining a political goal.
- [05:28]
A
So I want to pick up that question about the day after, but I want to first get your thoughts on a couple of near term questions that I think have really dominated debate in the US Increasingly over the past few days. And the first is about Palestinian civilian casualties. You know, I think at this point, 11,000 plus Palestinian deaths in Gaza in the last few weeks. I think most of these civilians, several thousand of them children. The IDF says it's taking measures to reduce those casualties, but, you know, it's hard to really discern that from afar. In your view, should the Israeli military be doing more? Can it be doing more? And is it fair to see this question of casualties as a strategic concern for Israel? You know, given the importance of regional and global opinion? You know, we're talking at a point when even President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken, who have been fairly unstinting in their solidarity with Israel over the past several weeks have made some pointed statements about the need to take greater pains to minimize civilian casualties.
- [06:24]
B
It's a fair question, it's a fair concern. But this is a war. And I think that people tend to forget. It is just. It is not an operation, it is not a military campaign. We are not fighting in Afghanistan or in Iraq. We are not fighting in Libya. We are fighting on the other side of the fence. We have to understand that we are living in a very, very unstable, violent and dangerous neighborhood. And after what we experienced and we faced as a horror, the violence, yes, it is a fair question, but let me tell you, I don't think that the military can achieve its military goals without doing exactly what they are doing today. And I want to say something about it. I don't think that we understood until the 7th of October. I'm not meaning me or the other directors of the Shin Bet who replaced me, we totally understood. But our political leadership did not understand or did not accept our definition of Hamas because it did not serve their political policy, political goals. So we have to understand Hamas is using its people, civilians, innocent people, elderly, women, children, as a human shield and all. What we see today is, in a way, the results of this policy. Now, it's not something new. This is their official strategy. The idea is to bring us Israeli IDF to kill as many innocent Palestinians as possible in order to achieve support, first of all, within the Palestinian society, because they are paying in blood in order to achieve freedom, end of occupation, etc. Etc. Second, within the Muslim community around us, all the Arab states and the international community. And unfortunately, they are winning this war. And I'm saying unfortunately because, you know, we. I know most of the Israeli generals, although they are much younger than I am, but I know them personally. And they are doing all what they can, by the way, even more than we did earlier or in former battles, in order to avoid civilian casualties. But you have to understand the hospitals, armed military installations, and Gaza is probably the most populated, you know, city or, or, or area on the wall. There is no other way to defeat the military wing of Hamas and its political, and its political, of course, leadership. And if somebody will come to me with an advice how to do it, I'm not laughing, I will listen.
- [09:56]
A
I want to go back to the point you made about the distinction between the way people in the security establishment saw Hamas and the way the political leadership did say more about that difference and where you think that divide started.
- [10:09]
B
Look, it's an ongoing debate between at least all the director of the Shin Bet, as far as I know, and our political leaders, at least since Netanyahu came to power somewhere about 15 years ago, because he came to power and he came with a policy that there is nobody to talk with, nothing to talk about. He did not invent it, by the way, but he created it as his formal policy. Now, in order to do it and to avoid pressure from the international community, the only way to do it is to empower Hamas in Gaza to make sure that Palestinians will be divided and Hamas will control Gaza and Fatah will control the west bank. In order to do it, since, you know, Gaza was there was a closure, he had to assist Hamas in many ways to allow them to come, you know, to work in Israel and giving them, or at least enabling Qatar to pay, as far as I know, more than 1.2, $1.4 billion and to make sure that they will stay in power in Gaza. And on the same time he had to make sure that the PA will be weaker and bigger because if the Palestinian Authority will get stronger, so probably they will win Hamas in elections, etc, etc. Now every time when we told him, look, you do not understand the ideology, you do not understand that this ideology, you will not be able to control it. And the only way to make sure that Hamas will not get the support of the Palestinian people, because during the last 15 years, he is becoming more and more popular among Palestinians, especially because Palestinians want to see a better future now, if they will be able to get a better future not only as people, but as a people. They are fighting not only for better economy, better education, they are fighting in order to see themselves as a nation alongside Israel. What we saw on the 7th of October, this is a collapse of the theory because, you know, every two years, three years, we had to enter into Gaza in order to make sure that they will not, you know, increase their military power. And we lost control. And we didn't have the human intelligence and they didn't use anything that goes by bits and bytes. Singing. So yes, I think that on the 7th of October, if you ask me what collapsed is first of all the theory of dividing and trying to manage their conflict, and of course later, intelligence and operational. But this is in a way the result of this policy that was imposed on the security community.
- [13:35]
A
The other factor that people have pointed to in looking at the environment in Israel before October 7th is of course the political turbulence. And most of that around Netanyahu's judicial overhaul was the distraction of that, the divides that that was creating part of the scenario as well, at least since
- [13:52]
B
the beginning of his trial. I think that if you ask me what is the cornerstone of his policy is to stay out of prison. And I'm not joking. It's unbelievable. It's nonsense that he is still in power as a prime minister. There is a huge rift between Israelis on the future of Israel. Less and less people believe in Israel is a Jewish democracy. And more and more people are ready to give up the concept of democracy and speaking on the idea of a Jewish state. So, yes, it's a combined complex, a very complicated issue. I studied it, I wrote about it, and I think that when, you know, the founders of America, if I remember Madison said that a democracy will not survive in an ongoing war. I believe that in a way, this is what we see today in Israel. A friend of mine, Brian Jenkins, is, I think he was the vice president of Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. He wrote a very, very important article during the 90s. I think that the title is Incremental Tyranny. But step by step, bite by bite, Democracy eating safe in itself, in small bites. Yes, this is exactly what we see. And by the way, you know, Supreme Court or the judicial branch is part of the society. And in time of war, we are giving up on rights in order to achieve security, especially when it is the rights of the minorities. So if it is a war that will end in six days, only six years, it's okay. America locked Japanese in camps during the Second World War. Their sons served somewhere in the, you know, in the Pacific Ocean. But after the war, America became, let's say, a democracy again. But this is an ongoing war in terror. It's not a war. It is an ongoing battle with varied intensity. Sometimes it is a higher intensity. But there will be no end to this war of a state against an organization, especially in our case when we are fighting for religious, national and social concepts.
- [16:35]
A
So turning to that question of the day after and that definition of victory, do you believe that Netanyahu has an end game in mind? You know, he's talked about an Israeli presence in Gaza for some indefinite period of time. But what does he envision and what's a plausible outcome here?
- [16:51]
B
I think that all what he envisioned is to stay in power. I said this is a cornerstone of his policy. And he convinced us it is not for me to solve the problem. I just have to manage it. And sometime someone, you know, it will be solved with the help of God or with a change in the circumstances. So I think that more and more Israelis are saying, okay, this is the reality in which we live. And we have to fight, and they do not understand, you know, what we discussed earlier. We cannot separate our concept and understanding of democracy from the concept of war, because if we shall have to go fighting for generations, our democracy will not survive. Democracy cannot survive in ongoing war.
- [17:51]
A
There's been speculation here that Netanyahu and others in the leadership would like to shift the focus to Hezbollah and the northern border after they think they've had requisite success against Hamas. Do you see a risk of escalation there? Do you see a serious debate about going to Hezbollah next, given the presence of, you know, US Carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean? It seems like, you know, good conditions under some argument, though, could also escalate to very dangerous levels very fast.
- [18:16]
B
If you ask me about what he think and what he envisioned, it's very, very complicated. You know, I used to say that the psychology department in our family belongs to my wife. And this is something that I do not pretend to understand, but I think the way I understand Netanyahu. And I'm saying it very carefully, because when I was director of Sinbet under him as a prime minister, I met him every week at least once for almost four and a half years. Oh, sorry, I was four and a half. But he was only two and something at that time because he was replaced by EH Ubarak. But anyhow, I thought, I understand him, but he do not take risks, not political risks and not risks in the battlefield. He's very, very careful. And this is why he believes that, you know, he can manage it, because in order to solve something, you have to take risks, whether, you know, to face Jewish terror that brought to the assassination of our Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, or whether to face Arab, Palestinian, or a case of war. So he will do everything in order to, you know, to go between the drops when it is raining. It doesn't work all the time. But I don't think that he planned to go to war against Hezbollah, although, by the way, I don't think that we should do it now. But again, we understand what we saw in the south make it very clear to us in the north. You know, we cannot live when on the other side, one side of the fence, Hezbollah, with all his military capability, leaving, and our civilians are living on the other side of the fence. You know, it's slaughtering, raping, or, you know, the horror that we saw the 7th of October. But on the other hand, yes, okay, Hezbollah is something different. If you ask me, we shall have to face Hezbollah Later. But it should be always a combination of threatening and even using our superior military capability, but with a very, very. With the idea that our security concept should be based on military power and a political cornerstone, probably. If you ask me, I think that we should discuss with them with Lebanon, not with the international community as the exact line of the border in the north, because they are gaining a lot of support in Lebanon. When they say parts of these areas belongs to Lebanon. And as I understand the history, they are right. So it was agreed between Eruk Barak and the international community, but they did not, you know, participate in this debate.
- [21:38]
A
We'll be back after a short break.
- [21:43]
B
The Foreign affairs interview is brought to you by Foreign affairs magazine, the source for authoritative discussion on global events, straight from the world's leading experts. This holiday season, give a gift subscription to your favorite reader. Visit foreign affairs.com gift and give the gift that lasts all year.
- [22:05]
A
So let's turn to the day after questions as you would like to see them handled. You talk about needing a political vision for the day after, and that being the ultimate theory of victory, what to your mind is that is the correct political vision?
- [22:16]
B
For me, the only viable political horizon is the horizon of two states for two people. In Oslo, we did mistakes, Palestinians did mistakes. We can go into the history and to discuss it for, I don't know, four hours and we shall not agree. But there are two conflicting narratives between Palestinians and us. We shall tell you as an Israeli will tell you all what we wanted to achieve was security, and we gave them everything. And instead we got, you know, violence, intifada, etc. And we are right. On the other hand, they will say we recognize the state of Israel along the lines of the international, you know, resolutions, and we wanted to achieve our freedom, end of occupation and all. What we saw is more settlements, more settlers, more checkpoints, more army units. So two we do not see their narrative, they do not see ours. But I think that the goal of two states, and this is a great achievement of Oslo, we know if, if ever we shall achieve an agreement, what will be more or less the parameters. This is the achievement of Oslo. I belong to the generation of Yom Kippur war, which was the bloodiest war until the 7th of October 23. And. And for our generation, it was, I think, a major trauma. And it took us four years to see Sadat visiting our Parliament, speaking to our Knesset members, and in the Knesset, you know, speaking to the Israeli people, and two more years to sign a peace agreement with Egypt, which was our largest enemy. And this peace, you know, still exists. And so every time when I think about it, I am trying to see what should we do with the international community in order to try not to duplicate, but to achieve the same goal. And I think that today, if you ask me about the process, it will not come from Israel, certainly not from this government. It will not come from the Palestinians, especially not with, you know, the weak Palestinian Authority who believe in the concept of two states, by the way, it should come from abroad. America is the only superpower who can lead this process. Biden entered to a leadership vacuum in Israel. Israelis see him as our grandfather. He's the only political person in the world that Israelis trust. So he has the power, he has all the leverage to come to us and to tell us, look, I will support you, but you have to understand that I will not act against the American interest and I will not act against what I believe that it is. Your interest. Your interest is to see Israel safe, Jewish and democratic. And you can achieve it only in a reality of two states. So this is the way he will have to lead the way. He will have to show the goal and he will have to assist us, to help us, to go to US and the Palestinians. Now all the players in the Middle east are watching him and they are waiting. Saudi Arabia will lead the regional Sunni pragmatic states, Egypt, Jordan, probably Morocco, to create this regional coalition. They should feel the vacuum in Gaza, not us. The people who enter to Gaza in order to fill the vacuum, to control the city life and to start to rebuild what was destroyed, they should speak Arabic because otherwise they will be presented by the Muslim world as crusaders. Second, they should. Money should come from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, not Qatar and not Iran. I believe that it is achievable. It will take years, but if we shall ignite it, if people will believe, if people will see a political horizon, even if they will know that it will take 10 years, I think that the support of the majority among Israelis and among Palestinians will be there.
- [27:30]
A
So I'm sure you've had conversations with people in the Biden administration and the US Government who invariably say, look, we spent much of the Clinton administration trying to promote a two state solution, maybe another attempt in the Obama administration. The Oslo parameters have been fairly clear for 30 years now. A Palestinian state in the west bank in Gaza and a capital in East Jerusalem, and land swaps and some details to be ironed out. But the basic principle is fairly clear. They came into office this time around saying there's little chance of making any progress, especially with Netanyahu in power, what case do you make to them that there's a way to do this?
- [28:06]
B
I will tell them, look, today, and I think that we didn't see it. America didn't see it, and all the players in the Middle east didn't see it. Before the 7th of October, we used to think that the Israeli, Palestinian conflict is a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. And I will tell you, Americans in the American administration, no more. It is not only a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, it is a regional conflict and it is part of the global conflict. Because you have to understand, China is here. If China is your, you know, rival or enemy, whatever you call it, so China is here. And if you will not create here this coalition, regional coalition, and if you will not be the leader from outside, don't send soldiers, but be the leader of this coalition. If you will not do it, China in few years will control this region. If you want to lead the west, this is what you have to do.
- [29:24]
A
Let me close by asking about the kind of Israeli public dimension of this. You know, the kind of story, at least as we understand it from outside, is that, you know, really since the kind of second intifada for the last couple of decades, there's been decreasing support for a peace process and a two state solution among, among Israelis and the, you know, parts of the political spectrum that have been most vocal in their support. Labor and parties to the left have lost a huge amount of power, as you of course know. What would it take to get the Israeli public to see things the way you do? Do you see that understanding emerging from the catastrophe of these past weeks? I mean, what would get us to a place where progress on that front is really possible?
- [30:04]
B
In every conflict there is an opportunity. And what we are facing today, you know, it shakes all what we understand. People will tell you it will take years for us to understand what we see today. So I'm saying it because what is needed now, I mentioned political horizon for the Palestinians, but we need a political horizon. Until now, you know, we felt relatively safe, but our security was based on fences, walls, technology and military power. All of it collapsed. All of it collapsed. So Israelis are afraid. So what we need is someone to trust that will lead us and will show us a better reality.
- [31:02]
A
That is a good note to end on Amiyah alone. Thank you so much for joining me and for the work you've done in foreign affairs these past weeks.
- [31:08]
B
Thank you very much.
- [31:16]
A
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannan, Julia Fleming dresser and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph, Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sierra and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.