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- [00:00]
A
Dan I'm Dan Kurtz Phelan, and this is the Foreign affairs interview.
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B
We who do foreign policy and God knows foreign affairs does a lot of foreign policy, we forget that we are in an era of big leader culture. Ideology is important, yes, political systems are also important, but so is the personalities, the nature of each of these leaders. And I think, you know, Putin, Xi Jinping, Trump, Kim Jong Un, even Modi. We're in a different political world where these big leaders are what we need to understand better. Where do they come from? Who are they? What do they want? How are they going to react and respond?
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A
Last week's meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping may have brought a respite in the trade war, but it hardly touched the more fundamental drivers of US China rivalry, a rivalry that has come to shape more and more dimensions of geopolitics, the global economy and beyond. Few have spent as much time observing and chronicling the interactions between Washington and Beijing as Orville Shell. Shell, one of America's foremost China hands and the author of too many books on China to name, has been in the room for encounters between a slew of American presidents and Chinese leaders. He has also for decades interpreted the bitter factional struggles and geopolitical jockeying of the Chinese Communist Party. And as Xi Jinping's attempt to remake the Chinese state continues, Shell has mined China's history and its present for insight into how the country thinks of its place in the world and into the unresolved contradictions that continue to roil the party. Peek behind the veil, Shell writes in the latest issue of Foreign affairs. And a different reality reveals itself. A dog eat dog world of power struggles, artifice, hubris, treachery and duplicity, yet also an enormous amount of sacrifice. I spoke with Shell on Tuesday, November 4, about Trump and Xi, about the state of America' and about both the past and future of China itself. Orville, thank you for doing this. You've of course been on the podcast before for a fascinating conversation with Steve Kotkin about Mao and Stalin. But I'm very glad to have your solar return.
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My pleasure.
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A
You've been one of the most perceptive observers of interactions between American presidents and Chinese communist leaders, really since those interactions began with Nixon and MAO more than 50 years ago. You've personally witnessed some of these with President Carter and President Trump in his first term, and surely others. What did you take from watching the first summit between Trump and Xi Jinping in Trump's second term last week?
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B
Well, I think whenever you are at one of These presidential meetings, whether it's in China, another country, or in this country, I mean, you can feel the atmosphere of whether the two principals are really willing to play, or if there's a lot of resistance on the line, or whether they're just out to get each other. And I think that the thing that's so striking for me about Trump and having been on his first trip to China and watched him since and one other trip with him and Xi Jinping, is that I think his manner has built up a very high level of resistance in Xi Jinping. And you could sense that in Korea, but you could also sense a common conclusion that they were heading for an abyss and they ought to at least take a time out. And I think that's basically what we got. But I think that the fundamental antagonism and contradictions that exist, but within the trade system, the geopolitical sort of structure that the US And China find themselves in, in the world, that really has not abated.
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A
There was a sense after the meeting of a certain kind of paradigm shift in the US China relationship and in the Trump Xi dynamic, kind of a moment of treating this as its own arrival encounter that would fit with one of the attempted slogans of recent years, a new kind of great power competition or the like. Some of that stemmed, I think, from Chinese generation and use of leverage around critical mineral supply, the kind of leverage that for several decades, we thought of as mostly American. But the atmospherics of the meeting seem to reinforce that, especially with Trump talking about a G2 between the US and China and calling Xi Jinping great. Did you see that paradigm shift, or is that over reading it?
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B
Yeah, I think that there is a paradigm shift here. And I think the paradigm shift is sort of, if you look at it historically, it's that, in fact, China has now at last gained the kind of leverage that historically, ever since the Opium wars, it was seeking. And it was always somewhat of a supplicant. It was always compelled in some way or other to make some sort of genuflection before a meeting like this. I mean, remember in the past when people like Bush or Obama or, you know, even Carter, and after that, whenever they went to China, there was the presumption that they were giving something and that China had to let some dissidents free, you know, let them out of prison, do something, make some demonstration of its sort of willingness to. To make a concession. Those days are gone. And so I think the paradox is that we are now in a world where almost everyone ends up genuflecting to Trump, except Xi Jinping. Now, how that will work out, I don't know, because it presents us with a kind of an insoluble sort of stubbornness on both sides. But this is definitely something new where China has enough cards to really play the retaliatory game well.
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A
And that reflects work on China's part, not just since Donald Trump's first term, but over a longer period, an awareness of American dominance when it came to those kinds of competitions and the broader relationship. And it was a really a conscious effort on Beijing's part to correct that imbalance over time.
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B
Yes. Whatever realm you look at, you see China seeking to correct the balance and gain greater independence and less dependence on, on the outside world, particularly on the United States. There's a version of this in trade, there's a version of this in sort of military rise. There's a version of it in China's effort to become technologically, paradoxically, again, almost like Mao, you know, autarchic, independent. So the game plan is make China is independent and autarkic in all of these realms, military hardware, tech stuff, even finance, in every other way, geopolitically, while at the same time making the United States, Europe and the so called allies, partners and friends as dependent as China can make them on China. And this is where critical minerals or rare earths become so important. And there, if you sort of plot out the two double entry chart of who has what choke points, you find that China is not without some ability to choke.
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A
You and I were talking recently about the critical minerals piece of this, and we were both somewhat astonished to reflect on the fact that it's been 15 years since China first used its control over critical mineral supply chains to pressure Japan. That was in 2010. There was a fair amount of focus of this in the American national security community starting in Trump's first term. And certainly the Biden administration made this a priority. It doesn't seem to have resulted in real action on the ground on the American part. Is that fair to say?
- [07:43]
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I think it's quite extraordinary when you look back and remember when China first used critical minerals, or what was then known as rare earth, against Japan, nobody woke up. It was quite striking because you could see this sort of incipient lever being explored by China. I think it was partially because we just sort of didn't imagine that they had the same kinds of levers that we had. And so then when we got into the first sort of retaliatory cycle, which was Americans using microchips and the machines that fab microchips, particularly leading edge chips, the low nanometer range scale, we sort of didn't realize that, you know, what's fair for the goose might be fair for the gander. And then China began sort of cataloging the things that it had. So that's a very interesting exercise. We might even look at what choke points does China have and what choke points do we still have? Because this is where we're headed. Despite the pause that was brought about by the meeting in Korea, there have.
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A
Been many surprises in Trump's second term. One of the biggest to me is the shift in his China policy and his approach to China from the first term. What do you think Xi makes of Trump's second term so far, as you've tried to understand Chinese reactions to the second coming of Trump? What do you think they understand of what he's up to?
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B
Well, I think we have to sort of forgive the Chinese if they have trouble making sense out of Trump, because I'm not sure anybody really has a handle on that question. And what you note is quite striking, that he's gone from being sort of the prime hawk, recognizing a China threat and thinking that balance of payments is unsustainable, viewing China as the main competitor, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, to where we are now, which is quite ambiguous. But there certainly is a strong sort of incipient tendency just to say, oh, well, you know, it doesn't matter what the threat is, whether geopolitics, what the political system is, just leader to leader. I think I can fix this. This is sort of Trump's attitude, and that what really matters is just two guys get together and slug it out, hug it out, whatever it takes, and sort of letting the whole notion of China as a threat as a risk. And thus we need to be more hawkish in every category, whether it's trade, military diplomacy, that is sort of, I think, up for grabs right now.
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A
Do you have the theory there's a kind of Rorschach test quality to attempts to discern the China policy of Trump's second term? Do you have a theory of. And if we were going to give it the best possible analysis, what is your theory of what he's trying to do at this point?
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B
Well, I think one of the things that Trump has accomplished, which I think the Democrats and even the more sort of conventional Republicans fail to accomplish, is is that his unpredictable nature is reminiscent of Chairman Mao. You don't quite know what he's going to do. It's almost the madman Theory of geopolitics. And so that has really thrown everybody, including China, somewhat off balance. He's not very predictable, and there is power in that. So I think it's caused a lot of consternation in China, but fortunately they know how to play that game because they've been doing this a long time too, and now they have the power. Although Xi Jinping is not so unpredictable as Chairman Mao was or as Trump. He's quite predictable, actually. I think he, he realizes that he's going to have to play a game of hardball, and that's where we are. And the paradox is that while American allies don't wish to stand up to Trump because the costs are too high, Xi Jinping might be willing to, although you see him sometimes becoming a little cautious and recognizing that he better maybe sometimes give a little to get a little, or the whole train will run off the rails. And remember, China is a very export dependent country. It overproduces and it cannot absorb what it produces, whether it's concrete, steel, copper, you know, lithium, whatever. And so it is deeply embedded in the world. And this is one of the choke points, of course, that the United States has. It's such a big market, everybody needs it.
- [12:15]
A
I want to come back to Xi Jinping, but I want to first linger on this idea of Trump, the Maoist, that Trump has these kind of Mao, this Maoist theory of power. In some ways, there's the foreign policy dimension of that. This seems to be a domestic dimension of that. His ideas of control and struggle and keeping people kind of both worked up, but also unsettled seems to be central to his theory of power domestically as well. Do you think that's fair to say? I'm not saying he was reading the writings of Chairman Mao and building his theory accordingly, but there does seem to be something connected there.
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B
Well, I think Trump is Maoist in the sense that he kind of in an animal way recognizes that if you can put people off balance and if you can make them unclear, not able to clearly recognize where you're headed, you derive immense power from that. And so I don't think this is a conscious thing. And unlike Mao, he's not written it down in any sort of philosophical treatise, but he uses it. And so I think this, this makes him quite a threat to China. And I think if China really did want to understand him better, they would look at their own Cultural revolution when everything was getting turned upside down and where the mantras were, you know, make great disorder under heaven. That was, you know, Dan, Ao Tian Gong. That was one of the great sort of mantras of Ma or I remember there was a slogan back during the Mao years, you know, the world is in great disorder, excellent situation. And there were many of these kinds of expressions. And I think, again, Mao had a deep and abiding sense of the power of disorder, and his whole notion of the world as being in a state of contradiction constantly, and that most contradictions had to be solved by struggle and even war was the outcome of that. I don't think Trump has that sort of worldview, and he hasn't thought it through or written it down, but he almost instinctually knows what to do to make people scratch their heads and wonder, where are we? What the hell do we do here?
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A
I wonder if anyone has had the idea to create a little red book of Trump sayings. There's probably one out there somewhere, but.
- [14:21]
B
Well, I think it would be a quaint idea. There is a certain virtue to that. And of course, on his side, we need to understand Xi Jinping in this equation, because there are two things that need to be factored into the equation. People have spoken of him as being somewhat of a Maoist, and in a certain sense he is. But he's not a Maoist in the sense that he likes disorder in China. He doesn't. He's not a person thrusting giant political mass movements and Red Guards attacking the party in the state. So he's Maoist in the sense that I think he feels there is a fundamentally antagonistic relationship between. Well, it used to be capitalists and imperialists and socialists in China and Russia, but now it's between countries like the United States and maybe the EU and China that, yes, we have to get along in some degree, yes, we need to trade because we're dependent on that. But deep down inside, I think he views that the fundamental intention is really to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party and the one party state in China. So that builds into the whole proposition of each analyzing the other. A very antagonistic element you can discern.
- [15:37]
A
In Xi Jinping's speeches occasionally, and certainly in the speeches of Wang Yi, the foreign policy chief, a sense that China has a geostrategic opportunity missile, that the US Is stepping back from its traditional global role. In lots of ways, it is unsettling and alienating both allies and partners, both traditional allies and also partners in the global south. It's withdrawing from international institutions. The Chinese decision makers seem to have some awareness that this creates an opportunity for them. At the same time, there's some question about Whether they'll be able to effectively seize this. They haven't really changed the economic practices that, that American allies at least object to and many others. You've seen aggressive exercises in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and East China Sea and elsewhere. How do you think China is reacting this opportunity? Are they're handling it adeptly or is this kind of deficiency of their system that will prevent them from really seizing it?
- [16:32]
B
Well, I think that they're well aware that, for instance, Trump is not doing a very proficient job at keeping allies, partners and friends together, which was the heart and soul of the whole strategy of deterrence, for instance, in the South Sea or in Taiwan or wherever the border with India. But I think China, in its way, and I emphasize in its way because in its way is not always very beguiling or convincing to other countries that, after all, is a Marxist Leninist state. But in its way, it's doing quite an efficient and good job at sort of sewing together an alternative universe, whether it's the Belt and Road, whether it's a Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whether it's brics, you know, all of these very well thought out and put together webs of interaction that it's casting out around the world where the United States is pulling back, it's also pushing away or confusing allies. And so I think in this sense, China's doing well. But you have to ask, does Southeast Asia, for instance, really. They want to, yes, walk in the middle and be able to deal with both the US And China. But would they like to have a, have a one party state like China? I don't think so. So in this sense, China does have an impediment, I think, to really being as successful as it might. But it's very well organized, very well funded, and it's making, I think, remarkable steps.
- [18:03]
A
I've been struck by the dynamic with Europe, between China and Europe. It seems like a moment when some shift in the Chinese position, especially on the war in Ukraine, would allow it to pick up some influence with Europeans who are concerned about actions coming from Washington. But Xi seems more committed to Putin and to supporting Putin's war in Ukraine than I would have thought a year ago. Are you struck by the commitment to that policy?
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B
Yes. And I think what we see with North Korea too, and China, I mean, they're both not going to abandon Putin because Putin and Russia are the one big ally available to that and they come well armed with oil and gas. And I think the Ukraine war is a big impediment now between Europe and China. The problem is that countries like Germany are so deeply embedded in the German economy, whether it's automobile industry, you know, BASF and chemicals and one thing and another, it's very hard for them to decouple. I mean, this is the word of the age, decouple. And everyone recognizes that as things get more hostile and more uncertain, this is probably the best strategy. But it's very, very difficult to do. And this is why things like rare earths and polysilicon and chips and you name it, or what's going to rule the world for the next few years at least.
- [19:30]
A
You have a fascinating piece in our new issue called the Miseducation of Xi Jinping. It's a review of a book by Joseph Turidjian about Xi Jinping's father. But one of the lines that really struck me as I was reading your piece is about the difficulty of interpreting or understanding Xi Jinping. You write, I've encountered few leaders whose body language and facial expressions reveal so little about what's going on inside their heads. With a Mona Lisa like hint of a smile permalech on his face, she's mean. It's hard to read. Why? As you reflect on attempts to understand Xi Jinping by American policymakers over the last 15 or 20 years, I suppose since there was early speculation that he might be the next Chinese leader, why have they struggled and how have you understood that arc the way we talk about Xi Jinping?
- [20:15]
B
Well, Xi Jinping is a very cloistered. He doesn't reveal much. In this sense, he's very much like this early school, way back thousands of years ago of political statecraft called legalism, where the leader wants to be as elusive as possible, reveal very little, keep people on edge, be always uncertain, so everybody has to tiptoe around him. And I think that this is if you compare Xi to the whole group of last leaders who I've watched come and go. Mao is a bit enigmatic, but Hu Ya Bong, the next party general secretary, was incredibly open and sort of creative and you could read him easily. He interacted well and then came, you know, John Zhang, who was really like a normal person. I had a daughter who been to college in Hawaii and he would give interviews and sit and drink a bottle of beer. I remember one time with Tom Brokaw when NBC went over to China. He was not an enigma and I should say in a certain sense neither was Deng Xiaoping. And when he came in 1979 to confirm US formal diplomatic relations with the US and China, he was a Very sort of interesting and open and a person people warmed to very quickly. And even Johnson bin in the 90s, who we thought was a little clownish at the time because he always liked to sing Solo Mio in Italian or recite the Gettysburg Address. But actually he was very open. And when you saw him interact with Bill Clinton when Clinton visited in 98, it was an extraordinary moment because these two guys were enjoying each other's company. You could see it and were smiling and laughing. And then we had Hu Jintao who sort of wasn't there. It was hard to read him at all, but he was just sort of a non entity. But Xi Jinping is powerful, strong. He has great aspirations, great ambitions, great pretensions, but he's very close, very hard to read. And I think this was the result of his coming out of the Cultural Revolution when his father, Joseph Turregian, so well explains in his book about his father was a counter revolutionary for 16 years. And this is when Xi Jinping was coming of age. And I think he learned don't reveal too much, don't say what you're really thinking. It'll only get you in trouble. And he had to be redder than anybody else to survive. And I think he learned to be very sort of retracted. And in this sense, he's quite different than many of the leaders who've gone before him. And that means when he gets together with someone, well, with Joe Biden, you would have thought, I mean, Joe Biden's is very avuncular. You know, slap him on the back. Hey, how are you doing? You know, she let's, let's have a beer together. No, that's not Xi's mo. So he's now cast in with Trump. I mean, I can't think of two more sort of unlikely figures just as human beings. And it's almost hard to imagine how they could interact in a way, except by choke points to come up with any new balanced order.
- [23:43]
A
I mean, you were in the room with both Trump and Xi, and I believe Biden and Xi as well, when Biden was vice president. What was it like? Watching that in person, I mean, really.
- [23:52]
B
Is like watching a statue, you know, and no matter what Biden did and you know, the way he is, very kind of, how are you doing? And hey, hey, come on down, let's get together with a wife and kids. Xi Jinping was not buying any of that. He was just not going to go there. So it's a very different kind of person. And I think we frequently we who do foreign policy, and God knows, foreign affairs does a lot of foreign policy. We forget that we are in an era of big leader Koltor. Ideology is important, yes. Political systems are also important, but so is the personalities, the nature of each of these leaders. And I think, you know, Putin, Xi Jinping, Trump, Kim Jong Un, even Modi. We're in a different political world where these big leaders are what we need to understand better. Where do they come from? Who are they? What do they want? How are they going to react and respond? And I think we're ill equipped to do that. And paradoxically, here, I think literature can help us. In fact, there's this very interesting new book just out called the Tragedy of China and King Lear. And, you know, this young Chinese scholar, Johns Hopkins, is sort of ruminating on Mao as a kind of a Lear like figure. And it doesn't really get to Xi Jinping. But I think it's these people as people who've become as important as these people as political, you know, people with political worlds and. And worldviews and et cetera, et cetera. So I think we're a little bit like we were in World War II. You know, Hitler, Stalin, Franco, Salazar, Ho Chi Minh, Mao. I mean, these were all this was big leader culture. And we're kind of back into it again.
- [25:54]
A
I imagine that's what explains what's been so fascinating to a lot of readers about the Trigian book about Xi Jinping's father, is that this is one way to try to understand perhaps the most important or one of the most important of those big leaders in ways that we haven't so far. Triggian is very disciplined about not engaging in, I think, as you put it in the essay, kind of Freudian analysis of Xi Jinping based on his father's experience. But as you read about the father, what else beyond that closed quality do you think Xi Jinping took from that experience?
- [26:28]
B
Well, I think he learned first of all. I think he did imbibe sort of the whole sort of the Maoist lexicon. But it's not so much that as the Leninist version of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong thought that. I think he took away, that you need to be disciplined above all. And this is when his father said, and he says, the party's interests come first. This takes discipline, because no matter what the party has done or what the party does, you don't believe it. And his father, even though he was literally crucified for 16 years, and that was the second purging incredibly Painful, taken away from his family, pilloried, demeaned, you know, imprisoned. He didn't leave the party. And I think Xi Jinping has absorbed that kind of discipline, devotion, and loyalty to the party. And so I think that's one thing we do need to bear in mind. And that comes with a whole package of things he will and won't do. And he's not going to take the portrait of Chairman bow down off of the gentleman gate and say, you know, that was a bad moment back then. Let's move on. No, he's going to embrace the past. He's going to stick with the past. And that means he's also going to retain the presumptions of the past towards the outside world, and particularly the United States of America, which is no matter what they say, no matter what they do, there is a fundamental and antagonistic contradiction. There's a hostility that we can't ever, ever ignore. And I think that is something that's probably pretty deep in his being. So no matter whether how many times Obama says, you know, China's rise is not against American interest, we don't oppose, doesn't go into the operating system. And so I think this is. Makes it really, really difficult as we go forward to find any more than momentary common ground on certain critical issues that both people need to work out or their economies will come to an end, or they'll have military conflict, or, you know, so we're in a very transactional world and a world between blocks that are forming, I think, that are fundamentally insoluble with each other.
- [28:52]
A
Reading your piece, it's hard not to feel some degree of sympathy for the teenage Xi Jinping during the Cultural Revolution. You recount these anecdotes from the Tridgian book about Xi's own mother denouncing him and turning him to authorities when he searched for food. And of course, he was, when he was 15 or so, sent off to poor village to taken out of school to do manual labor for several years. There was an expectation that that would lead to a degree of moderation in Xi Jinping that he would take from that experience desire not to repeat that kind of ideological extremism. It seems to have driven him the other way. How do you understand his relationship with Cultural Revolution and beyond just reflecting on his father's own experience?
- [29:33]
B
You know, Dan, I think that we underappreciate how important formative years are in creating a leader. I mean, that's what goes into the sort of political genome of their being. And I think this is why Turzian's book, I think, is so interesting. As you point out, he eschews wallowing into the bog of psychoanalysis, but he lays out what happened. It's like a playwright. You watch the play, here's what happened. You can read into it whatever you want or a great novel. And I think we do need to understand that. And it's the same as with Trump. His formative years were incredibly important to him, and I think they were quite brutal too, with his father, who was not a very kind or embracing man. And books have been written about that. So I think, again, and if you go back in history, Hitler too had these problems, so did Stalin. I mean, people become who they are by the lives they've lived. And that part is very hard to understand in foreign policy discussions because we usually think of policy in terms of national interest, of, you know, rational things. But the truth is many, many leaders in history have not been rational.
- [30:54]
A
Do you, do you read Xi Jinping as irrational or actually quite, quite savvy? I mean, there's a piece in the same issue by, by John Zinn, who was the chief CIA China analyst, China political analyst for a long time, and he talks about Xi's ability to correct course and even without democratic feedback mechanisms, a degree of kind of self correction that might surprise many American observers. Do you think that gets it right or what accounts for that side of Xi Jinping?
- [31:20]
B
I think Xi Jinping is a fairly well ordered and not sort of constantly threatening to run off the rails the way some leaders are. However, I think he is deeply insecure, which means that he's very sensitive to any imputations of weakness. And this is always a big challenge. I mean, leaders that are confident can make concessions without feeling wounded, damaged or weak. And I think Xi Jinping probably has a more difficult time doing that than, I mean, someone like Mao was both insecure and confident, throw his weight around with impunity. But so I think, yeah, listen, this is a difficult area and I think this is why it behooves us to go back and read Shakespeare and Euripides and Sophocles because they kind of nailed these archetypes of leadership that help us understand something like Xi Jinping. And paradoxically, you know, Trump, I mean, Richard plays, he's right there, hump and all.
- [32:31]
A
We'll be back after a short break. For the past 30 years, American Foreign policy has been bold and transformative, attempting.
- [32:41]
B
To reshape the world.
- [32:42]
A
But the failures of the war on terror, the rise of China and A shift to multipolarity globally. All suggest that a new approach approach is needed. In First Among US Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World, Emma Ashford challenges how we think about American foreign policy. She proposes a return to a more pragmatic, realist set of strategic principles and argues that the United States must fundamentally reconceptualize its role in the world from.
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Global hegemon to shared leadership.
- [33:12]
A
First Among Equals is available now from Yale University Press in print and ebook. And now back to my conversation with Orville Schell. I'm struck when I hear Chinese observers talk about Xi Jinping, about this other parallel with Trump and their kind of relationship to their own elite. They're both in some sense, came from very elite backgrounds. Trump was very wealthy. Xi Jinping was a child of a revolutionary leader, was a princeling. And yet they both have this very tortured relationship with elites, the sense that they were not quite accepted by them. And when Chinese people observe Xi Jinping, they say he hates elites of all kinds, but kind of comes alive when he's among the people as he sees it. Trump seems very similar in that regard.
- [34:03]
B
I think that's right. And it's a very, I think, astute observation, something that's worth remembering as we read the paper and we, we try to figure out what's going on, that, you know, who these people are and how they respond isn't always based on the best interests of their country or the world. I mean, when you think about it, what rational leader would let go of engagement? This was nine presidential administrations on our side, all trying to get along, and China got wealthy and China developed. Why put a stake through the heart of engagement? It was working pretty well for everybody. And so you have to ask the question that was that in China's interest? Well, yes, if you aspire to a China dream and the sense of China regaining a kind of a greatness that historically once had, and it doesn't matter, you have to break some eggs to get there. But from any other perspective, it isn't very logical. So we have to understand there is an illogic in some of the biggest decisions that these leaders make. And it's perhaps based on something else other than a kind of a very cool, calculated assessment of what's good for their economy, what's good for their people, what's good for the world. These are human beings.
- [35:27]
A
Unification between the mainland, Taiwan is one of the key pieces of that from Xi Jinping's perspective. I think there was a lot of anxiety from hardliners on China in this country and lots of others, including many officials from Trump's first term. Going into the meeting in Korea last week, that there'd be some kind of deal on Taiwan. There's, as far as it's been reported, as far as the readouts have it, there was really no talk of Taiwan. How do you understand Xi's strategy towards Taiwan at this point? Is 2027ameaningful benchmark?
- [35:56]
B
Well, I think it was sort of amazing that Taiwan didn't come up in Korea, but it didn't. But nothing should amaze us too much in this world where we really are kind of enlightenment era. Minds don't always tell us what's going to happen. I mean, I think Taiwan is such a devilish and such a vexing issue because it bespeaks of one of the last things that the Chinese Communist Party said it would do when, as it came to power in the 20s, 30s and 40s, the last century, and then up since then, would reunify China. And it has reunified China, according to the old Qing dynasty map, which is very expansive, includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and as we now see, the South China Sea. So this was a big deal. So I think for Xi, it is a kind of a matter of pride. I think he feels he can't be a big leader and not put this piece of the puzzle back together. Never mind that Deng xiaoping said in 79 in Japan on his way to Washington, oh, let's leave it for future, smarter generations to solve it. Even Mao Zedong told Nixon, it's okay if we don't solve this for 100 years. Let's not let it get in the way. And they didn't. But for Xi, I think it's a matter of pride. And I think, again, pride merges somewhere with face, one of the most poorly understudied aspects of Chinese sort of cultural behavior, and makes it a very sensitive issue. So what's going to happen there? It's very hard to know. One would hope they could just kick the can down the road for another hundred years, and at some point, China would become more of a Republican country, and Taiwan would say, great, let's team up, but we're not there. So I think I worry as I.
- [38:00]
A
Look at the other pieces of that definition of greatness. If you go back over the past 15 years or so, 20 years, China has gotten quite assertive on each one of them. And despite occasional pushback from the United States or others, and lots of rhetoric, denouncing measures in the South China Sea or Hong Kong, or treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or Tibetans. China has more or less gotten away with all of those. Some of that Xi Jinping, some of it precedes him. But I imagine you'd be quite confident about your ability to do the same with Taiwan if you're a Chinese leader looking at that record.
- [38:33]
B
Yes. And I think gray zone tactics are what will probably ultimately happen bit by bit by bit, so that there's no moment when anyone says, that's enough, that's it, we're in. But we have to remember there are other places. You know, the whole area that is west of Burma, up the Chicken Neck in India, the Northeast territories. China calls it, you know, South Tibet. And on its maps, every town is in Chinese and they say it's ours. They just haven't claimed it the way they have in certain territory in Ladakh. And so, I mean, there are a lot of pieces of unresolved real estate flying around Asia that a leader like Xi Jinping is, who is very grandiose in his pretensions of restoring China to greatness, will certainly want to sort of. It's like getting the crown of Napoleon's wife back. And if they're jewels missing, you want to put them back in the crown. He wants China to be restored to greatness. This isn't an abiding dream of his, the China dream. And it is also, I think, bespeaks of his own sort of sense of insecurity and wanting to make himself and China be strong, respected, even if it's an autocracy, even if you don't act respectively. I think it's really important to Xi Jinping that he be respected, esteemed, and not sort of treated as some tin pot dictator who shut out of, you know, the G7 or whatever. So I think we've got some very, very contentious issues here which are manifested in the most graphic way by the leaders themselves, both in Russia, China and.
- [40:20]
A
The U.S. i was fascinated by the comment you made a couple minutes ago about face, about the way we misunderstand the significance of face or the extent to which it's understudied. This strikes me as something that any American policymaker kind of throws around about China, especially that you need to think about face. What do you think we get wrong in our understanding of. Of that concept?
- [40:40]
B
Yeah, it's very hard to talk about because it sounds somewhat condescending to just say, oh, the Chinese have a face problem. But you have to remember that the last Hundred years have been what they call the hundred years of humiliation. There is a narrative that came out of Leninism of the imperializers and the imperialized. And it's a very demeaning narrative for countries like China and. But they built out of it a whole victim culture and a culture of humiliation, so that even as China has become an immense success, they still have not been able to drop the narrative of failure and humiliation. It's a kind of a paradoxical thing. And this plays into whatever this category of face is all about, which I think is quite profound. And there are some cultural elements which I think are distinctly Chinese that make it difficult to vault over an insult or something that deprives someone in public life or even private life of face. And I think this is a really big issue that's been built into a national culture. So it's embedded in the whole nationalist narrative of what China is and how it interacts with the world and how the world treats it and denies its face, humiliates it, disesteems it. And all of these things are true.
- [42:05]
A
You've talked about the engagement period of the US China relationship over the course of nine or so presidencies and how good that was for China. I think what's so fascinating about your body of work going back decades is that you started chronicling China from the outside before you were able to go there during the, I guess, the Cultural Revolution, or even before you were very much present in the early years of opening and started traveling to China and spending time there. And you've watched the end of that era. There's a way we depict the engagement period, that there was kind of an expectation that China would evolve in ways that would make it more like us, or at least better able to coexist with us in the international order. As you look back at the early hopes of that opening, how do you understand them? And what do you think they got fundamentally wrong? Or was it the right thing to try and merely had an expiration date?
- [42:57]
B
That's a really important question. And I think engagement was the right thing to try. If America is truly a great power, it should always try to peacefully resolve something, particularly when it's dealing with an autocratic state. And if there's any way under heaven for that state to slowly morph into something less antagonistic, maybe not completely democratic, but no democracy is perfect. That would be a great victory. And I think, you know, to America's credit, it really did try. You know, universities went in ballet, troops, foundations, government. I mean, programs. I mean, we were full on trying to make that work, to somehow mute the contradiction between the two countries that existed under map. And we came very close. And Paradoxically, I think 1989 was a terrible blow to the promise of engagement and reform upon which engagement depended.
- [43:58]
A
This was Tiananmen Square and the images of that massacre.
- [44:01]
B
This was Tiananmen Square. And the Beijing massacre kind of ended a big that promise to some really significant degree. But then it did come back again under Jiangsamentis to some significant degree, and there was grounds for hope. So was it wrong? No, I don't think it was. Was it naive? Yes, it was somewhat naive because it didn't take into account the fundamental inflexibility of Leninist systems. And we've talked about that with Steve Kotkin on Stalin and Mao. But I think it was a good try. Could it return? It's possible. And I think it's really important for us to remember as we look at policy now and we see these two big leaders lumbering around, bumping into each other, that underneath the suspicion, paranoia, distrust, there's 150 years of deep and abiding interaction that goes way back to the missionary years. Had its downside, sure, but I mean, there's a fundamental aquifer of good US China feeling that's beneath the surface. And it will arise up again sometime when it's very hard to say. So I'm not completely despairing about the future, but I think it's going to be incredibly difficult to avoid some trigger moment happening that leads to military conflict. That's my great worry about. And then of course, with military conflict in the Ukraine, and if we had it in Asia, we'd essentially have a world war. So I think that's the fear. And here diplomacy is important, but here Trump is not the steadiest hand on the helm.
- [45:48]
A
That's right. It's hard to imagine how a real crisis in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea would play out with the current set of leaders we have to deal with.
- [45:55]
B
No, we might end up in a terrible conflagration, or he might just give it away.
- [46:00]
A
There's another fascinating theme in your work, going back decades, about the ways in which, underneath the kind of dominant political narrative or geopolitical narrative, there's much more ferment and debate and diversity within Chinese political and intellectual and civic life than might appear from the outside. You wrote about this in a 2021 essay about the centennial of the Chinese Party for Foreign affairs, but you also wrote a fascinating piece in 2004 on China's hidden democratic legacy, where you looked at thinkers, especially in the late Qing and early, early Republican period in the first half of the 20th century, Chinese attempts to define their own political systems or inversions of democracy. Talk a bit about those thinkers and whether you think there's any enduring value and, and perhaps significance in Chinese political life to them.
- [46:47]
B
Well, Dan, being a historian, I really do believe that history exists and exerts a kind of field of gravity even after it passes, that it is a country's past and it stays with it. Whether it's a revolution, it stays with it. Whether it's a. A democratic movement, it also stays with it. And China does, as I just said, have a deep and abiding fund of much more liberal and to a certain degree Westernized, but a democratic tradition that it can draw on. And I think you see that for instance, when you go to Taiwan, I mean, here are Chinese people, by at least the mainland's account, there's some Taiwanese who don't think that, but they do have a vibrant democracy. One feels relaxed and comfortable there, not always followed watched. You don't have to be careful about what you say, and you do. So there it is. And that came out of the whole John Kaik era, which you'll remember in the 1930s, was immensely promising. That was the golden decade when China was developing. It had a Republican government. It wasn't completely democratic, but it was not doing badly. And then what happened? The Japanese invaded and it was, I think, doing pretty well in competing with the. The Communists, even trying to exterminate them. But after that, the gift to the Communist Party was Japan's occupation of China. So that republican experiment, remember that in that government, you've written about it in your wonderful book on George Marshall. I mean, he had Christians, he had people who studied in Europe and America. There was no. I see. The Chinese just said that any leader that has a child that doesn't come home six months after that graduating from the United States will lose his job. That wasn't the case back then. So that tradition of cosmopolitanism exists. And remember Jan Kai Shek? He was a Christian. He became a Christian perforce of his wife. He also remained a Confucian. And he prayed every day, read the Bible every day, did Confucian meditation every day. So that was another whole world that existed, largely came out of Shanghai and the treaty ports. And it's not gone away.
- [49:15]
A
You have an ability to follow. Debates within China that are inaccessible to most of us is, of course, become much harder in the last few years, as it's become more difficult to go to China, and the kinds of conversations you can have once there are certainly more constrained than they were 10 or 15 years ago. But you still do have interactions and relationships and part of conversations that reflect that kind of diversity. And from it now, how much is there that we're not seeing on the surface? How do you understand that deeper debate about the future of China and its political system that's unfolding today?
- [49:50]
B
You know, the years of reform that began in 1978, continued through the 90s, were profound years for China. It's when China literally came alive after the Cultural Revolution. People were going all around the world as businessmen, students, whatever, cultural troops. And it influenced several generations in ways that I think are very hard to palpate now, hard to feel it, because Xi Jinping has sort of put such a dome over what can be publicly said public discourse, but it doesn't mean it's not there. And I think those years are profound. And if you know China's people in the professional classes, educated classes, urban people, you realize there's a lot of, lot of disaffection. But Chinese know when they can speak and when they can't. They're realistic people. And to be a dissident in China, it's leads to one place, it leads to jail, and it leads maybe to death. And rational, you know, people with families and kids and jobs, they'd rather not go there. So they tiptoe around, but that doesn't mean they aren't thinking things that aren't published in the People's Daily. So I think, you know, my sort of long association with China reminds me that there are many, many layers that we can't divine easily now, but are there. And I see it in, in my friends, I see it in the work that I do. It's just harder to see and it's harder to participate in than it used to be. We were so accompanied to just running back and forth between China and the US Whether we were Chinese or Americans or Europeans, the barriers had fallen down for one amazing few decades, and now they're back up again. So when Xi Jinping grants visas to the New Zealanders and the Europeans, you know, you don't need to get it easy. You can go for a week, it's a device, but it doesn't rebuild the kind of interaction that once was so influential and had such a profound impact for a period of time. But it happened, and we shouldn't forget it.
- [52:18]
A
Not that we're in quite as Dramatic, a rupture, as we were in, in 1949. But I am struck, reflecting back on that history, the extent to which the inaccessibility of China to American policymakers and journalists and cultural figures and others, the extent to which that created an image of China that I think undermined good policy and good understanding in American foreign policy. And I worry about that a bit now as well. Do you see a similar kind of rupture?
- [52:43]
B
Well, I mean, I think it's very easy. We began this conversation talking about hawks. And when you get in a situation like we're now in, presently in, it's not illogical to be somewhat hawkish if you see China as a threat and a risk. And what engagement did for a moment, for a couple decades was sort of mute that impulse. And, and I think in a real way, and you know, when Deng Xiaoping was here in 1979, I remember we were down and went down to Texas, this rodeo, I mean, it's a classical moment and they were playing country western music and everybody's eating ribs and beans and then Deng Xiaoping sitting in the front row and this cowgirl came up on a quarter horse and slapped a 20 gallon hat on his head. Well, this was the kind of theater that gave everybody permission to relax and to say it's okay to like each other. But we're not there now and Xi Jinping's not going to do that kind of theater. I wager, although he would be one of the smartest, brightest, most worshiped leaders on earth if he could engineer such a moment to say, okay, let's stop, let's get back to a time when it's okay to interact. You don't need to be careful. You don't need to have a lot of official talk that doesn't mean make any sense. Let's just be, let's just be human beings and see what we can work out. But those moments are few. It didn't come in Germany and we had a world war. It didn't come with Russia. So I don't know. This is why I say leadership is everything. And who the leaders are really matter, what they believe, yes, that matters too. But what they're afraid of, what they like, what they dislike, what they, you know, all of these things are, these are complicated people.
- [54:43]
A
There's a thread in your work of cautioning the rest of us against drawing straight line projections from where things are now to where they'll be in the future. If you look beyond Xi Jinping, what kind of change can you imagine Whether it's an adjustment back to where we were or something else altogether.
- [54:59]
B
Well, Dan, listen. Remember what an enormous amount China has accomplished. It's staggering. In my lifetime, I've watched it. I was there when Mao Zedong was wreaking havoc with the Cultural Revolution. And now look at the place. If Xi Jinping could enjoy that success and all those accomplishments and say, listen, let's take a Mao Zedong once called the Chinese people ijang baizhi, a piece of blank paper. If you could just take out a blank piece of paper and say, let's try to write this again. And there actually need not be a contradiction between China and America because we've lived a time when the contradiction was very muted. Let's get back to that. What's wrong with that? He would be the greatest leader on earth. He would be a man memorialized by today's Euripides as the as the non tragic leader who overcame his tragic flaws and his excessive ambition and instead position China to be a leader in the world with whom everybody could feel comfortable. I think that would be an extraordinary accomplishment. Will it happen? Well, you see, here's where leadership matters.
- [56:24]
A
That's a great note to end on. Orville. Thank you for both the most recent piece and the series of wonderful pieces you've done for Foreign affairs over the years. We'll look forward to the next one. And it's been great to have you on the podcast Solar for the first time.
- [56:36]
B
Well, great, Dan. It's always fun writing for you all and being on your podcast. I really enjoy it.
- [56:47]
A
Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show@foreign affairs.com this episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Ben Metzner, Elise Burr and Kanish Kharoor. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning.
- [57:18]
B
In.