A (3:48)

Let me put a version of that question to you on US Policy. How would you describe the Biden administration's theory of the case? And again, how well does it seem to be working?

B (3:57)

Well, I think something very important has happened in the evolution of US Policy, particularly in the last few weeks. The evolution started with a very notable speech by John Finer, the deputy national security advisor who went to Michigan to speak to disaffected voices in the Arab Emirates and progressive community. I think it was about six weeks ago, but his remarks were leaked and they were, Mayor Cooper, on behalf of the administration, that they had not been sensitive enough to Palestinian casualties, that they had not focused enough on the Palestinian dimension of this conflict. And that started a process that unfolded very quickly of the vice president, Kamala Harris, president himself, and then Chuck Schumer, the leader of the Senate, all coming out and making clear that they had greater concern on Israel's part with the humanitarian problems that they were contributing to Gaza. And it became a chorus of criticism of Israel, the likes of which we have not seen before, clearly aimed at trying to signal to Democrats that, quote, we care, unquote, and that the battle for what might or might not happen over Rafah became the real indication of a real test of whether the administration was true to its word in that regard. And so it became a real confrontation between Netanyahu and Biden and Schumer and Kamala Harris. I mean, the big guns came out on the American side in a way that we've never seen before. But what it marked was, I think, fairly dramatic shift in American calculus whereby it was no longer a question of standing by Israel and hoping it would all blow over. It was now a question of standing by Israel as much as possible, but making sure in the process that Israel took into account the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people. That was a big shift in policy. And then when the administration felt that they were not getting Netanyahu's attention, that he was more defiant than pliable, they started to press in areas that were previously forbidden territory. And so we heard talk out of Washington of conditioning arms sales. We heard Democratic senators talking about legislation that would put humanitarian conditions on arms supplies to Israel. This previously was something that would never be discussed, let alone considered to be implemented. And that, in a way, crossed another guardrail. And finally, we had a vote in the UN Security Council where the United States abstained on a resolution that called for an immediate ceasefire and a release of the hostages. That abstention was a shot across Netanyahu's bow, an indication that he could not rely on the United States anymore to protect Israel in the Security Council if Israel was going to take actions that created problems for the United States in particular, on the humanitarian front. And to just underscore how radical a change this is, Chuck Schumer, leader of the pro Israel community, leader of the Democrats in the Senate, top Democrat and top pro Israeli, gives a long speech in which he calls for the overthrow of the Israeli government of Netanyahu, and the President of the United States supports him.

A (8:10)

I just want to turn to the Hamas side of this because you wrote something very notable in Foreign affairs on October 7, where you said, I fear that Hamas's intention is to get Israel to retaliate massively and have the conflict escalate. A West bank uprising, Hezbollah attacks, a revolt in Jerusalem. We haven't seen those last three. But I'm curious, if you look at this from Hamas's perspective, do they have a strategy? Do they have a sense of how this might play out that could work to Hamas's advantage?

B (8:38)

It's not going well for them. They're under a lot of pressure militarily. Their ranks have been broken up. Their commandment control has been disrupted. It's hard to know if you listen to the Israelis and suggest that they're close to their last legs, but not there yet. Others are more skeptical, but they've certainly suffered a military blow in their ability to exercise control in Gaza is very questionable now. But they'd hoped always, I think, from the beginning, to spark a wider conflagration, first with Hezbollah, then with other Iranian proxies. They've been most successful with the Houthis. Hezbollah has been a very controlled engagement which Hezbollah has made clear it doesn't want a war with Israel. But the biggest test and the biggest failure I would say, so far is in these current days of Ramadan, when Hamas hoped to spark an uprising in Jerusalem, the most sensitive place at the most sensitive time of the year. And it's been quiet, amazingly quiet. It's partly because Greta Wickred is due and I don't give him much. But Netanyahu took action to defuse the situation and to prevent his crazy ministers, particularly Ben Veer, from stoking trouble there. But there was clearly a decision on the part of the leadership of Jerusalem, Arabs, Palestinian, Israelis, to keep things quiet and in effect, to break with Hamas. And I think that sends a very important signal that basically Hamas is unable to spread this conflict beyond the Houthis. And that's somewhat contained. They have failed to really spark an uprising in the west bank or in Jerusalem. And I think that that is the biggest blow to them.

A (10:39)

That's a good segue to the very powerful and trenchant essay you have in the current issue of Foreign affairs is again called the Strange Resurrection of the Two State Solution. You focus on the fact that after several years in which the efforts to really make progress on a two state solution have been more or less moribund, there is a kind of glimmer of hope, somewhat paradoxically, in the horrors of what's going on. You have, of course, been engaged in this effort, probably more intensively than almost anyone else for the last few decades. As you look back at that history, there's so much of an attempt to kind of understand what happened in the 1990s, especially when you were very central to those efforts and what we should take from those. As you look back and look at the hopes of that period in the Oslo process, what do you wish you'd known then? What would you do differently if you could go back and do it again, if anything?

B (11:32)

Well, I think what became most obvious in our engagement with the two sides was that neither was sick about making peace and reconciling on the basis of a two state solution. Political conditions simply weren't there. There was no trust between them or between their people that could serve to overcome the leadership problems. And there was basically nothing the United States could do to change that dynamic. So the big question now is, with so many Israelis opposed now to anything for the Palestinians, there's this extraordinary, I find, as somebody who's been involved with Israel for so many decades, extraordinary insensitivity to the suffering of the Palestinians. And it's not just right wingers. It's across the board, as Israelis remain preoccupied, understandably so, with their own suffering and a feeling that they, as long as their hostages aren't returned, that they be indifferent to the suffering of the Palestinians. And that that is just a reflection of how far we are from a reconciliation. And on the Palestinian side, it's similar. How could it not be after some 30,000 Palestinians have been killed, so many thousand children. So to start from here and try to promote reconciliation is a hard sell to Israelis or Palestinians. And I think we just have to face that reality. On the other hand, and there is another hand, there has never been a common conviction on the part of the United States, the Arab Sunni leaders, the international community, that there has to be a way forward to resolve this problem. It can't just keep on going like this forever. And the suffering is too great. And so I do think that that pressure on the two sides forces them to come up with some way forward that is manifesting itself now with the decision of Palestinian President Abu Mazen to change his prime minister and bring in a technocratic government and start the process of revitalization. And he's also taken steps to remove the pay to slay arrangements that caused the Palestinian authorities so many problems with the United States and Israel.

A (14:01)

This is payments to the families of Palestinians who have killed Israelis. That's the pay to slay.

B (14:06)

Exactly. We're engaged in terrorist acts. Under the old arrangements. They were paid more for killing Israelis. So Abel Mazen has undertaken that. Process appears to be underway and we'll see in the next few weeks where that happens. But it would be an even step towards the revitalization of the PA that Sadhany have been talking about. You have Arab states, particularly Saudis, Qataris Emirates, the rich Gulf Arab states, but also with the support of Egypt and Jordan, willing now to take a bigger role than they've ever been willing to play before in getting behind the Palestinian Authority, building its capabilities, helping with the United States to train its cadres of security people to introduce them into Gaza and areas where they can operate, like controlling the passengers and so on. This is a lot of weedy stuff, but the point is that there is a growing willingness to do things that weren't previously considered. Don't want to exaggerate it, but I see some green shoots there. Unfortunately, the Israeli side, it's the exact opposite. The coalition government of Bibi Netanyahu is so opposed to the Palestinian state, to a two state solution to the Palestinian Authority exercising any kind of control in Gaza that we're stuck and we're unable to move with them, even though there is the kind of golden pot at the end of the rainbow of normalization and peace with Saudi Arabia. If the Israelis were to move down this road towards a credible path for two state solution involving rehabilitation of the pa, Saudis are ready, but Netanyahu is not because of composition of his coalition government, which is absolutely opposed to introducing the PNA or to anything that might cramp their style when it comes to their efforts to annex the west bank, which is a complete non starter for the Arabs, of course. So you've got this disconnect and this is why there is so much tension between the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government. Because President Biden sees an opportunity here to chart a course to a more positive future for Israelis and Palestinians. And he's got the Saudis and the other Arabs ready to cooperate and the rest of the international community. But he can't get Netanyahu to cooperate

A (16:44)

before getting to the possible path to that better future. Just to linger on some of the darker visions, you noted the desire of the far right members of Netanyahu's coalition to annex the West Bank. They've talked about clearing Palestinians out of Gaza since the war began. In some ways, that solution seems like one of the more likely ones. Just given who is in power in Israel and the way this war is playing out. Do you fear that some of that could come to pass in the months ahead, given again the composition of that coalition and the state of politics on the Israeli side?

B (17:18)

I don't fear it because I think that they've put everybody on alert now and Biden administration is not going to let that happen. Another guardrail that's come down has been sanctioning settlers successive administrations were very reluctant to do, but now we're doing that as well. Vigilante settlers who attack Palestinians are subject to US Sanctions and that hurts them in their pocketbooks. They can't function financially and we're going to be doing more of those things. I think that when Secretary of State Blinken made it clear that from the administration point of view now settlement activity was illegal under international law, we crossed another line. And so I think the full array of pressure will be brought to bear to prevent the disruption of the status quo that could lead to annexation of more territory, whether it's in the west bank or Gaza.

A (18:20)

What other kind of pressure do you think the Biden administration could and should be using to try to bring about a change in the leadership or politics on the Israeli side, I think there

B (18:31)

are two aspects to this. One is operational and the other is political. On the operational side, the administration wants to have a significant say in what operations Israel undertakes now to minimize the humanitarian impact, the civilian casualties especially. But on the political level, there is a strong need for the administration to be able to show that it is actually reducing the number of casualties, stopping what looks like a disastrous raid on Rafah. And so the combination here is, I think, proving to be quite successful without actually withholding security assistance to Israel. And the reason for this is subtle, but it comes down to the following reality, which is that the Israeli Defense Forces are heavily dependent on the United States now for arms supplies, particularly as they look to the north and have to try to figure out what to do about this increasingly hard conflict with Hezbollah. And the fact that something like 180,000 Israelis can't go home in the north, which is an unacceptable situation for any government. And so as they think about their options there and the potential for war with Hezbollah, they have to have the United States on side. They cannot afford any slowdown of military equipment, any talk of slowdown of military equipment. So Netanyahu may want to go out by Biden, but people around him understand very clearly that there's a stringent to how far this game can go and they are not going to push it. It doesn't require Joe Biden to tap the brakes. They already understand it. And it's why we haven't seen an operation in Rafah. And that dependence which has been driven home in this war will continue for the foreseeable future. So we have a lot of braggadocio from Netanyahu. But when you look at the reality on the ground, there's a lot of willingness to take the advice of the United States and make sure that that relationship is not damaged by Netanyahu's childish performances.

A (21:09)

And as you look at the opportunity that that leverage creates, as you look to the next six months or so, what would be a kind of optimistic scenario about what US Pressure can achieve in terms of ending the war, but also laying the groundwork for the kind of pathway to two states that you lay out in the essay, it's very

B (21:27)

hard to say because it depends in the first instance on whether it's possible to get a prisoner exchange. And that's what's being negotiated as we're talking now. If they succeed, and that includes a six week pause, it changes everything. There will presumably be a pause with Hezbollah and a pause with the Houthis as well. There will be a breathing space to bring in the humanitarian relief that's so necessary. And there will be time, which I believe the Biden administration will use to try to launch the day after project, both in terms of bringing the PA into Gaza with international support and Arab support, and in terms of opening the way to eventual negotiations on a two state solution. So a lot gets triggered by a ceasefire and hostage exchange. If that doesn't happen, then, you know, I think we'll see some controlled operations into Rafah in various places, moving displaced people out and targeted attacks and a kind of continuation what we've been living with in the last few weeks. Operations we saw in two hospitals, but not a lot of casualties, not a lot of bombing, just a slower pace of war. Until something else turns up.

A (23:01)

We'll be back after a short break.

C (23:05)

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A (23:37)

Do you think as you look beyond this next phase of the war, progress on negotiations requires a change in leadership in Israel. Does this require, as Chuck Schumer said, Netanyahu being out of power, and you've been sparring with NETANYAHU since the 90s when you were ambassador to Israel. How likely is it that he will in fact be out of power a year from now?

B (23:59)

Well, from my experience, the likelihood is pretty low. He's the great survivor, and there's nobody quite like him in terms of his political skills and some maneuvering with the Israeli political system. But he's in a tight corner and something very significant happened. I would say we're at the beginning of April. Two important things have happened in the last couple of weeks that we should take note of. We've already discussed the way in which the United States is moving to pressure Israel in ways that it's never done before. The second thing that's happening is that the demonstrators are coming back to the streets of Israel now. For a long time after the October 7th atrocities, this was not the case you consider unpatriotic to demonstrate against the government in the middle of the war. That has all changed, I think, partly because of the United States and the pressure that we're now putting on Netanyahu, that the public in Israel are responding. And this last weekend they came out in very large numbers, tens of thousands again. And for the first time you saw protesters who had been involved in protesting Netanyahu before the war coming out again now and joining with families of hostages who for the first time called for Bibi's overthrow. Now, it's not yet critical mass. There were tens of thousands in the street, but we will see how that develops. It has the potential, with US backing, which is so overt now, it has the potential to become a widespread civil disobedience campaign, general strikes and pressure on the Knesset members to go to a new election. So I think there are a lot of moving parts now. If they manage to get a hostage deal, it'll send us off in a potentially positive direction. If they don't, I think the action is going to be in the streets of Israel and the calls for Netanyahu's resignation are going to become thunderous.

A (26:17)

One other recommendation you make in the essay, and this is one that has been picked up by a range of other observers in the last few weeks, is that President Biden should give a speech directly to the Israeli people. Not necessarily in Israel, but one in which he really speaks directly to them. Not so much going after Netanyahu, but trying to make the case to them that return to negotiations and creating a path to a Palestinian state is really the only way to avoid a much darker future. Do you see the moment for that kind of speech coming and how might that, if executed well, reshape the debate around this within Israel?

B (26:52)

No, I did not believe that he should go to the Knesset and make a speech. That's the difference between Richard Ice and myself, partly because of the parallel with Bibi going to Congress, which was so controversial, but mostly because he would get no respect there, they would throw tomatoes at him. And I think it would be pretty bad to expose the President in that way. But I do think that in the context of a ceasefire, with everything calming down and the hostages coming home, President to speak from the Oval Office to Israelis and Palestinians and Americans and explain his vision and lay it out in a way that is non threatening and provides hope for all sides that there is a way forward, a two state solution, and try to take away the things that the Israelis in particular most fear about Palestinian state. So to make the case that it would be demilitarized, there would be security arrangements, there would be testing periods, there are ways of dealing with all of these issues that the United States and the international community can be involved in, but they don't need to fear this and it's not being forced down their throat by them. I just think there's a way for him to speak directly to the Israeli public to address this and to the Palestinians as well. That timing's ripe for that. If we can get a ceasefire.

A (28:26)

Why would the Palestinians trust him at this point? I mean, thinking. When you look at views of the US among both the Palestinian population and Middle Eastern populations more generally, the views of the US are close to historic lows, I believe, or certainly as bad as they've been in many years. Are there other leaders, whether that's MBS or others in the region, who would be the right partners there? Or is there a possibility for American leadership to shape Palestinian opinion in a way that it hasn't for some time?

B (28:54)

It's a paradox that while everybody hates the US and blames the US and because the US is so supportive of Israel, it gets all the blame in none of the kudos if anything positive happens. But everybody and I, everybody knows the reality. It's only the United States that can influence Israel. And they look to the United States to influence Israel, and they get upset when the United States doesn't do what they want them to do. But it doesn't change their view that only the United States can deliver. For all of the bellyaching and complaining, in the end they know that Washington is the address. And we know that as long as we can deliver Israel with the Arabs, we'll be fine. The problem we have now is delivering Israel. They don't have a cooperative prime minister. We have instead of prime minister who's defying us. It really does undermine our ability to influence the other side. They don't like us fighting with Israel. They'd much rather see us delivering Israel. So there's no alternative to the United States taking the lead. Most importantly, because of our supposed influence on Israel, nobody else can come close to that. But I do believe, as I wrote in the Foreign affairs article, that Saudi Arabia can have a very positive role to play here. I mean, if you imagine a situation in which the President is trying to paint a picture of a more peaceful future for Israel and for the Palestinians, what better way to do it than to have the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia backing him up and saying he's ready to join this alliance of peace and to make peace with Israel, and the Saudi crown Prince remains keen to play that role. The challenge is to kind of break through the skepticism that the Israelis have at the moment because of their traumatic experience. And they blocked out anything that could possibly be good in favor of everything that's bad for them. So it has to be choreographed carefully. But you have a willing player in the Saudis and that can certainly, I think, be used to good effect. In a situation where we're past the hostage problem, we can kind of move on or try to, to look to a different future. And I really believe in the end that Israelis do not want a future of never ending war occupation for their children and grandchildren. And it's just a matter of finding the right time to be able to articulate to them a credible alternative that they can support.

A (31:54)

I want to end on a somewhat more personal note, if you're willing. You've devoted much of your professional life for almost half a century to bringing about peace of the Middle east, to achieving a two state solution. But as you reflect back on those decades, what has driven that quest? What has kept you at it in the face of the disappointments and setbacks along the way?

B (32:13)

Well, I just had the belief that my job in this world was to try to help Israel make peace. I came upon that notion, arrogant as it sounds, when I was a student in 1973 during the YOM Kippur War. And I was ground zero in Jerusalem when war broke out. And from that point on, I just decided I would pursue peace in whatever way I could to help Israel achieve peace with its neighbors, the Palestinians in particular, and that the only effective route for doing that was via the United States. The United States provides Israel with everything from a loaf of bread to a phantom jet. And so Sadat said, I'm going to Washington, I'm going to Washington to try to get them to help Israel and the Arabs make peace. So that's been my driving motivation for my life. And though I don't expect to see it in my lifetime, I've had my Mount Nebo moment. Mount Nebo was when Moses was shown the promised land and told by God that he would not cross into it. And I've seen the promised land. I've seen what it looks like. I've negotiated the details. I know where they will end up. A lot more killing, unfortunately. But I can see it, how it will work out. And so even though I won't cross over, I'm still confident that in the end, as all conflicts come to an end, this one will too. And its result will be a two state solution.

A (34:06)

I will say again, the very compelling piece is the strange resurrection of the two state solution. Please go and read it at foreignaffairs.com, martin, thank you for that essay as well as for joining me today.

B (34:16)

Thanks for having me.

A (34:24)

Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com the Foreign affairs interview is produced by Kate Brannon, Julia Fleming dresser, and Molly McEnany. Special thanks also to Grace Finlayson, Caitlin Joseph, Nora Revenaugh, Asher Ross, Gabrielle Sears and Marcus Zacharia. Our theme music was written and performed by Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts, and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.