Podcast Summary: The Foreign Affairs Interview

Episode: What Comes Next in Venezuela

Host: Daniel Kurtz-Phelan (Foreign Affairs Magazine)
Date: January 8, 2026

Overview

In this pivotal episode, host Daniel Kurtz-Phelan explores Venezuela's rapidly changing landscape following the U.S. raid that captured Nicolás Maduro. With the Trump administration now wielding unprecedented leverage and pushing for U.S. control of Venezuelan oil, a bewildering new phase dawns for Venezuela and Latin America. To make sense of the upheaval, Kurtz-Phelan speaks with Phil Gunson (International Crisis Group) live from Caracas, followed by Juan Gonzalez, former NSC lead for Latin America. The conversations probe the tenuous stability under interim president Delsy Rodríguez, the fate of Venezuela’s opposition, and the sweeping repercussions across the region as U.S. policy grows overtly interventionist.

Key Discussion Points

1. Caracas After Maduro: Atmosphere and Power Dynamics

(Phil Gunson, [02:06]–[09:07])

• The mood is tense and subdued in Caracas after the U.S. raid—quiet streets, increased security presence, sporadic pro-government demonstrations.
• Widespread uncertainty and nervousness: “It started out obviously, the shock, the initial shock, then ... extremely quiet, eerily quiet.” – Gunson [02:18]
• Security forces, collectivos (armed civilian groups), and military intelligence are actively policing and harassing civilians and journalists.
• The Chavista government’s rhetoric about U.S. imperialism has collided with reality, leaving the leadership disoriented.
• Power balance: Delsy Rodríguez, now interim president, and her brother Jorge represent the civilian political wing, but true control lies with the military: Defense Minister Padrino López and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello.
  • “They control all the guns ... on the tanks, on the planes ... and the police, most of the intelligence services.” – Gunson [06:45]

2. U.S. Demands and ‘Zone of Possible Agreement’

(Gunson, [09:07]–[12:27])

• Trump’s demands are clear: U.S. material gains (oil, denial of territory to traffickers, ousting Chinese influence, oil to Cuba cut-off).
• The red line for Chavista elites: they cannot afford to lose power—jail, exile or worse awaits.
• The U.S., however, seems uninterested in fully overturning the regime; instead, it seeks compliance and resource access.
• The true “zone of possible agreement” is pragmatic: the U.S. backs the regime in exchange for resources; democracy and human rights are sidelined.
• The political opposition, despite winning elections and representing public will, is shut out—“Trump has thrown them out the window, it seems.” – Gunson [09:07]

3. Opposition Disempowered: Maria Corina Machado and U.S. Calculus

(Gunson, [12:27]–[18:41])

• Both Trump and Marco Rubio have openly dismissed Machado’s power despite her legitimacy.
• U.S. perception: “It’s not to do with popular support … it’s to do with the fact that they couldn’t control internal security.” – Gunson [16:23]
• U.S. learned from Iraq: avoided total regime ouster, instead leaving armed Chavista elites in place to prevent chaos.
• There is concern that U.S. hubris could trigger the very chaos it aims to avoid: “If Trump pushes this too far, he's going to have … the kind of violent chaos that they stepped back from on Saturday.” – Gunson [18:54]

4. Military Doctrine and Threat of Asymmetric Warfare

(Gunson, [21:29]–[25:34])

• Venezuela’s longstanding doctrine: if toppled, they threaten protracted asymmetrical warfare—urban chaos, insurgencies, criminal gangs.
• “They know that in conventional terms, they can't stand up to the U.S. ... But we will still be here ... It doesn't take very many ... to create chaos.” – Gunson [21:29]
• U.S. has leverage, but pushing too far could tip Venezuela into prolonged violence and regional instability.

5. Economics, Collapse, and Migration

(Gunson, [26:00]–[33:24])

• While the U.S. disrupts drug flows, oil remains the linchpin, and its blockade is grinding the economy down further.
• Inflation and humanitarian crisis are escalating, with no more migration ‘safety valve’—neighboring countries are less welcoming, and Venezuelans are too poor to flee.
• “The fact is ... people won't be able to [leave]; the outside world is less welcoming ... people have less money.” – Gunson [29:09]

6. Is There a Path Forward? The Case for Inclusive Negotiation

(Gunson, [33:24]–[39:17])

• The U.S. should use its leverage to impose not just transactional demands but to insist on a real political settlement that includes the opposition.
• The opposition needs to regroup—Machado’s dominance failed tactically; a broad-based coalition pursuing specific democratic concessions is required.
• Gunson’s “optimistic scenario” involves U.S. support not just for resource extraction, but for reintegration of democratic voices and civil society.
  • Memorable advice: “You need to release political prisoners ... start opening up the political system ... allow exiles to come back in without being prosecuted, and ... start talking to them.” [34:49]

[Break at 39:17]

7. U.S. Policy Lessons from Chavez to Maduro

(Juan Gonzalez, [41:03]–[46:01])

• U.S. policy was historically too passive, hoping for regional resolution—missed opportunities for stronger sanctions and earlier intervention as Chavismo consolidated.
• “We could have been much more hands-on early on ... a lot of the failures ... is ... the region can't cooperate regionally without the U.S. as a superstructure. That sounds really paternalistic, but it's the reality.” – Gonzalez [41:47]

8. Oppositional Disarray and Chavista Cohesion

(Gonzalez, [44:22]–[46:01])

• Regional governments couldn’t overcome internal opposition divisions; Chavista strategy was always to polarize and fracture rivals.
• Foreign engagement with the opposition was hampered by factionalism.

9. U.S. Diplomatic Engagements and Missed Moments

(Gonzalez, [46:01]–[50:16])

• U.S. negotiated prisoner releases but refrained from oil deals during the Biden years.
• The Barbados Agreement enabled opposition wins in 2024 but ultimately couldn’t overcome regime intransigence.
• There is regret U.S. didn’t apply more military pressure or guarantees to secure democratic outcomes.
• Gonzalez: “A lesson ... is that the United States often needs to be a ruthless international actor ... maybe we should have posted a destroyer off of the coast of Maracaibo” – [47:36]

10. The Personalities in Power: Delsy and Jorge Rodríguez

(Gonzalez, [50:16]–[52:47])

• Maduro is inflexible, ideologically committed, and brittle; the Rodriguez siblings are pragmatic and formidable but lack the military’s means.
• Delsy is the regime's most able manager, but her authority is contested by military elites; she is seen as the best interlocutor with the U.S.

11. The Operation to Capture Maduro

(Gonzalez, [53:17]–[58:01])

• The U.S. operation was a bureaucratic triumph for Secretary Rubio over Rick Grenell, leveraging the security bureaucracy to set policy.
• It relied on unprecedented penetration of Maduro’s circle; “this was something that I've never seen ... in Latin America, I've never seen something this complex be executed.” – Gonzalez [58:01]

12. The “Dunro Doctrine” & Resource-Driven Hegemony

(Gonzalez, [58:27]–[61:19])

• Trump administration pursues overt, Roosevelt-style hemispheric dominance, where the U.S. enforces stability and extracts resources directly.
• “It aligns closely with Rubio's worldview ... U.S. policy has been too hesitant, too constrained by process ... more muscular approach.” – Gonzalez [58:27]

13. Possible Outcomes: Managed Transition or Criminalized Continuity?

(Gonzalez, [61:19]–[66:29])

• A “30% chance” exists for successful stabilization—Delsy Rodríguez could consolidate power, negotiate, and stage an election satisfying the U.S., but risks of criminal mayhem and insurgency loom large.
• U.S. strategy relies on removing figures like Cabello and empowering Delsy, but the environment remains volatile, with possibility of Haiti-like fragmentation.

14. Oil, Investment, and Economic Prospects

(Gonzalez, [67:49]–[71:10])

• Venezuela’s reserves are uncertain; infrastructure is decrepit, and attracting investment will be difficult.
• Effective economic recovery would need $100B+ investment and years of sustained stability.
• Risks of swift exploitation by U.S. political insiders (e.g., Trump associates) are high, raising transparency issues.

15. Risks of Escalation and Regional Blowback

(Gonzalez, [71:10]–[80:22])

• The possibilities include managed transition, criminalized status quo, or escalation into instability.
• Crackdown on journalists and opposition continues: “Delsey is buying time, not legitimacy.” – Gonzalez [72:43]
• U.S. presence and assertiveness could drive anti-American sentiment and backlash among Latin American democracies.

16. External Actors: Cuba, Russia, and China

(Gonzalez, [73:40]–[77:47])

• Cuban intelligence supports regime stability but does not drive it; Iranian influence is minimal and overstated; Russia provides technical military support; China is mostly an economic player.
• U.S. military superiority was decisive—“Chinese radars had no idea the F-35s were there until they were right on top of them.” – Gonzalez [74:07]

Notable Quotes

• “There really is no long-term political solution on the table ... All we have is ... a possible, much diminished Chavista regime hanging on, struggling on, but staying in power, while the U.S. essentially turns Venezuela into a colony in all but name.” – Phil Gunson [00:05]
• “The good news for them is, it doesn't look like Trump is particularly interested in [removing Chavistas from power].” – Gunson [09:07]
• “You could only point guns at your friends so long before they start pointing them back.” – Juan Gonzalez [58:27]
• “Delsey is buying time, not legitimacy, and I think we're in a very dangerous period right now.” – Gonzalez [72:43]
• “It’s not a regime change, but an autocrat change.” – Gonzalez [61:19]
• “We can’t go back to big stick and gunboat diplomacy ... The U.S. has to come in with more than just trade, but have a very ambitious approach to economic policy, especially if he wants to compete with China in the Western Hemisphere.” – Gonzalez [82:21]

Important Timestamps

• [02:18] – Gunson describes Caracas’ tense, eerily quiet streets post-raid.
• [06:45] – Breakdown of Chavista power structure: The guns vs. the negotiators.
• [12:57] – On theories of an inside job: Gunson refutes coordinated Chavista collaboration with U.S.
• [18:54] – Dangers of U.S. overreach; lessons from Iraq.
• [25:34] – Chavez-era military doctrine: threat of asymmetrical “hundred years war.”
• [29:09] – Mass exodus from Venezuela isn’t possible now—regional welcome and means have vanished.
• [34:49] – Gunson outlines concrete steps for an optimistic transition scenario.
• [41:47] – Gonzalez on early U.S. missteps in post-Chavez policy.
• [47:36] – Lessons of ruthlessness: “maybe we should have posted a destroyer.”
• [53:17] – How the Rubio faction won over the Trump White House.
• [58:27] – What the new U.S. hemispheric doctrine means for regional autonomy.
• [61:19] – Evaluating the chances for successful resource extraction and political control.
• [67:49] – Warning: U.S.-driven oil extraction could further wound Venezuela’s economy.
• [72:43] – Current phase: “criminalized continuity” sustained by crackdowns.
• [74:07] – U.S. military dominance over Chinese and Russian military tech.
• [80:29] – Regional response: deeply skeptical, divided, fearful of revived U.S. interventionism.

Tone & Takeaways

The conversation is unsparing—alternately analytical, sober, and at times wryly cynical (“We don’t really know until the Netflix series comes out” – Gunson [12:57]). Both guests stress the historic dangers of externally imposed “solutions,” the fragility of the current balance, and the absence of a genuine path to democracy.

The Trump administration’s Venezuela policy is characterized as transactional and neocolonial, rooted in coercion and resource extraction, risking both regional blowback and profound instability inside Venezuela. Both Gunson and Gonzalez warn that Venezuela could either limp forward in an even more criminalized state or spiral into chaos, and that any sustainable solution must include real dialogue with the true representatives of Venezuelan civil society and opposition.

End of summary.