The Foreign Affairs Interview: Turmoil in the Middle East
Foreign Affairs Magazine | Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan
Date: October 19, 2023

Episode Overview

This episode of The Foreign Affairs Interview convenes two leading Middle East analysts—Suzanne Maloney (Brookings Institution, Iran specialist) and Marc Lynch (GWU professor, expert on Arab politics)—to dissect the crisis unleashed by Hamas’s October 7th attack. The discussion tracks how prevailing strategies pursuing regional stability and U.S. disengagement unraveled, exposes flaws in “normalization” ambitions, unpacks regional power dynamics (including Iran and Arab governments), and examines the likely consequences for Israel, Palestine, and U.S. policy. The tone is analytic, urgent, and skeptical of recent Washington orthodoxy.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Pre-Attack Regional “Equilibrium” & U.S. Exit Strategy

Timestamps: 00:22–05:44

• U.S. Focus on Other Priorities:
  • Washington had been promoting Israeli–Saudi normalization, aiming to “reduce the U.S. role in the region and focus on other priorities” (A, 00:22).
  • Domestic exhaustion with “forever wars” and a political climate less tolerant of further entanglements fueled the push (C, 02:49).
• Theory versus Practice:
  • Theoretically, “offshore balancing” would let the U.S. step back, with local powers securing their interests.
  • Maloney: “A completely reasonable theory of the case...but in practice, it ran up against...the inherent possibilities of conflict within and between states.” (C, 04:53)
  • U.S. policymakers misjudged both “spoilers” and the explosive potential of the Palestinian issue.

2. The Normalization Track—Promises and Pitfalls

Timestamps: 05:44–12:09

• Perceived Progress:
  • Regional powers were de-escalating conflicts (e.g., Gulf rifts patched up), Saudi outreach to Iran, U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords.
  • Lynch emphasizes: “...there were real signs of de-escalation that were very real...but they might not have been enduring.” (B, 06:18)
• Authoritarian Foundations:
  • Stability relied on “authoritarian regimes, which in many ways were the cause of the problems rather than their solution.” (B, 08:38)
  • Public grievances—repression, economic hardship—were building beneath the surface.
• Palestinian Issue Ignored:
  • U.S. and Gulf elites “whistled past the graveyard,” ignoring that “some kind of explosion was inevitable.” (B, 09:57)
  • Lynch: “I can’t tell you how many times...I kept saying, how is the Abraham Accords going to hold up when we start seeing large numbers of dead Palestinians turning up on Al Jazeera screens?” (B, 10:13)

3. Iran’s Role and Regional Spoilers

Timestamps: 12:09–16:53

• Diplomatic Attempts:
  • The U.S. sought to “buy off” Iran with prisoner releases and frozen funds, hoping to reduce escalatory risks.
  • Maloney: “There was a set of diplomatic initiatives...that did culminate with the release of five Americans in September and the transfer of $6 billion...” (C, 12:37)
• Moral Hazard and Limitations:
  • The logic of “unwritten bargains” with an adversarial Iran was questionable; chaos often serves Iranian interests.
• Iran–Hamas Connections:
  • Maloney underlines: “Iranians are extensively engaged with Hamas in every way...funders, providers of missile technology and training.” (C, 14:07)
  • Despite Sunni–Shia divides, Hamas is “a key component of this broader integration of transnational Shia militias that the Iranians mobilized.” (C, 15:36)

4. Hamas: Motives, Dynamics, and Catastrophe

Timestamps: 16:53–23:24

• Uncertain Motives:
  • Lynch: “We don’t really know” what motivated the scale and brutality of the attack; reporting suggests compartmentalization, possible underestimation of Israeli unpreparedness. (B, 17:12)
• Strategic Calculus:
  • Hamas has twin priorities: maintain Gaza rule, claim leadership of the Palestinian movement.
  • Contrast with PA’s “lost legitimacy” was likely attractive; proving “force works” after periods of impotence.
• Atrocity and Backfire:
  • The scale of violence was a tactical surprise: “Carrying out these unbelievably horrible atrocities would seem to be counterproductive.” (B, 18:53)
  • Lynch speculates this may have been a “catastrophic success”—they expected to make a statement but not to have a free hand for so long. (B, 20:45)
• Memorable Quote:
  • “We had American officials...shuttling back and forth between Riyadh and Israel and trying to broker this agreement. And meanwhile the fires beneath them were steadily rising...as we see now, that just wasn’t possible.” – Marc Lynch (B, 00:05 and echoed at 10:13)

5. Israel’s Response: Reckoning and Risks

Timestamps: 25:27–31:33

• Retaliation Is “Hardwired”:
  • Israel’s doctrine (and public mood) made overwhelming retaliation—and likely a ground invasion—inevitable.
  • Lynch: “It’s hardwired into Israel’s security DNA that when they are attacked, they respond with massive disproportionate force.” (B, 26:12)
• Shifting U.S. Posture:
  • Initial U.S. support was “full license,” but public concerns, humanitarian outrage, and pressure from human rights groups prompted recalibration.
• Key Risks:
  • Humanitarian disaster in Gaza.
  • Uncontrollable violence by Israeli settlers in the West Bank, stoking potential for a “third intifada” (A, 30:51).
  • Lynch warns: “Everyone is focused right now on Hezbollah...but they should be focused on Jerusalem.”

6. Regional and Public Reactions: Containment or Explosion?

Timestamps: 31:33–39:39

• Arab Regimes’ Calculus:
  • States like Egypt and Jordan are wary of taking Gaza refugees or being drawn into escalation.
  • Maloney: “No good options...that’s probably the story of the Middle East...” (C, 33:47)
• Risk of Wider War:
  • So far, all actors (Hezbollah, Iran, Israel) have calibrated their responses; “one wrong move...pulls Hezbollah in.”
• Public Opinion as a Wildcard:
  • Lynch points out: “...repeatedly when some kind of crisis breaks out, everyone then gets surprised when they find out that Arab publics actually do still care about Palestine...” (B, 37:08)
  • After 2011, regimes fear mass protest—even about Palestine—which could threaten their own stability.

7. Forward-Looking Policy Considerations for the U.S.

Timestamps: 39:39–46:03

• Normalization Cannot Ignore Palestine:
  • Maloney: Any credible normalization or “de-escalation” will now need “a very substantial and meaningful place for concessions to the Palestinians.” (C, 40:32)
• Palestinian Political Future:
  • Lynch: There’s “absolutely no basis for negotiations towards a two state solution” right now; the PA lacks legitimacy and Hamas’s Gaza control is unsustainable.
  • The risk is “another Nakba”—mass expulsion of Palestinians under the pretext of humanitarian corridors. “For every Palestinian...this is another Nakba.” (B, 42:23)
  • He foresees, at best, hope for “Palestinian political renewal over the next five to ten years”—otherwise, cycle of conflict continues.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Foundational Flaws in U.S. Strategy:

  • “We just wanted to work with these autocrats and try and get the regional, the top down part put together. And then finally Palestine, which everyone could see this was coming.” — Marc Lynch (B, 08:45)

• On Hamas’s Calculus and Catastrophic Success:

  • “It seems like a genuinely new strategy...this might have been kind of an unexpected success, the whole catastrophic success narrative.” — Marc Lynch (B, 20:08)

• On the Risk of a “Third Intifada”:

  • “But it’s also one in which, once Jerusalem comes into play, that basically makes it extraordinarily difficult for Saudi Arabia or any of the Arab countries to play a moderating role.” — Marc Lynch (B, 30:59)

• On Regional Regimes & Public Opinion:

  • “Arab leaders are not going to sacrifice themselves for Palestine...but they are highly attuned to their own political survival...mobilized publics...scare them.” — Marc Lynch (B, 38:03)

• On the Future of U.S. Policy:

  • “If anything, there may be an opportunity...to put back the pieces of a broader normalization approach. But it would have to be...one that had a very substantial and meaningful place for concessions to the Palestinians...” — Suzanne Maloney (C, 40:33)
  • “There’s absolutely no basis for negotiations towards a two state solution. There’s nobody to negotiate for it, either on the Palestinian side or the Israeli side...” — Marc Lynch (B, 44:03)

Important Timestamps & Sections

• 00:22–05:44: Contextualizes U.S. regional strategy and normalization ambitions.
• 06:18–12:09: Debates the limits and dangers of normalization policies and regional “de-escalation.”
• 12:37–16:53: Nuanced breakdown of Iran’s role as spoiler and its links to Hamas.
• 17:12–23:24: Examination of Hamas’s motives, logic, and implications of October 7th attack.
• 25:27–31:33: Israeli response, strategic and emotional considerations, and U.S. diplomatic posture.
• 31:33–39:39: Regional diplomatic complexities, the humanitarian dilemma, and the unpredictable role of public opinion.
• 39:39–46:03: What future U.S. policy should—and should not—seek; prospects for “de-escalation,” Palestinian politics, and lessons learned.

Conclusion

This episode delivers a sobering, deeply informed analysis of Middle East instability in the wake of the October 7th attacks, highlighting the perils of shortcut diplomacy, the resilience of the Palestinian issue, and the enduring challenge of reconciling theory with on-the-ground realities. Both guests stress that going forward, no strategy can afford to ignore Palestinian aspirations, the volatility beneath authoritarian stability, or the real risk of wider conflict—no matter how much world powers might wish otherwise.