The Foreign Affairs Interview

Episode: "Total War Is Back. Can America Adapt?"

Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan
Guest: Mara Karlin (Scholar and former senior U.S. Defense Department official)
Date: December 5, 2024

Overview

In this episode, editor Daniel Kurtz-Phelan sits down with Mara Karlin, a veteran policymaker and scholar, to discuss her recent Foreign Affairs essay, "The Return of Total War." The conversation explores the resurgence of state-on-state conflict, the changing character of modern warfare, and the implications for U.S. military strategy and global security. Karlin draws on her firsthand experience overseeing defense strategy during major crises, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and escalating tensions in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, to offer insights into U.S. deterrence, alliance management, and adapting to rapid technological change.

Main Discussion Points and Insights

1. The Return of Major War and Changing Geopolitics

(00:19–04:18)

• The world is witnessing a revival of wars once considered relics of the past, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Gaza conflict, and growing tensions with China.
• U.S. strategists spent decades focused on counterterrorism, underestimating the return of great power conflict due to limited resources and being "sucked in by whatever's occurring at this moment in time."
  Mara Karlin:

  "...it makes a lot of sense that in the Cold War period of time there’s this massive obsession with the Soviet Union…in the post-9/11 wars…there’s this obsessive focus on how to fight terrorist insurgents…And to think about kind of great power challengers as this far off thing..." (03:13)

2. Shifts in the Nature of Warfare – The New Total War

(04:18–10:23)

• The surprise isn’t just the return of war, but how war has transformed: conflicts now blend conventional, unconventional, and hybrid aspects, with “the continuum of conflict…shattered.”
• The "laboratories" of Ukraine and the Middle East illustrate these shifts: advanced weapons coexist with low-tech tactics; multiple international actors play influential roles.
• Demographics of war have changed—volunteers, foreign fighters, and unconventional recruits are all more central, while allies and adversaries offer unprecedented outside support. Karlin:

  "It was a little bit easier...to say we’re only going to have to really worry about one type of war…what we have seen…is actually, nope, those have all bled into each other and that continuum has almost kind of fallen apart…" (07:38)

3. Lessons from Ukraine – Deterrence, Pessimism, and Adaptation

(10:23–18:41)

• The U.S. and allies were surprised by Ukraine’s resilience and Russia’s military inefficiency, challenging many prewar assumptions.
• Efforts to deter Russia failed short of deploying U.S. troops, but mobilizing international aid and intelligence-sharing proved effective.
• The risk of analogies and the difficulty of assessing the “will to fight” led analysts to wrongly discount Ukrainian capabilities. Karlin:

  “We’re generally pretty terrible at understanding will to fight and also can’t help but use analogies often totally inappropriately…” (17:43)

4. Escalation and U.S. Military Assistance

(18:41–23:52)

• Managing escalation, especially the risk of nuclear use, was a central (if underappreciated) concern for U.S. policymakers.
• Decisions about aid (e.g., tanks, F-16s, ATACMS) were weighed against potential Russian "red lines," often leading to delays that, in hindsight, may have helped manage risk. Karlin:

  “We have been the closest to nuclear use over the last three years than in either of our lifetimes…That should be a little bit striking and a little bit shocking…” (19:36) “That delay allows for signaling and kind of gradual escalation of our assistance in a way that allows us to contain the effects…That’s exactly right.” (23:14)

5. The Future of the Ukraine War under U.S. Policy Shifts

(23:52–28:03)

• A potential Trump administration may withdraw support, raising the prospect that Ukraine could “run out of stuff,” erode morale, or see Russia escalate.
• Security guarantees for Ukraine would become harder to credibly offer; Russia retains significant occupied territory. Karlin:

  “If you have a United States that now says, hey, we’re not really going to be a part of this anymore and we’re not going to be a leader in particular, it’s hard to imagine that folks can think of an endgame that’s terribly satisfying…” (24:45)

6. Shaping Ally Actions – Israel, Gaza, and U.S. Influence

(29:42–32:09)

• The U.S. faces limits in shaping Israeli actions during the Gaza war, encountering frustration over the lack of a clear Israeli “theory of victory.”
• Leveraging other regional actors (Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt) may improve U.S. influence and future stability. Karlin:

  “What we do have in Gaza is probably the most complex battlefield in the history of war…It’s better for you to kind of have them on your team and try to influence them than…have them turn elsewhere.” (30:43)

7. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Unexpected Challenges

(32:09–37:27)

• Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah has been unexpectedly effective, but underlying causes in Lebanon remain unresolved.
• The Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping has proven more resilient than expected, highlighting new vulnerabilities and limitations of U.S./Western naval power.
• Lessons learned from these non-state actors also have implications for future encounters with state adversaries, notably China.

8. The Persistent Return to Middle East 'Purgatory'

(37:27–39:14)

• Despite policy intentions to prioritize threats from China, the U.S. finds itself repeatedly drawn into deep engagement in the Middle East.
• The present level of focus is “different” from the past, with more actively managed and diplomatically intensive engagement.

9. Resource Constraints and the Indo-Pacific

(39:14–40:20)

• While the U.S. has made “transformative” improvements in its Indo-Pacific posture and alliances, finite resources create real tradeoffs, especially given concurrent crises in Ukraine and Israel. Karlin:

  “There are finite resources to the US military…while it makes sense to me that in this period…we have had to put more energy towards the Middle East, I do sure hope that we’re not here kind of a year from now…” (39:39)

10. China’s Lessons from Ukraine and Implications for Taiwan

(40:20–42:56)

• China has observed the Ukraine conflict carefully, taking lessons about modernization, alliances, and economic resilience.
• Deterring China over Taiwan has improved, but requires ongoing alliance-building, support for Taiwan’s defense reform, and countering gray-zone tactics.

11. Alliances, Trump, and Future Deterrence

(42:56–45:30)

• U.S. alliances are vital to deterrence. Erosion of U.S. credibility or leadership could prompt allies to seek nuclear weapons or exclude the U.S. in favor of other security arrangements.
• There’s measurable progress in alliance investments under “honey” (Biden) versus “vinegar” (Trump) approaches. Karlin:

  “If countries feel like they can’t rely on the United States, they’re invariably going to look for other ways to satisfy their fundamental national security interests…” (43:52)

12. Adapting to Technological Change

(45:30–47:01)

• Rapid adaptation is now the norm on the battlefield, but there’s “lag” between innovations developed in theater and bureaucratic or political response.
• Karlin suggests special funding and faster processes to accelerate technological adaptation in the U.S. military. Karlin:

  “Sometimes there’s a bit of a lag between the folks on the ground learning, the folks in headquarters taking in that information…if there’s a way to fast forward that, maybe through special funds, that may be a way…” (46:23)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Disquieting Geopolitical Change:
  "I really like your use of the word 'disquieting' because I think it perfectly captures this moment wherein…we're just seeing bumps and hills and mountains all over the place, and what's particularly challenging is how different they look." — Mara Karlin (02:49)

• On the Limits of Deterrence:
  "I don't think Putin was going to be compelled to change his course of action on Ukraine short of some massive effort by the United States to put troops on the ground." — Mara Karlin (12:21)

• On Escalation Management:
  "We have been the closest to nuclear use over the last three years than in either of our lifetimes…That should be a little bit striking and a little bit shocking." — Mara Karlin (19:36)

• On Alliance Management in a New Trump Era:
  "If countries feel like they can’t rely on the United States, they’re invariably going to look for other ways to satisfy their fundamental national security interests." — Mara Karlin (43:52)

Segment Timestamps

| Segment | Timestamp | |--------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Introduction to Changing Geopolitics | 00:19–02:49 | | Defining and Explaining "Total War" | 06:50–10:23 | | Surprises in Ukraine and Lessons Learned | 04:18–06:50, 17:09–18:41| | Deterrence, Escalation, and US Assistance | 11:23–23:52 | | Ukraine under New US Policy | 23:52–28:03 | | The Gaza War and Shaping Allies | 29:42–32:09 | | Hezbollah, Houthis, and Adaptation | 32:09–37:27 | | The US "Middle East Purgatory" Revisited | 37:27–39:14 | | Resource Constraints & the Indo-Pacific | 39:14–40:20 | | China, Taiwan, and Deterrence Lessons | 40:20–42:56 | | US Alliances & Deterrence under Trump | 42:56–45:30 | | Adapting Military Technology | 45:30–47:01 | | Conclusion | 47:01–47:11 |

Conclusion

This episode offers a rich, nuanced discussion of how modern conflict is evolving, the challenges for U.S. strategy in a world of "total war," and the crucial—yet precarious—role of American alliances and technological adaptation. Karlin’s experience and forthright insights provide a deeply informed perspective on both dangers and opportunities facing U.S. policymakers as new wars encroach on old assumptions.