Tehran Target Acquired...Damaged...Destroyed...Debated

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Gist – "Tehran Target Acquired...Damaged...Destroyed...Debated"

Host: Mike Pesca
Guest: Yonah Jeremy Bob, Senior Military Correspondent and Intelligence Analyst for the Jerusalem Post; Author of Target Tehran: How Mossad Is Using Sabotage, Cyber Warfare, Assassination and Secret Diplomacy to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Realign the New Middle East

Release Date: June 24, 2025

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Introduction

In this episode of The Gist, host Mike Pesca engages in a comprehensive discussion with Yonah Jeremy Bob, delving into the intricate dynamics of Israel's ongoing efforts to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions. The conversation scrutinizes recent military actions, intelligence operations, and the broader geopolitical implications surrounding Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities.

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Israel's Strategic Operations Against Iran's Nuclear Program

Mike Pesca initiates the conversation by referencing Ehud Barak's concerns about Iran's nuclear facility, Fordeau, highlighting the perceived "zone of immunity" that made it a formidable target. He questions whether recent US strikes have alleviated these concerns.

Yonah Jeremy Bob responds by detailing the chronology of Mossad's relentless operations over the past 15 years, which have consistently disrupted Iran's nuclear advancements. He emphasizes that the US's deployment of an advanced "mother of all bombs" has significantly bolstered Israel's capacity to impede Iran's nuclear progress. Specifically, Bob notes:

“Israel has taken out key components of the nuclear program, including the Natanz and Isfahan facilities, effectively pushing back Iran’s nuclear timeline by at least two years.”
([10:04])

He further explains that these strikes have dismantled approximately 80% of Iran's nuclear capabilities, a feat that would have been unattainable without US assistance.

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Effectiveness and Implications of the Strikes

The discussion moves to assess whether the strikes have indeed neutralized Iran's nuclear threat or merely delayed it. Pesca raises a critical viewpoint:

“The driving factor wasn't the imminence of the nuclear acquisition. It was the conditions of allowing such a strike to happen with maximum safety for the conductors of the strike.”
([27:47])

Bob counters by arguing that the comprehensive nature of the strikes—targeting multiple facilities and advanced centrifuges—has fundamentally hindered Iran's ability to swiftly develop nuclear weapons. He asserts:

“The key elements—advanced centrifuges, 60% enriched uranium, and critical manufacturing sites—have been significantly impacted, making any immediate nuclear weaponization unlikely.”
([31:40])

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Netanyahu's Evolving Military Strategy

The conversation transitions to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's strategic evolution. Bob reveals an exclusive insight into Netanyahu's transformation from a cautious leader to one willing to undertake significant military gambits:

“After witnessing the IDF's success against Hamas and Hezbollah, Netanyahu gained newfound confidence in his ability to conduct extensive operations against Iran.”
([21:04])

He further elaborates on Netanyahu's gamble to strike Fordeau, a decision influenced by deteriorating negotiations with then-US President Donald Trump and the resilience displayed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

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Critiques and Counterarguments

Addressing critiques from figures like Ben Rhodes, who question the immediate necessity and effectiveness of the strikes, Bob defends the operations by underscoring the tangible setbacks inflicted on Iran's nuclear infrastructure:

“Iran was at a very close threshold to attaining nuclear weapons. The strikes aren't just delaying—they're significantly degrading Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons in the near term.”
([48:49])

He challenges the notion that the strikes might inadvertently motivate Iran to pursue nuclear capabilities clandestinely, arguing that the extensive intelligence and operational prowess of Mossad make such outcomes unlikely.

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Impact on Iranian Military and Regional Stability

Pesca probes into the broader ramifications of the strikes, including Iran's potential for retaliation and the capacity of Iranian militant groups. Bob highlights the unexpected successes against Hezbollah:

“Despite Hezbollah's vast arsenal, Israel managed to neutralize almost all of their heavy missile capabilities swiftly, which was unforeseen by Israeli defense officials.”
([46:37])

He emphasizes that such achievements reflect a significant intelligence and operational edge possessed by Israel, mitigating fears of an overwhelming retaliatory strike by Iran or its proxies.

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Future Prospects and Regional Dynamics

Looking ahead, Bob speculates on the long-term effects of the strikes, including the possible reinforcement of diplomatic efforts towards a "better deal" with Iran and the continued suppression of nuclear ambitions. He expresses cautious optimism:

“The combination of dismantled nuclear facilities and the demonstration of Israel’s capabilities serves as a deterrent, potentially steering Iran away from pursuing nuclear weapons more aggressively.”
([17:52])

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Conclusion

The episode concludes with Mike Pesca commending Yonah Jeremy Bob's insightful analysis and thorough reporting. The discussion underscores the delicate balance between military intervention and diplomatic negotiations in addressing nuclear proliferation threats. Both host and guest acknowledge the complexity of the geopolitical landscape, emphasizing the need for vigilant and informed strategies to maintain regional stability.

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Notable Quotes

• Yonah Jeremy Bob:
  “The United States stepping in with the mega bunker buster is a statement to Iran, we will not let you get a nuclear weapon.”
  ([17:51])

• Mike Pesca:
  “Campaigning's aspirational. You gotta have these big ideas, you know, even if they all can't come to fruition.”
  ([15:18])

• Yonah Jeremy Bob:
  “Netanyahu was terrified of using force. Something changed when Netanyahu saw that the IDF was tearing Hamas military apparatus apart.”
  ([21:04])

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Key Takeaways

• Israel's Proactive Measures: Israel, with substantial support from the U.S., has effectively hindered Iran's nuclear progression through targeted strikes and intelligence operations.

• Netanyahu's Strategic Shift: Prime Minister Netanyahu has evolved from reluctance to aggressive action in response to regional threats, bolstered by successful military engagements against groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

• Effectiveness of the Strikes: The recent operations have significantly impaired Iran's nuclear capabilities, delaying potential weaponization by at least two years and demonstrating Israel's enhanced operational capacity.

• Regional Stability: The dismantling of Hezbollah’s missile capabilities has reduced the immediate threat to Israel, contributing to broader regional security.

• Future Outlook: While the strikes have provided a temporary setback to Iran's nuclear ambitions, continuous vigilance and a combination of military and diplomatic efforts remain essential to ensure long-term stability.

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This summary encapsulates the critical discussions and insights shared during the episode, providing listeners and non-listeners alike with a comprehensive understanding of the strategic maneuvers shaping the Middle East's precarious balance.

Transcript

[Mike Pesca]

What is dadication?

[Yonah Jeremy Bob]

The thing that drives me every day as a dad is Dariona. We call him Dae Date for short. Every day he's hungry for something, whether it's attention, affection, knowledge. And there's this huge responsibility in making sure that when he's no longer under my wing that he's a good person. I want him to be able to sit back one day and go, we worked together. We did a good job.

[Mike Pesca]

That's dadication. Find out [e-mail] brought to you by the U.S. department of Health and Human Services and the Ad Council.

[Yonah Jeremy Bob]

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[Mike Pesca]

It's Tuesday, June 24, 2025. From peach fish Productions, it's the gist. I'm Mike Pesca, and if it weren't for Zoran Mamdani's ideas, I would definitely vote for him. Well, to be fair, not just his ideas, but his ideology. You know, that's the word we use when ideas become rigid, prepackaged, maybe not necessarily one's own. But mostly I'll be fair and say it's his ideas. Zo Ron Momdoni who is right now, if the polls were to be believed and if the prediction markets are to be believed, likely the Democratic nominee for mayor of New York. He's a great candidate. He smiles winningly, he engages with people, and this is really important. He makes potential voters happy and excited, and he doesn't do it by appealing to their worst instincts. He's been far more engaging in every sense of the word than his rival, Andrew Cuomo. But then there are Momdani's ideas. What he'd actually do or says he would do, because, don't worry, I think what he'd actually do is much, much less than what he says he would do. But what he says he would do is also a little bit concerning. So the three big ones are a rent freeze, free grocery stores in every borough, and free buses, respectively. Bad, terrible economic policy, a never successful anywhere policy, and a policy that Might work, but would be very, very expensive. And I'm not sure it's worth the cost. I say you could give the third one a try the buses, see what happens. He has a slew of other policies which, as I said in my chat with Ross Barkin Politico estimates would cost 20 times as much as Bill de Blasio's signature. Drag it across the finish line, but change and improve the lives of many New Yorkers. Policies free 3K. That's what a politician has to do. Spend all his capital on getting a big thing done. And maybe it happens. Mamdani wants to do 20 times as much, which is to say it's never going to happen. And with some of these things, they shouldn't. Russ Barkin is a strong political analyst, a great writer, and if you heard our substack live conversation, he once ran for office. And guess who his campaign manager was. It was one. I'm either going to say Bill de Blasio. No, I'm not. It was Zoran Mamdani. So the two were friends. And Ross thinks very highly of mom Donnie. A lot of people do. He's an inspiring guy. So, yeah, Ross likes and defends mom Donnie. New Yorkers are like that. I guess Ross is closer to the pulse of the New Yorkers. But Ross did say something that is conventional wisdom. Doesn't mean it's untrue. In fact, it probably is true. A lot of people say this, but I was thinking about it a lot again and again. Campaigning's aspirational. Whenever I would say the price tag doesn't add up at all. Campaigning's aspirational. Gotta excite people. You gotta have these big ideas, you know, even if they all can't come to fruition or even if none of them can come to fruition. So I guess that's true. I guess we'll get a better feeling if campaigning's aspirational. But, you know, then you have to live your life with the results of the campaigning and on Net, are we better off for having bought an aspirational campaign? Here's a better way to think about it. In other walks of life, isn't that kind of aspirational mindset or. Or aspirational affect and using and relying and falling back on the idea of aspiration to explain or excuse some of your worst ideas? Isn't that rightly more criticized than praised? Wouldn't that default to aspiration be seen as naive or deceptive? Let us take a tech founder whose ideas are aspirational, but if they promise results they have no earthly way of delivering if they have concepts that if properly scrutinized, would reveal themselves to a fair minded observer to be impossible. What do we say about the people who invested in these ideas? And what do we say about the people who knew all that, who knew that there was no way of delivering these ideas as promised and still champion them? And what if those people doing the champion in fact stood to benefit from some of these ideas, realized or unrealized? We could name some of these aspirational type figures from the world of business. Adam Newman of We Work, Elizabeth Holmes of Theranos. Don't they seem more dangerous than inspiring? Now I am for trying big things. A grocery store in every borough run by the city. It's not really going to work, but you could pretend it works until the media scrutinizes you and then it depends how the public reacts. This is exactly like in store blood tests that give the same results as blood tests that used to take weeks and that you'd have to spend hundreds of dollars on. It's the same thing as the promise of free or government run grocery stores with fresher produce and cheaper produce than what the market can deliver. I just say this because it has been tried in many cities and has never worked, has always either failed pretty spectacularly or failed slightly less than spectacularly because they pulled the plug on it before it could fail spectacularly. Anyway, I am for trying new things. I am for experimenting with policies that might not work. But when the sheer volume of these policies or one by one you go down the line and find how often there were failures of these policies elsewhere, well then the suggestion is that most of them, the vast majority of them, won't work. I wind up feeling something other than inspired. I feel concerned. Anyway, we'll see what the rest of the New York City electorate feels about this. It's going to take some time to figure out who actually won the vote, thanks to the ancient sclerotic nature of New York City politics and the New York City Board of Elections, which Mamdani is right about. These things all need reforming. Let's see if he is the man who could do that on the show today. It is a full show interview, a really good one. The perfect guest for this moment. His name is Yonah Jeremy Bob. He's military reporter, intelligence reporter for the Jerusalem Post, author of a book with a title that once you hear it you will say, My God, did he know it was Coming? Target Tehran How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyber Warfare, Assassination and Secret Diplomacy to stop a nuclear Iran. Yonah, Jeremy, Bob, up next. Hi guys. Is Ed getting you down? Do you not if literally here imagine the crude crescendo of the slide whistle. You know the one. Let's get other things like your confidence back up with hims. HIMS provides you access to treatments that could help you last longer. 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Now here's the part I speak fast. Yonah Jeremy Bob is the Jerusalem Post senior military correspondent and intelligence analyst. And he along along with Alon Ivater is the author of Target Tehran How Mossad is using Sabotage, Cyber Warfare, Assassination and Secret diplomacy to Realign the Middle East. Yonah. Bob, welcome to the gist.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Glad to be here.

[Mike Pesca]

So what a book is using has used. Let's just start with Ehud Barack's warning that Fordeau could represent what he called I think a zone of immunity. Of course I'm talking about the forte reactor because of the recent or the forte operation because of the recent US strikes. But what was the concern and do the bombs recently allay that concern?

[Zoran Mamdani]

Yeah, so we're Talking about the 2010 period and this is before the United States has developed to the extent it has today the mother of all bombs and then the even more advanced mother of all bombs, the MOP that penetrates 30,000 pound bomb going deep under a mountain. And so the idea was that they didn't want Iran to be operating for do again like this key nuclear facility that Iran has that's under mountain. They didn't want it to be operational. They didn't want them to be able to move centrifuges there. They wanted to attack the Iranian nuclear program before it could be moved, before those pieces could be moved under the mountain, basically. And so you could say luckily, or if you read our book, target Tehran, you'll see, because the Mossad stopped them over and over again for the last 15 years, until a point where the United States had a bomb that was able to still destroy Fordeau and all of that machinery, nuclear machinery, underneath the mountain. But in 2010, they didn't have that weaponry. So if you go back in time, that's what Ehu Barak was worried about, was them breaking out to a nuclear weapon in a time period when there was no weaponry which could necessarily destroy Fordeau.

[Mike Pesca]

Right. So just to contextualize everything, 10, 12 years ago, the idea was, oh, no, they're going to be able to pursue their nuclear ambitions, which were documented, though maybe much of the world and international agencies didn't believe the documentation or rebutted it. And then Mossad, through daring raids, which you chronicle, made it incontrovertible that this was going on. But the concern was they're going to be able to have an operation that there is no way to stop. And this was seen as maybe through what the Mossad, what should bet what intelligence in Israel said was maybe we could do whatever we can through guile, through our methods to try to stop this. But it does represent a giant problem in that our main adversary or one of our main adversaries who vows to kill us seems to be, unless something massive happens, seems to be on a glide path to achieving the means to destroy us. And I just want to point out that everything has changed. And we seem to many in the west seem to take it for granted or see it more as a negative, that this horrible inevitability has actually been unplugged and destroyed.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Yeah, look, Israeli military intelligence said in the late 1990s that if nobody intervened, Iran would have a nuclear weapon within two and a half years. The only reason that up until now, Iran did not get a nuclear weapon, the 2015 nuclear deal did delay things to some extent, but the main reason, certainly until 2015 and even after the 2015 deal started to fall apart, was the Mossad over and over again, whether it's blowing up a nuclear facility, whether it's taking out a nuclear scientist, just making it impossible for Iran to get across the line, to get to that point, slowing them down, making them have to rebuild instead of Progressing. And so what's happened in the last 12 days is Israel did, I would say maybe 80% of the work in terms of wiping out the key components of the nuclear program. You take the Natanz nuclear facility, the largest one. You take the Isfahan nuclear facility. If you want, I can talk in more detail why that one is also very specifically important. And then dozens of smaller ones. And then the United States came and took out for Joe, which was at least, you know, 20% of Iran's nuclear program. They had advanced centrifuges there, they had 60% enriched uranium there. Those were things that needed to go. And if the United States hadn't taken that out, we write in Target Tehran that Israel could have damaged it, but it could not have, as Trump like say, obliterated it. And, you know, so there would be.

[Mike Pesca]

That's probably inaccurate. Sorry to interrupt. Obliterate is probably inaccurate, right?

[Zoran Mamdani]

Yes, it's. You're right. They probably didn't obliterate everything but blow it up a lot more, damage it a lot more. 30,000 pound bomb is a lot more than 5,000 and 2,000 pound bombs, which is what Israel has. So that has sort of taken the Iranian nuclear threat off the table for now. I would say it's probably pushed it off at least two years. And that's in a situation where probably Iran was only several months away from a nuclear weapon if it made the decision. So that's a big improvement. And it may be a lot more than two years because Iran now may sign a better deal. And if it doesn't, and if it tries to break out again, Israel has now proven that, that it can take out pretty much anything that Iran puts.

[Mike Pesca]

Out there if the United States does this again.

[Zoran Mamdani]

So you're talking about if the United States. You mean if Iran built another facility under Iran?

[Mike Pesca]

Well, I was reacting to the very last phrase where you said Israel's proved it could do this, but that's depending on something like the United States involvement and gigantic mop bombs.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Right. So the interesting question is there's one new facility under Natanz, has a lot of different facilities. So there's one new facility that Iran is building under a mountain near Natanz. It's not operational yet. And so if Iran started to move operations into there. Yeah. That would be another situation where the United States would be needed to come in or would be more reliable to be able to destroy it again, if that's something Iran tries to do.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. So I want to kind of take this piece by piece, an American might be hearing this and saying, saying, well, why couldn't we just rely on Israel, which maybe this American will see. An Iranian bomb is just an Israeli problem, certainly much more of an Israeli problem than an American problem. Why couldn't Israel just do what it's doing through its guile, cunning, and funding from the United States and keep setting back the Iranian nuclear program six months, 10 months, a year at a time, as they had been? Why wasn't that? Why. Why'd you need the United States? I understand the big bomb pushes it back two years. Voicing the concerns of this American seems manageable without us.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Okay, so I think. I think the first question is, does the United States need to worry about a nuclear threat? And I would say that the North Korea example shows that it does. Right? I mean, look, you could say the United States has had a nuclear threat from the Soviet Union, Russia for a very long time, but it still seems like as crazy as Vladimir Putin is, he actually isn't. He threatened a million times to use nuclear weapons during this fight with Ukraine. He hasn't done it. He's probably not that crazy. The North Koreans are a much smaller rogue country, and we don't know what they'd be willing to do. And the Iranians are a rogue religious fundamentalist country, and we don't know what they would be willing to do. So if they could, for years, people said, well, they could enrich the 5% uranium, but they'll never get to 20%. They got the 20%. They'll never get to 60%. They're pretty smart, the Iranians. And so they could probably also figure out how to do what's called an icbm, intercontinental ballistic missile, which could reach the United States. And so basically, the United States wants Israel to get rid of as much of this problem as possible. But I think what was huge, and I can't. I don't want to, you know, I can't emphasize it enough. But the United States stepping in with the mega bunker buster is. It's a statement to Iran, we will not let you get a nuclear weapon. Neither Israel nor we. It's something that every president has said and most Iranians have sort of left.

[Yonah Jeremy Bob]

Ha, ha, ha.

[Zoran Mamdani]

We know that actually you're not serious about that. If we really went for it, you would be afraid to stop us. And this is a clear action, not words, clear action saying, Iran, you are not going to get a nuclear weapon. So I think if they don't go for a nuclear weapon in the future, one of the reasons will be that they didn't just get bombed by Israel, they also got bombed by this 30,000 pound mother of all bombs by the United States.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. I'll also add to that the conception of deterrence with Hamas was, oh, why not do it? Do it. It seems maintainable. We'll mow the lawn. And then suddenly it wasn't. And certainly the Israelis, such as yourself, changed their attitude towards what do we do with maybe not imminent threats, but looming threats. And they changed their attitude, which was we have to attack them head on. So I would say that certainly factors into it. Right?

[Zoran Mamdani]

Yeah. Look, Israel was allowing looming threats as long as they didn't actually come. So it allowed Hezbollah to go from 10,000 rockets after the 2006 Second Lebanon War, after Israel, know, sort of beat Hezbollah, they let them go from 10,000 rockets to 150,000 rockets. And they let Iranian militias build up in Syria. And Israel allowed the Houthis to build up threats in Yemen. Nobody in Israel dreamed that the Houthis in Yemen would shoot at Israel. And they let Hamas build up a huge rocket arsenal much more qualitatively superior to what Hamas had, let's say the last major, major ramp between Israel and Hamas in 2014 and certainly before that. So Israel allowed all of these looming threats to happen based on the idea that all of these entities, terrorist organizations, some of them countries, knew that if they really messed with Israel, there would be, you know, major punishment and that would deter them from doing it. And that is not the mentality now. The mentality now is you start to build a looming threat, we will bomb you. We're not going to wait to see whether you come in. Israel saw on October 7 that people in the Middle east are not always rational actors. They're willing to kill 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and, you know, rape and torture and all kinds of things. And so Israel is going to have a forward posture on all of the different fronts to make sure that a looming threat can't one day just jump in and surprise.

[Mike Pesca]

Israel had many strategic and military successes against Iran and its proxies. And it had had, as we've seen, established air dominance over Iran, which a few years ago, because of a lot of factors would seem inconceivable. But from your reporting instincts, everything else, Did Netanyahu just hope that he'd get to that point and then be able to convince the US President who was Donald Trump, or was there something more than we're just going to present to him the argument that it should be done now and we think that our argument will win out.

[Zoran Mamdani]

So I wrote an exclusive in the last couple days in the Jerusalem Post about the evolution of Netanyahu himself, that everybody has sort of always thought that Netanyahu was this big, tough guy who loves military force. You take a look at 2012, 2014, 2021, those are the sort of big conflicts Netanyahu was involved in. He was terrified of using force. They barely touched Gaza, all right? They shot from the air. They barely invaded anything. Even after October 7th, I'm told by basically every source on the security establishment, Netanyahu was terrified of going into Gaza. And something changed when Netanyahu saw that the IDF was tearing Hamas military apparatus apart. The political apparatus is still there, but the military apparatus apart. By summer 2024, all of the 24 Hamas battalions are taken apart. He gains new level of confidence. And that takes us to the Hezbollah beepers operation, which was a major gamble. All right? All Israeli defense officials had said that if Israel went into a big war with Hezbollah, Hezbollah could kill thousands, maybe tens of thousands of Israelis. And Israel has a lopsided major victory over Hezbollah with almost no losses on the Israeli side from that. Netanyahu says, okay, maybe I can do this with Iran also. And what he did have going for him is already in October 2024, which was a second back and forth round, sort of a prelude between Israel and Iran. Iran fired 200 ballistic missiles on Israel. Israel took out all of Iran's best anti aircraft defense Systems, called the S300. So then Netanyahu did know that sort of the skies would be easier, clearer for Israel to attack. But he also thought that Trump was going to be in favor of it from the beginning. Candidate Trump said in October 2024, Israel, go ahead, take out the nuclear program. President Trump suddenly started saying, I'm the peacemaker. I don't want Israel to attack. I want to negotiate a big deal. And so actually, Israel was really disappointed. Don't believe this narrative that they were all on the same page all along. They were not on the same page. And there was a point where Netanyahu thought maybe they wouldn't be able to attack at all. And finally, when the negotiations between Iran and Trump hit a wall in early June, that's when they said, okay, we can take advantage of this situation, roll the dice. They did not know whether Trump would come in. They absolutely did not know. It was a roll of the dice. And they were ready if they had to, to attack Fordeau, as we describe in Target Tehran. But they hoped that if they were successful enough that Trump wouldn't be able to resist getting a piece of that success. It turned out the gamble worked, but it was a gamble.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. And that brings me to my next question. And I have to admit the last one was a leading question is so is this because I knew that you wrote that piece. I should note that the idea of Netanyahu as a warmonger but then actually being seen, especially by many in the Obama administration, one key official was quoted as calling him chicken shit. Then forms my next question, which is that recently on Pod Save the World podcast, Ben Rhodes, who was behind a lot of the negotiation between and selling the jcpoa, a former Obama foreign relations official and communications official, noted that and he was critical of Trump's decision to bomb Fordeau. He said there was no imminent threat from the Iranian nuclear program. Nothing had changed materially from a few weeks ago other than Israel disrupting Trump's own diplomacy and beginning to bomb Iran and demanding that Trump came in. What would you say to that critique?

[Zoran Mamdani]

So if we're defining imminent threat as was Iran about to develop a nuclear weapon that week or that month, then he's right. But Iran is a country of 90 million people. They had dozens of nuclear sites. They're a country that's multiple times the size of France. And the fact is that they were advanced enough in their nuclear program that they no longer needed large facilities all the time where you would be able to easily follow what they were doing with the uranium and how they were advancing. They were already at a point where according to the IAEA itself, they could within weeks, maybe even days, enrich and weaponize enough uranium for 10 to 15 nuclear weapons. That doesn't mean fire them. Fire them would be a few more months, maybe several months. But basically they were really close. And a lot of the other things that you would need to do to fire them neutron playing with neutrons and shockwave generators, you could do in smaller facilities. It would be hard to follow. It is possible. People you know with tayic talk about could Iran break out to nuclear weapon? The fear was Iran would sneak out to nuclear weapon. They could do it in a facility that no one was watching that was not high profile. And so you put that together with again I mentioned Israel took out Iran's best anti aircraft defenses in October 2024. That was something that wasn't going to last. Iran was going to repair them. So I think when you put all of those elements together and then the last key element is October 2025. Right. That's the end of some of the key limits of the Iran nuclear deal. That's the end of the ability to snap back all of the global sanctions on Iran from the 2015 nuclear deal, put all of those elements together. Basically, Israel did believe that it had a period of months, June, July, August, I don't know if that mattered. But Israel did believe that there was a window of a period of months, that if it missed that period, the situation could be dire. The situation could at the very least be much more difficult.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. And in a nutshell, the driving factor wasn't the imminence of the nuclear acquisition. It was the conditions of allowing such a strike to happen with, as we saw, no casualties, maximum safety for whoever was conducting the strike. And the second part of that is, well, what's the good amount of time for Iran to be close to a nuclear program? Do we all decide it's two weeks and be sure that our intelligence is right about that? Do we decide it's six months and say, well, that's certainly enough and also be sure our intelligence is perfect there? I mean, there are no, there are no great choices or clear choices here. But as I understand it, that is what was in the consideration of both the American and the Israeli officials. Is that right?

[Zoran Mamdani]

Yeah. The amount of time was too small and the ability of Iran to hide what they were doing was elevated. And as you said, Israel had a easier ability to act. You put all of those things together. This was a unique period of time which is really felt not just Netanyahu. Israeli defense officials felt they couldn't let pass and that after X number of months the window would close. And by the way you brought up at the very beginning of our conversation, Ehu Barak, in 2010, the entire Israeli defense establishment was against Netanyahu hitting the nuclear facilities because they thought it was too hard, because they didn't think Iran was that close. That was not the case this time. The entire Israeli defense establishment wanted to take the shot, believed that it could, and believed that Iran was too close.

[Mike Pesca]

So another critique, and this is from the same podcast, though it might have been voiced by Rose's co host Tommy Vitor before Trump took this strike. The idea was that actually maybe they'd only be able to set the nuclear program back about six months because they couldn't get it for dough, because they couldn't destroy these deep underground sites. But then the Israeli foreign minister was out there saying before Trump took this strike that they'd set it back two years. And he also noted that now after the Strike. They're also saying two years. Therefore, we can't really trust anything that's being said. How much did we really set the Iranians back? It seems to either be six months or two years, just based on whatever narrative wants to be grasped for. What's your thoughts on that?

[Zoran Mamdani]

So, look, let's forget about the numbers for a second and talk about the capabilities. The key elements here are the advanced centrifuges. All right? Until a few years ago, Iran had call them slow centrifuges. They're called the IR1s. And then if you just go up in numbers, they got up to IR4s and IR6ers. Those are able to enrich uranium much faster and to much higher quality. All of that means get a nuclear weapon much faster with less machinery. Okay, so those things had to be destroyed. All right? And then you have the 60% enriched uranium. That's the material that already is almost ready to be a nuclear weapon. That material needs to be destroyed. And then there's the finishing pieces. I mentioned Isfahan. Isfahan is sort of what takes some of the uranium and makes it together into metal that can be put on a warhead and the hemispheres that you put on the warhead, all of these sort of final touches in order to actually be able to make it into a nuclear weapon. So you need to blow all of those things up. And as long as Fordeau wasn't blown up, they had advanced centrifuges. They had 60% enriched uranium. So whether you had pushed them back, you know, six months or eight months or a year by blowing up Natanz and Isfahanim and the other places, they still had a serious threat because they had. Most of the key elements were at Fordeaux in smaller amounts than at Natanz. Natanz had the most. So why are people so excited about Natanz? Because it had the most centrifuges, the most uranium. And so that's, you know, when the foreign minister, Gideon Nassar, is making a big deal about it, I think that's what he's referring to. And if you talk about the IAEA when they were saying Iran had enough uranium for 10 to 15 nuclear weapons. So probably most of those are gone after Natanz. But if you still have enough for three or four nuclear weapons at Fordow and the centrifuges, advanced ones to enrich fast, to weaponize them, that was a big problem. Once you take out four do, then you can talk about two years because they're missing all of those pieces. They can't redo one piece and hook it up to another piece. They have to redo all those pieces at the same time, and that's difficult.

[Mike Pesca]

We'll be back with more of Yonah. Jeremy Bob in a moment.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Foreign.

[Mike Pesca]

Jeremy Bob is the Jerusalem Post's senior military correspondent and intelligence analyst. He is also the author of Target Tehran How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyber Warfare, Assassination and Secret Diplomacy to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East. We resume the conversation. There's been some reliable reporting that indicates that the material, the 60% enriched uranium, might well have been spirited out of Fordeau in advance of the strike. There were many trucks pictured there at the facility. We're only talking about 400kg, 880lbs of material. So the two part question is, is it likely in your reporting that that's happened? And even if it has, what does it mean?

[Zoran Mamdani]

I think the whole question about the trucks, look, it's very exciting for us in the media and it's sort of like a snapshot and it's easy to explain to the public, but the trucks I don't think are the point. The point is, has Iran succeeded in hiding some of its uranium from Israel in the United States? I'm sure it has.

[Mike Pesca]

Okay, so it has. It still has some of the 60% uranium. We don't.

[Zoran Mamdani]

It has some 60% uranium, but I think it's very little. I don't. When people are talking about, look, they might have moved all of it out. I think that's nonsense. All right, Take a look at what Israel did in penetrating this country. They killed in the first day nine out of 13 military chiefs. They didn't have one or two agents there on the first day. They had hundreds of agents, all right? They blew up, you know, hundreds of different targets all in one day. That means unbelievable penetration in every single part of Iran. So if they're moving uranium from point A to point B, Israel's following that. If you go back to my book, Target Tehran, the Iranians moved their nuclear secrets from a whole bunch of different sites to a really good hiding place, this abandoned warehouse in Tehran with no footprint, basically no guards, no satellites are looking at it. And it was a great plan, except the Mossad knew the old sites and followed them to the new sites. So I don't accept this idea that yes, the Mossad is able to take out all of these hundreds of targets, penetrate Iran with hundreds of agents, and somehow they're going to completely miss the movement in the uranium. That seems to be, to me, nonsense. I Also am sure the Iranians could get some amount of something past intelligence and they need to keep an eye on that. But the idea that all of the uranium has been moved and Israel didn't hit any of it, if you look at what Israel is able to do, it just makes no sense.

[Mike Pesca]

Ok, so you're saying it's nonsense because it's logical that the capabilities that Israel showed in that attack are such that they just wouldn't have let these trucks go by, trucks that we know about, because I guess commercial satellite imaging showed that. And so therefore, if some commercial satellite imaging that is shared with the world's media showed that, we're sure that Israel also had that intelligence.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Correct. And that Israel has hit, I think something like 30 nuclear sites were again, in the media. We only know how to focus on like two or three things. So we talk about four do Natanz and Isfahan. But Israel's hit like 30 nuclear sites. So my understanding from sources is some of the uranium might have been moved and been hit at some of these smaller sites.

[Mike Pesca]

Okay, so some of the headlines are fears over Iran's missing 400 kilograms of uranium. That was in the Times of London. It's not the most tawdry headline. That's from something called Times Now. I don't know what this is, but the 400 kg of missing uranium from Fordo that's haunting Washington and Tel Aviv. And I only raised that to say is, is it haunting Tel Aviv, do you think?

[Zoran Mamdani]

I don't think it's haunting Tel Aviv. Again, I think that there are a lot of people in a lot of countries that were against this operation and they want to present this operation as a failure or as something that shouldn't have happened. And one of the ways you can do that is say, ah, they blew up the buildings but they didn't get the uranium. And so that's like this great narrative. Look, nothing was accomplished. Again, forget about the politics because I think there are ways that you could say, you know, this could have been resolved differently and you could say that this operation wasn't necessary and you can make those arguments. But to say that Israel just missed the most important piece of all of this when they got dozens of nuclear scientists, dozens of nuclear sites, almost all the top Iranian officials. It doesn't make sense to me. It's not the feel that I'm getting from Israeli officials. And I have had times where Israeli officials expressed to me we're worried that we missed something. This isn't one of them.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. When Operation Spiderweb was executed by the Ukrainians. Did it make the Israelis nervous that it would blow their upcoming operation in Iran?

[Zoran Mamdani]

That is a great question. I haven't asked them that. I'm going to write that down to ask them that in the future. I'll project that the answer is yes. I just said a second ago that Israelis do worry and Israelis, yeah, they're known for that. Israelis for a couple reasons. Super worry about informational security. We have an Israeli censor here that sometimes will let me and others publish something two or three times and then they'll decide that the fourth time because something is going on in the news that they think the bad guys are going to pay more attention to that suddenly we can't publish it even though we've already published it three times before. So I think Israelis are super worried about operational security. I would guess that that probably did get them concerned.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. That's interesting. By the way. You probably argue, but it's already out there. It was out there last week and they say, yeah, we don't want to emphasize that. Now to remind anyone, is your relationship with the censor, how contentious is it?

[Zoran Mamdani]

I believe that every journalist in Israel has a contentious relationship with the censor. I will say that I have worked with them long enough and it helps actually to have done books with them because when you do books you get to speak to higher up managers. And so then if you have a problem with a particular article that you're dealing with, you know, Joe Schmo, who's 20 years old, you can call the manager and say, can you help me out with this guy? They don't know what they're doing. And the higher up managers have more leeway and sort of a more nuanced understanding of the issues. So I would say that it's always contentious. It's not specific to me. It's all of us. All journalists would prefer that there was no Israeli censor and that the way it worked would be honor system. Don't mess over national security of your country. If you mess over the national security of your country, you can get in trouble, which is true in the United States also. That's how we would all prefer it. By and large. I have gotten a lot of things through. I mean, again, if you read the book, the number of things I was able to get through that aren't 25 year old, 50 year old operations, things that happened just in the last two or three years was incredible.

[Mike Pesca]

Oh yeah. The next question is not to ask you to consider the unintended consequences of the next action I'm going to talk about or the legal entanglements internationally. But it's this is an alive Ayatollah Khomeini more useful or less useful to Israeli strategic interests.

[Zoran Mamdani]

So I personally have not been in favor of taking out Khomeini. I think it just, if you look at the history of sort of over forcing regime change from a foreign entity, that it doesn't work. You know, it didn't work in Afghanistan, it didn't work in Iraq, it didn't work for Israel and Lebanon. You can help a local population do their own revolution that's worked in a bunch of places. But they have to, they have to want it, they have to fight for it. And so I don't know that what Israel did in this operation was enough. But I thought it was interesting the last couple of days when they started to bomb the IRGC internal security units, the Basij militia units, right, the besieged. That's the militia that was created specifically to beat up Iranians when the regime was afraid that the army wouldn't want to do that. And so to bomb those units so that there would be less oppression, less forces to oppress Iranians. And if a protest movement breaks out again, as so many have before. So that, I think was an interesting strategy, specifically taking out Khomeini. I think there's a lot of other Khomeinis out there. They have a lot of radical clerics, a lot of nasty IRGC people. I think they could replace him pretty fast. Again, I think you need a local movement getting some outside help. And I think you need an Iranian general. You need an Iranian general who's willing to take the side of the people against the clerics. That's my formula for if you want regime change to actually happen.

[Mike Pesca]

And what's the debate like in Israeli intelligence circles?

[Zoran Mamdani]

I think there's a big disagreement about it. I think there are people who say Khamenei is a radical himself. He's a fanatic. He's so anti Israel. He's so, you know, mistrusting that nobody who would replace him would be as bad or certainly wouldn't be worse. And so some say, you know, it would have been worth to take him out. I don't believe it ever became such a practical issue because Trump was saying very clearly, don't take him out. And as we saw today, Israel was sending aircraft to bomb, I believe, probably dozens of targets in Iran. And Trump sent out a tweet after he spoke with Netanyahu on the phone that said sending aircraft back, and they ended up bombing one unmanned radar station to just sort of like, send a message to Iran. If Iran shot two ballistic missiles at Israel, breaking the ceasefire, this was Israel, you know, a symbolic coming back. So I don't think the Khamenei issue ever rose to the point of like, should we really do it or not? Because Trump was blocking it.

[Mike Pesca]

Was there any part of the debate that argued, you know, he's quite the opposite of a tactical genius? Maybe it benefits us from him being in place.

[Zoran Mamdani]

I don't think anybody thought that it benefits to have him in place. I think there were people that said, good to take him out. There were people that said, not good to take him out, because it could rally the Iranian public around the regime and it could also open. I mean, not that there aren't foreign entities that have been interested in killing Israeli prime ministers, but it would sort of give them, like, a very clear basis to do it. If you take out somebody else's head of state anyway, there are all kinds of concerns by the people who didn't want to take out Khomeini. I did not hear anybody saying, the guy's a moron. You know, leave him in charge.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. And now I'm going to make just a domestic US Politics aside that you don't have to comment on. I just find it interesting that the United. That the United States president can tweet or truth a sentence and this will call back planes in Israel, but he can't call back planes in America when they've left to deposit prisoners in foreign prisons. That's it. You don't have to comment. Do you. Do you think, obviously you always have to be vigilant, but what are the capacities of Iranian sleeper cells, assassin assailants? And I bring this up because here, where I'm sitting in Brooklyn, there was a supposed attempted assassination at a very soft target journalist who was a critic of the regime, and they put a lot of pressure on her family in the regime. But these assassins, who were supposedly also Trump assassins, were bumbling and didn't strike terror. I mean, I wasn't the target, but didn't inspire terror. But that is my question. What is their capacity? That we know of?

[Zoran Mamdani]

There's a wide variety. There was an operation by Iran and the IRGC to kill Israelis in Turkey a couple years ago, and it was such a bumbling operation, and they were outed so easily and all arrested so easily in cooperation between the Mossad and Turkey at the time that the IRGC intelligence chief Was fired like the same day. Like they didn't even, you know, give him a chance, you know, to sort of have a hearing. The week later, he was fired the same day.

[Mike Pesca]

So by the way, did that ultimately spare his life?

[Zoran Mamdani]

You know what, I stopped following him after he was fired. I should look into that. That's a good question. Right, right. Maybe. Maybe he's better off. I did not think about that angle. Get fired two years. Yeah, interesting, right?

[Mike Pesca]

Or like the guy, like, you're not up. You're not a good enough physicist. We're busting you down to computer programming. Saved his life.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Saved his life. Good point. But all of that said, there have been a number of successful Iranian terror operations all over Europe, in South America and Israel in the United States. They are what I would say the difference between them and the Mossad is probably, you know, the spectrum that I would say they recruit agents and have agents who are as good as the top Mossad people, and then they have people who are bumbling at the bottom of, you know, sort of the spectrum of what you could recruit, and that's all they were able to get to. So I'd say there's a wide variety.

[Mike Pesca]

Yeah. And I would surmise that if they had really good ones already in the United States, they might have used them for the journalist, for Trump, for any other actions. But then again, you can't not be vigilant. I'll give you that. Or I'll give whoever would argue with me that. So as I mentioned, the operations against Hezbollah were necessary to allow Israel to achieve what they achieved against Iran. From when you wrote the hardcover until now, what has been the most shocking to you in terms of the Iranians lack of capacity? Is it Hezbollah? Is it something else internally? What is it?

[Zoran Mamdani]

I would say Hezbollah. I would say that I was told by every single Israeli defense official for years that Israel could not have a major war with Hezbollah because Hezbollah, with 150,000 rockets, could shoot 6,000 to 8,000 rockets per day. And it wouldn't matter that Israel has Iron Dome and the Arrow and the multi layer defense system. They would overwhelm it. And Even if only 10% got through, 10% of 6,000 is 600 rockets. That could kill thousands, tens of thousands of people in a matter of days, in a week. You know, you saw some video footage maybe of Tel Aviv getting hit by the Iranians, I think in four or five spots. But most of Tel Aviv is basically Tel Aviv. The fear with Hezbollah was they could really, you know, burn Tel Aviv to The ground basically with their rockets. And so to see that Israel was able to use this beeper operation to completely catch them off guard and then in a matter of days, basically destroy almost all of their heavy missile capacity. All their commanders, Hassan Nasrallah, who had ruled them for over 30 years, to do all of that in a matter of days. There's no way that I could have seen that coming. I don't think anyone in the Israeli defense establishment believe that they were gonna be that successful that fast.

[Mike Pesca]

So I wanna put to you another argument that I think I understand what the argument is. And it's voiced by a lot of people who I think are generally against or critical of the U.S. involvement in the strikes. And this one is by. It was as quoted in the New Yorker, Karim Sajapur, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And he asks, will we look back and say this prevented an IR bomb or insured one? Now, I was trying to understand what the insured one part is. And this argument goes something like the Iranians are now going to be extra motivated and they'll know they have to do it clandestinely so they'll sneak and race to a breakout. What's your assessment of that?

[Zoran Mamdani]

I have a major problem with this argument. I understand people make it on a good faith basis, but the idea is, well, right now, or until this 12 day war, Iran was definitely at most several months away from a nuclear weapon. They needed to make the choice to do it. But they had the 60% uranium, they had the advanced centrifuges, they had places to hide it. That was not like a maybe, that was like a yes, it exists. It is a absolute threat. Imminent threat. Next week, next month? No, but very, very close threat and maybe a threat we can't catch. Now to say that it is worse that maybe Iran, now that I'm arguing there, two years back, we'll try harder to get a nuclear weapon and have less compunctions about sort of going all the way. And that that's worse than where we were 12 days ago when they were actually really close to it. It doesn't make any sense to me. The other thing is, again, I come back to how did Israel pull all of this off? It was with extensive investment in penetrating Iran. Iran is a country of 90 million people. The Sunnis, the Kurds, the Balukis all hate the regime. Not like in the United States, where you have red states and blue states. But I would think that most people still think they're part of the same country. These people really don't see the Shiites and ayatollahs as part of their country. They basically see themselves as occupied. So you literally have tens of millions of people who you can recruit who, if they're working against the regime, they don't even think they're betraying anyone. They think they're sort of fighting for their own people. And so when you have that level of penetration, no, I don't think that the fact that Iran might try harder in the future is worse than the fact that they were close to a bomb. Now.

[Mike Pesca]

Couple other quick questions. Aren't physicists replaceable? What's the point of killing them?

[Zoran Mamdani]

So physicists are replaceable. We have a whole chapter in our book about killing Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the father of the Iranian bomb, sort of the Oppenheimer of Iran. And they replaced him. And he was a big loss, but they replaced him and they moved forward. Probably the fact that he was killed probably delayed them for six months or a year and a half or something, but they replaced him. So, yes, the dozen or so nuclear scientists who were killed are replaceable. And that's why, again, I come back to the sheer immensity of all of the things at once. The nuclear scientists, the small nuclear sites, the big nuclear sites, the centrifuges, the uranium, all of these things being hit at once. That is what I think will make it harder for Iran to think about, do they really want to go forward? If they do, do they really think they're going to be able to sneak it past the Mossad and the Israeli Air Force? But no. If you just look narrowly at the question of can you replace nuclear scientists? For sure you can.

[Mike Pesca]

Are the Iranians too committed to the idea and the public messaging of we're going to be a nuclear regime to back off it?

[Zoran Mamdani]

Nobody knows the answer to that question, including the Iranians themselves. They don't know how badly they've been hit. Remember, they basically stopped using their cell phones after the first few days because they were being tracked. And so they probably will only have a full situational assessment of what's happened to them in a month or two months. It's going to take them time to go through the rumble of all of these different places that were hit. It's going to take them time to find people who know how to look and read through the materials that were destroyed or partially destroyed. So I don't think we know the answer to that. Obviously, my hope is that they will have taken such a big hit from this that they will say, you know what? We thought a nuclear weapon after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 was going to be the thing that would save us from regime change. It didn't help us at all. It brought this terrible attack on us. Let's figure out another way. I hope that will be their answer, but I can't say so.

[Mike Pesca]

I was listening to Nadav Ial on Dancing or his Call Me Back podcast, and he said, and I don't know if you have any knowledge of this, I don't know if it's true, but at least put a thought in my head that the Israelis did some planning about acceptable losses from the Iranians. And they had a range of how many people, how many citizens might die. And it's been in the dozens, but they thought it would be in the low hundreds to. I think the upper limit he articulated was 4,000. And I don't know if that's true or not. Maybe you do, but this brought to mind the fact that the United States tolerance for loss couldn't be more different from the Israelis. The United States probably has a zero tolerance for loss. And if I'm not going to say if the hair on the head of one serviceman, because many after the assassination of Soleimani had brain injuries, but I would say if any servicemen dies, if two servicemen die, if somehow any American citizen dies, I think it's all going to be seen as not having been worth it to the Americans a lot there. But my question is, do the Israelis take this into account? How much do they?

[Zoran Mamdani]

They absolutely do. And I'll just come back to two dates. 911 in the United States and October 7, 2023 in Israel. After 911 in the United States, for the first time, I would say, since the Vietnam War, Americans were ready for servicemen to die because thousands of Americans had died on American soil. And that shifted the mentality. And after 911 became something that happened 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 25 years ago, Americans got back into the mentality of we don't want any of our servicemen to die fighting to protect the country. Israel, until October 7th was actually, relatively speaking, in the same mentality to where Americans are right now. All right, Israel didn't want to risk. This is, you know, we were talking about before. They didn't want to risk a war with Hezbollah. They didn't want to risk a war with Syria. They didn't want to risk a war with Iran. They didn't want to risk a war with Hamas. So because Israelis have been sort of getting it more in the mentality of it can maintain security using technology and superior firepower without having to risk lives. And October 7th tore that to pieces. When 1,200 people, mostly civilians, on your own territory get killed and you say, okay, we don't have a choice. We need to take the fight to the other side. And that's going to mean a certain number of losses.

[Mike Pesca]

Yonah Jeremy Bobb is the co author of Target How Mossad Is Using Sabotage, Cyber Warfare, Assassination and Secret Diplomacy to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Realignment of the New Middle East. I have to give a recommendation. It's well reported. It's really well written and exciting. There's a lot of diplomatic considerations, how the Abraham Accords hinged on settlements in the West Bank. It's really a fascinating read and Jon has been doing excellent, excellent reporting for the Jerusalem Post. Thank you so much.

[Zoran Mamdani]

Thank you. It was a pleasure.

[Mike Pesca]

And that's it for today's show. Corey War produces the Gist. Astrid Green does our socials. Kathleen Sykes, she's the editor of the Gist List. Ashley Khan is the production coordinator for the Gist. Michelle Pesca does all that she sees. She sits over that and calls the shots and moves the chess pieces. Leo Baums, our intern, he's very good with coming up with databases. Data's base improve. Thanks for listening. The gist is brought to you by Progressive Insurance. Fiscally responsible financial geniuses, monetary magicians. These are things people say about drivers who switch their car insurance to Progressive and save hundreds. Visit progressive.com to see if you could save Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and affiliates. Potential savings will vary. Not available in all states or situations.