Podcast Summary
The Foreign Affairs Interview – “The Reeducation of Russia’s Military”
Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, Editor, Foreign Affairs
Guest: Dara Massicot, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Release Date: October 9, 2025
1. Episode Overview
This episode delves into how Russia’s military, deeply underestimated after its initial failures in Ukraine, has become a surprisingly adaptive—though still deeply flawed—fighting force. Host Daniel Kurtz-Phelan interviews Dara Massicot about her latest Foreign Affairs essay, “How Russia Recovered,” tracing Moscow’s learning curve, battlefield innovations, and what both Ukraine and the West might be missing about how Russia now fights. The conversation also explores implications for NATO, future warfare, and Russia’s efforts to share its hard-won experience with partners like China, Iran, and North Korea.
2. Key Discussion Points & Insights
A. War Status – Current Battlefield Dynamics
[02:47]
- Russia’s counteroffensive centers on the Donbas (Donetsk), with little front-line movement.
- Momentum: Both Russia and Ukraine now focus on long-range strikes, especially targeting each other's energy infrastructure.
- Russia is attempting “envelopment” tactics in the Donbas, seeking to bypass strongholds rather than assault directly. Progress is slow, resulting in a grinding attritional conflict.
B. Stalemate and Evolving Tactics
[04:16]
- Heavy drone use and deep fortifications thwart large-scale assaults by either side.
- Russia’s progress comes from small infantry teams infiltrating lines, often countered by Ukrainian drones (FPVs) and artillery.
- “Russia has not yet found a solution to gathering large numbers of armored equipment…Ukraine can see them coming now… and they're able to target them.” (Massicot, [04:16])
C. The U.S. Policy Shift and Western Uncertainty
[05:43]
- Despite U.S. political volatility, actual flows of weapons and intelligence have remained relatively stable for Ukraine.
- The guest focuses on what is tangibly changing on the battlefield, rather than diplomatic drama.
D. Revisiting Russia’s Initial Blunders
[07:40]
- Two main blind spots at the onset:
- Russian troops weren’t informed of the invasion until <24 hours in advance.
- Western/NATO intelligence and advanced warning enabled Ukraine’s defense.
- “Ukraine alone vs. Russia alone is the war that I assumed would play out ... but the war that we got was Ukraine plus the support of Western intelligence services…” (Massicot, [07:40])
E. American Aid and Escalation Debates
[11:22]
- The slow U.S. ramp-up in aid resulted more from logistics and military stockpile challenges than fear of escalation alone.
- “You can't just hand over a jet, you can't just hand over a Patriot.” (Massicot, [11:22])
F. Russian Nuclear Threats: Real or Overblown?
[13:41]
- The fall 2022 nuclear fears were rooted in real battlefield setbacks for Russia, but structurally Russia was never close to using tactical nukes.
- Russian doctrine did not support escalation as predicted in the West.
G. Russia’s Unexpected Resilience
[16:38]
- After initial defeats, Russia adjusted, fortified, and reversed narratives of collapse.
- Public optimism about Ukrainian offensives ignored how prepared Russian defenses became.
H. Russian Military as a Learning Organization
[21:38]
- Russia’s response has gone beyond survival: it’s adapted at multiple institutional levels.
- Research, procurement plans, and field tactics have evolved—though adaptation is uneven and sometimes fails to reach front-line troops.
- “There is a really vibrant community of learning in Russia about this, and I was surprised at how complicated and complex... it has grown.” (Massicot, [21:38])
I. Examples of Battlefield Innovation
[23:58]
- Adaptation to drone-saturated fields: infantry teams infiltrate on motorcycles or on foot.
- Decentralized mission planning is emerging at lower levels, a break from rigid Soviet doctrine.
- “...they've taken that and they've disseminated that across the force. Okay. This is changing. It's mixed.” (Massicot, [23:58])
J. Enduring Culture of Indifference and Resilience
[34:07]
- Russian military “resilience” is about enduring misery and obeying orders, not positive adaptation.
- Abuse and indifference persist, yet these traits help Russia absorb losses and sustain long grinds.
- “This indifference, the cruelty, the hazing, the violence within the unit, that's still happening, and that hasn't changed … But again, there's this resilience—they just endure through, and they know not to expect any better.” (Massicot, [34:07])
K. Ukraine as a Learning Organization
[29:18]
- Remains highly adaptive, horizontal, and open to sharing information, but old-school attitudes among mobilized older officers may erode this.
- Technology and generational divides are affecting Ukrainian adaptability.
L. Balance of Technology
[32:23]
- Russia’s defense industry is catching up with Ukraine’s ad hoc innovations. Mass drone production, improved missile guidance, and ability to tinker quickly gives Russia new strengths.
- Willingness to take outsized losses for marginal gains gives it a grim edge.
M. Human Factors: Mobilization and Resolve
[42:36]
- Ukrainian front-line units are strained for manpower, and political difficulties in mobilizing more troops remain acute.
- Russian resolve is less about morale than about the ability to endure for the state, regardless of individual cost.
N. Western Resolve and Russian Hybrid Warfare
[44:00]
- Russian drone incursions into European airspace may backfire, stiffening Western resolve rather than eroding it.
O. Exporting Russian Doctrine: Global Risk
[45:35]
- Russia is openly sharing battlefield lessons with China, Iran, and North Korea—especially in drone warfare, logistics, and mass-casualty paradigms.
- “Russia's not the economic powerhouse. They are the powerhouse when it comes to combat experience.” (Massicot, [45:35])
- China has military observers in Russian command posts—not reciprocated by Western advisors in Ukraine.
P. Lessons for the U.S. and NATO
[48:24, 48:51]
- The U.S. lacks a unified mechanism to synthesize and distribute learnings from Ukraine.
- Host and guest agree: Dismissing Russia as incapable of institutional learning is dangerous.
- Many battlefield lessons—especially on drones, mass casualties, officer adaptation—are relevant to potential Asia-Pacific conflicts, not just Europe.
Q. The Analyst’s Dilemma: Understanding the Fog of War
[52:21]
- Massicot describes a process of humility—data is biased by what’s chosen to be shared, and analysts must be careful about generalizations.
- “You have to just be kind of humble about what you don’t know ... You can’t make blanket pronouncements that the Russians are uniformly trash…” (Massicot, [52:21])
3. Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
-
On Russian adaptation:
“There is a really vibrant community of learning in Russia about this, and I was surprised at how complicated and complex ... it has grown over the last 18 months.” (Massicot, [21:38])
-
On Ukraine’s strength and vulnerabilities:
“They are a very horizontal organization in terms of how they share and disseminate information ... There’s a generational split ... where the senior levels have a more traditional idea of what to do and the younger ones are more technically savvy.” (Massicot, [29:18])
-
On Russian resilience and suffering:
“They know not to expect good treatment. They know not to expect relief ... it's your ability to execute your mission.” (Massicot, [34:07])
-
On misreading Russia as a military learning institution:
“I think we have not fully grappled with what this means and what it means for NATO, what it means for Ukraine.” (Massicot, [23:48])
-
On Western complacency:
“To the extent I've heard arguments that none of this is applicable to a war with China and Taiwan, that's wrong. That's really wrong. I know it's not a land war, but there's a lot that actually is.” (Massicot, [48:51])
4. Important Timestamps
- 00:36 – Setting up Russia’s shifting military fortunes and expectations
- 02:47 – Current front-line dynamics (attrition, long-range strikes)
- 04:16 – Effects of fortifications and drones on offensive tactics
- 07:40 – What Western analysts missed at the start of the war
- 11:22 – Why US arms deliveries ramped up slowly
- 13:41 – Debating the Russian nuclear threat (fall 2022)
- 16:38 – Russia’s pivot and adaptation after early setbacks
- 21:38 – Russian military learning as institutional change
- 23:58 – Concrete innovations (small team tactics, motorcycles)
- 29:18 – Ukraine as a learning institution and its generational divide
- 32:23 – Russia’s technological catch-up; mass drone attacks
- 34:07 – The culture of resilience and endurance in the Russian military
- 42:36 – Tension in Ukrainian mobilization and manpower
- 44:00 – Russian drone provocations in European airspace backfiring
- 45:35 – How Russia is sharing battlefield experience with adversaries
- 48:24/48:51 – The West’s learning gaps and call to action
- 52:21 – The problem of selection/confirmation bias in open-source analysis
5. Conclusion: Key Takeaways
- The Russian military, deeply damaged but underestimated, remains capable of adaptation—despite persistent flaws.
- Ukraine and Russia are both locked in a cycle of adaptation, with Russia’s industrial capacity and cruel endurance offsetting Ukraine’s ingenuity and Western support.
- Western analysis often makes dangerous assumptions, both about Russian incompetence and about the limited applicability of these lessons.
- Russia’s learning—both technical and organizational—is already filtering to authoritarian partners.
- The future of warfare, from energy infrastructure to mass drones and hybrid tactics, is being written now, and policymakers ignore these lessons at their peril.
For deeper context, readers are encouraged to see Dara Massicot’s essays in Foreign Affairs—especially “How Russia Recovered” (2025) and “What Russia Got Wrong” (2023).