The Foreign Affairs Interview

Episode: What Kind of Change Is Coming to Iran?

Date: January 13, 2026
Host: Kanishk Tharoor (Foreign Affairs Magazine, Deputy Editor)
Guest: Karim Sajadpur (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Author of "The Autumn of the Ayatollahs")

Overview of the Episode's Main Theme

This episode explores the upheaval gripping Iran following widespread, brutalized protests at the end of December 2025. Host Kanishk Tharoor speaks with Iranian expert Karim Sajadpur to unpack the regime’s fragility, the root causes of public anger, the role of foreign powers, likely scenarios for regime transition or survival, and the possibilities—if any—for a post-theocratic Iran. Sajadpur draws on historical context, recent events, and his renowned October essay to map the possible futures for Iran and analyzes what might emerge after or instead of the Islamic Republic.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Nature and Uniqueness of Recent Protests

• Nationwide Scale and Ferocity
  • Protests have spread to all 31 of Iran’s provinces, transcending previous limits of class, ethnicity, and region ([03:13]).
  • Even traditional and regime stronghold cities like Qom, Mashhad, and Khomein have seen major unrest.
  • Protest slogans call explicitly for regime change, a notable escalation.

“People are essentially done with the regime. They're calling for regime change, including in places we would have thought of as regime strongholds.” – Karim Sajadpur [03:32]

• Exhaustion with Theocracy & Comprehensive Grievances
  • The Islamic Republic, described as a "zombie regime," faces deeply-rooted political, economic, and social grievances.
  • Comparison to Maduro’s Venezuela and Putin’s Russia: at least there, leaders lack moral pretensions and don’t attempt to micromanage daily life ([05:05]).

“From upwards of 80% of Iranians, [the regime] has no redeeming qualities… I now describe it as a zombie regime.” – Sajadpur [05:53]

2. Economic Mismanagement and Irreversible Discontent

• Destructive Economic Policy
  • Inflation is around 50%—for food, up to 70%. Water shortages are so serious that relocating the capital has been proposed ([06:08]).
  • The regime has channeled national wealth into proxy wars and the costly nuclear program.
  • President Pezeshkian’s gestures at economic reform are seen as insufficient; the root anger "will not have gone away" even if protests are crushed ([06:55]).

“Iran will never fulfill its enormous potential as a nation as long as its organizing principle is death to America and death to Israel rather than Long live Iran.” – Sajadpur [07:29]

3. Opposition Dynamics: Fractured but Persistent

• Changing Opposition Landscape
  • The opposition is “too fractured to unite, but too persistent to simply vanish” ([09:47]).
  • Rising nationalistic tendencies are visible; the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, is now being openly supported even in provincial and conservative regions ([09:47]).
  • Despite yearning for a leader, organizational capability within Iran is lacking due to regime repression and decapitation of any would-be organizing figures.

“If there’s an overarching ideology of these protests, I do think it’s nationalism…our national interests haven’t been prioritized.” – Sajadpur [11:34]

4. Structure of the Iranian Regime and Succession Problem

• Military Domination
  • The regime is now “more of a military regime in clerical garb” ([13:00]).
  • The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has superseded religious authority and controls major aspects of the economy and security.
• Declining Ideological Cohesion
  • "At the start of the revolution, the regime was composed of 80% ideologues and 20% charlatans. And now it's the reverse: 20% ideologues and 80% charlatans." ([14:41])
  • Khamenei remains a "true believer," convinced that any reform will only hasten the regime's collapse (referencing the Soviet Union under Gorbachev).
• Succession Dilemma
  • With President Raisi dead, the only plausible successor is Khamenei’s son, Mujtaba, but dynastic succession undermines the regime’s very founding legitimacies ([18:33]).

“Him bequeathing power to his son is not going to have any legitimacy… if he tries to bequeath power to his son…in my view, it's not going to be sustainable.” – Sajadpur [20:18]

5. The Tipping Point and Security Forces

• Stability Hinges on IRGC Loyalty
  • The IRGC has historically tied its fate to Khamenei. A split or defection could end the regime, but such a break is unlikely and hard to orchestrate.
  • Lessons from the Arab Spring: military defection can bring down dictators, but rarely leads to immediate democratization ([22:15]).

6. Foreign Intervention and Regime Response

• Insistence on Blaming Foreign Enemies
  • Regime blames unrest on US and Israel; Sajadpur affirms the regime is weakened and compromised by sophisticated foreign intelligence operations ([25:36]).
• Military Humiliation as a Catalyst
  • Losses to Israel and the US have undermined regime credibility, contrasting with early-revolution “rally-round-the-flag” effects ([26:30]).

“Those types of military humiliations for late-stage dictatorships can actually serve to accelerate their demise.” – Sajadpur [27:47]

• Limits of US/Israeli Action
  • Direct strikes or regime decapitation seen as unlikely to produce regime change; instead, Sajadpur recommends cyber efforts to break the regime’s communications blackout ([29:01]).

“Anyone that can restore Iran’s connectivity to the world…will actually make a difference for protesters.” – Sajadpur [31:10]

• China and Russia's Role
  • China is Iran’s lifeline (90% of oil exports). China benefits from a stable, open Iran; Russia, meanwhile, is incentivized to keep Iran weak and isolated ([35:36]).
  • Regional militias from Iraq and Lebanon are reportedly assisting in repression, further fueling public anger ([38:20]).

7. Risks of Chaos, Ethnic Fragmentation, and the Yugoslavia Scenario

• Unlikely Disintegration
  • Despite regime rhetoric of “Iran as Yugoslavia,” the country’s long history and strong national identity make partition or large-scale ethnic secession highly unlikely ([39:18]).
  • Ethnic minorities (Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis, Arabs) may protest, but do not have the size or will for successful secession.

8. Post-Khamenei Scenarios and the Likelihood of Democracy

• Five Paths Outlined ([42:28]):
  1. Post-Soviet Russia: ideological regime becomes a nationalist strongman.
  2. Post-Mao China: authoritarian state conforms to pragmatic reform.
  3. North Korea: becomes more isolated and entrenched.
  4. Pakistan: a military-run country.
  5. Turkey under Erdogan: populist authoritarianism, democracy in name.
• Chances of Democracy
  • Only 1 in 5 authoritarian transitions lead to democracy ([43:46]).
  • Leadership and organization are essential; “absent cohesive democratic opposition, it’s not going to go to democracy on its own.”

“[Iran] is a regime which in some ways resembles North Korea, but it’s a society that aspires to be like South Korea.” – Sajadpur [45:44]

9. The Strongman Likely to Follow

• Profiles in Ambition
  • Mohammed Baghrel Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander and current parliamentary speaker, is “auditioning” for post-Khamenei power.
  • Sajadpur suggests the next leader may well be someone currently unknown: “mid-ranking” enough to avoid being tainted by the regime, but savvy enough to fill the subsequent vacuum ([47:28]).

“If we look ahead five years from now and there's another strongman ruling Iran...that strongman will not be wearing a turban.” – Sajadpur [46:38, echoed at episode open [00:07]]

10. Nationalism’s Promise and Peril

• Nationalism as a Double-Edged Sword
  • Protests are animated by nationalism; future leadership may champion national renaissance.
  • Warning: this sentiment can be positive (patriotism) or destructive (ethnic or fascistic nationalism), citing Orwell ([51:28]).

“The antidote to revolutionary ideology...for many people is Iranian nationalism. But you know, that can be manifested in destructive ways as well.” – Sajadpur [52:39]

11. Reza Pahlavi's Role

• Symbolic Leader, Not a Simple Solution
  • Pahlavi is seen as a transitional figure; nostalgia for pre-revolution Iran is strong among those with no direct memory of the era.
  • Pahlavi’s difficulty: must reassure elements of the IRGC and political elite that his return means safety, not revenge ([55:32]).
  • Supporters are divided between desire for democracy and vengeance.

12. Mistrust and the Iranian Political Psyche

• Enduring ‘Paranoid Style’
  • Political paranoia is centuries old, exacerbated by real plotting from foreign powers ([59:42]).
  • This mistrust inhibits coalition-building; democracy is unlikely unless “enlightened leadership” emerges.

“It inhibits collaboration…when you don’t have political collaboration and effective political parties, advancing democracy…becomes much more difficult.” – Sajadpur [61:28]

13. Closing Sentiment—Hope and Fear

• Sajadpur is fearful of the regime’s short-term willingness to shed blood, but hopeful that Iran’s future will break with the last 47 years, provided the right kind of leadership emerges.

“I definitely have fear in the immediate term that the Islamic Republic is going to be willing to kill many thousands in order to stay in power. I feel hope in the medium and longer term...” – Sajadpur [63:14]

Notable Quotes & Timestamps

• On the regime’s exhaustion:
  “It’s a regime whose ideology is dying, its legitimacy is dying, its economy is dying, its supreme leader is dying. But just like zombies, it still has the capacity for lethal force, and that’s what keeps it in power.” – Sajadpur [05:53]

• On economic mismanagement:
  “That nuclear program of Iran probably cost the country upwards of half a trillion dollars...for a nuclear program which wasn’t producing any oil. And nor did it end up being a deterrent…” – Sajadpur [08:05]

• On leadership and transition:
  “Absent cohesive democratic opposition, it’s not going to go to democracy on its own.” – Sajadpur [43:46]

• On the real likelihood of regime collapse leading to democracy:
  “From World War II to the present, only 1 in 5 authoritarian transitions lead to democracy.” – Sajadpur [44:08]

• Historical perspective on regime change:
  “For me, the best and perhaps only indication to really understand Iran’s conduct is to listen to the statements of Ayatollah Khamenei and his senior Revolutionary Guard commanders.” – Sajadpur [19:10]

Important Timestamps & Segments

• Protest Analysis: [03:13–06:55]
• Opposition & Nationalism: [09:29–12:40]
• Regime Structure & Succession: [13:00–21:53]
• Foreign Intervention: [25:36–35:36]
• Discussion of Scenarios: [42:28–47:24]
• Role of Reza Pahlavi: [55:32–59:42]
• Culture of Mistrust: [59:42–63:07]

Memorable Moments

• The “Zombie Regime” Analogy:
  Sajadpur’s depiction of the Islamic Republic as a “zombie regime” that lingers with sheer force despite dead ideology and legitimacy ([05:53]).

• Skepticism of Foreign Solutions:
  “You can't change regimes just with True Social posts… nor just through targeted strikes.” ([32:05–33:06])

• Iran’s Destiny After Khamenei:
  Suggestion that the next leader, if a strongman, “will not be wearing a turban” encapsulates the likely end of clerical rule ([46:38], [00:07]).

• Mistrust as a Political Legacy:
  “That culture of mistrust is going to inhibit collaboration, political collaboration, and the formation of effective political parties…” ([61:28])

Tone

The conversation is analytical, richly contextualized, and at times laced with dark humor. Sajadpur uses vivid analogies (e.g., “zombie regime,” “economic sugar high”), historical references, and direct quotes from both Iranian memory and global politics, providing a highly accessible yet profound exploration of Iran’s predicament.

This summary is designed to deliver all key context and insight for listeners who have not engaged with the episode, using the language and intellectual style of the podcast’s hosts and guests. For more detail, refer to the highlighted timestamps throughout.