D (5:09)

First, good evening from Tel Aviv. And it's really good to be here with Dan and Khalid. I look forward to this conversation. Now, this is not a cop out or playing for time. I think it's less than 50% within the next year.

B (5:23)

Okay, Khalid.

A (5:25)

Yeah, thanks for having me. I would say also it's less than 50%, but only slightly.

C (5:33)

Okay, Dan, thanks for having me. It's good to be with Shira and Khalid. I'd say it's less than 50% of returning to a war. Anything like what we've seen for the last two years.

B (5:44)

Okay, interesting. So three very hedged but relatively optimistic predictions here. All of you think that there is a less than or maybe slightly less than 50% chance that we'll return to war. Put another way, you think that there's a greater than 50% chance that this ceasefire will hold for the next year. I want to ask you why that's the case, Shira. Tell me why, in your view, that's the most likely outcome. Just barely.

D (6:12)

I think the key reason, you know, it's one word, it's Trump. He seemed adamant about not stopping in Gaza and having the war. And he made it clear in his speech in the Knesset. He made it so clear that even Prime Minister Netanyahu beforehand tried to imply that this is wink, wink, you know, an end of war, but not really, and we'll just do what we want to do and the US Will greenlight it. Netanyahu now admits it. The end of the war following President Trump's speech at the Knesset and visit to Israel. I'll just add another point that I think is a little bit lost to observers outside of Israel. The Israeli public, for the most part at this point, is against the war. The hostages, mostly the living hostages being held by Hamas was a reason for many Israelis to justify why they're still sending their most sons, but sons and daughters and brothers and husbands to continue fighting. There is no real justification for people to continue serving beyond 700 days of war and risking their lives for a goal that they see now is still rather elusive, defeat of Hamas. Not that Israelis don't want that, but it's not as tangible as bringing back the hostages. And the living hostages did return home yesterday in moment that was full of excitement and joy for the first time in two years in Israel.

B (7:45)

Interesting. Okay, good. Khalid, what's your reasoning? Why. Why do you think there's a better than even chance that, that a year from now we'll, we'll still be in something resembling a ceasefire?

A (7:55)

Yeah, I agree completely that this, it's really the Trump factor. And we've seen Donald Trump almost make 180 degree turn from where he was when he began in. It seems like years ago, but it was only, you know, nine when he came to power. And, you know, he, he came in, of course there was a ceasefire that he pushed and tried to take some credit for. But then he made it very clear that, you know, Netanyahu was free to disregard the ceasefire after phase one if, if he felt like it. And at the same time, he was talking about clearing Gaza of Palestinians and building this bizarre Gaza Riviera that was decidedly not for Palestinians. And so he's done a complete about face in that time period. And I think that has a lot to do with the pressure and influence of Arab states, particularly after Doha, the strike, the Israeli strike on Doha, I think, sort of hit home to him that, okay, maybe I don't have to take everything Netanyahu says at face value. Maybe his ideas aren't always that great. And so there was that overreach, I think, really propelled him to pivot, with the help, of course, of Qatar and other Arab states. And so I think at the end of the day, the ceasefire will hold for as long as Donald Trump wants it to. Right now, it serves his interests, but it may not do that indefinitely.

B (9:30)

Okay, so the Trump factor again, but what exactly the Trump factor is, is a little bit uncertain, as it always is. Dan, why did you give a similar answer? Somewhat optimistic answer.

C (9:41)

Well, it's tempered optimism. But I do agree with both Shira and Khalid's characterization of Trump's influence very much with the turn that he made after the strike against the Hamas leaders in Doha and his sheer determination to declare the end of the war and put out a plan in a way that was sort of very unconventional in normal diplomatic terms. Not really careful whether people agreed with it just to announce it and then kind of muscle it through. And obviously, it came with a lot of leverage that he had on Netanyahu, who's tied himself so closely to Trump, but also with the Arab states and with Turkey, very importantly, to use their influence with Hamas. So I agree with those characterizations and also with the fact that the hostage release very much removes the key driver of the war. From the point of view of most Israelis, generally speaking, wars in the Middle east end messy. It's rare that there's a clear victory or surrender, and somebody gets to determine all of the terms of the end of the war to their satisfaction. Exhaustion sets in. Certainly two years in, both societies are completely exhausted by this war. And so the promise of total victory, which was something that Prime Minister Netanyahu kept selling to his public, really became so elusive that to get the meaningful, very meaningful outcome of the hostages released, but without all of his other terms being met, again, very much under the influence and leverage of Trump and Hamas, too, accepting terms that they had previously not agreed to under some pressure from Qatar and Turkey, I think, is the dynamic we're seeing now. My. The reason my optimism is tempered is because while I think it's less than 50%, we'll see a war, as I said, like what we've seen for the last two years. That doesn't mean there won't be any conflict. Israel may continue to conduct what it sees as counterterrorism operations on a limited basis, raids or a strike where they see a threat. Hamas, we know, has not been displaced from power yet. And that's really critical. And the worry I have, of course, is that the seeds could be sown for another round of conflict. Every previous Gaza round of fighting between Israel Hamas has also ended messy, without fundamental things resolved. And when I was at the state department on October 7 and was working on regional integration and had to somewhat put that portfolio to the side to handle the crisis and was asked to work on post conflict planning, one of the immediate assumptions we established was that unless Hamas really is removed from power after an attack like October 7th and really disarmed in a meaningful way, there won't really be a post conflict. There might be a ceasefire, there might be lulls, but you could have the risk of another round lurking and laying in wait for the right conditions. And so I do have that concern. Maybe not over the next year, but without Hamas's removal and disarmament over the next years.

B (12:44)

I want to push all three of you on the Trump question here because you all mentioned it and I have read many news reports and a lot of commentary that claim that Donald Trump pressured Netanyahu into accepting this deal. And you all sort of refer to some version of that, but I haven't seen anyone explain what that means very simply. What I don't know is what did Trump threaten to do or not do if Bibi didn't play ball? I'll start with you, Dan. Do you know what form that pressure took? Do any of us actually know the answer to that?

C (13:24)

What I think is somewhat unique about the relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and it's really unlike any previous relationship between an Israeli prime minister and a US President, is the degree to which the prime minister has tied himself and his political identity to President Trump. And he is not far from having to face the Israeli voters in an election that will occur sometime in 2026. His own popularity has actually very much been harmed by the war. Dissatisfaction with the unpreparedness before the war, much management of the war, the seemingly not always prioritization of releasing hostages and continuing the war for these elusive total victory war aims. And so I don't know that President Trump had to threaten him with anything. I think in the case of that dynamic, it was enough to be concerned about public criticism about essentially an instruction. Actually, there's two occasions now, once during the brief war with Iran in June, and again around the time of this ceasefire coming into effect. Last week, where President Trump, over social media, has just issued an instruction to Israel to cease its fire. And Israel, of course, followed up.

B (14:45)

So this is interesting. What you're hypothesizing, Dan, is almost that unlike what we would conventionally see as a diplomatic relationship between a very powerful country and a smaller ally or even patron, what you're describing almost sounds like Trump treating Bibi like a Republican primary candidate, you know, in a red state or something, that it's less about withholding, you know, aid or any kind of policy threat, and more about almost like a campaign style thing where if you're running again, you're going to want my backing and I can sort of hurt you with your voters. Does that ring true to you, Shira? Is that, is that how you see it?

D (15:21)

I mean, I won't go into the specifics of how Trump sees Netanyahu, but there's clearly this relationship that was demonstrated during Israel's 12 day war with Iran, right, when President Trump basically ordered 52 Israeli fighter jets and then he said the number, which would be otherwise classified information, as Dan knows very well, ordered them to turn back and not to strike. He also yesterday at the Knesset told the President of Israel to pardon the Prime Minister. So there is this sense of freedom with instructing the Israeli government and different branches of the government to do what President Trump thinks is correct. But I 100% agree with Dan. I don't think that there needs to be a threat or a leverage. What happened here, which was really interesting, and this is reportedly by reliable journalists, that when Trump came up with his offer and Hamas gave an answer, that I read Hamas's response and I said, well, they're not compromising on any of their core positions. They're saying what they said all along, right? It said, we really respect what you said, but we want end of war. And da, da, da, da, da. A series of things. We know that Netanyahu called Trump and said, look, they're basically saying no. They're saying yes, but. And after the but come all these conditions, and then President Trump decided to take the yes, and with this interpretation, basically locked Netanyahu in. And this is what's happening here now with all the goodies that Trump gave Netanyahu and this is including more meetings in the White House than any other leaders, including intense times where he needed the support of the US to pass the budget here. This attack on Iran and the love for Israel and the hostages, really, it's basically coercion through love, if you want.

B (17:17)

And not through threats Well, I would. Yeah, right. I would call it lots of carrots, but it's not clear to me there's much of a stick. And I think that's important to note, because I think a lot of the coverage sort of seems to imply otherwise, that there was some sort of coercive threat. Your coercion through love or inducement is actually a lot different than the kind of public image of Trump as this tough, you know, negotiator who's forcing Netanyahu to do something he doesn't want. Khalid, what do you see here as a. As a. Is there. Is there something coercive? Was there something that we're not seeing?

A (17:48)

Yeah, no, I generally agree, but I also disagree with both Dan and Shira. There isn't an overt or explicit stick. There wasn't a threat. I think maybe there was an implicit threat. I think Trump is unpredictable enough and similar enough to Netanyahu that maybe they recognize themselves in each other and so they're sort of close, they serve each other's purposes domestically, but they're not quite. I wouldn't call it. I mean, what Shira described as sort of the Biden bear hug, you know, we have to love them to death, and then they will feel comfortable and take these risks for peace. And, and, and that approach has been a colossal failure for 30 years. We have 30 years of empirical evidence of that has never actually worked. So I don't think Trump was loving Israel or Netanyahu to death. I think he was saying, look, I need you and you need me, but I think you need me more than I need you. And he simply bypassed him by getting out ahead of him and saying, here's what it is, here's the plan. And he even let Netanyahu have a whack at, you know, making the modifications that he wanted, but then he. He used that as leverage to lock him in. I think Netanyahu now was genuinely surprised. One, when Trump pushed a plan with Arab and Muslim leaders, second, when he accepted Hamas's yes, but I think he was genuinely surprised. I mean, he. I think he was certain that everyone would see Hamas's yes, but, you know, focus on the but and not on the yes, and when Trump didn't do that, he had to fall in line. But not because of a threat. I suppose it was an implicit threat, but. But he didn't need to. You know, the fact that he's the President of the United States was enough to bring him in line. And that is something that Joe Biden never did. He Never used that leverage that he absolutely had, I think because he loved Israel too much. He was too emotionally and ideologically invested in a sort of mythological Israel that no longer exists. And he just couldn't do what, what was needed to be done.

B (20:08)

I want to go back to this yes but and focus a little bit more on the but part of it from Hamas and stick with you for a second, Khalid. Like Israel, Hamas agreed to the hostage and prisoner exchange, but really left everything else open to negotiation. Now, it's hard to imagine that the group will disarm or allow its tunnel network in Gaza to be destroyed, but that's what the Trump plan calls for. Is this mostly a chance for Hamas to regroup and rearm?

A (20:37)

It could be. I, I think, I think Hamas is going to take some time to figure out who and what they are. Now this is a very different world, it's a very different Hamas than the one that planned and carried out, you know, the attack on October 7. Its leadership has been completely wiped out. But even so, it's, it still has managed to retain a kind of command and control. There is a leadership that is able to make decisions and execute them. They're still able to recruit fighters. So it was never really in the, in the cards that Hamas was going to be totally obliterated, but it's going to be a very different Hamas. I think they're going to, there's going to be a soul searching process. I think as part of that there will also be some form of accountability internally that in the same way that Israelis want to hold Netanyahu and the security establishment in Israel accountable for the failures of October 7th.

C (21:39)

Right.

A (21:39)

The security and intelligence failures, I think Palestinians will want to hold, especially in Gaza, will want to hold Hamas in some way accountable. And Hamas as a political movement that seeks popular support, they're going to have to be responsive to that on some level. So we may find them more accommodating than we would expect. That said, they're going to want to pursue disarmament to the extent that they do within the context of a broader Palestinian consensus. Right. They said as much in their yes, but reply, and I think that's wise because that gives them cover to do that, to disarm, gives them the political domestic cover, but it also puts some constraints on disarming because it's not going to be very popular with Palestinians in general. Why would you disarm before Israel has agreed even to end its occupation and while it's still carrying out military armed actions against us? So of Course we have. If we, if we give up all of our weapons, we become sitting ducks and vulnerable to this fanatical government run by Ben GVIR and Smotrich and Netanyahu, who openly talk about ethnic cleansing, who openly talk about pushing Palestinians out. So it would be stupid for Palestinians to agree to completely disarm, but that doesn't mean that there isn't some middle ground somewhere. But the idea that they would be a completely helpless disarmed population in the face of a highly predatory occupier like Israel, I think that's a very tall order.

D (23:20)

I think the question of disarmament of Hamas is really key and the sequence by which this happens or doesn't happen. Because from the Israeli perspective, why would they take any risk, withdraw further from Gaza and not actively use kinetic means as Israel has always done, to disarm Hamas before there's any change to the movement. Now, I think as analysts analytically, many interesting things can happen to Hamas. The movement can split, it can change in many ways. The problem is the time. We don't have the time for this at when we look at disarmament, the question is not just disarmament, disarmament and demobilization and reintegration into society. Those are big questions. And my fear is that our most successful example is the one of the IRA in Northern Ireland. And that took over 10 years of a process finally complete after 30 years in the mid 2000s. So in a sense, this is where the question begins. And it's not just the Hamas pretext against Israel or not. If we're looking at the images from God Gaza at the moment Hamas is turning their weapons against other Palestinians who may have collaborated with Israel or otherwise. So this is a very, very, very complex question and I think it's going to be one of the thorniest going forward. And unfortunately, we don't have many positive precedents to indicate there's a positive future ahead of us.

B (24:55)

Dan, do you share some of those concerns?

C (24:58)

I do. I think the importance and the primacy of the disarmament requirement is not only related to how Israel will react and whether it will follow through on what we want to see, which is complete, the withdrawal from Gaza and so forth. All of the other elements of phase two of President Trump's plans are dependent on disarmament occurring. All the good things we want to see. And again, we knew this as we were planning day after scenarios during the Biden administration. Getting an international stabilization force to come in to Gaza, getting reconstruction funds to start flowing from the Gulf and elsewhere to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. Getting the Palestinian Authority to start to have a presence and participate in the governance of Gaza in preparation for some reconnecting of the Gaza Strip and the west bank and getting Israelis and Palestinians on the road to a dialogue about their political future on the horizon that the 20 point plan says should include credible pathway to a Palestinian state. None of those things will happen unless Hamas is reliably disarmed. As long as they hold the guns and hold the power in Gaza, I don't see most of that getting off the ground.

A (26:10)

There is going to have to be some version of disarmament. The question is how far is that taken? What does that consist of? Who's doing the disarming? What exactly are the weapons to be disarmed? I mean, it cannot be that there aren't even pistols or light weapons or you can't have a police force or. I mean, it's just that's not going to work. There has to be some authority with weapons. If that can be done in the context of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority and the whole mantra of one gun, one authority to decommission Hamas weapons in trusteeship under the PLO umbrella and perhaps with Egyptian or, you know, other Arab kind of supervision, that kind of an arrangement is something that Hamas might agree to. The second point though is that disarmament as a concept is going to have to also be linked to Israeli withdrawal. That's something Hamas is going to insist on and it's something that will make sense because otherwise Israel will never leave. They talk openly about remaining in Gaza forever and so that whether it's Hamas or anyone else, if you're logical person, even if Hamas is totally disarmed, as long as there is an Israeli military presence on the ground in Gaza, some group somewhere will have an incentive to buy, create or otherwise produce weapons to be used against that military occupation. Even if it's not Hamas, something else will emerge. So it's in everybody's interest to link those two so that if you want disarmament to happen, this is the surest way to ensure that it happens. That's a very hard sell for Israel, right? That's not going to be its, you know, obligations on Palestinians, but not on themselves.

B (28:05)

We'll be back after a short break.

E (28:09)

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B (29:49)

And now back to my conversation with Shira Efron, Khaled Al Gindi and Daniel Shapiro. Shira, I wanted to go back to you and ask you a question about Israeli politics. You wrote recently in the New York Times that the deal represents a defeat of Netanyahu's government's messianic vision. You said it directly contradicts what the government has sold Israelis for two years, the promise of total victory and the destruction of Hamas. So tell me what you mean by that, because to judge from the optics of, you know, the, the kind of spectacle in Israel on Monday, that is certainly not how the government is trying to spin this.

D (30:31)

Of course. And the government has to spin this as a victory, right? And their victory is, hey, we were able to return all living hostages. Everyone said this would not happen. But it's not what we said. We said that if, you know, Hamas believes, and I guess they received a warrant guarantees that the war would not resume, they may agree to do this under the right circumstances. And this has happened. There's still implementation of the first phase of the deal, right? Something's going to change in the next few hours. But so far the remains of only four of the 28 deceased hostages they were holding. So it's not like Hamas is fulfilling their part. But from an Israeli perspective, Prime Minister Netanyahu, maybe not him himself, but all his coalition members were talking about voluntary migration. Voluntary in Palestinians from Gaza. The Ministry of Defense set up a voluntary Migration Directorate with some staff. There was a discussion the Cabinet in September working on operational plans to do so. Emptying Gaza of Gazans. There were ministers in the cabinet who were talking about resettling Gaza with the Jewish settlements going back to Gaza. But even more so, of course, this, in addition to annexation in the west bank, which is also related, a total defeat of Hamas and a real estate bonanza in Gaza. And so far, at least it looks, and I thank goodness for that, that President Trump put a hold on all of these things, that Hamas is not going anywhere. Right? They're staying. They may change. It's going to be hard work and hopefully, inshallah, we're able to transform it to a political movement that doesn't pose threats to, by the way, the Palestinians themselves, but also to its neighbors. But Hamas not going anywhere. And so far, neither do the people of Gaza, unless, of course, they want to. And there's a country that's willing to take them, which has always been the issue, but it's not a forced smoke them out policy by Israel. So in a sense, Netanyahu has to spin this and say, this is everything we wanted, but in fact, it's definitely not what his coalition vowed to achieve.

B (32:44)

Khalid, is that how you see it.

A (32:45)

As well, on the voluntary, you know, quote, voluntary emigration, that was always a euphemism. Obviously, there is no such thing as voluntary emigration when Israel has systematically destroyed the entire means to sustain a society of 2 million people, from hospitals to roads to infrastructure to agricultural land, everything, virtually everything has been destroyed. So it may very well be that Gaza is already uninhabitable, that the 2 million people who live there now may not actually have a future there. That is a very, very real, maybe even probable outcome of what has already taken place. So in that sense, I think Netanyahu has not failed. He and his fellow travelers, Ben GVIR and Smotrich, have been wildly successful in annihilating Gaza as a place where human beings can actually live. So it may not happen in one burst, a million people over the border, but it will happen as a trickle or an exodus over time.

B (33:52)

Dan, I want to turn to you for a second and ask you a question about U.S. israeli relations. You know, on Monday, Trump spoke at the Knesset, and even in his, you know, meandering style, the message was very clear, that this was a win for America, it was a win for Donald Trump, and it was a win for Israel. But more broadly, that the countries were aligned, they were sort of on the same team. But really, to what degree are American and Israeli interests genuinely still aligned?

C (34:23)

Well, this relationship obviously goes back Decades. And it relates not just to what happens between Israelis and Palestinians, which is important, very important, but relates to the threats that emerge from all over the region. Israel, of course, has had numerous actors in this Iranian sponsored axis. Iran itself, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, other militias threaten it. Hezbollah built a massive arsenal, or Iran helped them build a massive arsenal on its northern border. Iran itself was pursuing a nuclear program that could have easily produced a nuclear weapon. And we saw what hamas did on October 7th, and we've seen what the Houthis have done over the last two years with missiles and drones. Those are all threats that also threaten U.S. interests and other U.S. partners. And in my judgment, that alignment remains, that we want to work together, we should want to work together to keep those threats at bay, to capitalize on, frankly, the use of Israeli and US Military power over the last two years. That's weakened many of those actors. But now, using non military means, using diplomacy, using development, using the building out of that coalition of integrated partners that the Abraham Accords represented, the Negev Forum, the possibility of Saudi Arabia normalizing its relations with Israel, all as dynamics that serve both US And Israeli interests. Now, those are not disconnected, of course, from Palestinian matters. We saw that the Trump plan, even though Trump himself has been of questionable commitment to a two state solution, as we have generally thought about it, included discussions on a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. That's because the Arab partners that he needed to bring to this table and Turkey and others to help get Hamas to release the hostages, that's very important to them. So these are dynamics that can reinforce each other if skillfully managed. But of course, that runs up against some of the challenges of domestic Israeli politics. Of course, given the current government and this uncertainty about whether Hamas is really going to be dislodged in a way that will allow the changes that we, I think, all want to see happen on the Palestinian side. So there's lots that we still benefit from by working together as security partners and addressing these regional dynamics. But it doesn't mean we agree on everything. And when we disagree, it's perfectly legitimate for the United States to use the leverage we have, use the relationship, use the arguments we can bring to bear to try to change Israeli policies that we think should change.

B (36:55)

One sort of emerging obstacle, it seems to me, is changing attitudes in the US electorate. And I want to ask you all to reflect on this a little bit. The Times recently did a poll that had some pretty striking findings, including it said that in the Aftermath of the October 7 attacks, American voters broadly sympathized with Israelis over Palestinians. 47% sided with Israel, 20% sided with Palestinians today, according to the Times. That has changed a lot. It's now 34% said they sided with Israel and 35% with the Palestinians, 31% said they weren't sure or they backed both equally. Another really striking finding from that survey to me was that 40% of American voters said that Israel was intentionally killing civilians in Gaza, which is nearly double the number who had agreed with that in 2023. So, you know, there's the question of US interest and Israeli interests in a kind of geopolitical sense, but there's also these political realities. I wonder what do you make of those changes and what sort of, what sort of challenge does that pose, both to the Israelis, but to any American government as well?

C (38:07)

There's no question that the traumas of this terrible war that has caused so much suffering on all sides are being reflected in some American attitudes. Now. We'll see how that or whether that persists, at least in those numbers once the war is over, once hopefully we're in a phase of some kind of reconstruction and some kind of better pathway for the future that could moderate that. But it's something that clearly has to be addressed in some ways. I think the fact that even the Trump administration, in partnership with these Arab partners, is putting on the table that all these elements are linked, that building this regional dynamic of integrated partners to address common threats is linked also to addressing the Israeli Palestinian future in a way that meets both Israel's security needs. And of course, they're acute and Israelis feel them acutely after October 7th and Palestinians needs for self determination in a state of their own. And so there's the potential to have our own public as well as those partners in the region, see that those can be combined in a certain way. So I don't think that there's, you know, this is all to the negative, but it's going to require work. It's going to require, I think, a bipartisan commitment of that in the United States. I think it's going to require the Israeli government and public to understand that those are linked in some ways. But I think one of the things that's important to bear in mind as we have this debate, including by those who are now more skeptical or even more negative about the US Israel Partnership, is what would be the impact on US Interests and US Influence in the region if we were to see that partnership really go through a major decline. And I think it would cost us very dearly with Gulf partners with Egypt and Jordan versus the common adversaries of Iran and its axis. And we think it would create significant openings for our competitors, Russia and China, to find footholds. So we should bear those in mind. I don't know if that's something that will resonate in opinion polls when people feel strong emotions, as they understandably do, but those are critical strategic aspects of keeping that relationship working to our own mutual benefit, even while we try to address these other problems.

B (40:35)

Shira, I'm interested in hearing what you think of those changes in American public opinion, but also more broadly, I'd love to hear you tell us a little bit about how much that matters in Israel both to the government and to ordinary Israelis. But more broadly about this question of Israel's isolation internationally or the sense that, you know, the country and its conduct of the war in Gaza, you know, has come in for a lot of criticism. How important is that to Israelis? And I'm sure you can distinguish between various groups of Israelis, but to what degree does that resonate in Israeli society and politics?

D (41:16)

You know, of course Israeli feels that Israel is a small country, it's export dependent, depends on investments from abroad. The relationship that gets most attention is Israel's relationship with the U.S. but in fact it's the European relationship that makes Israel what Israel is today. Europe is the number one investor in Israel. Israeli academia will not survive without the horizon program of the Europeans. Israel is also, you know, in sports activities and cultural activities is connected to Europe. So there's definitely, it is felt, however, there is not an on base suspicion in Israel that the motivations and anti Israel inclinations are rooted in anti Semitism both on the left and right. And you know, it's Europe, there's history there. So this is something where it's convenient, I think, for some Israelis to say, well, they hate us anyway, whatever we do. In terms of the region, there is this idea that they keep buying weapons from us and once the war is over, the region will want us to integrate. I'm skeptical about this. And for Netanyahu, him, himself, he really views him and his advisers, they really view the international community as stretching between 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and Washington D.C. to Capitol Hill. That's it. That's all they have. And so I think this is a very limiting factor. There is an assumption in Israel, and this is the assumption that Netanyahu and Ron Dermer have, have expressed in different circles that Israel, in the last few decades at least Israel is, is always unpopular during wars. But it resurges after a war and becomes popular again. I think that this time it's different. We have not seen pictures like that from Gaza. It's not just the death and the humanitarian situation. Khalid, I think with me, where I'm not going to go back to stuff. He said, of course it's not voluntary migration. Of course Gaza is in a catastrophic condition. But it's the basic lack of dignity for the Palestinians that I think is really heart wrenching for people around the world to see. And this is something that I don't think where Israel is going to research. Unless, of course, and we don't know. It's too early. There's a different Israeli government that expresses some, you know, regret or at least acknowledges how badly this war has gone. And it's too early to say there is an understanding in Israel that Israel turning into such a partisan issue, which it wasn't in the past in the US Changing views in public opinion changes not only in the Democratic Party right, in the Republican Party itself and the maga, where the left meets the right in a way that it's going to be detrimental to Israel's security. Because if there's one thing that Israel always counted on is US support. It's not just the arms, it's the axis, it's the diplomatic cover. And without that, it's going to be very, very, very difficult for Israel. There are voices to talk about it, but, you know, the last two years, that's not what is fundamental here.

A (44:33)

So I think the shift that, that we've seen first of all has been underway for a long time. It's been accelerated and intensified after October 7th. But we've seen these trends, certainly in the Democratic Party, this growing partisan divide, and, you know, younger generations especially sort of not identifying with Israel in the same way that older generations had. And of course, only time will tell. But I think there is something irreversible about the trends that we're seeing. As Shira said, the images that we've seen, we cannot unsee them. You have now an entire generation in this country, but not just in this country, but all across the Western world that has been politicized, if not actually radicalized by what they've seen in Gaza over the last 740 some days. And it's very powerful. There's a reason that 43% of Americans believe that Israel is committing genocide. It's partly because Israel is on trial for genocide in the International Court of Justice, and that trial will go forward. And the fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu and his former defense minister both have arrest warrants. These are things that we have never seen before. Those cannot be undone. Those trains have left the station. There will be a genocide trial, and most likely it will find Israel guilty of genocide, because that's where most of the experts are. And that is something that doesn't sit well with ordinary people. Watching people queue in line for food and being shot not once, not twice, but every day for weeks. This is not collateral damage. This is, by design, 40 some percent of Americans, the percentage that you pointed out of Americans who believe that Israel is deliberately targeting civilians. That is not by accident. That's because that's where the overwhelming evidence is. We see it day in and day out. So that's something, I think, that is irreversible. How that will play out politically, we don't know, because there's a, Is an enormous gap between where rank and file Americans are and where their political leaders are on a range of issues. This is just. This is now one more adjacent to that issue is the question of accountability. There will have to be accountability. We cannot simply pretend that the last two years didn't happen or that it was somehow normal to watch an entire society be completely erased, to watch starvation being used as a weapon consistently from day one. That's not normal, and that cannot be normalized. And so if we want to see stability, in addition to disarmament, stabilization forces aid and reconstruction, accountability is a very, very important piece of that equation. Otherwise, if people don't feel like there is some form of justice, then you will get armed groups who will find their own form of justice and there will be more motivation. The kind of trauma that has been created in Gaza and for Palestinians across the board will last for generations. Not years, but for generations. So it's really important, if we're going to talk about stabilization, that accountability for all of these crimes that we all saw happen on some level.

B (48:22)

Can I, can I, can I, can I just jump in and push you on one thing there, Khaled? Let me, let me sort of play devil's advocate a little bit here. You said that this sort of thing is not normal and shouldn't be normalized. When I've thought about analogies to this conflict, Shira, you mentioned the IRA earlier, the troubles in Iraq Island. The one that has often come to mind for me is Russia's war in Chechnya. You'll recall that in the 90s and early 2000s, Russia was at war with Chechen separatist militants, many of whom were jihadists and the approach that first Yeltsin and then Putin took was essentially to obliterate Chechnya. Grozny was reduced to rubble. And at the time, many people made the argument you're making now, and I remember thinking it was quite compelling and persuasive, that I should say tens of thousands, maybe even hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed in that conflict. Whether it was intentional or through total indifference, I don't know. And the argument at the time was you can't do something like this because it will come back to bite you. It'll backfire. In fact, today, Chechen jihadism and Chechen separatism is gone. The leaders are gone, the movement is gone. The human cost was massive and the moral price was incredibly high. But it's arguable. I mean, I think you could say that it achieved its goal. Why is that outcome sort of unthinkable in Gaza? What would you see as the main difference? Difference?

A (50:01)

Well, we have the whole hundred year history of the Israel, Palestine conflict to instruct us. I think if you were an Israeli leader in late 1948, you would have come to the conclusion there is no more Palestine problem.

C (50:22)

Right?

A (50:23)

It's finished. And if you were an American official, and in fact American policymakers did come to this conclusion, okay, that thing that was a problem during the British mandate, this communal conflict between Arabs and Jews, that's not a thing anymore. Okay, now we have a humanitarian problem. Of all these, you know, the Palestine refugees, what do we do? Okay, we give them food and schools and, and medicine and jobs, training. But, but the issue is finished. And I think, I think a lot of people in Israel might have the same views about Gaza that, I mean, especially if, if, you know, if Gaza becomes emptied, we'll be done with the problem once and for all. But it's actually the beginning of the problem and not the end of it. And I think, you know, I don't know enough about Chechnya and Russia to speak intelligently about it, but everything that we know about this dynamic between Israelis and Palestinians suggests that this is going to remain in the same way that Israelis aren't going to forget what happened on October 7th.

C (51:28)

Right.

A (51:29)

I mean, they're going to. That will, that will be passed on for generations and not just by the people immediately who lost loved ones or who, you know, whose family members were abducted. It's part of the collective trauma. Now multiply that by a thousand, okay? And that's what Palestinians are going to carry. The, the stories that the people who are growing up Today, in these displaced in the tents along the, the shores of Gaza, that those children, when they grow up, they're going to be telling their grandchildren these, these exact same story. So this is not going to go away. Maybe in the future there can be some sort of truth and reconciliation process because at the end of the day, Israelis and Palestinians aren't going anywhere. They are accursed to live side by side in one form or another. But the point is that some form of accountability, whether it's these international mechanisms or it's some truth and reconciliation, there has to be some accounting for these atrocities. There has to be.

C (52:38)

Listen, this has been a devastating war. It started with the devastating October 7th attacks, terrorist attacks. It became a war that fought, followed, and I don't equate the two. But the suffering is enormous. The suffering is real, the trauma is real, and I agree with Khalid, it will have long lasting effects. So there's plenty of room for good faith criticism. And that is, I think again, part of that responsibility in the US Is a relationship with the United States to work with a partner to achieve better outcomes. While doing that, it's also, I think, important to recognize what they were up against. A terrorist organization that not only conducted the October 7th atrocities, but was so fully embedded within the society of Gaza, including virtually every civilian infrastructure that's very hard to disentangle. Those two tunnels, you know, everywhere and under almost every institution, the use of schools, hospitals, et cetera. And so that was a unique challenge for any military to address. Again, not to say every decision made was correct and there should be accountability within the Israeli military justice system where their own standards have not been reflected. One of the critical challenges of getting the discussion of a credible pathway to a Palestinian state, something in the plan, something I support, something I think needs to be part of this onto the table is to address where the Israeli public has moved on this question. The idea of a two state solution was already in decline in terms of support among Israelis and Palestinians before October 7th. But of course it's cratered for Israelis now who understandably wonder if a Palestinian state on the west bank or in Gaza could become the site and the launch point for a similar type of attack, but maybe affecting the whole country. So addressing that Israeli societal concern is going to have to be part of this. And that's why I said earlier, I think it's going to take longer and it's going to look different to get to that outcome that we, I think want, which is Israelis and Palestinians both living in full, self determined, in States that are in peace with each other. But I don't think this, these sort of international structures of a search for accountability, which tend to be very one sided and not take into account the full measure of what happened, is going to help us get there. I think there are better ways to address those questions. And as I mentioned, US Israel discussions and internal Israeli processes.

D (55:15)

You know, we do have to acknowledge this war, this round started with the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust and it's continued with the mass killing and the worst displacements of Palestinians since the Nakma. And one doesn't negate the other and we can't compare numbers. But what Dan said, the trauma is real. And I think if I'm trying to connect this into the public opinion conversation that we've had before, it's true that the global support for Palestinian rights has risen substantially and even in the idea of a Palestinian state and we have multiple recognitions. But on the ground you could argue that the Palestinians are as far from a state and from effective governance of their own territory and from dignity and, and from the security that I too believe that they deserve as far as they've always been. And Israel on the other hand, has become the de facto security guarantor of the Middle East. It's changed the Middle East. It's in a far better strategic position vis a vis Hezbollah, which was always Israel's main adversary. Right. Hamas. Part of the reason that October 7th happened is that Israel always thought Hamas was not a real threat. Changes in Syria showed Iran is not 10 foot tall. But on the other hand, Israel is weaker globally and isolated more than ever. And so I think for both, if we don't turn this horrible, horrible, horrible tragedy into a diplomatic initiative that benefits both sides and it will take time. And yeah, granted the Palestinians are in a different in place. This is going to be a huge, huge failure. And I just have to add because Justin, you played devil's advocate on Israel's response to the October 7th massacre. You know, I've heard Israelis say that Israeli officials and Israeli defense officials. There was a point in the way that Israel reacted to show that you don't, you don't start wars with Israel, definitely don't start them the way you started on October 7. I was against many of the things that happened, certainly against Gaza. But even when we talk about striking Hezbollah and striking Iran, those were things that I think people like Dan and I would be like, are you crazy? You're going to light up the Middle East. The Tel Aviv skyline would disappear. But the fact is that Israel has shown that with being so bold, it does change the Middle east in ways that could be for the better. That does not mean that the pain in Gaza and the destruction is real. And this is something that Israelis, these are going to be our neighbors. At the end of the day, Israelis are not going anywhere. Palestinians are not going anywhere. The suffering on both sides would have to be acknowledged across the border for both sides, I think, to move on. And I hope we can start with that sooner rather than later.

B (58:18)

I think we're going to close there. And I'd only want to point out, actually, that what's interesting to me about the arc the conversation took was that although you all sort of started from a place of relative optimism about this particular deal, by the end of the conversation, the things we were talking about were the very reasons why we generally turn to pessimism when confronted with this conflict. And and so there's a bit of a bitter irony there that I hate to end on a downbeat, but I think it's worth pointing that out. Khaled, Shira, Dan, thank you all very much. We really appreciate you coming on the show.

A (58:57)

Thank you.

C (58:58)

Thanks for having us.

A (59:05)

Thank you for listening.

B (59:06)

You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at Foreign Affairs. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Ben Metzner, Ashley Wood, Mary Kate Godfrey, and Kanish Tharoor. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager with audio help from Marcus Zachariah. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts, and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it.

A (59:34)

We review release a new show every Thursday.

B (59:36)

Thanks again for tuning in.