C (4:13)

In fact, I was reminded, sort of watching all of this unfold, including today, we're already in a different place than we were. A few days ago. Trump was calling Zelensky a dictator. Now today it's, oh, will you sign the minerals deal? Whatever that deal is, we don't really know. But I was reminded of the piece that you did right after the US Election in November in which you laid out the fact that Ukrainians are quite used to this, which is important to remember. And I just wanted to read a quote from that because I think it's so prescient to what is happening now. And you said Ukraine has many reasons to be concerned about a second Trump presidency. Trump has not said how he would end the war or even under what conditions. In the background there is his longtime admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Trump's running mate, J.D. vance, who is one of the first Republicans to embrace indifference to to Ukraine as a policy position. All this has led many to fear that Washington, by far Kyiv's biggest arms supplier, might cut off the flow of aid or even allow Moscow to dictate the terms of peace. And then you go on to say, but the reality of the war has made Ukrainians pragmatic. Setting aside Trump's campaign rhetoric, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is preparing to work with him. After all, Ukrainians lived through the first Trump administration and have some sense of what they are Getting deal making and attempts to flatter Putin, but also eventually a major sale of lethal arms, including Javelin anti tank weapons, which have been critical in the fight against Russia. Zelensky's task is and will remain to find ways to receive what his government needs to defend the population in the long run. And so this is more or less where we are today, is it not?

B (5:58)

It is. But you know, I remember prior to the campaign the US Rhetoric was not also very good. I remember very well that day during the campaign, Ukrainian ambassador was kind of accused of organizing the partisan meeting when the Democrats were. Zelensky visited one of the military production in Pennsylvania, you know, and there was even the demand of the Republican Party leadership in the Congress to fire the Ukrainian ambassador, you know, and I also remember that the Republicans didn't want to meet with Zelenskyy at that time, but somehow it worked and Zelenskyy met Donald Trump, you know, so it's like this moments when it's totally cut off, then something is happening. I think these moments will be still ongoing. But what is new, and I think not that much for us rather than for Europe, is that quite a clear idea that the relation between Europe and Donald Trump and the United States are not like they were, you know, that there are a lot of concern that the US Won't be backing up European allies. So I do think it's a bit more serious. And the level of flattering of Donald Trump with Russians is quite, I won't say surprising, but Trump directly quoting Putin more or less speaking in the same words. Again, it's not something we couldn't expect, but I wouldn't underestimate that. But yes, I think Ukrainians are used to that.

C (7:30)

Of course, under the surface we know that much more serious negotiations are going on with the actual negotiating team. Keith Kellogg meeting with Zelenskyy yesterday, I believe. And we have other developments. So it's hard to tell what on the surface really reflects actual actions and what is more kind of the rhetorical wave that we've almost become used to now, driven by social media.

B (7:55)

So look, I shouldn't also maybe miss a chance to say that if you really speak about public opinion, yes, quite a lot of people were furious about the deal with the US to have like half of the Ukrainian natural resources. We don't know exactly what is in this deal, but more or less it sounded appalling. People didn't like the tone. Emotionally, Ukrainians are more angry than generally the political leadership of Ukraine saying, but yes, we are in the moment when we believe there could be decrease of the American aid. And first of all, with usaid, there is no any longer money. You know, to be honest, like despite all the courts and processes, it's clear that part of the financial support is not there already. It's kind of happened that is already there. I think what we need to speak is like whether the Ukraine would be able, if the US won't be given this aid, to buy it, even like, you know, like to ask Europeans to buy that weapon. And I think that is the real thing because of course we can speak about the deal, about the settlement, but there won't be any, you know, no less intense fight on the battleground. While there would be discussion about the settlement and the peace negotiation with Moscow, the major thing for Ukraine would be still defending itself from the Russian missiles. And we really need the patriots, we really need the ammunition for Patriots and other air defense, but also on the front line. So it's still the most kind of critical thing at this moment for Ukraine to balance and try to fight this war with decreased American aid.

C (9:41)

Let's talk about that for a moment. We are now at the third anniversary of the full scale invasion and the actual frontline situation in some ways has been somewhat lost the last couple weeks. There was a report even as this sort of fight was playing out in the media, there were reports just this past week that the Russian offensive is slowing. I believe Ukrainian forces retook a village near Prokhovsk and the drone defenses have had a lot of success recently just on the military side. Where is the current situation?

B (10:18)

So it looks like it's better than half a year ago because I remember very well the whole autumn the discussion was, you know, the Pokrovsk will be overtaken and then Russia would be very close to the occupation of the full Donetsk region. Something they really want because it's a part of their special operation. But indeed, I even had a chance very, very briefly to meet one of the commanders of the ground forces a couple of weeks ago. And he said like for the last two weeks, the situation Yapokrovsk is definitely improving. And that's what we hear from the Western analysts who are also saying that for Russians to overtake the towns in or even Pokrovsk in the major towns in the east, they will need like half a year or year. So, you know, it really slowed down and that's why I'm like really returning to this point that, you know, the whole discussion this week since the Munich security conference, since the meeting in Iriad, was dominated by the fact that Ukraine was not invited to the talks in Saudi Arabia. It was not on the table. The Europeans were also not there. What is the leverage of the US to force Ukraine to the deal? You know, I'm using this terminology, force the deal on Ukraine. The leverage is, of course, military aid because Ukrainians really don't want the deal without the guarantee. So I think that the Americans are coming from the position that Ukrainians will accept the deal whatsoever, and Ukrainians coming from the position we won't accept the deal we don't like. And there is some misunderstanding in the media that, you know, people are coming from two different positions. Why I'm saying Ukrainians won't accept because Ukrainians won't accept anything which doesn't provide any security guarantees. And they are not at all discussed at this stage. They were not there during the meeting of J.D. vance with President Zelensky when there was this discussion about the minerals offered. There were kind of demands from Ukraine, or let's say, suggestion what Ukraine should give, but there was nothing about what the US Will provide in return. And if nothing is provided in return, it means situation for Ukrainian isn't improving. So there is no sense even to consider it to be a settlement. It won't be accepted without any guarantees.

C (12:40)

And maybe this brings us to your piece. I mean, one of the opening conceits of your essay, which seems very important, is that we have this sort of assumption in the west that after three years, Ukraine must be desperate for a deal. And your point is actually no, you know, no deal is better than a bad deal. And that given all other realities, without these crucial guarantees, Ukraine is not going to just stop fighting. But I think the other crucial point that is in your framing is that in fact, there's a kind of disconnect in how the west sees the war now and what it is like in Ukraine and not just on the front lines, but as your pieces have continually pointed out, the civilian situation in Ukraine is remarkably different than what might be portrayed as a kind of total war over a society. And can you just give us a sense of that now? Where are we now after, you know, we're two thirds of the way through the third winter of the war.

B (13:48)

So indeed, it's something very unusual, this abnormal normalcy. And of course, as a Ukrainian, I'm permanently leaving Kyiv. And, you know, we have the air strikes almost every night around the country. So it's obviously tiring. There is a level of devastation and 20% of the country is occupied and some parts of the country are destroyed, particularly on the front line. But since it's a big country, the rest of it kind of manages to live and function. So for instance, for the second year, despite of the all negative prognosis, we didn't have any serious blackouts during winter. You know, there was energy, there was electricity, despite Russians are shelling on the infrastructure all the time. Obviously not without the Western financial support, including a huge European ones. You know, you know, Ukraine has functioning economy because the pensions are paid, health care system is working, education is there, the bank system is working. Yes, we have curfew. But life is kind of normal in most of the country. Of course, there is always a permanent risk to die of the people who are fighting in the front line. And almost every Ukrainian has a family member who is fighting. But at the same time, modern technology and generally the functioning state allows Ukrainians kind of live as if the war is not there, especially for those who are further from the frontline or in the big cities. So I think I usually try to explain it as chances of terrorist attacks. So you kind of live your life as if it's normal. And then there is always a chance that the Russian bomb would fall on your head at night. During the day, would you be in hospital, would you be in shopping mall, Would you be elsewhere? But there is this air defense alert, so you can kind of find your way to hide. And also, first of all, there is air defense, contrary to 2022. And what is also missing in this point that Ukraine is today, let's say it can fall easily if there are no money at all. But somehow it's more stable. So compared to zero production of weapon in 2022, today the Ukrainian government claims 40% of the weapon used in the front line is produced in Ukraine. We were fully dependent. We had almost nothing. Now it's different. And also people are kind of more prepared to the risk. Therefore, the life like we have, despite all the exhaustion, is definitely better than the life under the Russian occupation, which is something we couldn't even imagine how bad it is in 2022. It's really the level of the political repressions. The repressions against the people is horrific. The crimes which are committed under the occupation, but also a prospect that if we give up, if we kind of just freeze the conflict today and the Russians would attack in couple of years, then the cities which were protected, like Kyiv, which didn't fell in 2022, you know, which could have been occupied because the Russian troops were really close. If there is just a settlement without the guarantees, then Kyiv could be in situation like Kherson, which had been occupied, or like other territories. So it's a very clear choice. So what we have is bad. You don't want to have it. But it's so much better that what the freeze without guarantees or the Russian occupation will bring, that you opt for preserving what we have.

C (17:43)

This brings us to the heart of your piece, and let's turn to that now, because I think in Putin's Ukraine, your essay, you do something which is really kind of remarkable at this stage into the war, which is, I think, you kind of reconceptualize how we should think about the war. And the whole question of occupation is interesting because I think even for the sort of military analysts, it has been sort of to the side of the main discussion of the war. And we have this kind of human rights perspective. And this is, of course, important. And your own work on this has been crucial. Your. Your organization, the Reckoning Project, is in fact, doing human rights documentation. So I think it may be actually sort of surprising, knowing your work, that you are arguing actually that the human rights perspective is kind of missing the larger point. And I'll just read this passage because I think it neatly captures what you're trying to say. And you write, as many Ukrainians recognize what observers in the west have characterized as brutal excesses in occupied areas, human rights abuses, political repression, and war crimes are in fact, a central part of Russia's war strategy. The issue is not merely what happens to those under Russian rule, but how Moscow has used its control of significant numbers of Ukrainians to undermine the stability of the whole country, even without taking more territory. And then you go on to say, put simply, Russian control over any part of Ukraine subverts and corrodes Ukrainian sovereignty everywhere. So in a sense, you're saying this is war strategy. It's not excess. Even the kind of systematic abuses are not just wanton brutality. This is a concerted part of what Russia is trying to do to achieve its larger goals in Ukraine. Can you just sort of explain what you're getting at?

B (19:44)

Yeah. So there are two sides. So indeed, I've been working on the war crimes documentation since 2022, but since 2014, I've been reporting mainly from the human perspective, the occupation of the eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Traveling to Crimea quite often, it was very, very hard to raise awareness internationally about the human rights abuses, repression of what's going on in Crimea and the eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainians knew well what was going on, but I think we were all mistaken, including myself, including a lot of Ukrainian human rights defenders, because we were always speaking about that as a political repressions. And you know, these two words of real politics of geopolitics, sometimes you, the human rights people consider to be very naive, idealistic. The war is different. But what we observed that eight years of the occupation of Crimea and the eastern Ukraine was a preparation by Russia to launch the bigger war, to use that territories as a launchpad for the war, militarize peninsulas, accumulate the troops there and put behind the bars the people who could be outspoken, not because they're politically criticizing the Russian regime and they didn't want to have any dissent. They really literally wanted those people who on February 2022 could be picking and telling that, you know, oh, the full scale invasion is there, the tanks are on the border with the rest of Ukraine. They were all behind the bars. And the whole strategy of bringing the Russian population to the occupied territories, putting the people en masse, in jail, torturing them, beating them and threatening against any dissent, they were the part of pacifying the territory so their military can fight. And that's what we really expect from the occupied territories. So the closer they are to the rest of the Ukraine, the more territories they control, the larger chances are that in some years the very similar territories today of Kherson region, southern part of it, Zaporizhzhia region, would be again used like the launchpad further to attack Kharkiv, to attack Dnipro, to attack Odessa. But also the whole processes, administrative processes, giving the Russian passport to the Ukrainian population. It's all part of this strategy how to control the part of the territory which could be used for waging even the bigger war. But there is something else which is also very interesting and that's something which I heard from the Russian side in Riyadh. You know, the Europeans and people like myself who follow the negotiations which were called Minsk Agreement 2, but including, you know, French and Germans, recognize that what Russia is offering today to the new American administration is more or less something which was there and which was discussed in a very similar way for the last eight years.

C (22:42)

Before 2022.

B (22:43)

Before 2022, it's really strikingly similar to, to the Minsk offers. We call it Minsk Tree without Zelensky. You know, it's really just almost the same. But at that time there were discussion about the elections in the occupied territories where the Russians could put their puppets and you know, like destroy Ukraine from within control it politically. And it's even amazing to understand how they are literally offering almost the same deal. It's too similar, but in a larger scale, you know, with more territories occupied. And why it works, because the Americans, the current administration, was not there. It's really fascinating how they are not even trying to hide it.

C (23:28)

It's a case of deja vu, you might say. So there's a lot there. I want to unpack this kind of in several steps because I think it's really important to get clear on what you're saying. Firstly, in a sense, we're sort of mistaken when we talk about the third anniversary because this is really an 11 year war. And I think, as your piece makes so clear, the Ukrainian understanding of the war really begins with 2014 and specifically the occupation, which was such a reality from that moment. And you're reporting in Crimea and what you actually call the Crimean toolkit that Russia has developed in Crimea and in eastern Donbas. And we're now seen kind of amped up to a whole new level in the territories that have been occupied since, since 2022. But just first to explain that toolkit as you describe it, because I think we have this idea in our head that occupation is just a military force coming in and establishing military rule over a territory. And in fact, this has a whole series of implications in how order is imposed and what it actually means for the rest of Ukraine. And why is it that the 80% of Ukraine that is free today nevertheless is acutely feeling the occupation every day.

B (24:55)

So I think we still need to differentiate the type of the occupation which was happening before 2022, because if before that, you know, it was something we could expect that, you know, journalists, Crimean indigenous population, which were always not trustful in Russia, would be risking their lives while staying in the occupation because they were detained, they were politically repressed, everything Ukrainian was forbidden, the schools were Russified, the Russians were preparing and teaching the children, in totally different narrative were more or less really Russifying this population, but creating the situation when the population of the occupied territories could be drafted to the army. But at the same time we could understand who were under the attack. What happened after 2022. I remember very well the conversation which for me described it very, very well. I talked with the wife of one of the survivors of the man in Berdyansky Zaporizhzhia region near Mariupol, who've been detained and tortured and treated horribly by the Russians. And she really said, you know, it's enough to have your own opinion to be arrested and detained. It doesn't matter which opinion you should have. And now we can see that anybody who is not openly supporting the Russian occupation can be taken in prison, can be violently treated. So I should say, within our project, the Reckoning Project, we have Talked for over 500 survivors of the war crimes, and half of them are from the occupied territories. And all people from the occupied territories, almost all of them were at some moment detained, beaten, tortured, and dozens of them electrocuted. So it's really, the magnitude of the violence used against the people is drastic. But the second thing is the social and political life. So indeed, you know, it's not about even having a Ukrainian flag. You can be told that once you used to have the Ukrainian flag, that's already the reason to be detained and be suspicious. But also without the Russian passport, for instance, you cannot get the medical aid, including the urgent medical aid, or you can be threatened that your children would be taken. You need to cooperate with the Russian state in some way. But also politically, these territories are kind of in limbo. Some of the parts of these territories, there was no active battlefield for some time there, but in some parts, because after the first year when Russians couldn't really occupy any bigger town, what they were doing, they literally were destroying the town. And when the Ukrainian army had to withdraw, they were taking these areas, but they're not really rebuilding them properly. And people are really suffering there because there is no, you know, proper schooling, proper health care. But the people who are brought from Russia, they receive preferences.

C (28:03)

You said the people brought from Russia, because I think this is another aspect of the occupation that we in the west have sort of lost sight of. And that is the, the very significant program of bringing in Russians to this territory. And again, this goes back to Crimea, as you say, I think however many is it 800,000 or it's quite a large number who were brought into Crimea after 2014. And this, in a sense is a model for what's happening in some areas of the new territories.

B (28:38)

Yes, as you know, it's something which was estimated after quite a few years that in Crimea, which is Overall it's about 2 million people and up to 800,000 people were brought from Russia to the peninsula, which also, you know, creates the long lasting problem. Because who will speak about the public opinion in Crimea today, you know, how we can define it if it's not about the people who used to live there before, and if the same will happen in Mariupol, where also people are moved from the rest of Russia. So it's more or less erasing anything Ukrainian in The territories and creating long lasting problem. So at the same time for Ukrainians, it's hard because if you don't live at that territories, for instance, and you, let's say move to Kyiv or Kharkiv or to different town, but you have your flat and apartment there, there are cases when the housing was taken away from people if they didn't return to the occupied territories and they were given to a different people, to the newcomers. So it's extremely complex and difficult life. And it's also about the difficult choices. Do you want to leave this territory, abandon this territory and fully, you know, leave it for the loyal Russian citizens. But also the life there is unlivable if you are not openly supporting the occupation. Of course, you know, a lot of people leave in the occupation without supporting the Russian regime. But that's a huge challenge. And you know, who are the people coming? It's military, it's their families, these are law enforcement. So it's really creating this territory which could be hostile to the Ukrainian state. You know, it's a complex issue how Ukraine should deal with the population, with the territories afterwards. But I would insist the time in this regard is not on our side. The longer the occupation lasts. So for instance, we agree for the freezing situation as it is, within the couple of years, children won't go to the schools where would be any sign of the Ukrainian language. Moreover, you know, they are taught a totally different version of history of what's going on. So there is also a huge propaganda brainwashing campaign. And quite a lot of people also have forgotten. How has Russia changed since 2022? You know, I've been to Russia the last time in summer 2021. I have friends and family members and we know it's a different country. I know a lot of European and American experts, they had been to Moscow. You know, it's a vibrant city, big, looks quite western. And again, like I've been quite a lot to Moscow after 2014. It's very different country today. You know, the Russian regime for quite some time offered their citizens, you know, like we bring you financial stability, something like that, but do not express your opinion, express your opinion in kitchen or whatsoever. After the full scale invasion. It's very ideological state. People are prosecuted, they're taken from their houses. You know, it's really more like North Korea than we can imagine. The ideology is in the schools, in the universities. And that's why what is being created in these territories, it's really a pretty drastic type of regime, a kind of warlord, military Type repressive territories which you really don't want to be there. Me or anybody whom I know out of my circle knows that there is zero chance to survive in the Russian occupation if we stay there. For us, there is no chance.

C (32:37)

I mean, one way of thinking about this, there are actually two different occupations happening. There's the occupation of Ukrainians who are stuck in these areas, this kind of reign of terror which you describe so well in your piece. And then there's the second occupation of these Russian communities which are essentially being created on the ruins in Mariupol, literally on the ruins of this once very large and flourishing city where the population has been largely destroyed. It's quite an astonishing story that has happened sort of underneath the actual sort of top level of the war.

B (33:17)

So again, in this regard, the time is not solving the problem, the ceasefire, the just like keeping the situation as it is. Because in the territories occupied by Russia, first of all, Russia itself would accumulate weapons, would still work with all their partners in North Korea or Iran or wherever to build their military economy to produce more weapons to catch up, because they are also exhausted. But at the same time there would be this broadening the territory where the Russians would be able to do whatever they want, not following any agreements. But there won't be anybody to watch that. And again, the closer to the rest of the Ukrainian territory, the more fortified the line would be, the more soldiers they would have because they're disproportionately trying to mobilize the local population. It cannot happen today, but in future, of course, they would use this population as well to have more soldiers to fight against Ukraine.

A (34:25)

We'll be back after a short break.

D (34:28)

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C (36:03)

And now back to my conversation with Natalia Gumenyuk. Let's just talk for a minute about the issue of negotiations because I think also the way we think about territory is essentially that is the central thing, it's how much territory would be on each side of any ceasefire. And as you point out in your piece, it's not about territory, it's about what is happening on the territory. And I think it's useful to remember as you point out, that there's something like 6 million Ukrainians under the occupied areas. I mean it's a huge population and this is actually less than the many more who have been able to leave or to go to the West. And I guess the larger question is here, what do you see playing out in a kind of ceasefire that does not provide the kinds of guarantees that Ukrainians are saying are absolutely essential.

B (37:03)

So the most important part is don't repetition. Let's say that Ukraine would be less militarized and then Russia attacks. So for Ukraine the most important is being even stronger protected than it is now. So Russia there would be this level of deterrence that the Russians won't attack again and if they attack, we would understand what will happen. I think that now discussion is really shifting too much about very hypothetical idea about some European troops on the ground without clear understanding what they should do there. But for Ukraine it's more about protecting the sky, protecting the country, having a superiority on air because if Ukraine has superiority on air like usual NATO army has, the Russians won't be able to wage this type of war, to be honest. So it's not the miraculous kind of solution which doesn't exist. It's pretty simple. So now coming to the idea of Ukraine being part of NATO and by the way, yes, reminding everybody that just part of Germany was accepted to NATO in 50s. So I don't think it's totally impossible, but we see that there is no willingness of the American president, I won't speak about the red lines from the Russian side because if we really speak about the Russian red lines, militarization of Ukraine is also similarly a red line for them. NATO is largely symbolic, but NATO is kind of the cheapest option as Long as we start to list what are the security guarantees. You start to write 1, 2, 3, 4, and then you understand that actually you're inventing the wheel. And then there is a question whether you need to create something which is very similar to NATO, just isn't called NATO, but isn't like creating the systems which duplicates each other, maybe weakening current alliance again. But I don't think that for the Ukrainians, the symbolic things matter at this stage that much. But there are not yet on the discussion the real things which won't allow Russia to repeat this type of war before we discuss the real guarantees. Everything else doesn't look like like serious discussion, like real deal, like real settlement.

C (39:33)

Indeed. Maybe one of the more important takeaways of what is happening now is that the most likely outcome in the immediate near term is more fighting. And how should we think about that? And I think it's helpful to remember one of the points you made in your previous piece last summer after the Kursk offensive. And that offensive itself followed a major Russian offensive which we may have forgotten now, but this was a kind of a failure that Russia tried to take Kharkiv. And as you concluded in that piece, as of the time you wrote the piece, it seemed highly unlikely that Russia would be able to, not only not to capture Kharkiv, but any other large Ukrainian city. And that in itself seems quite remarkable. Now, we can remember that there was the failure to take Kyiv at the start of the war. There was the failure to occupy Kherson, which was occupied for nine months but then lost. Then the repeated failures to take Kharkiv. And I just wonder at this point, do you stand by that? Do you think that Russia is actually unable to, in a sense that what it is fighting over is these areas of occupation, but it has, has not actually achieved these goals that it set out to.

B (40:52)

So look, Russia called the North Korean troops to free Kursk region. It's very important for them. Putin really wanted to liberate the Kursk region before kind of meeting with Trump before the deal, because then it gives him an opportunity to ask again for the freeze of the territories. Because now if you really ask for the freeze, then it means that Ukraine is controlling part of the Russian land. By the way, also worth it to say and understand what do the Russians red lines mean. So many people were saying, like Crimea is a red line for Putin. That is a red line for Putin. Ukraine, in the end, occupied part of Russia, you know, and waging the war on the Russian territory. But you Know what Russia does? Russia does everything possible, fighting back. But it's already half a year. I honestly thought that it will be way faster for them to liberate the Kursk region. And so it's not really easy. Again, it costs lives of the Ukrainian soldiers. It could be done better. So for Ukraine is the most important argument as well. Saying that, you know, what President Trump is doing today is kind of like prolonging the war. And, you know, the war is bad for every society. I really understand well that it's not something we want to prolong, but the settlement isn't the end. It just because the occupation is not the peace. Occupation is just another way of war. We cannot call the occupation a liberation, the peace, especially if it's used for further attacks. So, yeah, I don't see now the opportunity to occupy Kharkiv, Dnipro or Kyiv, but it doesn't mean they won't try. Russia is. Is not that mighty to take over Ukraine, but it's strong enough to destroy a lot. But what Ukrainians are trying to say, that Ukrainian task is not really to destroy Russia or win over Russia as such, but make everything possible, that their mission in Ukraine will fail, and their mission is failing. It's already failed and it's failing. So that is a realistic goal for Ukraine to let them know that there is no sense to do that. They won't get more. They won't destroy Ukrainian state. It will still exist. So they would, in some moment retreat to some extent.

C (43:27)

In short, you could say even if Ukraine can't win, it can make Russia fail. Realistically, recapturing all of that territory now in the immediate future may be impossible, but you can ensure that Russia is continuing to fail in its own goals. And that, in a way, is a kind of victory, and maybe a better one than entering some kind of deal that would, in a sense, undermine the future security of the country. I just want to ask you one final question, because I think maybe this is left out and this will be on a lot of people's minds here. And I think there's a general sense that Ukraine has had a remarkable run these three years. But is it sustainable now? The manpower, the flow of arms, and of course, in the background is everything you've said about U.S. support. But beyond the question of U.S. support, just from the internal perspective, can Ukraine keep fighting this war?

B (44:30)

So, of course, there is a huge task for the Ukrainian society and state to go on as long as it takes. It's not something Ukrainians really feel is fair and Just. But couple of things in terms of, for instance, for mobilization, which is very critical, of course, you need to have a manpower to fight back. You know, now we started discussing how normal life is in some of the parts of Ukraine where there is no war. And it was the choice of the Ukrainian government not to force people leave country, to keep taxpayers inside the country, to kind of have this double life when you have the frontline and the normal life. And I think that if things are getting too bad, part of the Ukrainians would have to decrease the level of their life. You know, pay way higher taxes, have way more limitations. It's complicated because then Ukraine may lose more people. You know, people leaving the country, not staying, which means Ukraine may lose money from the taxpayers. So it's a very complex decision. And I think in this regard, Ukrainians have to be prepared that the level of life would be worse, it would be much harder. But it's still possible. Of course, we can't discount also what Russia will be doing. The Russians will be trying during this way, you know, divide Ukrainian society, play with vulnerabilities. We're already observing how they're using these talks in Riyadh and the message that, oh, the U.S. has abandoned Ukraine in order to sow the division and kind of create this kind of atmosphere of despair. You know, the mood in Moscow, they celebrate, you know, see how this campaign is kind of floating the Ukrainian media space in the social media, in the telegram channel, like, celebrating the ideas that that the west has abandoned Ukraine. So it's also something to take into account that if the life of the people would get worse and there would be this kind of information campaign from Moscow, there could be a different type of the mood. But what is also interesting, you know, the days after the Riyadh talks and all the Donald Trump tweets, I haven't seen Ukrainians that determined and united for quite some time, for probably last year. There is a moment, the feeling very similar, like Ukrainians had in February 2022, when the whole world was saying Kyiv would fall within three days. And Ukrainians were like, no, we will fight. No, we will fight. We'll make a cause. We'll prove, we will fight. This moment feels like the ones we need to prove we can survive whatsoever. But also it's very important for Ukraine at the same time not to throw Donald Trump and the new American administration into the Russian hands because it would be too much of a present just to give up upon the US Support and just by default say that, okay, they are there somewhere. With Putin, I don't believe that the US Would ever really fight on the Russian side. So I really think we also shouldn't push them too hard into the disregarding what our emotions are, because it would be just a very good present to the Russian leadership.

C (48:01)

Natalia with that, I think we should wrap it up. And please read Natalia's pieces, not only her current essay, but her previous essays in Foreign affairs, many of which are as relevant today as when they were written. Thank you.

B (48:18)

Thanks for having me. It was a pleasure.

A (48:26)

Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Julia fleming dresser, Molly McEnany, Ben Metzner and Caroline Wilcox. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.