D (7:34)

Thanks so much for having me, Mike.

A (7:36)

So this is not the main topic of the book, but Warhead is a clever title. Why do puns work from a brain perspective?

D (7:44)

So it is about a lot of what makes things interesting is surprise. So when you have a pun, and I'm making this up now, but that's partly my job, when you have a pun, it's interesting and surprising because it opens up multiple meanings and surprise is a key way that all of us have our attention drawn to things.

A (8:06)

Yes, but what part of the brain? Which part? It's Higher up than the brain stem. Is it an interaction between two parts of the brain?

D (8:14)

I am almost. Well, almost everything's about an interaction between parts of the brain so that, you know, there are two, you could say there are two principles about the brain. So there is specialized, there are specialized areas for, for example, for vision and for hearing. And then there are other specialized areas, for example for language. Right. So if I'm right handed, so a lot of those language parts will be in the left side of my brain. And what happens is, as well as having specialized areas, what we also have is those areas are integrated together. So when I'm listening, the auditory input goes into the language areas and I hear what you're saying, like warhead. And if I'm reading, then the visual areas input into the language parts of the brain and I'm reading warhead. And so our brain has specialized areas and then those areas are integrated together to, you know, help us do tasks like find things funny.

A (9:10)

Right. So let us now talk about something you definitely have studied. Our brains have not changed since the age of the Spartan is a very warlike culture and wars have ebbed and flowed. So if the brains are the same, why has, is it just technological? Why is the nature of war or even decisions whether to go to war, why has that changed or has it?

D (9:35)

So I'd say that the basic nature of it hasn't changed. So war has always remained the same. War is politically motivated violence between human groups. And that violence is at scale, it's not just a bar fight, it's politically motivating, it's large scale. So the basics of it hasn't changed since time of the Spartans. That's why people to this day read literally about Thucydides, wrote about Sparta and Athens going at it in ancient Greece or in the ancient Mediterranean. And that is still really useful for us to read now. Just as Mao Zedong, the paramount leader of China, who won the Chinese civil war and turned China into the communist state it is today, in many ways he read the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, which is again the sort of like a story of stratagems and so on from many, many centuries ago. The nature doesn't change, but the character will change, for example, with technology, as you say, but also different ways we organize our societies. So democracies, for example, act in importantly slightly different ways to authoritarian states. And for all those reasons, the character of war will always change even as the nature of war remains the same.

A (10:47)

Yes, and we will definitely get to how the nation state and identity as you write about, plays a hugely important role. But I have also got to think that in an earlier age, when lifespans were even if you calculate it just from people who survived infancy, which was far from a sure thing, lifespans were short, life was tough. The downside of dying in war compared to every side, everyday existence was maybe not so stark. Of course, it's absolute. Dying and living are quite different. But to send whole societies to war and to have your people slaughtered, maybe leaders wouldn't get as punished. So this is one thing that I've often thought about and you tell me what you think as material circumstances change in life in general gets bigger, better, the attractiveness of the gains of war, the calculation at least changes and I think for many gets worse.

D (11:44)

I think you are, I think you're partly right. So one thing I would say is, is that human, the way our brains work is quite relative and we worry now, you know, yeah, we live in what is by any objective standard in a country like America or Australia or Britain or France or Germany, right. In the modern day, these are basically some of the very, very, very best, safest bits of history ever to live in. And yet the number of people who are whinging about how terrible everything is all the time and how we're on the brink of catastrophe in catastrophe, you know, is a lot, right? So that's one thing, everything is relative. And of course the second point is, is that, yes, our societies now enable us to live so much safer, you know, objectively, materially superior lives. Right. In very many ways. But coming alongside the spiraling up of our ability to give ourselves nice things is also a spiral by which the capacity we have to destroy ourselves also increases. An example is nuclear weapons, right? However hard the Spartans fought, you mentioned the Spartans. However hard they fought, they weren't going to annihilate absolutely everybody in the whole world, right? And yet potentially that's what could happen tomorrow afternoon if things go wrong.

A (12:59)

Right? So tell us about the idea of the nation state and how after to take it in the American context, after 9 11, a kid in Spokane, Washington, who hasn't come within a thousand miles of New York City says they attacked this idea of America, signs up for the military, adding on, layering on to the fact that whatever responses that we did stopped really being about 9 11, even if that was the justification. This is a real change in psychiatry and psychology, isn't is?

D (13:30)

But I think that in some ways we think it's utterly remarkable that we have these giant coherent groups, but in many Ways the more remarkable thing is that, not that these groups could potentially fall apart, for example, but that these groups can get so big and enormous and powerful and coherent in the first place. Right. So to give you an example, humans are the only primate species that can form groups of more than a few hundred individuals. Right? Chimps might have groups, about 40 or 50. Baboons might get to a couple of hundred. Humans can get to vast groups. So how do we do that? So you talked about this chap in Spokane, I think you said, right? Yeah. So why does he identify? Why is his identity that of an American? Right. And identity is really crucial. So how do we get there? So how do we create these groups? So it's a spiral. What we do is we create groups in which the identities of the individuals are coherent enough with each other that those groups can work, that the people, the individuals in those groups can work together. Right. So the question of who am I? You ask the question, who am I? And it's I'm an American or I'm a Britain or whatever it might be, or I'm a, you know, I'm a member of the Green Party, I'm a Republican, I'm a Democrat, whatever it might be. Now then, in addition to that, you've got identities and you've got the cultures that make those identities happen, Right? So cultures are the rules, the rules that say how things work around here. And so identities help form the cultures and cultures help form the identities and they spiral together and they make that chap you were talking about in Spokane, they make him care about what happens to Americans in New York. Right. And it makes him care about going out enough to go out and fight for those people in Afghanistan. And just to say this is absolutely central, for example, to why American troops were in West Berlin in West Europe during the Cold War. Right. The point of those troops, it wasn't that they were going to be able to defeat the Soviets in a war, because they weren't. There were just far too few of them, certainly in many key parts, the early parts of the Cold War, the point was they were Americans. And if American troops were killed, that would mean Americans, other Americans, their identities would say, we have to avenge that. Right. And so this idea of identity is absolutely essential to how all militaries and for example, modern day deterrence works.

A (16:00)

Yeah. Well, let's take an issue that I kept thinking about as I read the book, which is the war in Gaza. So what happened there was 1200 or so Israelis were slaughtered and then by a popular Analysis, they were. This was by design by Hamas and they were goaded into the overreaction of invading Gaza. All of these points along the line are contestable. But my question to you is, for someone from the outside criticizing that, are they not understanding what you just said? The identity aspect of, of course, Israel was going to be, you could say goaded, you could say seeking vengeance, you could say protecting themselves. But it's almost. Here is my contention, goaded, not goaded. Fell into a trap. Not. It really is almost impossible for someone inside that society, and Israel is a very coherent society, not to want to. And then also actually to act very forcefully after event.

D (17:09)

I mean, you're correct. And just to say that this wasn't, as you said, this wasn't a byproduct. This was absolutely, you know, deliberate on the part of Hamas. So a key way our brains work. I mentioned it. You, you know, I mentioned at the beginning that some things that are surprising are really important, you know, really shocks us, right? Changes what we're doing. It's very. Has very powerful impacts on us. And so what Hamas did, as we know from a number of documents and a variety of other sources, they deliberately, for a couple of Years before those October 7th attacks, ke things calm, right? They deliberately didn't do a lot. So that then when they unleashed the mayhem of October 7th, which they deliberately filmed and they deliberately made as grisly and unpleasant as possible, right? That was all very deliberate, right, that their surprise and creativity of what they did really increased the shock and made that terrible. Now, you are absolutely right that it is very difficult to, you know, not to seek revenge in those types of circumstances. And that to a reasonable degree is what occurred. But I think we can say something different, right? Is that. Yes, that's part of the thing, but it's not the whole of the thing, right? Our brains are not just. Yes, we have parts of our brains that are particularly involved in things like revenge, righting wrongs that we perceive to have occurred. But we don't just have one part of the brain, as we discussed at the beginning. We have many parts of the brain, and we also have parts of the brain that can plan forwards and think about future consequences. And we also have a part of the brain right at the very front, so just behind the forehead. And this is one of the most remarkable parts of the human brain. And that part of the human brain, which is called the frontal pole, that part of the human brain can do something called metacognition, which is thinking about our own thinking, okay? So now what we can do is we can reflect. And this is what a lot of Israelis started to do a bit later on. They can reflect and say, is this the right thing to do? Have we gone too far now? Should we show restraint? And I think the answer to that is they probably did go too far. And if you look at wiser leaders, right, People like, for example, Winston Churchill. Winston Churchill, if you look at, I mean, that guy was a tough guy. He was more than happy to wage war against Germany with whatever means it took, right? But if you read his multi volume history of World War II, right? At the very beginning of that multi volume history is the morals of the story, right? And one of the key morals of the story right at the very beginning is in victory, magnanimity, right?

A (19:42)

US Grant also thinking of his opponents in the south, now he gets criticized for that, you know, that the, that the peace was too easy on the South. I just throw that out there. But I want to just go back and ask you, do you think in terms of how overwhelming this is to the Israeli psyche and their prefrontal cortices or their front frontal lobes, and taking into account the metacognition, is there anything to the analysis where people would say, you have to understand in a society like Israel of 6 to 8 million Jewish citizens, if you kill 1200 and they extrapolate what that number is to a society of 330 million, I criticize that. But there is maybe something to it from a neurological perspective and maybe even in ways I'm not thinking of, like actual, actual connections, tangible connections to the dead. Just what's your analysis of that?

D (20:40)

I mean, we do, I mean, we do care about. I mean, to give you an example, right? Not that my mother passed away over 10 years ago. I'm not like, you know, I thought she was a lovely lady, right? The thing is, I have an exquisite model of my mother in my brain. I mean, I grew up with her. I thought she was great. I interacted with her for, you know, decades. And I have an exquisite model of her, how she will act, right? We having, we have amazing machinery in our brains for understanding what other people are thinking, right? For what's called theory of mind, right? I have a model of you. And I have a model of you thinking of me right now, Mike. And I have a model of you thinking of me, thinking of you and so on. We have incredible capabilities for thinking about other people and thinking about groups of people. Now, one of the things that that means is that we care deeply about others. Even when they have died, right? And as we said, this is part of our identity. Our model of who am I? Involves I am. In that I'm not an Israeli, but it would be, I am an Israeli. They have killed Israelis. I care about that. Right? For all those reasons. People will care deeply about that. But again, I think it's. Those aren't the only parts of our brains, right? We have an orchestra of systems in our brains, an orchestra of brain systems. All of those parts are needed for us to flourish, right? And if you ask the question, would Israel, how is Israel going to create peace? Right. The idea that they don't need a powerful conventional military, to me is nonsense. If Israel didn't have a powerful conventional military, I don't think that in a few years there will be many, if any Jewish people living, you know, in that part of the world, right. On the other hand, they are not going to create peace, right? Which is what ultimately what they want. Unless they are also generous and unless they're also magnanimous. Magnanimous, Right. And all. And they think carefully through how they move forwards. And we've seen it before. Israel and Egypt went to war twice, right? 1967, 1973, and a lot of other stuff went on as well. And yet in 1977, Anwar Sadat, the leader of Egypt, went to Israel, right. He made a surprising gesture. He said, I'm gonna go to Israel and speak to the Knesset to their parliament, right. And, and, and he did that. It helped break the logjam. The United States was very helpful as well. And it made, you know, that peace has lasted for over four decades. It can happen. And, you know, I think Israel has to think slightly more long term now. It's going to take a long time. I don't think there's any immediate way that they're going to make peace with a lot of the people around them, like with Iran, for example. But they have to be open to that and they have to create the conditions that as well as being militarily capable, which they obviously are.

A (23:25)

Yes, I agree with all of that. I think and hope that there is more of an appetite in that in Israel. I don't think the current leadership like Netanyahu is the right person to bring about peace. It's all very complicated. There are so many thoughts going through my. All my courtesies. One is that if the world blames Israel for getting goaded into an overreaction, what are the examples we could point to where that didn't happen after a massive attack? I Mean, you cite Churchill. So if the example of restraint includes the firebombing of Dresden and the two atomic weapons that ended the war, this was restraint. And I'm not saying that you're wrong. I'm saying that sometimes to effectively end a war and even keeping in mind not to have such an oppressive peace as was the case after World War I, it takes a lot of force. And here's another complication. Give me the neurological angle on this. With Israel when it comes to Gaza, I think they've made a lot of mistakes and, and waging war has not been the path to progress. And yet with their other regional adversaries, with the Iranian proxies, of which Hamas is one, a subset, it seems to have been the right answer and has put Israel in better stead. The fact that they waged war and used a beeper operation and had the 12 day war where it showed that the Iranians were weaker or less willing to respond than many people in the international community have had thought. So if I was a general in the Pentagon who put that to you as a neurologist, what would you say?

D (25:09)

Yeah, I mean, as I said, so I think this is why we need, why we need to be able to think about our own thinking, why we need to be able to make wiser decisions. Because there is no, you know, there is no simple, there is no one single answer. There's no simple way. Like as you say, there are what, 8 million Jewish Israelis, however successful they are militarily, they're not going to occupy the whole of the Middle east, run the whole thing. And even if they did, that wouldn't be tenable over the longer run. It's not feasible. They have to make peace with other people and they have to make peace with those other groups of people in ways those other groups, people want to make peace with them. I think this gets us to one of the, the fundamental challenges, if you look at Right, which is that they've got to balance, the Israelis have got to balance military success with the political dimensions and they have to balance the two. Right. And that requires restraint. Now, again, you're absolutely right. The firebombing of Dresden. Right. A wide variety of other things, but we could have done a hell of a lot worse in World War II had we so chosen to. Right. And we did not.

E (26:16)

Right.

D (26:18)

And you know, the Soviets did do worse. Right. Their soldiers did do worse in East Germany right after, after World War II. And again, it's very difficult to, I mean, 27 million odd Soviets died in World War II, it's pretty appalling situation for them. I think we need to be wiser and we need to realize that we have to balance these different things. I'll give you another example, right, to do with America now. How could America lose, right, in. In our time? So America now is in what would be described as a gray zone competition. So this is a competition is more than normally thought of as peace, but less than is traditionally thought of as war. And it's in that grazing competition with China, which is an enormously capable country, right, that now produces more stuff, produces more things than the next four, maybe even nine countries in the world combined right now. How could the US lose that long haul competition with China? It could lose it because its domestic regime decays, right? That's what happened to the Soviet Union, right? It lost the Cold War because its domestic regime decayed. It could lose in a conventional war, it could lose over somewhere like Taiwan, and then eventually it could lose essentially pretty much the whole of the Eurasian landmass potentially. And only 13% of the world's population live in the, in the Western Hemisphere. And London is closer to Houston, Texas than Buenos Aires is to Houston, Texas. So it's very important to remember that the US can't just remove itself from world politics. And the third way the US could lose is nuclear weapons. It could fight a nuclear war. Right now, all three of those ways of losing, you can't just focus on one of those ways of losing. You have to think about all three of those and balance them together. That requires wisdom. And there are ways we can enhance our wisdom. And, you know, that's part of what I try and do in the book. And we can apply that not only to Israel, we can apply that to the US and we can apply that to our own lives.

A (28:13)

And we'll be back with more of Dr. Nicholas Wright, author of Warhead, right after this.

F (28:26)

Guys, thanks for helping me carry my Christmas tree, Zoe.

G (28:28)

This thing weighs a ton. Drewski, lift with your legs, man.

D (28:32)

Santa, did you get my letter?

G (28:33)

He's talking to you, Bridges.

A (28:34)

I'm not.

F (28:35)

Of course he did.

A (28:37)

Right, Santa, you know my elf, Drew Ski here.

G (28:39)

He handles the nice list. And elf, I'm six' three. What everyone wants is iPhone 17 and at T mobile, you can get it on them. That center stage front camera is amazing for group selfies. Right, Mrs. Claus?

F (28:50)

I'm Mrs. Claus's much younger sister. And AT T mobile, there's no trade in needed when you switch. So you can keep your old phone.

D (28:57)

Give it as a gift.

F (28:58)

And the best part? You can make the switch to T Mobile from your phone in just 15 minutes.

E (29:02)

Nice.

G (29:02)

My side of the tree is slipping. Timber.

H (29:05)

The holidays are better. AT T Mobile switch in just 15 minutes and get iPhone 17 on us with no trade in needed. And now T Mobile is available in US cellular stores with 24 monthly bill.

I (29:16)

Credits for well qualified customers plus tax and 35 device connection charge. Credit and balance due if you pay off earlier. Cancel financing agreement 256 gigs $830 eligible port in a new line $100 plus a month plan without a pay plus taxes fees required. Check out 15 minutes or less per line.

E (29:25)

Visit t mobile.com the holidays always remind me of the year I was scrambling for the perfect gift and ended up discovering how effortless great hosting and great gifting can be. From unforgettable presents to stress free entertaining, Omaha Steaks delivers the world's best steak experience. I love gifting Omaha Steaks because the quality is unbeatable. USDA certified tender steaks, premium proteins, elegant sides and indulgent desserts. Every box I've ordered has arrived perfectly packed and everyone I've gifted it to has raved about the flavor and variety. With five generations of expertise, Omaha Steaks makes holiday magic easy, delicious and guaranteed. Save big on gourmet gifts and more holiday favorites with omaha Steaks. Visit OmahaSteaks.com and for an extra $35 off, use code Flavor at checkout. Terms apply. See site for details. That's Omaha Steaks.com promo code flavor.

D (30:29)

And.

A (30:30)

We'Re back with Dr. Nicholas Wright, author of Warhead how the Brain Shapes War and War Shapes the Brain. And I sometimes wonder if the United States is so loss averse and maybe rationally so, that it constrains us for good and for ill. Let us take our two recent wars, wars that the public thinks we lost. And I wouldn't argue with them on Afghanistan, Iraq, a different case. There is a non autocracy, somewhat of a democracy there. I don't think most Americans think it was worth the sacrifice, but if you look at the ratios of this war that we supposedly lost, America killed its enemies at a ratio of what, a thousand to one? And yet we still feel and think that we lost this war. So this comes down to a lot of factors, but might one of them be that our loss aversion is so historically high compared to almost everyone else in the history of warfare?

D (31:32)

I think one thing to remember is is that America is number one, right? I mean you do have when you're number one. And you, like, you are the richest. I mean, you have a lot more to lose than everybody else, right? So it's not unreasonable. This is reasonably rational way to operate in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why did the US not do very well? Right. And it's important to remember that the US didn't do very well. And in fact, if you look at the big. Those are called counterinsurgency campaigns, right? So this is like where, you know, a more major, a big power is trying to stop a group of people in a country they occupy from fighting against them, right. Of the big counter insurgency campaign since World War II, right? The Soviets lost in Afghanistan, the Americans lost in Vietnam and then lost subsequently in Afghanistan and, you know, plus or minus Iraq, Right. The only big one. And the French also lost in Algeria. The only big one that worked was the British in Malaya in the early 1950s, which is one of the most studied campaigns, counter surgeon campaigns, you know, historically, because the British didn't lose. And why was that? A key part of that was that it was about balancing the political and the military together. They were always taken together. And the other thing is, is that it went on for a reasonable amount of time, right? These things take a lot of time. People expect things to happen overnight. I love America. America is great. My daughter is an American. That's how much I like America. Right? But Americans really like stuff to happen right now, you know, or maybe even yesterday. Ideally. That's not how human brains work. I'll give you one example. In 1945, right, Hitler had lost, right? Demonstrably lost. And there were now giant armies of occupation in Germany, right? And yet still, consistently from 1945 to 1949, when they did polling in Germany, right, a consistent majority thought that still thought Nazism was a good idea, badly applied, right? But in 1952, a quarter of Germans who were polled still thought that, you know, had a favorable opinion. True.

A (33:43)

Nazism has never been tried. I suppose they would argue.

D (33:47)

Well, that was actually one of the good. That that's why, for example, Churchill didn't want to assassinate Hitler, right? They could potentially have killed him. They didn't want it because the moment you. The moment you have the out, right? Oh, if only Hitler had lived that last few months of the war, maybe you'd have pulled the rabbit out of the hat. No, he lost. He fought absolutely as hard as he possibly could right to the end, and he lost, which was a good thing. And we showed that there was that he just simply did lose. Right? But the point here is it takes years. And that's why we need to think, for example, about all of these different things, like how do we think about Hamas in Gaza, how do we think about how we're going to build a better society in Iraq? It's going to take years. And it's the same thing. If you think about American domestic politics. It is going to take years to reconcile polarized American politics. It cannot happen overnight because a lot of these things are, you know, our brains work through culture. Culture changes how our brains operate, and that takes years to change itself moving forwards.

A (34:49)

Right. I'm going to try to think, map my next question or observation onto US domestic politics as I ask it. But in all those cases, in the counterinsurgency cases of the occupying power, that's very important. The indigenous people who are fighting against the occupying power cared a lot more and had a lot more at stake than the occupying power. Now, if you look at, as you have counterinsurgencies in, say, East Timor, that wasn't the situation and counterinsurgencies could work the insurgents. I mean, it's unbelievably bloody, but it's because both sides were equally committed and willing to make these sacrifices. So I don't, I don't know exactly how it affects effective polarization. We have to get to the point where I think right now there is more of a charge and more thrill, delight. People get more out of it by hating than they do by being brought together, the people most motivated. But I'm also thinking of Israel in that the international community uses the phrase colonial or white colonialism to describe the Israelis. But it's not. I could argue why, it's not apt for many reasons. But if you look at Israel as falling within the examples of, say, Algeria, and they do, and they say, well, the Algerians rose up against the French and it took many years and it took terrorism, what we would call terrorism, but it still worked. I do think it's a different calculation. I don't know if it's closer to the East Timorese. I think that the Israelis are wealthy people and maybe can leave the country. I know that. I know that the Iranians have said, well, what we're trying to do is make life so miserable not for the top echelon of Israelis, but maybe Echelon Echelons 2 and 3, and they all leave the country anyway. This is my analysis that counterinsurgencies work when you can outlast and out sacrifice your life of the occupier. And Israel's not a true occupier. In that sense, that's.

D (36:55)

But also, if you're smart, right, I mean, yes, you can outlast others, but you still need to be smart and you need to do things cleverly, right? You need to think how you're going to do it. You need to seize opportunities when they arise. For example, like, you know, I mentioned, Egypt and Israel have been at peace for decades, right? And it's partly because they had a leader, Anwar Sadat, who was very brave, actually, because he got assassinated in part for this, not that long afterwards, right? But he seized the opportunity. Now, I think, and this is also another thing about why leaders do matter so much, right? So you're right. I think Netanyahu. It is impossible to really understand Israeli politics without thinking about Netanyahu, right? The singular character of Netanyahu has really, he's bestrode Israeli politics for a couple of decades, really. In many ways, leaders matter. To give you another example right now, Vladimir Zelensky, right, We can have a whole discussion about the rights and the wrongs or whatever, but when Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, you know, the Americans, the British said, look, Vladimir, you need to get out. You're going to be killed, you're going to be assassinated, right? That was the advice. We've got guys, they can take you out, right? And he stayed. He didn't have to stay. A lot of people genuinely thought he was going to be killed, but he stayed. He was a brave guy. He was a very skilled politician, and he actually did a pretty good job, right? And he was very important in giving the Ukrainians the will to fight. And that's why they were able. Even though they were outnumbered 12 to 1 north of Kiev, they were able and completely outmatched in terms of tanks, planes, all the rest of it. But they took on and defeated those Russian forces.

A (38:39)

Yes. And they're being degraded now. Ian Bremmer has, I think, just the correct analysis, analysis of this, and it's out today, the day we're speaking, why peace in Ukraine remains a distant prospect. And first he looks at Putin's incentives, and then he looks at Trump's incentives, which are to try to end the war. He doesn't care how. And so Trump is using some logic, saying, well, I can't pressure Putin, he's the stronger party. I can pressure Zelensky, I'll pressure the weaker party. But what he doesn't realize is, though, even though the polls have shown that the Ukrainians are, you know, less committed to a total victory, they will only Accept an end of fighting more or less on their terms. So Zelensky is even more incentivized to keep on the fighting, to keep up the fighting, to keep the war going than even Putin. I think that's right. Do you think that's right?

D (39:35)

I think I. I mean, I think unfortunately, they're both incentivized. And the reason for that is, is if you look from both of their perspectives. So there was a famous British general in World War II called, who won a big battle in North Africa called Montgomery. And he was facing this chap, this brilliant German general called Rommel, and he used to have a photograph. Yes, indeed, the Desert Fox. He had a picture of the Desert Fox in his. In his caravan. Right. Because you have to. You have to know who your. Your adversary is. It doesn't mean he was like, oh, I really like Erwin Rommel. He's great. It was that. You have to understand how they're thinking. Sure.

A (40:10)

Now, Saladin and Richard the Lionheart.

D (40:13)

Yeah.

A (40:13)

Lee And Grant. Grant understood Lee. He really understood Lee.

D (40:17)

Yeah.

A (40:17)

He predicted what Lee would. It's essential to winning the war.

G (40:21)

Yes.

D (40:21)

This is, I mean, this is the whole. I mean that you, I all, Every listener view of whatever out there. We all have amazing abilities in our, in our brains. Right. There are large areas of cortex, fancy bits of cortex, the job of which is to understand other people's intentions and what other people are going to be doing. Right. So we're all very, very good at that.

A (40:41)

You know, I was reflecting on the US which has an enormous capacity and doesn't really lose, but we haven't. We. The US hasn't won a war in decades and decades. I guess you could count Grenada if you count that as a war. I don't know if there was an actual official act of war. What effect does that have? I don't know. You can answer it in two ways. Why? Why not? And then what effect does that have for future wars? It must be nice to win a war once in a while.

D (41:09)

I guess the question would be, what would America have got by winning those wars? Right. I mean, yes, it clearly didn't do a very good job in Afghanistan and Iraq. You know, I don't think there's any doubt. Even the most bullish people wouldn't say everything went precisely according to the original plans in either place. On the other hand, they weren't that important. Right. And that's in no way belittling the sacrifices many brave people made. Americans and Australians, Britons and so on. Right.

A (41:41)

In no way Especially Iraq. Quintessentially a war of choice.

D (41:44)

Yes, but ultimately that was never going to be crucial. That was never existential for the United States or even enormously important. Right. So the question is much more and the same thing with Vietnam. And indeed, if you think about Vietnam, was Vietnam actually a failure? Right. I know it sounds counterintuitive, but think about why was the US In Vietnam? The US Was in Vietnam because the US Was prosecuting the Cold War. Right. The way that our brains work and the way that we think about strategy is hierarchical. So smaller components fit together to make bigger things. Fit together to make bigger things. For example, if you're reading on a page, two lines make a T, then next that three little lines make an H and then an e, and that's the word the. And then next to that is whatever, and it makes a sentence and so on. Our brains are hierarchical and our strategies for operating in the world are always going to be hierarchical. Right. Thinking like that, the United States was trying to win the Cold War, and by showing that it was very tough in Vietnam, it was prepared to fight in Vietnam for a long time, many, many years, that showed that the United States was a tough actor that was prepared to take casualties, was prepared to do things in a tough way. Now, in a sense, that's also what the global war on terror to some extent also demonstrated. Now, it wasted a lot of resources, even if you're being purely pragmatic and you're just saying how much resources you want to create your best military. And it took the eye off the ball of doing things like new technologies and so on. But no one can doubt the US Is tough and the US Is going to take action if it feels that it's threatened. And that action could be lethal action. Right?

A (43:30)

Oh, so maybe we shouldn't think of our wars as wars. We should think of our wars as battles and take and define the wars as the more abstract goal. The war on terror, the war on Communism, who beat communism? Or at least the USSR form? The United States did, and the war on terror. There's been much less terror in the world, or there's been much less terror to the Western world than before it was enjoined and definitely to America. Britons have experienced more terror.

D (44:02)

I do think, though, that the war on terror just was done quite badly and it was done sufficiently badly that it just probably didn't serve the relevant goals. But, but I think, like Vietnam, for example, I think an argument can be made, I think a reasonable argument, actually Vietnam was a success Right. In the broader scheme of the United States won the Cold War, one assumption.

A (44:21)

Undergirding the war on terror and certainly Israel and Gaza is if we punish our enemies enough, they will draw the conclusion not to, excuse my language, fuck with us. Does anyone ever draw that conclusion? You never hear that. They do.

D (44:39)

I mean, if you think about Germany now, right, I go on holiday to Germany. It's a lovely country. I'm not saying they wouldn't fuck with us, but I mean, for example, when, when Germany thinks about Russia, yes, Germany feels bad about invading Russia, the Soviet Union and killing an enormous number of people, right? But the Germans also feel fearful, right, because they lost. They lost catastrophically, you know, and the Soviets were not enormously kind to them. Right. It wasn't like, you know, Britain and America. Britain, for example, increased rationing after World War II, food rationing and was sending food aid to Germany. Right. The Soviets weren't doing any of that. They were just taking everything they could from, from East Germany and taking it back to thing and there was a lot of rape and all the rest of it. I'm just not convinced basically the.

A (45:33)

Not that you're not convinced that people don't draw the conclusion we shouldn't fuck with that. Yeah, Germany, I mean Germany, Germany got rich. Japan got rich. Took a couple decades. That's part of it. You know, we're no longer. It's a rational decision not to wage war but to trade goods at that point.

D (45:50)

But, but Germany still does fear Russia. Now that is still part of. That is still part of what Germany has. One of the reasons why they're apprehensive about doing things with Russia is because they fear Russia. Right. And I think again you could look at how did. I mean, I also think you're correct about the global war on terror in the sense. I mean there were clearly a lot of people who dissuaded from being terrorists. Now what's the purpose of police? The purpose of police is to dissuade people from doing bad stuff. Most of it you don't actually want bad stuff to happen and the police catch the bad guys. Most of it is that you think you are going to be caught. You were deterred from doing it. So the whole central thing is deterrence and deterrence does work just as, for example, during the Cold War. I mean, we didn't have a gigantic war partly because there was nuclear deterrence backing the whole thing up. Now that's not the most stable and safe way of doing it, but that's what we ended up with during Cold War. And deterrence does work. Not perfectly at all, but it does work.

A (46:45)

Nicholas Wright has advised the Pentagon's joint chief of staff for over a decade. He is a scholar at Georgetown and at University College London, and his new book is Warhead how the Brain Shapes War and War Shapes the Brain. Thank you so much.

D (47:05)

Thanks so much for having me, Mike.

A (47:13)

And that's it for today's show. The GIST is produced by Cory Wara. Kathleen Sykes helps me with the Gist list. Text Mike to 33777 for a discount on the Gist list. Lia Yane is the production coordinator. Jeff Craig does all things visual. He's a visual guy. I've seen him move in 22 or 24 frames per second. And Michelle Pesca is COO of Peach Fish Productions in Peru. Gpura Duper and thanks for listening.

H (47:58)

Everyone deserves to be connected. That's why T Mobile and US Cellular are joining forces. Switch to T Mobile and save up to 20% versus Verizon by getting built in benefits they leave out. Check the math at tmobile.com switch and now T mobile is in US cellular stores.

I (48:16)

Savings versus Comparable Verizon plans plus the cost of optional benefits, plan features and taxes and fees vary. Savings with three plus lines include third line free via monthly bill credits. Credit stop if you cancel any lines. Qualifying credit required.