Ashley Tellis (18:29)
Well, I think it's a mistake simply because of arithmetic. If you look at the growth trajectories of the four major entities in the global system and project that out to 2050, you're looking at the United States, you're looking at China, you're looking at the eu, and you're looking at India. Every other country falls below this big four in terms of raw economic size in 2050. Now, if you look closely within these big four, the United States and China really towered above the EU and India. Now, this is a judgment that is dependent on many assumptions about growth rates and so on and so forth. But if you make reasonable assumptions about the growth rates of each of these entities, you end up with a world that is either unipolar, that is the United States really stands above the other three, or you end up with a world that is asymmetrically bipolar, I.e. the United States and China tower above the other. Two, even though China doesn't quite match up to the United States. Now, that has an implication for me. It has actually two implications. One is even though China is not going to be a comprehensive payer of the US in the sense that it's not going to match the US across all dimensions of national power, it will still be capable enough to, shall we say, give us a few sleepless nights but because the delta between Chinese capabilities and Indian capabilities will be so significant, it's going to give India even more sleepless nights, which to my mind makes the logic for a special relationship, if I may put it that way, between the United States and India very, very compelling. And of course, we'd like to have the EU in this coalition as well. But for reasons of geography, the EU may not see China in the same way as India and the US do. And it's not clear that the EU will remain a unified political entity even by 2050. Right. So I want to keep them in the equation, but I don't want to put my money on them. So by the simple sort of arithmetic of growth rates, there is no way in which you get a world that is multipolar. Now, the people who argue for multipolarity are really describing greater systemic complexity. There are layers and layers in the superstructure of the system that have gotten complicated. You have multinational organizations, you have NGOs, you have all kinds of complexities that are layered over the broad distribution of power. This goes to a big methodological question that underlies my difference with both Nirupama and Dhruva on this. To use the old Marxian language, there is a base and there's a superstructure. The base is the distribution of power among states, and it's a material distribution of power. Then there's a superstructure which consists of everything that is layered over that distribution. Now, the real question is which of these layers have causal capabilities to determine outcomes? My argument is, and I really believe this, so I'm not just making this up for the sake of the article. I really believe that the causal outcomes are determined by the material distribution of power. And the elements of superstructure qualify those outcomes in some ways, but they don't fundamentally transform. In other words, the most important outcomes in global politics will be determined by the material relative differences in capability. So I'm skeptical about the multipolarity argument, but let's get to the policy implications. This is sort of an IR theory, excursus, right? The policy implications are this. If at the end of the day, India is going to need the United States, and the United States is going to need India to deal with the China challenge, then I simply think it is unproductive as a policy measure for India to be pursuing multipolarity, which by definition implies a diminution of US Power at exactly the time when it needs the United States in order to cope with China. I mean, that's the nub of my argument. And when I say This, I want to clarify something because, you know, it's now the poverty of our language, right? We can very easily describe the relationship between the United States and NATO. We can describe the relationship between the United States and Japan. It's harder to encapsulate what exactly is the relationship between the United States. And. And so I never talk about an alliance. I talk about an alliance like, or something that resembles an alliance because I'm trying to capture what is a sort of intractable sort of reality. So I'm not arguing for a alliance relationship of the kind that we have with Plato. And to me, the essence of the alliance relationship is collective defense. So I'm not arguing that we should have a collective defense agreement with India, which I think Dhruva is absolutely right. That is not an offer and possibly will never be on offer. But to my mind, there is a lot that we can do short of that collective defense arrangement. Now this is where I think Dhruva and I also disagree. Dhruva makes the argument that everything that India and the United States have been doing so far is moving in that direction of alliance. Like, even if it's not collective defense. And that's adequate. My view is we are moving in that direction, but it's not adequate and we have to do a lot more. And what is it that I'm arguing for? I think I'm arguing for three things. One is, I'm arguing for much greater Indian sensitivity to US Interests at the level of broad international interactions because I have seen in practical circumstances of policymaking where India's relations with other states have now become impediments to the kinds of things we want to do with India. I saw this very, very close up during the Biden years when we were discussing isiprop. So ISET was the Initiative on Emerging and Critical Technologies that the Biden administration and the Modi government reached. And there were many pillars under iset. These were all high technology pillars like artificial intelligence, advanced computing and so on and so forth. And I saw up close how the United States was inhibited from moving as much as we would have liked if it were not for India's relations with some of our competitors, Russia in particular, on some specific issues. But there is also a general discomfort with India playing in groupings that don't always wish us well. So there's a practical effect of India's multi alignment on the trajectory of US India relations. So one, I think India needs to be a little more conscious of the impact those engagements are having on the bilateral relationship. Two, I'M arguing actually for much more robust cooperative defense. And by cooperative defense I mean we need to think about how we can coordinate in an emergency. Now, the fact of the matter is simply this. When India faces hard times and is with its back to the wall, it picks up the phone, dials 911 and the 911 is somewhere in Washington. That happened during the Galwan crisis. It happened in crises that went before. The US has provided emergency assistance. We've provided either equipment or we provided intelligence or whatever. You haven't. What I want is to be able to institutionalize these patterns of activity so that they don't turn out to be accidental, they don't turn out to be one off. And most important of all, they end up building Indian capabilities for deterrence. Now, I take Nirupama's point completely that India cannot live on deterrence alone. It needs reassurance strategies and so on, so forth. I don't deny that. But to my mind, the deficits in India's strategy are not at the reassurance end. India does very well with respect to reassuring its adversaries. India does less well with respect to deterring. And it's that deficit that India needs to make good on. And it's also the same deficit that we have vis a vis China, which we need to make good on. And so my argument is you need to start thinking about cooperative defense where there is no automaticity of assistance that is presumed by either side. But there are real serious institutional forms of cooperation that precede conflict, that allow us to do many more things than we are doing today. Of course, I have not had the opportunity to describe what cooperative defense would mean extensively. But one can think about coordinated defense planning. One could think about developing shared threat assessments, but could think about exchanging information about what one needs to maintain certain deterrence capabilities and which could be provided by the United States to India and so on and so forth. I promise you, we've not got into this level of conversation except in possibly one area which is underseas warfare. But other than that, we really have not touched this seriously. And then the last area, of course, to my mind is a much deeper economic relationship between the two countries. And I'm not thinking of a trade agreement of the kind that is being negotiated right now because that is being done with a gun to Delhi's head. And it's done primarily with the intention of getting the US Off India's back. And I can understand India's response, but I'm talking of a genuine symbiosis between the Two economies. And that would require, I think, India to rethink not just its trade policy, but its economic strategy more generally. Right. So there are different components that I think we need to be investing in and none of those require a formal alliance which is centered on collective defense.