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Dan Kurtz Phelan
I'm Dan Kurtz Phelan, and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
Fiona Hill
Basically, what Trump always wanted to be was the big strong guy in front of Putin. And he does that by beating up on the people he can beat up on. And it's obvious to Putin he's doing that. Let's just be frank. It's pretty obvious because it's obvious to everybody else as well.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
Not even two months into his second term, Donald Trump is already reshaping US Russia relations at a critical juncture for the war in Ukraine. As Putin presses his advantage on the battlefield, Trump's admiration for the Russian leader and his push for warmer relations with Moscow is raising alarms across European capitals and in Kyiv most of all. Fiona Hill spent years studying Putin and Russia as a scholar and as a US Intelligence official before in the first Trump administration, becoming Senior Director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council. She became a household name during Trump's first impeachment, when her testimony provided crucial insights into Trump's dynamic with Putin and his early interactions with President Zelensky. I last had her on the podcast In September of 2022, when it was becoming clear that there would not be a quick end to the conflict in Ukraine. I spoke with her again on the morning of Tuesday, March 11, about Trump's relationship with Putin, about the prospects for peace in Ukraine, and about European security in an age of American retreat. Later that afternoon, US and Ukrainian officials unveiled a tentative agreement for a 30 day ceasefire, meaning that the ball is now in Putin's court. Fiona, thank you for joining me. It's really hard to think of anyone we'd rather have on at this particular moment in history, which has brought back so much of what you've written in Foreign affairs over the last few years about Putin, about Ukraine and about Trump and about how the interaction among them is reshaping geopolitics right now. No.
Fiona Hill
Well, thanks so much, Daniel. Really glad to be here with you.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
In part because there are so many ways into this conversation. I'll start very broad. As you've watched the first seven or so weeks of Trump's second term, what has surprised you?
Fiona Hill
Speed. You just had seven weeks and I thought, gosh, has it only been seven weeks? Yes, it's definitely the speed of things. I mean, there was a lot of things that I did anticipate, but honestly, I will confess I didn't expect it to happen this fast and this furious as well.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
As you watch that rather extraordinary encounter in the Oval Office between President Trump and President Zelensky. Did that surprise you? What kind of stood out to you about that? I mean, when you were the top NSC official handling Russia and Europe during Trump's first term, you were present for early interactions between Trump and Zelensky, including those that led to the Trump impeachment in 2019. So, as you watch this, what did you think was going on on Trump's side, and how did you think Zelenskyy handled it?
Fiona Hill
Well, on the Trump's part, it was sort of vintage Trump and very reflective of his feelings of antipathy towards Zelensky personally and towards Ukraine. I mean, I think what was very telling was that he doesn't want to be associated with Ukraine in any way. Basically telling them they had no cards, that it was the United States that had puffed up Ukraine and Zelensky himself to be a tough guy, that they were losers, you know, basically had the losing hand, and he was basically, you know, telling them that should sort of give it up already. And also making it very clear that any undertaking or any agreement that had already been made with Zelensky in Ukraine by the United States by previous presence was null and void. Because I think the thing to bear in mind when you're watching all of this was Zelenskyy was already walking into an interaction that wasn't going to go favorably for him. And I think in terms of Zelenskyy and his whole team, they didn't do sufficient preparation for this. And in part, it's not entirely their fault, because I don't think they fully understood what they were dealing with. TR Trump was basically telling Zelenskyy that he had to make a personal agreement, in effect, a treaty of friendship with him. That was the rare earths, you know, the raw materials agreement. I don't think Zelenskyy fully understood that this was not just a sort of a continuation of agreements with the United States and with previous presidents, but that this was something to cement the deal with Trump himself personally, and that this was all very personal. And you can see that where Zelenskyy really went awry, there was two different things that went wrong. First of all, he shouldn't have been speaking in English. And what he should have done was, you know, slow the whole thing down and used his Ukrainian interpreter. And I think in future, they need to have a really good interpreter. Perhaps they even need to assign a special envoy in the way that Trump has done this, you know, to basically engage somebody who is, you know, kind of capable of holding their own in these kinds of environments. Because I don't think Zelenskyy on the one hand really understood where Trump was coming from, and on the other hand didn't really understand the way that everything was being phrased. It was moving very fast. And even for, you know, kind of a native English speaker, it would have been hard, you know, to keep on the game. It his English is good, but it's not, you know, he's not native. And that's 101. In diplomacy, you don't have an interaction no matter how good you are in your non native language. So that's kind of, again, a problem. There was also a lot of the people around Trump and the team around Kellogg, and obviously we heard that also from Lindsey Graham, Senator Graham. They were very angry with Zelensky because they said that they told him already what he was expected to do, which was go in, thank the president, profusely signed the deal and get out and do something was going to be good for television, not in the terrible way in which it played out, but in the way of kind of performatively thanking the president. And he didn't do that because again, I don't think he fully understood because again, they were explaining to him in their terms. They understand how Trump operates and Zelensky absolutely doesn't. And where it really went wrong was when Zelensky was trying to remind Trump of two things. First of in the way that Vladimir Putin operates, which Trump didn't really want to hear. And secondly, that there were commitments already made to Ukraine and to Zelensky by previous presidents. And that's when Trump essentially lost it. He basically said, those people don't count for anything. No one respected them. They were weak, they were useless. People respect me. This is with me. So this is a hyper personalized set of interactions. And it's not really about the team, it's not really about the people around Trump. It's just the way that Zelensky was supposed to behave with Trump himself. And it was ahead of the State of the Union. There was all these compilation videos that had been made on behalf of Trump by his press office of people thanking President Trump from hostages that had been released to other people thanking him for all the things that he's done that he could refer to. And I think Zelenskyy was supposed to be fitting into the same frame. And he did not get that message. He genuinely thought he was still negotiating for some kinds of security guarantees. He didn't realize he was making a personal treaty, perhaps not even really a friendship, but of some kind of undertaking. With President Trump himself personally.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
So when you were at the National Security Council, you were not only in the room with Trump and Zelenskyy, you were also in meetings with Trump and Putin, and you were, of course, doing that. After many years of studying Putin and Russia carefully, both as a scholar and as a member of the US intelligence community, you wrote an extraordinary essay in our November December 2021 issue called the Kremlin's Strange Victory that kind of especially extraordinary because it came months before Putin's invasion of Ukraine and years before Trump's reelection, and yet seemed to portend so much of what we've seen in the years since in both regards. And that essay opens with a really vivid and kind of staggering description of the July 2018 meeting between Trump and Putin and Helsinki. When you watch in dismay as Trump in public echoed Putin's talking points over those of his own intelligence officials, you understand the dynamic between these two figures almost as well as anyone. How do you explain it? What's it like in the room who kind of drives conversation? What's the atmosphere like? And what does that tell you about what may happen in that particular relationship in the months ahead? Trump has said that he wants to meet with Putin at some point, and we'll see whether that happens. But we're certainly looking towards another such summit, which will be similar dramatic, I assume.
Fiona Hill
Yeah, I mean, there's a lot of the same things I've just said about the interaction with Zelensky that would hold true for this one. But perhaps on the other side of the ledger, Trump isn't really all that prepared for his meetings with Putin. And interpretation, in his view, is kind of meaningless. And having people who actually really understand the situation, who Putin is and what Russia is about, is key as well, because although it's a hyper personalized setup in Russia as well, Putin's, you know, the main guy. He is where all decision making begins and ends with. He also does have a system around him. He is a product of the deep state. He actually likes the state in Russia. He uses it. And he's got a whole number of state functionaries like Ushakov, his presidential advisor, Lavrov, the foreign minister, Kirill Dmitriev, who many of us have seen active in these negotiations with the United States, the head of the Russian sovereign wealth fund, who for many people is certainly not a household name and not somebody that people were kind of expecting to see. And Oliver, these people have been in the Russian system for years. K. Dmitriev's wife is close to Putin's daughter K. Dmitriev, the head of the sovereign wealth fund, is Harvard trained, went to business school. He's worked at Goldman Sachs. His English is impeccable. Same with Ushakov and Lavrov. Lavrov, of course, has been foreign minister since time immemorial, it seems certainly longer than seven weeks. And also the Russian representative of the UN These guys know what they're doing. And again, they speak impeccable English and they know all their talking points. They know what country they work for, they know how their system operates. They know all the externalities as well. They've got a kind of a complete picture of the field of play. And I think, you know, what we're sort of seeing with President Trump, which I saw the first time around. He's fixated on the one guy himself, on Putin. He sees other people, the intermediaries around him, you know, basically as just sort of conduits to Putin or some ways of just sort of facilitating interactions. Certainly interpreters, certainly his own stuff he doesn't pay any attention to. It's all about being able to sit down with Putin. And when you're not prepared and when you don't know where the other person is coming from, it's just about his interaction that of course you're going to be taking on the talking points of Russia, because the only peer he sees in this relationship, it's certainly not Witkowf. It's not Rubioff for certain. Absolutely not. He's a secretary. He's a secretary of State. But for Trump, he's absolutely a secretary. He's just a member of staff. Waltz, it's the same thing. Wyck might be a billionaire or millionaire and a kind of an ambassador and, you know, have had a business role before, but again, he's just brokering a deal. That's how Trump saw Rex Tillerson before or H.R. mcMaster or John Bolton or any of the various people who were working from previously. They were nothing in their own right. They were just facilitators and conduits. And it's the same with a translator. He's not listening really to the words. He's just trying to get the vibe. The very first time I was in one of the phone calls with Putin, I was listening very carefully to the Russian because the interpreters don't always capture everything. They don't capture the nuances. And particularly when it's the Russian interpreter who's translating into a language that's also not their native language, all kinds of things are missing. And Trump said what a great What a great conversation. I thought, actually, not really. There was all kinds of menace in what Putin had said. He chooses words very carefully. Many times when Putin and Trump are interacting, Putin's actually making fun of him. It's just. It's completely lost in the translation. I can give lots of episodes of this, or he's goading him and urging him onto something because he's trying to kind of see how he reacts. Fact. And the translation, you know, smooths over all of that. That context is absolutely missing. And he doesn't do a readout afterwards. And, you know, we heard, for example, that Witka spent several hours, one on one, with Putin. Was anyone translating? Was Witka making notes in real time, or was he trying to remember, you know, what was said afterwards? All of this is amateur hour because it kind of means that you're not really fully cognizant of what it is that the Russians have said beyond, you know, what you've taken on board from their talking points.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
And it's worth noting that Witkoff is Steve Witkoff, who is ostensibly the Middle east envoy, certainly not a Russia specialist, a longtime New York real estate mogul who is suddenly in this position. So it's not exactly a worthy successor to Fiona Hill, who's doing this publicly. Russian leaders have reacted to Trump's early moves in the second term with a degree of triumphalism, I would say. And you can see that in the statements of lots of officials and in what Putin himself has said. But you noted in that 2021 piece and in others that Putin has in the past not seen Trump's volatility and obsequiousness as entirely a good thing. You recalled that leaving that Helsinki press conference, that notorious encounter, Putin said to his press secretary that the whole thing was, in quoting you here, bullshit. As you see Putin's reaction and Moscow's reaction this time around, how do you think they're reacting to Trump's early moves? Have they kind of figured out how to manage the volatility? What does the picture look like to Putin, and what do you think his strategy towards Trump is at this point?
Fiona Hill
Well, I think he's a real mixed picture. I mean, as you said, there's been quite a bit of euphoria in Russia. In fact, they think that they've walked into a fairy tale kind of where there's all these Russian fairy tales where somebody finds a golden fish or a firebird or it's like the genie in the lamp kind of equivalent, and all their wishes come true. And in many respects, that's what's happened. Putin wanted Ukraine to capitulate. It looks like that's what Trump is trying to fulfill, facilitate for him. Putin wanted to see a rift between the United States and NATO and the United States and all its European allies. And Trump's doing that in spades. And also with Canada and Mexico and pretty much everybody else as well, the Russians would have loved the United States in every other interaction to just take on their talking points without any, you know, kind of pushback. And that's exactly what's happened as well. And the thing is, what we've done here is we've just gone completely over to the Russian side of the position, which is not necessarily good for Russia either. And I think that that's kind of also creating, you know, some apprehension in Moscow. What does this mean? Does this, you know, actually mean that the United States has completely shifted its position? I mean, Trump, you know, certainly has been of. Of many of these views all the way along, because he's a strong man. He sees Putin as a peer, as a fellow strongman. He wants to rule the United States in the way that he thinks, you know, that Russia is ruled by Putin. But Putin also himself is beholden to public opinion. There's also kind of like a whole series of war bloggers and nationalists and others, you know, who are also trying to hold Putin's feet to the fire. And there's also kind of, you know, a lot of anxiety about whether the United States and Trump can be trusted to stick to their word, because the first time around, you know, Putin also was hopeful, and all the Russians were very hopeful. You know, they're popping champagne corks when Trump got elected because, you know, they certainly didn't want to see Hillary Clinton elected in 2016, but they didn't get what they wanted out of it. Trump himself keeps saying, you know, I was tougher on Russia than anyone else. Well, that was also not true. But in fact, it was the team of people around him who once, you know, Russia started doing various things, basically persuaded Trump that he needed to push back or he would look weak, you know. But Trump has never believed that Russia has been interfering in the political space. And so he wants to now take, you know, Putin at his face value, irrespective of all the things that, you know, kind of Russia has actually done. And in a way, now the Russians are kind of feeling that maybe they're the dog that caught the car. And so they're not really sure where this is going to go. And, in fact, I've got colleagues who've been taking part in some of these track twos. You know, they've been happening in Geneva and elsewhere. And one was taken aside by one of the Russians saying that they worried that this would lead to a crisis because Trump will also expect now that Putin will bring peace, that peace will break out all over, and that Putin actually is perhaps not in a position to do that. So let's just play the scenario. Ukraine completely capitulates. Trump, you know, has been saying, maybe there'll be a country, maybe there won't be a country. So Russia gets the control of the territory that it holds, maybe it gets control of the territory it claims because it doesn't hold all of the territory that it claims to have annexed. Then what? You really think that the Ukrainians are going to put down all their arms? Is Trump going to force them to do so? Is it not going to be kind of rear guard, you know, action? Ukraine is a failed state on the borders of Russia as well as on the borders of Europe isn't necessarily going to be, you know, something that Russia wants. And once the facade of a US Russia confrontation is stripped away, this becomes what it always has been, which is a Russian assault on Europe. The second, you know, largest land war in Europe after World War II, the first one being Chechnya, where the Russia invaded its own territory and created absolute chaos. And effectively, what you will now see is that Europe is in a war with Russia over Ukraine, because this is existential to European security. And it may not be what Hungary thinks or Slovakia thinks, but certainly what a heck of a lot of other European countries think. And that means that China, North Korea and Iran are also engaging in a war against Europe. They joined it because they thought that they could take potshots at the United States. But this becomes extraordinary complicated because Russia might be able to, and Putin may be able to have their discussions with Trump, but it doesn't resolve the question of European security, because Trump's saying, I want nothing to do with European security. They're on their own. So actually, this becomes really complicated, and so does the question of proliferation as well. Lots of people are talking about this now. Basically, what Putin has done is make it much more likely that European countries and other neighbors like Japan, South Korea, you know, for example, will be rushing to get a nuclear weapon because the United States, along with Russia and the United Kingdom, gave Ukraine assurances, guarantees, as far as the Ukrainians were concerned, that when they gave up nuclear weapons that they'd inherited from the Soviet Union, you know, back in the 1990s, the one there in Barus and Kazakhstan gave those weapons back to Moscow to be dismantled, that they would be guaranteed that nothing bad would ever happen to them, certainly that they wouldn't be invaded by Russia. And that's exactly what's happened. So the lesson to everyone else is you're going to get clobbered by a nuclear power. And Trump wants to have nuclear negotiations with Putin. Well, he might be able to do that, but he might have also presided over the proliferation of nuclear weapons to many more countries than have them already.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
You wrote a piece in Foreign affairs with Angela Stent one year into the war in Ukraine, noting that, and I'm quoting you here, despite a series of blunders, miscalculations, and battlefield reversals that would have surely seen him thrown out of office in most normal countries, Putin is still at the pinnacle of power in Russia. Russia, two years later, more than two years later, Putin has continued to struggle in this war. The Russian economy has done better than I think most people would have imagined, given how much it's been sanctioned and how much pressure has been put on it by the US and its allies. But it's still going okay, but not great. For most Russians, Putin has had to resort to various fairly extreme measures to get adequate men to the front line, including, again, several thousand North Korean troops. Is it still your assessment that Putin's power is fairly secure? And if so, what accounts for that? Why has that not been dented more by his rather flailing effort in Ukraine?
Fiona Hill
Well, because of multiple battlefields. I mean, it is actually true, contrary to what President Trump and others think, that Russia hasn't done as well as one would expect on the battlefield because it still hasn't taken over the whole of Ukraine, which was definitely the goal when Putin first moved in with his special military operation. Now, on that particular battlefield, Trump's actually Putin's best hope, because Trump again, as he said in the Oval Office to Zelensky, you know, we. We're the ones who've made you a tough guy. If we take away our support, you're finished. You know, so you need to get to the table. Well, in actual fact, Ukraine's still got some fight in it. You know, we saw these drone attacks on Moscow, and we've seen Europeans rallying around. Now, admittedly, they can't compensate for the United States anytime soon, and everybody knows that. But it doesn't mean that Ukraine's fighting spirit is completely gone. And again, there's been lots of calculations made by very smart military analysts that it would take something like 118 years for Russia to take over Ukraine at the pace that it's going. And if Ukraine really wanted to dig in and reinforce the lines of contact, it actually could with some assistance. And perhaps that's something that they should have done before. But Ukraine never wanted to give up the idea that it might be able to incrementally take back some of its tarachi. But I think, you know, Ukrainians are seeing the reality of the situation right now. But the other thing that Putin was really relying on was the broader psychological battlefield, the broader political battlefield as well. And psychologically, he's given everybody the impression that he's won. He's certainly given Trump the impression that he's won and many other people besides that as well. And politically, he was hoping for a change in government in many different countries, just like Vice President Bunce seemed to be hoping for. He was hoping that the AfD would win in Germany. Well, they haven't. I mean, the CDU has, but again, in a difficult situation where they'll have to be a coalition government. But Friedrich Metz, the head of the cdu, the Christian Democratic Union in Germany, has started to be pretty forceful in the things that he said about Russia and also about the United States and its stance in the United Kingdom. In July, it was the Labour Party that won. And the Labour Party have actually been quite forward leaning in terms of their continued support for Ukraine. Based on the previous conservative governments and Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak and all the other intervening prime ministers, there's been actually a continuation of support for Ukraine. Similarly, in France, at the top level of Macron, but very importantly in countries like Poland, the Baltic states, all the Nordic countries, and Sweden and Finland are now part of NATO. And Sweden and Finland actually have real resources. They're bordering countries with Russia. So some of the things that Putin was holding out for haven't exactly happened. But Putin still thinks that he can manipulate the situation. And this is where, getting back to what we were talking about before, about where Trump may be a mixed bag, he may not like it that Trump has become basically antagonistic towards Europe as well. Because in Putin's view, just as in Trump's view, Europe is a set of vassal states. The European Union, Trump said, was basically created to rip off the United States. He wants to see the end of the European Union. Putin sees the European Union as formidable and its ability to aggregate economic potential and financial wherewithal, which is actually we're seeing right now with the EU talking about putting up billions in defense spending, and also talking about doing that in a NATO context, so that countries like Norway, the U.K. switzerland, and also Turkey, you know, could be involved in defense spending. And it seems like this has been done precisely in reaction to the us not just in reaction to Putin, which, you know, suggests that Europe has agency and other countries have agency as well. And so Putin may have to do other things to maintain his position. And then the question is, what's going on inside of the domestic battlefield? Now, obviously, he's eliminated all opposition, but there are these nationalist bloggers, there are people who, you know, want to see the war pursued to its final solution, in their view, which is subjugation of Ukraine and then from there, subjugation of other countries to make sure they don't go their own way. They will also be keeping Putin in their crosshairs, which, of course, we already saw with Prigozhin. We've already forgotten that, that there was an insurgency, there was an attempt, you know, to change the tide in, in Russia. And if it becomes more clear about the huge cost that Putin has incurred and that. That maybe that isn't acceptable to others, you know, things may change as well. For him, it's a price which is different from a cost. Right? A cost may be something seen as negative, but for him, it's a price worth paying if he has success, and success is not 100% guaranteed at this particular juncture.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
What kind of deal would Putin be interested in when it comes to ending the war in Ukraine? You've written in the past, and many commentators assume that a ceasefire would be really just a chance for him to rearm and to rest his troops for another offensive. But is there some deal that you can imagine that would really result in a sustainable end to this war, even if it's more of an armistice than a true peace deal?
Fiona Hill
Well, that's the problem, isn't it? That's what Zelenskyy was trying to get at in the Oval Office, to no avail, pointing out that armistice, equivalent ceasefires, just like we're seeing in Gaza, with kind of difficulties of how hard it is once you get beyond just getting the fighting stopped, the big issues have to be resolved. Things are much more difficult. The devil's always in those very big details. So getting an armistice. And the Ukrainians are proposing right now at air and at sea, and you also got to remember that the Ukrainians have wiped out a third of the Russian Black Sea fleet without having a fleet of their own. They've done that also with drones and basically autonomous vehicles for weapons. So the Ukrainians have been quite effective in that regard. And we have the World War I type front line, which is actually very difficult. And it's not just a war of attrition. It's dynamic, it's back and forth. But I think it's actually quite difficult for Putin to affect a kind of a ceasefire and then take it from there, because, I mean, he obviously wants then things that is not in Trump's wherewithal to hand over. And I don't know whether Trump can actually force the Ukrainians to give up territory that they hold, rather than that Russia holds. And then Putin has also made it very clear Russia's terms are pretty extensive, which is also no army of any conceivable size that could defend itself on the part of Ukraine not joining NATO. And actually, NATO may be the least of things at the moment, because there are other military bilateral treaties that Ukraine can avail itself of with a whole host of other countries and other arrangements that it doesn't actually need NATO, to be frank, at this particular point to defend itself. And also the United States is pulling back from that. So it diminishes, you know, that value of the military relationship with the United States. It used to be enshrined within NATO, plus the nuclear umbrella. But Russia obviously has said, you know, we don't want to be talking about new European security arrangements. They don't want any European troops in Ukraine, which is European territory. And this is all about European security. They would like to have the US Pull back, but they can't force Poland to pull out, Polish troops and Polish soil or Finns to pull out Finnish troops and Finnish soil or Baltic states to pull out their own troops, Canadians, Germans and the UK Forces who are pre positioned forward deployed in the Baltic states and pulling out. So there's all kinds of things going on here. And the Russians are saying they want the root causes of this conflict resolved, which for them is they want a sphere of influence recognized. And the United States might say, yeah, great, okay, we recognize your ability to have a sphere of influence in Europe, but what about Europe? You know, they have agency. You can't just infantilize. The Europeans, you know, just basically say, right, we're not with you anymore, you're on your own, and then expect them to just kind of sit about. There is an assumption in the United States, a lot of the time I have to say that the Europeans aren't capable of anything. Well, what are they talking about? You know, they're talking about what France and Germany Maybe JD Vance is random countries that haven't fought a war. Well, J.D. vance has probably not been to Finland and has not seen the front lines there. Probably not been to Norway, Sweden, you know, perhaps he has, but I don't think he's, you know, kind of fully processed. Has he been to Poland and, you know, seen how the Poles are trying to build themselves up? The Turks have certainly fought wars and they're part of, you know, NATO. The Turks have been in Syria, you know, recently and also kind of involved in Iraq. And frankly, again, as Europeans keep pointing out, the only time that Article 5 was invoked was on behalf of the United States after 911 and European troops, including Georgians and many others who were not part of NATO, went to support the United States and Afghanistan and also in Iraq. So there's a lot going on here. And although the Russians have been very clear on what they want, I do not believe that Trump has the ability to give them everything that they want and to force other people to give up things, because everything is going to be a concession for Ukraine and everything's also going to be a concession for Europe. And you know, again, a ceasefire is one thing, but resolving all of the issues on this is something else. And it may be that lots of Americans may believe that Russia has a right to a sphere of influence, but a heck of a lot of Europeans certainly don't believe that, particularly when it comes to them being in the sphere of influence. And also what Trump has done in terms of threatening Canada and Greenland, which people should take very seriously because I'm pretty convinced he means it. And then also, you know, the pressure on Panama is basically showing countries a very different view of the United States. There's a genuine rupture in the relationship between the United States and its allies at this point. Not just European allies, but Japan, South Korea and others. And it's a one sided rupture, but it's basically come from the United States saying it's not going to be an ally anymore. It's going to be America first and really not interested in what happens in the security of other countries.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
How do you assess the European reaction so far as you watch what various leaders and governments in Europe have done over the last couple of months? Do you think they're doing what they need to do? Are there things they should be doing that they're not so far?
Fiona Hill
Well, I think the problem has been the speed of it. People have just been in a state of shock, so they should have been forewarned a long time ago going Back to frankly, Kennedy and Johnson and you know, back to the 60s and 70s, Europeans were being told they needed to do more for their own defense. They shouldn't be relying exclusively on the United States. Bob Gates, Equity Gates, who went obviously from the Bush to the Obama administration, made that point over and over again. They knew this and this is on them, that they didn't take steps. They allowed their militaries to get hollowed out. They were focused on expeditionary forces, you know, indeed helping the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq and you know, the French case in the Sahel and you know, Mali and places like this. They weren't thinking that they might have to engage in a peer war, a major power state on state conflict. Well, now they are. And you know, this really means that the European part of NATO needs to step up and they've realized that. And I would say, you know, belatedly, let's hope it's not too little too late. There's some really serious discussions going on again about pooling resources from the eu, but also other NATO countries looking at capabilities and capacities. The fin certainly have a lot of military capacity. Countries are building up their armed forces again, you know, they're talking about building up their military industrial base. They realize that they're in, you know, kind of a very difficult environment. Obviously in the aggregate they've got a lot of potential countries will see the threat differently from Russia. Obviously the threat of a land war is very real for Poland and for the Baltic states and for Finland and anyone who has a direct border is very close proximity to Russia. And that will require more investment in land armies and you know, perhaps in tanks. Although, you know, as I said, we talk about drones and the whole face of warfare changing, but at the same time we've seen in Ukraine that's not always the case. But critical national infrastructure for every country is under risk, not just from bombardment by drones. I mean Ukraine has been devastated by these attacks, but also GPS jamming. That's what the Russians have done. Remember there was that dreadful case of Azerbaijani flight that not just got its GPS jammed but was also hit by anti aircraft fire over Russia. So there's all these kinds of things that are happening in the vicinity of Russia for commercial airlines and then military aircraft. You've got Russian surveillance ships all over in the maritime zone looking at critical cables, undersea cables. And the United States is connected to the rest of Europe through these cables in the Atlantic. The UK for example, is a hub for all the communication networks, including for the United States. The United States would be just as affected by an attack on undersea cables. And then you've got pipelines, critical gas pipelines, and, you know, basically cyber attacks. I was shocked to see that the US was, I, I mean, I suppose they're signaling to Russia, but getting rid of, you know, offensive cyber or cyber monitoring against Russia when Russia, as everybody knows, I mean, the Europeans are not idiots on this front. They know that the Russia, along with China and Iran, is a major perpetrator, particularly for criminal groups as well, of cyber attacks, ransomware attacks, you know, for example. So these are real. And every single day the results on European public through disinformation and propaganda coming from the United States now as well, not just from Russia. So there's a feeling in Europe that they're caught between a rock and a hard place, the rock being Russia, which the threat hasn't really changed. And then the technological challenge from China, rather than perhaps a direct military challenge, obviously, but with it China, Iran and North Korea helping Russia, you know, their whole security has become global and global dimensions here. And then the hard place is the United States, because nobody knows how to act with it. Is it going to be an adversary? You know, United States is making challenges against free speech in Europe under the guise of protecting free speech. They're kind of basically demanding that people apologize for saying things about President Trump, or they're basically saying that government should be overthrown, etc, etc, but, you know, nobody should say anything back to the United States. I mean, this is kind of basically a chaotic mess. So the Europeans are also, while they're trying to navigate the more conventional, so to speak, threat from Russia, are also trying to navigate what was a very unconventional threat now from the United States to disrupt their ability to basically improve.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
Their military position in the grim scenario where a bad deal is forced on Ukraine and Putin is allowed to get most of what he wants and escape sanctions and otherwise kind of get away with it. Do you imagine that he will go further and start to test NATO by going into the Baltics or into Poland or. Or will we see kind of further aggression in Moldova or elsewhere? You kind of often hear this from Ukrainians and supporters of Ukraine that Putin won't stop here. But what does that actually look like if he's given everything he wants from Trump?
Fiona Hill
Well, it looks like what I just talked about. Honestly, he's already doing it. It's undersea deep sea cables, it's potentially gas pipelines, it's GPS satellites, it's propaganda, it's psychological operations, it's cyber attacks, it's already happening. There's been, you know, assassinations. We haven't even talked about assassinations and poisonings. You know, there's an inquest going on in the UK right now about the death of Don Sturgis, who was the woman in Salisbury in England, you know, the famous cathedral town that the members of the gru, the Russian military intelligence unit, visited to poison Sergey Skripal, the former Russian spy, and his daughter Yulia. And also, you know, put the entire population of that town at risk with Novichok, the weapons grade nerve agent, in a small perfume bottle. The agents discarded the perfume bottle, which had enough to kill everybody in Salisbury, into the donation container for a charity shop. Don Sturgis's partner found that, spread them both with the perfume. He was seriously ill and she died, you know, so this is the kind of thing they do. And of course, before that, there was Alexander Litvinenko, who was poisoned with polonium, essentially a dirty bomb with polonium spread, you know, radioactive material all the way around London. Assassinations in Germany, all kinds of sabotage attacks, DHL flights, warehouse fire. We've got case after case of Bulgarians and Serbs and all kinds of others being recruited by Russian intelligence for assassinations. You know, going against Khrusa Grozdiev from Pioneering Journalistic Intelligence Group and others. Elliot Higgins, you know, all the people who helped Navalny uncover the plots against him, the poisoning of Navalny, the killings of Navalny and hostage taking. We've got Evan Gershkovitz from the Wall Street Journal. I think he's writing a book about his experience there. But so many people, journalists and ordinary people, have taken hostage by Russia on visits. I mean, there's still people in Russian prisons there. All of this is happening all the time. And he can certainly step up the tempo. He doesn't have to send a tank, you know, across the bridge at Nava in Estonia, for example. It's all happening all the time, everywhere, all at once. And Putin's already emboldened and there's going to be more of this. And even if it's not Russian GRU agents, as I said, there's an ability to basically take on criminals from sympathetic Slavic countries, you know, for example, or others, in fact, if the price is right. So we're in the middle of it. And it's not just thinking that something will happen after the fact. I mean, the Ukrainians are absolutely right that Europe is under siege as well, but it has been for an absolutely long time.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
We'll be back after a short break.
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Dan Kurtz Phelan
You mentioned earlier the convergence or the similarity in worldview between Trump and Putin. This belief that kind of strong men should be managing the world, that they should each have their sphere of influence and what each one does within it is not really the concern of others. If you imagine this playing out over the next few years, if Trump really does have something resembling a coherent approach here, and I realize that's a big if, what does that world look like? What does that mean for the Russia China relationship? What does that mean for Russia, US going forward? Can you imagine this being a really durable change and in how we think about global order?
Fiona Hill
Well, only if nobody else in the world has any agency and that's kind of the part of the problem. Next year is the 250th anniversary of the U.S. revolution and independence and we seem to have gone from one king to a self proclaimed king. And Trump is using and the people around him this idea of unitary executive to kind of recreate something that the US cast off 250 years ago. But that's obviously part of Trump's worldview who obviously sees himself as a king. I mean, I would take that literally. I mean the way that he had the mock Time cover on the White House website. Just look at the White House website and you can see kind of exactly what it is that Trump would like the United States to be. Now in the case of Russia, that gets back to our mindset. It's not just the strongman, the spheres of influence, the sort of old style imperialism. I mean, and of course we're hearing a lot about McKinley and Teddy Roosevelt and all kinds of people that Trump never talked about before. But obviously he's had a crash course in they behaved and how they conducted themselves, like Andrew Jackson you know, from the 1820s as well. But he's kind of going back to sort of an 18th century style of governance, too, in the 18th century, when Catherine the Great, who was an idol of Trump, of Putin's rather, was ruling Russia, because Putin sees himself in a long line of czars and has taken the Russian presidency back to the czarist era. Not a constitutional monarchy, but monarchy with great powers. Well, he sees himself as a czar, you know, if not a king. But in that period, the great powers of Europe were carving the place up among themselves. America, that point, was a colony or what was parts of America in that period and up until the War of Independence. But in that same time frame that the US Is getting its or Americas are getting their independence from Great Britain, Poland was being carved up by the Russia of Catherine the Great, Prussia and Austria, Hungary, without the polls having any say in it whatsoever. And I think that that's the vision that certainly that Trump has. I'm not sure that Putin's quite, you know, right there or she is in China, but that's kind of basically what Trump is proposing. He's, I think, think mis representing or misassessing, if that's a word, the strength of Russia and Russia's ability to do that. But he's not necessarily wrong about China. And basically what he's proposing here is a kind of tripartite carving up of the world. It's certainly what the rest of the world is assuming is what they want. And, you know, again, that could work if it wasn't for the fact that There are now 8 billion people on the planet, that there are a whole host of other countries. There are 550 million people in Europe, you know, who have all kinds of different modes of association. And there are rising powers like India, Brazil and, you know, many others who want to have their role. And I was going to say on that, the nuclear powers. Now, because you've got Iran and North Korea that aspire to be nuclear powers, obviously countries like South Africa, Israel, India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. You've got Japan and South Korea that are major economic powers. You know, you've basically got a very complicated world out there. So you might have that model and you might think you have the power to do this. And certainly Putin and Trump seem to have very generous estimates of their power. But that's not the world that we're in. We're in a very complicated world. And they may try to do this, but I'm not sure that everyone else is going to cooperate.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
There are others in Trump's orbit who see the Russia relationship as really an opportunity to peel Russia away from China and to kind of see it in that context and not. Not sure Trump would articulate it in exactly that way. Do you see any chance of eroding a Russia, China relationship that has really strengthened in ways that would have been hard to imagine a few years ago?
Fiona Hill
Yeah, I did, years ago, and it was hard for me to imagine then. I wrote an article about this with a colleague, a former Australian diplomat based in the uk, Bobo Low, who knows a lot about China and Russia as well. And years ago, we actually thought it was unlikely that they would be in this, what seems to be like a strategic partnership because of all of these friction and differences in perspective. But, you know, circumstances change, as we've seen, and Russia has become more dependent over the course of this war in Ukraine on China in ways that the Russians themselves would have resisted. And also Iran and North Korea, we couldn't have envisaged four years ago, five years ago, for sure, that Russia would be throwing in its lot with Iran and North Korea and, you know, offering them technical assistance with their various weapons programs, basically giving them an entry into, you know, the larger global politics and decreasing their isolation. I mean, that's all come out of the sort of desperation of those initial failures of Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine. And in terms of China now the Russian relationship with China, in terms of trade, reliance on China for technology is so much more intensive than it was before. Trade has increased exponentially. A lot of it is one way, but Russia is relying very heavily now on China for the kind of technology that it got from other places before. Some of it is also being, you know, redirected. They're still purchasing on the. The global marketplace, including from European companies, and they're going through Turkey and Armenia and through China as well, all kinds of trans shipments. But, I mean, you know, the world has changed as a result of this. The war in Ukraine has been a pivotal war. In a way, it is World War iii. And I've said that before as well, because it's not. Everybody thinks of World War Three. And when Trump thinks about this, thinking Gambling three, he's talking about nuclear Armageddon. He's made that very clear in the last few days. He's very fixated on that. He genuinely does want to have arms control negotiations with Russia and with China and again with North Korea, probably, but also with Iran, which he's made very clear. But again, the world has become more complicated. You're going to have much more interest by other powers becoming nuclear powers. But the whole thing about a World War 3 like scenario putting the nuclear aspect of this to one side is it's a system changing war or one that shows that the conflict is broken out because the system has changed. Pax Americana had already ended, and this war was really one of the results of it because Russia didn't feel deterred by the state of play. It thought it could move in. No one cared about Ukraine. The US had pulled out of Afghanistan. The US Was basically on the back foot. And it could basically swoop in and take advantage of all of that. It didn't really kind of work, you know, as planned. And then China, North Korea and Iran come in because they also think that the United States is on its way out. And if the United States is defeated in Ukraine rather than Ukraine per se, then that's, you know, basically a way of them putting the United States on the back foot. I don't think they reckoned on the United States basically saying, yep, yep, we see this is a proxy war. We don't want any part of it. We're not part of this at all. We're off. You know, so this is actually, you know, in many respects, again, thrown everything into some point of disarray. I imagine that, you know, Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are going to have to. To recalculate because again, what I've said already is this now becomes a European war where those countries are raiding, abetting Russia. And, you know, I'm not so sure that China will be able to take advantage of this in the way that it thought. I mean, China's been telling the Ukrainians and the Europeans, this isn't about you. This is about the United States. And, you know, we're not helping Russia to do something terrible in Europe or in Ukraine. You know, we're. It'll all be fine. And, you know, now you're having this rupture with the US we'll be in there. We'll help you, you know, rebuild. Well, actually, they helped destroy. And if the US has nothing to do with this, you know, that's going to be for them to negotiate this with the Europeans and explain themselves. So the whole world has become extraordinarily complex now. This is the end of Pax Americana. The United States is, you know, heading off in God knows what kind of direction, all fast and furious, rupturing relationships, economic, trade, political military, left, right and center. And I don't think any of us know where it's going to be in the future. The last time, when you had the end of Pax Augustus, we ended up after a period, period of absolute chaos in the Roman world with the Dark Ages. And I, you know, hope that's not where we're headed now. But if Europe responds, and I mean European countries, because a lot of them do have the political will to respond to this and find out a modus operandi, then, you know, that'll be very different. And look, there's Brazil, there's India, there's Pakistan, there's Japan, there's South Korea, there's Australia, there's New Zealand. There are so many countries out there who are in a very different place from what they were when we all began all of this 80 years ago. This is a very different world. It's not just a world of three powers.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
Listening to you and watching Trump's interactions with Putin and with Zelensky and his statements on this whole set of issues over the last couple of months, it's hard not to come back to this question, this kind of enduring mystery of why, what is at the root of Trump's attraction or fealty to Putin, as you look at it? Is it all just that kind of similarity of worldview, his kind of envy of Putin's power? There are still people who, for all the overstatement of some of the Russiagate conspiracy theories last time around, who still believe there's some degree of kompromat. But as you've watched this, how do you explain this in your mind? What is the root of this as you see it?
Fiona Hill
I think he's fundamentally really enamored of Russia and doesn't see it as a threat at all. And there's a lot going around, as you said, about all these kind of questions about what do the Russians or the Soviets have on him. All kinds of people are posting things all over the place about his first visits to Moscow and the Soviet Union, how he was hosted, as many others were, and how he was probably compromised then. I think he was very much enamored of the Soviet Union at the time. He's very much in the 1980s realm. You know, that period of 1980s was when Gorbachev, you know, comes in and, you know, I went to study in Russia at the same time, 1987. I really, you know, kind of thought that Russia was on a different trajectory. You know, we have Gorbachev and Reagan meeting of the signing of the inf. You have this kind of feeling that the whole place is changing, changing, that they're no longer clinging to the old communist ideology, that there's new thinking in foreign policy. They all seem extraordinarily sympathetic. This is a whole period of, you know, all the kind of peace movements and people doing outreach, you know, Bill Clinton, Bernie Sanders, everybody goes to Moscow in this kind of period. And of course they're going to be whining and dining in a, you know, an American businessman. And I'm sure that, you know, he really felt flattered because Trump always responds to flattery. And, you know, then, you know, we have Gorbachev, we have the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have Yeltsin. Everybody thinks that the Russians have made a strategic choice. You have all these Russian business people emerging. Many of them invest in Trump's businesses, buy his apartments. He meets all these oligarchs and you know, who are just like him, billionaires with beautiful wives, you know, etc. Etc. I don't think he's changed his view at all about Russia and the trajectory that it's on. I don't think he believes for one second that Putin has been out to get get him. He just, like with Gorbachev, he wanted to sit down and basically negotiate nuclear weapons with. He sees Putin very similarly. And you know, in actual fact, although Putin may be a KGB operative, Trump's a total operative. He thinks in the same way. Conspiracy theories, lies, you know, these are all kind of part of his coin of business as well, is a real estate mogul. I mean, I actually hadn't pegged him for being an imperialist, but I think I hadn't probably taken his interest in real estate to its logical conclusion. You know, it's a great development of a literal greenfield site of green Greenland. And, you know, he operates in the same sort of way as Putin. It's one of the reasons why they don't want to clamp down on disinformation here in the United States. They don't want to clamp down on money in politics because it's extraordinarily useful for, for Trump. Trump and Putin are working in parallel tracks. And again, Trump doesn't basically have any respect for anyone apart from himself or people who thinks are his peers. And the people who thinks there's peers are very small number, number of people. Putin's one of them. She is another. The Queen was one, but, you know, she's gone now. He's got the richest man in the world operating as his tech support, according to his T shirt of Elon Musk. You know, how more powerful could he possibly be? And so, you know, that's the way that he's thinking about this. He thinks of Putin as an extraordinarily powerful individual. He's got name recognition, face recognition. You know, even Americans who can't tell, tell, you know, one U.S. senator or one member of the cabinet from the other recognize Putin. They know who he is. Elon Musk is one of the most recognizable people, you know, on the planet, and so is Trump. And that's how he thinks about things. And so, you know, of course, he's compromised. Of course he's an asset because he can be manipulated, he can be flattered. People are always coming up to me and getting really angry with me because they'll say, well, what have the Russians got on him? We've all got stuff on him. I mean, for God's sake, there's been 90 cases, you know, kind of basically in. In courts against him. He's already been found, you know, guilty on some charges. You know, so, come on. I mean, it's. It's more about the flattery and the. The bigger and, you know, more important you are, and the more you flatter him, the more impact that that has. And as I said, Putin is always extraordinarily clever, even though, in fact, he does make fun of him in Russian. And Putin is always saying nice things about Trump. And so, you know, as Trump doesn't believe in the interference, he'd rather believe it was Ukraine, or he doesn't believe that there was a real Russian effort on his behalf. That's why he says that he and Putin have been through so much together. It's almost like a kind of a teenage romance where everybody's been trying to keep them apart, and he just wants to get back together with Putin in spite of everybody, and he's doing whatever he absolutely can can to have that sit down with him.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
Could you share just one of those examples of Putin making fun of Trump in Russia?
Fiona Hill
Well, one of the classics was in osaka at the G20, which is also another famous incident where the Russians swapped out their interpreter for a very attractive, very skilled young woman. During that moment, they were standing off and chest beating about who had hypersonic missiles first. And Trump was saying he would get them. And Putin was basically somewhat sarcastically saying, yes, you will, but I've got them first kind of thing. And then they started talking about Israel, and. And we did have this really amazing, historic meeting among the national security advisors of Israel, Russia, and the United States that came around this time because at that point, the Russians were trying to make the case that they were protecting Israel and being supportive of Israel by being in the Golan Heights and the activities that they were doing in Syria. And Putin was talking about this. And then Trump said, but I do more for Israel than anybody else. They've named this after me and that after me in Israel. And Putin looked at him and said, well, Donald, perhaps they should name the country after you. And the way that he said it in Russian, it was so sarcastic. And you could see, you know, kind of his guys around him smirking. But when the interpreter, who was the only person that Trump was looking at, you know, basically said it, it just kind of came out as more sort of softer. And he. And Trump responded and said, oh, no, I think that would be too much. Almost as if it was a kind of a genuine suggestion. And there were other things like this where Putin would deliberately set him off, you know, goading him to say terrible things about fellow Americans, be it Biden or Senator Warren, who we would call Pocahontas, also to Putin. And look, I mean, honestly, I found that shocking. And I talked about that publicly and I, you know, said it in, you know, written materials, too. When your president throws you under the bus with a foreign leader who, you know, really doesn't care for you in the slightest, it tells you something. Because basically what Trump always wanted to be was the big strong guy in front of Putin. And he does that by beating up on the people he can beat upon. You know, he takes on very deliberate and very strategically people who he doesn't think are going to fight back, which of course, Zelensky actually did in the Oval Office, or people that he can humiliate and, you know, kind of look weak to look stronger to the other person. And it's obvious to Putin he's doing that. Let's just be frank. It's pretty obvious because it's obvious to everybody else as well.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
To close, I just want to quickly go back to that 2021 essay you wrote, the Kremlin Strange Victory. The core argument of that piece is really not about Putin or Russia or even US Russian relations, it's about the United States in a way that seemed perhaps a bit provocative at the time, but as I think proved quite enduring and farsighted. You wrote that rather than Russia becoming more like us, the United States becoming more like Russia. And quoting you here, Putin realized that despite the lofty rhetoric that flowed from Washington about democratic values and liberal norms, beneath the surface, the United States was beginning to resemble his own country. A place where self dealing elites had hollowed out vital institutions and where alienated, frustrated people were increasingly open to populist and authoritarian appeals. I suppose I'd close just by saying that we seem to be going in the wrong direction, not reversing those trends in any meaningful way.
Fiona Hill
Yeah, that's absolutely right. I mean, there was a great deal of discussion at various points about convergence, this called convergence theory between America and the Soviet Union. And again, in the 1980s, we thought that they were coming towards us. That certainly seemed to be the case. But over time, we've moved in their direction for all kinds of obvious reasons. And the thing is that Putin is pretty smart, and he did recognize that, because Putin knows the dynamics within his own country, and he recognized them obviously in the US and he knew exactly then how to. To push buttons, which they've been doing for a long time. I mean, basically, what the Russians do and why their propaganda is so effective is they surfer wave. That's already there. They don't try to create things, you know, and after a certain point, they just sit back and see this happening. And while they think that we're really weak, you know, we're not really going to get anywhere in terms of resolving issues, they do think that we're weak. I mean, I remember my interactions with Ambassador Antonov, the previous Russian ambassador of the United States, when I would. Would, you know, challenge him, you know, as I was supposed to do in my position about Russian interference in the elections. And he would say, you know, Ms. Hill, do you really think the America is such a banana republic that you're so weak that you would be susceptible to this? And he was just basically telling me that's what he thought. And unfortunately, you know, that seems to be where we are. And I still get screeds of emails from people, you know, screaming at me about these kinds of things and saying that, you know, we don't see, you know, the situation, that this is really about America being strong. But that's not what Russia thinks, and that's not what Putin thinks. And, you know, the only way to really get to pieces, to show that you are strong and resilient and to show that you are able to withstand all these kinds of provocations and to restore deterrence. And it doesn't mean, you know, by being on a war footing with Russia, it absolutely doesn't mean that, but it means that you're shoring up your own social cohesion, your own unity. And unfortunately, President Trump is focused on disunity, on playing to his base, which is, you know, not as considerable as it kind of looks like from the outside, I mean, basically two thirds of the American population didn't really vote for him, you know, because not everybody voted, you know, so this is, you know, a base that he can operate from. But, you know, it isn't a base of unity, and he hasn't been a force for unity. And while there is disunity and discord and Americans are being pitted against each other and he's dismantling, dismantling the state. This is like shock therapy. This is what Russia went through in the 1990s, is what the UK went through in the 1980s, or East Germany went through also in the 1990s, dismantling the public sector. There will be ample opportunity for, for Russia to continue to push buttons that make things worse. If we want to really resolve this, you know, we have to do something, do something different.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
We will end on that warning. Fiona, thank you so much for joining me. And thank you so much for the wonderful and truly trenchant pieces you've done for Foreign affairs over the last few years.
Fiona Hill
Thank you so much, Daniel. Thanks for having me.
Dan Kurtz Phelan
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Julia fleming dresser, Molly McEnany, Ben Metzner and Caroline Wilcox. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts, and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.
Summary of "What Does Trump See in Putin?"
The Foreign Affairs Interview
Hosted by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan
Released on March 13, 2025
In the episode titled "What Does Trump See in Putin?" The Foreign Affairs Interview delves deep into the intricate and often contentious relationship between former President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Hosted by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, the conversation with renowned Russia and Ukraine expert Fiona Hill provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolving dynamics shaping global geopolitics, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the broader implications for international relations.
Daniel Kurtz-Phelan opens the discussion by highlighting the critical juncture in US-Russia relations early in Trump's second term. Fiona Hill introduces herself, emphasizing her extensive background in studying Putin and her role in the National Security Council during Trump's first administration.
Speed of Trump's Actions:
Fiona Hill remarks on the unprecedented speed with which Trump has reshaped US policies toward Russia, expressing surprise at the rapid developments within just seven weeks into his second term.
"Speed. You just had seven weeks and I thought, gosh, has it only been seven weeks? Yes, it's definitely the speed of things." (02:09)
Trump-Zelensky Meeting:
Hill provides a critical analysis of Trump's interaction with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, drawing parallels to the 2019 impeachment episode. She asserts that Trump's antipathy towards Zelensky and Ukraine is evident, undermining previous US commitments and expectations.
"Trump was basically telling Zelenskyy that he had to make a personal agreement, in effect, a treaty of friendship with him." (04:30)
Comparison to Helsinki Meeting:
Hill references her 2021 essay, "The Kremlin's Strange Victory," to compare the current Trump-Putin interactions to the infamous 2018 Helsinki summit. She discusses Trump's fixation on personal rapport with Putin, often at the expense of strategic policy considerations.
"He sees Putin as an extraordinarily powerful individual. He's got name recognition, face recognition. You know, even Americans who can't tell..." (07:45)
Preparedness and Interpretation Issues:
Hill critiques Trump's lack of preparation for high-stakes meetings with Putin, highlighting the absence of effective interpreters and strategic envoys, which undermines meaningful dialogue.
"He doesn't want to clamp down on money in politics because it's extraordinarily useful for Trump." (10:20)
Europe's Alarm and Actions:
Hill examines Europe's response to Trump's policies and Russia's maneuvers, noting a surge in defense spending and military readiness among European nations. She underscores the belated but necessary shift towards greater self-reliance in defense.
"The problem has been the speed of it. People have just been in a state of shock..." (28:36)
NATO and European Unity:
The discussion touches on the challenges facing NATO and the EU as Europe grapples with the dual threats of Russian aggression and diminishing US support. Hill emphasizes the importance of cohesive European defense strategies.
"European countries are trying to navigate the more conventional, so to speak, threat from Russia, are also trying to navigate what was a very unconventional threat now from the United States..." (28:36)
Triumphalism in Moscow:
Hill observes a mix of confidence and uncertainty within Russian leadership, noting that Putin believes he can manipulate the current geopolitical landscape to his advantage, despite setbacks in Ukraine.
"Putin still thinks that he can manipulate the situation." (12:49)
Potential for Further Aggression:
She warns of continued Russian tactics beyond direct military action, including cyber attacks, assassinations, and psychological operations aimed at destabilizing Europe and undermining US influence.
"Putin's already emboldened and there's going to be more of this." (35:52)
Convergence of Worldviews:
Hill discusses the troubling alignment between Trump's and Putin's perspectives on global governance, both favoring strongman leadership and spheres of influence, which threatens the existing international order.
"Trump is using and the people around him this idea of unitary executive to kind of recreate something that the US cast off 250 years ago." (37:45)
Multipolar World Challenges:
She underscores the complexity of today's global landscape, with rising powers like China, India, and others asserting their influence, making any simplistic tripartite model unfeasible.
"You're going to have much more interest by other powers becoming nuclear powers." (37:45)
Strengthening of Russian-Chinese Ties:
Hill explains how Russia's dependence on China has deepened amid sanctions and economic pressures, leading to a more robust strategic partnership that complicates US efforts to counterbalance.
"Russia has become more dependent over the course of this war in Ukraine on China in ways that the Russians themselves would have resisted." (41:17)
Challenges to US Influence:
She highlights the erosion of US alliances and the growing perception of the US as unreliable, further emboldening Russia and its allies to pursue aggressive policies.
"There's a genuine rupture in the relationship between the United States and its allies at this point." (41:17)
Enamored Relationship with Russia:
Hill delves into the psychological and personal factors driving Trump's affinity for Putin, suggesting that Trump's real estate and business dealings have mirrored imperialistic tendencies, fostering a misplaced admiration for strongman tactics.
"He was very much enamored of the Soviet Union at the time. He's very much in the 1980s realm." (46:43)
Potential for Further Destabilization:
She warns that Trump's focus on personal power and disunity within the US undermines global efforts to present a united front against authoritarianism, potentially leading to increased Russian provocations.
"President Trump is focused on disunity, on playing to his base, which is, you know, not as considerable as it kind of looks like from the outside." (56:51)
Final Warning:
Hill emphasizes the critical need for the US to restore social cohesion and strength to effectively counter Russia's manipulative strategies and prevent further erosion of democratic institutions.
"The only way to really get to pieces, to show that you are strong and resilient and to show that you are able to withstand all these kinds of provocations and to restore deterrence." (54:06)
Personal Dynamics Over Policy: Trump's personal fascination and strategic interactions with Putin overshadow broader US-Russia policy considerations, potentially endangering global stability.
European Security Imperative: Europe's delayed but increasing investment in defense underscores the necessity for continental self-reliance amidst diminishing US commitment.
Russian Strategic Agility: Despite setbacks in Ukraine, Russia's multifaceted approach—including cyber warfare, assassinations, and psychological operations—continues to pose significant threats to global security.
Global Order on the Brink: The erosion of Pax Americana, coupled with the rise of multipolar powers and strengthened Russian-Chinese ties, signals a profound transformation in the international system with unpredictable consequences.
Call for US Resilience: Restoring internal unity and societal strength in the US is imperative to effectively counteract external authoritarian influences and preserve democratic institutions worldwide.
Fiona Hill on Trump's Speed:
"Speed. You just had seven weeks and I thought, gosh, has it only been seven weeks? Yes, it's definitely the speed of things." (02:09)
On Trump’s Antipathy to Ukraine:
"Trump was basically telling Zelenskyy that he had to make a personal agreement, in effect, a treaty of friendship with him." (04:30)
Regarding Trump's Preparation for Meetings:
"He doesn't want to clamp down on money in politics because it's extraordinarily useful for Trump." (10:20)
Fiona Hill on Global Complexity:
"We’re in a very different world. It’s not just a world of three powers." (37:45)
On the Importance of US Unity:
"The only way to really get to pieces, to show that you are strong and resilient and to show that you are able to withstand all these kinds of provocations and to restore deterrence." (54:06)
The episode "What Does Trump See in Putin?" offers a sobering analysis of the precarious state of US-Russia relations under Donald Trump's leadership. Fiona Hill articulates concerns about Trump's personal affinity for Putin undermining strategic policy objectives, the consequent destabilization of European security, and the broader implications for the global order. The discussion serves as a critical reminder of the intricate interplay between individual leadership styles and international relations, emphasizing the need for cohesive and resilient policies to navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics.