The Foreign Affairs Interview
Episode: Xi Jinping’s Successor and the Future of China
Date: October 2, 2025
Guests: Tyler Jost & Dan Mattingly (Political Scientists)
Host: Chloe Fox (Deputy Editor, Foreign Affairs)

Overview

In this episode, Chloe Fox speaks with Tyler Jost and Dan Mattingly about their recent Foreign Affairs article, After Xi, exploring the looming question of leadership succession in China’s Communist Party. The discussion ranges from the historical and political stakes of succession in authoritarian regimes to the current lack of a visible heir for Xi Jinping, dynamics within the Party and the PLA, potential implications for China’s foreign and domestic future, and the perils of outside intervention—particularly from the United States.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Authoritarian Succession as China’s Achilles Heel

Timestamps: 03:05–04:45

• Elite competition and instability: Succession is a moment of vulnerability for authoritarian regimes. In China, handovers are historically fraught, as leaders and their circles jockey for power.

  • Dan Mattingly: “Succession is, in general, sort of the Achilles heel for authoritarian regimes... The CCP is basically not immune from this problem.” (03:08)

• Historical precedents: From Mao (with failed or ousted successors) to Deng Xiaoping (cycling through potential heirs), smooth transitions have been rare.

2. Xi’s Consolidation of Power and the Succession Challenge

Timestamps: 05:17–07:02

• Xi’s situation is unique: Xi has reversed much of the collective leadership architecture, placing the burden of succession squarely on himself.
  • Tyler Jost: “Xi's consolidation of power… means that only he is going to be making most of these critical choices. And that, on the one hand, allows him to set the table... but then he'll also have tremendous power at his disposal to adjust things as he goes along.” (05:28)
• Risk of elite conflict: Xi’s one-man rule both empowers and isolates him, making a future transition less predictable and potentially bumpier.

3. Who Might Succeed Xi?

Timestamps: 07:02–09:08, 29:40–32:14

• Current roster dilemmas:

  • Li Qiang: Current premier and party number two; likely first-in-line if Xi were to exit unexpectedly, but considered too old for a "normal" succession.
  • Cai Qi: Close to Xi and influential, but similarly too old for a traditional long-term succession plan.
  • Chen Jining: Shanghai Party Secretary, 61, seen as a potential long-term contender, though not publicly anointed or given a clear succession-trajectory position.
  • Dan Mattingly: “Neither of these men is young enough to take over for Xi Jinping in a typical succession scenario... as a potential successor in the broader Politburo, is Chen Jining...” (07:26)

• Absence of "prince-in-waiting": It is unusually opaque—no protégé has been groomed or promoted along visible lines, suggesting Xi is actively avoiding elevating a successor who could threaten him before he's ready to step aside.

4. The Hot Mic Moment and Xi’s Intentions

Timestamps: 09:08–11:42

• Xi and Putin's conversation about living to 150: Symbolic of Xi’s almost mythic self-conception and reluctance to let go of power.
  • Chloe Fox: “Do you think that Xi Jinping is actively thinking about succession, or do you think... he plans on living to 150 and controlling things behind the scenes?” (09:33)
  • Dan Mattingly: “They both probably feel like they’re the best person and maybe the only person to lead their countries forward...” (09:50)
• Historical perils of aged leadership: Both Mao and Xi, as aging strongmen, risk ossifying the system and sidelining entire generations of would-be leaders.

5. Foreign Policy Risks in Succession Moments—Focus on Taiwan

Timestamps: 14:14–20:54

• Foreign policy decision-making becomes riskier: Succession periods stress China’s already difficult information environment and can incentivize dangerous displays of control over the PLA.

  • Tyler Jost: “The use of military force has a kind of positive externality when you’re in the midst of some sort of leadership challenge... military operations kind of allow for a leader to demonstrate that the military is following their orders.” (16:55)

• Historical precedent: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, ordered by Deng Xiaoping, partly to demonstrate his control of the military amid factional struggles post-Mao and push aside Hua Guofeng.

  • Dan Mattingly: “He enters this conflict in Vietnam, you know, partly against the objection of, you know, some of the PLA and the civilian leadership who see this as, you know, a kind of, like, risky gambit... one of the reasons the party entered arguably is that it benefited Deng in this period of leadership transition to show that, hey, the PLA is going to follow my orders over the objections of others.” (21:26)

• Taiwan scenario: There is genuine concern Xi or a successor could misuse military action as a show of power, with flawed assessments of PLA readiness exacerbated by purges and lack of honest feedback.

6. PLA Purges and Implications for Governance

Timestamps: 24:48–29:36

• Recent high-profile purges: Two Central Military Commission members, two defense ministers, and others—much of this believed to be driven by concerns over corruption, readiness, and succession jockeying.

• Uncertainties about reliability: These moves may indicate Xi’s mistrust in military readiness, raising the risk of senior officers being promoted through factional connections rather than merit.

  • Dan Mattingly: “It does suggest that maybe Xi Jinping should, on the margins, probably be a little bit concerned about PLA military readiness...” (29:29)

7. Succession Tensions: Strong Heir vs. Threat to Leader, Age Dynamics, and the End of the ‘Princelings’

Timestamps: 29:40–36:48

• No ideal successor yet: The leadership bench is “stacked with people who are kind of close to Xi Jinping's age...” (30:49) and none have been publicly elevated or given the apprenticeship route (e.g., Secretariat head or CMC vice chair).
• Generational change: Xi may be the last leader with direct emotional and ideological ties to the founding revolutionary generation, raising questions about future political orientation.
  • Tyler Jost: “Xi Jinping has tried to bring revolution or the revolutionary tradition back to Chinese politics in a kind of artificial way. He can’t manufacture a long march for all within the party...” (35:25)
• Ideological uncertainty: The next leader could depart significantly from Xi’s leftist/conservative orientation.

8. Public Unrest, Lessons from 1989, and Surveillance State Evolution

Timestamps: 39:35–43:07

• Parallels to Tiananmen?: A repeat of the student-led protests sparked by the death of a reformist leader like Hu Yaobang in 1989 is unlikely now, given the vastly more powerful surveillance state and social controls.
  • Tyler Jost: “The political climate in China today is not what it was in the late 1980s. The opportunity for such a movement to occur... is just different.” (40:26)
  • Dan Mattingly: “There will be a moment of peril for the party after [Xi] retires or passes away...” (41:20)
• Elite disagreement could still spill over: Moments of weak leadership or bitter debates may create openings for unrest but are hard to predict.

9. Dangers of U.S. or External Meddling in Succession

Timestamps: 43:07–47:19

• Temptation to meddle: Washington may be tempted to exploit internal CCP divisions at moments of succession, but this would likely backfire and fail.
  • Tyler Jost: “US insight into the contemporary factional battles... is limited... There is a long historical tradition within the PRC that sees countries like the United States as intervening in domestic political affairs... that is genuinely felt amongst the leadership.” (43:33)
• Lessons for U.S. policymakers: Allow succession to run its natural course; avoid actions that would trigger nationalist backlash or further harden Chinese stances.
  • Dan Mattingly: “It would be folly to try to intervene... if the US did try to do anything, it would just feed into... a perception... that the US is constantly trying to meddle in Chinese politics...” (46:00)
• Useful lens nonetheless: Following leadership and factional dynamics is important for anticipating shifts in Chinese foreign policy.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Succession is, in general, sort of the Achilles heel for authoritarian regimes... The CCP is basically not immune from this problem.” — Dan Mattingly (03:08)
• “Xi's consolidation of power... means that only he is going to be making most of these critical choices.” — Tyler Jost (05:28)
• “It was this amazing moment of these two authoritarian leaders, these two autocrats, talking about their desire to basically live forever.” — Dan Mattingly on Xi and Putin’s ‘living to 150’ moment (09:52)
• “A truly terrifying world if someone were serious about [uploading Xi Jinping Thought into an AI].” — Tyler Jost (14:08)
• “The use of military force has a kind of positive externality when you're in the midst of some sort of leadership challenge... it allows you to flex your muscles and show that the military follows your orders.” — Tyler Jost (16:55)
• “If you think about these purges, I think there are probably two dynamics at work... ongoing corruption... but also empire-building and succession jockeying.” — Dan Mattingly (26:15)
• “The Standing Committee [is] stocked with people who are kind of close to Xi Jinping's age... it's a real puzzle what the plan is and if there's any plan.” — Dan Mattingly (30:49)
• “Xi Jinping has tried to bring revolution or the revolutionary tradition back to Chinese politics in a kind of artificial way. Of course, he can't manufacture a long march for all within the party.” — Tyler Jost (35:25)
• “It's not obvious ... that whoever replaces Xi Jinping will have that same vision that a more politically conservative China is the right way forward.” — Tyler Jost (36:43)
• “There will be a moment of peril for the party after [Xi] retires or passes away, really, because... it's not that hard to imagine there being discussion and conflicts at the top over the future direction of the country in ways that can then spill out potentially in public.” — Dan Mattingly (41:20)
• “It would be folly to try to intervene... if the US did try to do anything, it would just feed into ... a perception ... that the US is constantly trying to meddle in Chinese politics.” — Dan Mattingly (46:00)

Summary Table: Important Segments & Timestamps

| Segment | Main Points | Timestamp Range | |-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | Succession as CCP Weakness | Authoritarian vulnerability, historical problems | 03:05–04:45 | | Xi’s Unique Dilemma | Power consolidation, successor risk, one-man rule consequences | 05:17–07:02 | | Who Could Succeed? | Roster analysis, absence of clear heir | 07:02–09:08, 29:40–32:14 | | Xi & the ‘Hot Mic’ Moment | Xi’s longevity ambitions, parallels with Mao, leadership risks | 09:08–11:42 | | Foreign Policy in Turmoil | Taiwan as flashpoint, use of force in power plays | 14:14–20:54 | | PLA Purge Implications | Readiness, factionalism, trust | 24:48–29:36 | | Generational Change | Princelings, end of revolutionary era, ideological uncertainty | 33:57–36:48 | | Public Unrest vs. 1989 | Tiananmen parallels, surveillance state difference | 39:35–43:07 | | US Intervention Risks | Costs & dangers, historical mistrust, importance of restraint | 43:07–47:19 |

Conclusion

This episode lays out the profound uncertainty—and deeply consequential stakes—of Xi Jinping’s eventual succession. The risk of instability, opaque elite maneuvering, risks of military adventurism (notably regarding Taiwan), and repercussions of poorly managed handovers in Chinese history all loom large. While the U.S. and other outsiders might be tempted to influence China’s next chapter, the advice from both guests is clear: observe carefully, but do not intervene. Above all, China’s next leadership transition already casts significant shadows on both its domestic future and its relationships with the world.