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- [00:00]
Martin Wolf
If you're the US in the current structure of the world economy, nobody has the faintest idea how long you can get away with it before there's going to be a big problem. The trouble is, if you wait until it really is a big problem, then it becomes almost unmanageable. And now the good fight with Jasia Monk.
- [00:27]
Jasia Monk
Over the last weeks and months, the main focus has been on domestic political developments in the United States and on some of the important geostrategic things going on around the world. But I thought it was an important time to take a step back and really think about the economy, both in the United States and around the world. What will the effect of the big beautiful bill be on the American economy and the American welfare state? How should we think about the rapid increase in the US national debt? In an era in which both political parties seem to have decided it is in the political interest to spend money on their watch and let the other side worry about filling budget deficits, can the United States realistically sustain the astonishing dominance over the world's economy? The United states is about 5% of the world's population and US firms at the moment about 50% of the world's stock market capitalization. Could that still be the case 20, 40, 60 years from now? Or are we headed for a very big correction? Well, I couldn't think of a better person to discuss these questions with then the legendary Martin Wolf, the chief economic commentator for the Financial Times. He is one of the very most prominent financial journalists in the world. He is thinking about these topics with a global perspective spanning many decades. In the last part of his conversation, we then went well beyond the United States. We assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy. Why has China still not reached the GDP per capita of poorer European countries like Portugal? And why is it that even if China never quite catches up to the standard of living in the United States or in Germany or France, it may nevertheless turn out to be dominant in the 21st century. How is India faring? Why is India so far behind on China so far? And can India have a significant growth spurt in the coming decades? And finally, where is Western Europe in all of this? Martin claims that in 50 or so years, most likely the three biggest powers in the world is going to be in that order, China, the United States, and India. With Europe nowhere to be seen, why is he so pessimistic about the future of the continent? If you want to hear all of these fascinating points about the world economy, please become a paying subscriber. Please go to jaschamunk.substack.com and this week, I'm throwing in a special deal, 25% off your subscriptions. That makes it about the cost of one coffee a week from a Kona store, from a bodega that is. Yashamok.substack.com the good fight. Martin Wolf, welcome back to the podcast. It's a pleasure, it's always pleasure to speak to you, Martin, even about somewhat depressing things. So we're recording this after the Senate has passed a version of the big beautiful bill. It's kind of amazing how Trump manages to invent these terms that we then all dutifully use. The House, as we're speaking, has not yet passed the bill. By the time that listeners are hearing this conversation, it seems possible, perhaps likely, that the House will have passed some version of, of the big beautiful bill as well. What does this bill tell us about the governing philosophy of Donald Trump and the nature of his coalition, and what impact is it going to have on the American economy?
- [04:28]
Martin Wolf
So I suppose the headline, which is important is one, objectively, he governs in the interest of, of extremely rich people, that his fiscal policy, so far as it can be defined, is completely consistent with the priorities of the Republican Party since Ronald Reagan, at least, which is the aim is to cut spending, particularly on programs that benefit the poor, and to cut taxes dramatically on the wealthy. So this is a very traditional, if you like, Republican view of the priorities of the fiscal policy and is in no way populist as you would normally define it. And I call, and I have called this now for two decades, plutocratic populism or pluto populism. It's pseudo populism. The second thing that is very clear about the fiscal priorities is, is that he really, really, really doesn't care about fiscal deficits, the scale of deficits they're prepared to contemplate. And this has now been consistent with the tax bill that was passed last time. And one of the things they did to make the tax bill look palatable last time, I think it was in 2017, was to say that the big tax cuts will expire now. But one of the things they're doing now is to extend those tax cuts. And they say, well, this isn't really a tax cut because we already committed ourselves to this tax cut, even though we promised that it would expire. So not only don't they care about the deficits, they're perfectly prepared to lie about it.
- [06:28]
Jasia Monk
So there's a lot that's interesting in this. I Mean, I think the first striking thing is that Trump was elected as part of this rather striking political coalition which looked like his party might be starting to build a multiracial working class coalition. The Democrats now really dominate the votes of highly educated, affluent people in the most well to do parts of the country. There's a famous graph going around which shows that Kamala Harris coalition in socioeconomic terms resembles rather strikingly that of Bob dole in the 1990s. The Republicans, of course, have hugely expanded among the white working class over a number of decades. I've had many other similar movements and parties around the Democratic world, but they have also started to increase the share of vote among non white working class voters. And I guess it's one of the strangers things about American politics that Democrats have this coalition of very wealthy, well to do people, but still feel in some way like their natural thing to do, within limits, is to actually serve the interest of working class voters that no longer really vote for them. And then conversely, Republicans, who certainly have some support among the very, very rich, are now supported by a much more proletarian coalition. But when it comes time to writing a budget, they sort of default back to, as you're saying, sort of engaging in budgetary policy that in some ways could have been put forward in perhaps a less blatantly irresponsible way by Ronald Reagan. So help us understand where this is going to go in the long run. I mean, do you think that these political parties are always going to be at cross purposes with their coalitions? Is somebody, a successor to Donald Trump, going to realize that really where their coalition lies today is rather different from where Ronald Reagan's coalition lay in the 1980s, and that they should follow through on that in public policy? It's kind of quite a remarkable moment in that respect, I think.
- [08:35]
Martin Wolf
I think that's an unbelievably important question. And I have to be completely honest, I've been somewhat surprised by this. So if you think of populist parties nowadays, there are quite a number, notably in Europe, that are pursuing the sort of policies you would expect. In a sense, they're nationalist, they're hostile to immigrants, but they also are quite supportive of welfare, welfare policy. Perhaps the best example I know know of is peace in Poland, which seems to have exactly that combination. And if you think back to the interwar period, well, you know, the pretty clear at least to some extent of the policy, the economic policies in the early period with Adolf Hitler and also Mussolini, he was very interventionist, very industrious about Creating new industrial jobs for the economy and so forth. While not only what I've described and you're describing is true, they're just scrapping all the subsidies for clean energy which were popular. They were generating lots of investment, lots of jobs, including in red districts. So if you look at this, with the exception of the tariff case, the tariff issue, it's really laissez faire. I mean, quite brutally so. And again, if you think of Trump intellectually, which is strange, it does bring you a bit back to the period he admires and loves so much, the late 19th century America, which was laissez faire, domestically highly protectionist, so nationalist in that sense, and intensely anti union. The big difference, and I have pointed this out in columns from that period, which is sui generis to him, is that in the era of McKinley, which he loved so much, they had enormous immigration. The question though is, as you say, can this last? Is that a sustainable coalition? I suppose there are. Economists tend to assume, and the evidence used to support this perspective, political scientists felt the same way, that economic conditions really mattered. And the story we tell about why the Biden administration was defeated, whether it was Kamala or Biden, was that inflation exploded. And because inflation exploded, people's real incomes were reduced for a while. And that was a terrible shock. And so economics really explained it in the end. It's the economy, stupid. And James Carville's famous remark, and that's by and large how we've analyzed not just American politics, but the politics of most countries. Well, Trump seems to be betting on the proposition that isn't true, at least that's certainly how we would view now.
- [11:51]
Jasia Monk
And I think he may, I think he may get that wrong. I mean, it's striking to me that there's.
- [11:57]
Martin Wolf
I hope so. But there is one, just that one. There is an alternative view which seems to be there, which is cultural issues, racial issues. Well, anti immigrants, anti woke, anti dei, all that stuff, the sight of the ICE officials running around the country throwing people into prison and ultimately throw them out is enough. And with the media as it is now, which will largely ignore these downsides of what's going on, and the hope that low information voters will continue to feel this loyalty to Trump. In other words, economics doesn't matter because nobody will really understand what's going on. And that would, of course, be a fascinating new possibility. But I tend to the view in the end that economics did play a role in leading the working class away from the Democrats towards Trump, and economics will in the end. But I could be wrong. Undermine this new coalition.
- [13:04]
Jasia Monk
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- [13:07]
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- [13:12]
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- [13:57]
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- [14:06]
Jasia Monk
I guess I take a somewhat middle position on this, which is to say that I do think we're in a moment in which culture seems to matter more electorally than the economy in many circumstances. And I do think it's cultural issues that have played a huge role in alienating huge shares of a working class away from left leaning parties, whether that's for Democrats in the United States or or labor in the United Kingdom, the Social Democrats in Germany, you name them. I also think that cultural issues are a huge part of the appeal of somebody like Donald Trump, particularly when the other side is in office. But I would temper this in two ways. The first is that cultural issues may be a little bit more of a draw than they look like. I think the Democrats are way out of the mainstream on cultural issues still, but so is Donald Trump. And so when Democrats are in power, I think people think I'm sick of all of this stuff. I want Republicans to come in. But when somebody like Donald Trump comes in and does stuff that is also way out of cultural mainstream, I think those things cease to be an advantage to him. So there's obviously a part of his base that is very happy with throwing trans people out of the military, with doing mass immigration rates, including on people who've been in the country for a very long time and so on. But I think there's A lot of people in the middle who are horrified by the open border with Mexico, who are very concerned about athletes who had gone through male puberty participating in female competitive sports, but who also don't want people who've been in the country for 30 years, working hard to be rounded up and sent to El Salvadorian prisoners, who also don't want trans people to be thrown out of the military. And since that middle, I think, is actually quite significant and big, there's a little bit of a weather vane effect where people are buffeted to and fro because they don't feel that anybody's actually speaking to them. Now, I think on economic issues, there's a little bit of a temptation at the moment to look at electoral politics and have a temptation, have a kind of feeling of Lowell, nothing matters. You can say whatever you want. You can do whatever you want. It never seems to have an actual, actual impact. And I think that that's wrong. I think Biden lost in part because as people like Jason Furman explained on his podcast in a great article, people just weren't doing better in 2024 than they had done in 2019. On average, there's many things on the economy that made people feel, I'm not feeling a lot better than I was four years ago. I think by the same token, if a lot of people lose their the access to medical benefits, if they suddenly have less money in their pocket at the end of a month, if they realize that all of these tax cuts are only going to be super rich, they're also going to become less likely to vote for Donald Trump's chosen successor in 2028. I want to ask you a little bit about both specifically what impact this bill bill would or will have on the lives of ordinary Americans, and in particular on some of the social safety net in the United States and more broadly, where we actually are with the social safety net. I feel like it's a cliche that America has much less of a social safety net than Europe, that it's a much more unequal place, that its taxation system is somehow less fair. And it's not obvious to me to what extent that is still the case, both because European welfare states have actually become rather less generous over the last few decades in a number of ways, because the American wealth estate has in many ways expanded over the last decades, and because the American income tax system, for example, is much more progressive than the European one, top rates of taxation are now roughly similar in many places, and you start paying a much higher share of your Income much lower down the income scale in most European countries, such that on balance, the American income tax system is actually more redistributive than the European one. So sort of how dissimilar are American and European welfare states at this stage and how much of a difference to the overall sort of structure of a welfare state is this big beautiful bill going to make in the United States?
- [18:21]
Martin Wolf
Well, that's a complicated set of questions and there are some areas here which I wouldn't regard myself as the definitive expert, but I think we can say a few things which are pretty clear. First of all, the overall share of GDP spent by the government is very much lower in the United States, excluding federal and state governments, than it is in Europe. At its extreme, it's 2 to 1. When Angela Merkel said, I think that we spend in Europe more than half of global welfare spending is spent by Europe, that was true and the US Is no exception. Now what's important here is if you like the welfare state, this is my understanding of what's going on. There is a basic social safety net in America for the old. So Medicare and Social Security provide reasonable, though nothing comparable to say, Germany support for old people. And that was the achievement of FDR and LBJ. This now goes back to the 60s and, well, even earlier. And that has not been fundamentally eroded. There was a period in the early part of this century when George W. Bush thought about privatizing Social Security, got nowhere with that at all. But the benefits for younger people, people under 65 or whatever the current age is, things changing in Europe are much more generous, particularly family benefits, health benefits, of course, which are universal, which is a pretty big deal given the expense of health care. Noticeably in the US if you don't have a job which gives carries now health insurance, you do really do have a problem in America which you don't have elsewhere. So the safety net does apply to very clearly to the elderly, but it's much thinner to the rest of the population, with an important exception, which is, as I understand it, implicit in your question is that they've actually tried to, they have ended up giving quite a lot to the poor. And so if you look at household income distribution of non retired people, they have actually brought up the bottom somewhat. And I think one of the consequences of that, which I think is important, is that it squeezed the differential in household income between, if you like, the middle classes who are not benefiting from this safety net for the old and the poor. And Medicaid was an important part of that really important part. And the food program was also a very important part of it, both of which are attacked in this budget. But that did bring up the poor. And I think one of the resentments of quote unquote hard working class people, if you like the broadly defined middle class in the United States is they felt feel that the idle poor as it were from their point of view is doing too well. And that's very much part of the focus of the Medicaid cuts. What people are arguing in the Republicans in Congress is these people should go out and work and get therefore support their health care. Now there's Paul Grumman has just written about this very recently. But the evidence that that's the, that they're not working because of Medicaid is basically non existent. But there is a reason for people to feel in the middle. Nobody middle and non retired people. Nobody's doing much for us.
- [22:41]
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- [22:59]
Jasia Monk
I want to shift to the second sort of set of things that we mentioned about the bill, which is the extent to which it's going to drive up the deficit and what kind of long term consequences that might have. I mean it's interesting that in a way there seems to be an elective affinity here between some fashionable theories on the left but are not taken seriously by economists like modern monetary theory or magic money tree theory and the attitude on the right among Republicans. Both of them now basically seem to be agreed on the idea that America has so much power in the global financial system that it can kind of do what it want. It can try to influence politically the decisions of the Federal Reserve bank, it can rack up enormous debts, it can run a very significant budget deficit. And none of this is ever going to have truly negative consequences. And it's concerning not just that America is running such a serious deficit that overall debt is now so high. But that is kind of unclear why where in the political system the actors are that are going to turn that ship around since it feels a little bit like a game of chicken where each party is saying well the other party is not going to try and rein in the debt. Why should we be the stupid ones who do it on our watch and then reap the negative electoral consequences? Why is it that all of this is not so far led to serious adverse consequences for the United States? In terms of its ability to refinance the debt and all those other kinds of things, do you think that there's a serious risk that that might change potential disastrous consequences not just for the US but for the world economy?
- [24:55]
Martin Wolf
Well, the first question you asked is sort of the similarities between the left and right. And I think the similarity is the extremes of the political system share one thing, which is they would like to believe in magical alternatives. Because contemplating the possibility that you actually have to pay for things is rather depressing. If you want to do some rather big things would shake up the whole system and you don't want to inflict any pain on anybody who really matters. So there. I think they share something that's very clear. The second point I'd make is in the last 30, 40 years, 40 years, actually 35 or so, the Democrats were actually the more responsible party. I won't go further back, but the. It gets more complicated then. And I do think the Reagan moment was decisive here because Reagan promulgated for the first time from the right the principle that traditional Republican balanced budget ideology was over. And I always thought supply side economics was a brilliant idea if you want to be on the right because it released you from the constraints of fiscal property, which is never very politically popular. Politically popular. And so that transformed politics. And in the. So the next Democratic president, as it were, after Republic Republican landslide in 1980 was Clinton or 79. Whenever Reagan actually won, I think it was 80, wasn't it was Clinton and Clinton and Bob Rubin and Larry Summers, his Treasury secretaries, eliminated the deficit, which was seen as a great triumph. The economy boomed for a whole set of reasons which I won't go into. And then promptly when George W. Bush came into power, he slashed taxes like crazy and then fought a great war. And so they said to themselves, what did we do that for? And then there was a huge financial crisis and Obama was really very responsible again. I mean, he really did a lot of work to cut budget deficits. They didn't do a huge fiscal boost. It was really quite modest, much less than I thought was necessary, lots of other people thought was necessary. And so the growth was weaker. And partly because the growth was weaker than it needed to be, they lost in 2016. And Trump came in and he slashed taxes. We just discussed that and produced a huge deficit. And then the pandemic came along and produced a huge deficit. And then at last the Democrats said, well, that's crazy, we're not going to cut taxes and we're just going to have a huge big budget deficit too, because there's no point in being responsible. And now I don't think they lost because of that. But in any case, the Democrats have decided there is absolutely no point in being responsible. We won't get elected as a result. We'll just be blamed for slow growth. And the Republicans, and we're just handing the Republicans the opportunity to slash taxes, which leaves us with a much worse problem when we come in because then stabilizing the budget means we can't do lots of spending. So I think you're absolutely right. Both sides have decided there is absolutely no reason to run balanced budget. Then the question is, can they get away with it? And the answer, I suspect, is the one very simple. We can discuss the detail. They can't do this forever. Gigantic fiscal deficits are not a sustainable position forever. But if you're the US and in the current structure of the world economy, nobody has the faintest idea how long you can get away with it before there's going to be a big problem. The trouble is if you wait until it really is a big problem, then it becomes almost unmanageable. It becomes an unmanageable crisis. And this is the famous Rudy Dornbush, a great MIT economist, died some decades ago, said, well, when things are unsustainable. This is a rough paraphrase. They can go on for much longer than you think they can go on for. And when they end, it's much faster than you can think. So that's the prudent thing, is don't go anywhere near that. But it seems to me absolutely clear from the discussion we've had that prudence is not represented in current politics. So I assume there will be a huge fiscal crisis and I have absolutely no idea when.
- [29:59]
Jasia Monk
I mean, that seems right to me. It nearly feels like the economy is a little bit like that Willy Coyote cartoon thing where once you've gone over the cliff, you are going to fall. But when you're going to look down and when the fall is going to start seems difficult to predict.
- [30:18]
Martin Wolf
But at the present, if the things continue, the US is going to have more debt relative to GDP in four or five years than at any time in its history, including after World War II. And it will continue on up almost certainly. And the US is hugely dependent largely because of the fiscal deficit. It has nothing to do with trade and all the wickedness of so called foreign traders, foreign countries in trade, because they're running this huge fiscal deficit in a country where household and corporate savings are very low. They are dependent on foreign savings. And that means the foreigners have to keep on buying their debt, a lot of it Europeans, as I said, also Japanese. And at some point, people are going to say, this is just too risky. Nobody knows when. It could be tomorrow, much more likely further back. But once you got to that level of debt, 150%, 180% of GDP and interest rates start getting up real interest rates to 4 or 5% or even higher, then the fiscal manageability of debt becomes there is none and you have massive inflation. The central bank will be overwhelmed. And here a crucial factor which may accelerate the crisis is that I think Trump clearly intends to replace Jay Powell with an inflationist central banker. And I'm going to assume, therefore, he will tell him to cut rates just while he's trying to sell vast quantities of bonds. And that could, stress, could accelerate the crisis significantly. Just as in a very different way, Nixon's pressure on Arthur Burns in the early 70s created the great inflation of the 70s, along with a few other things which destabilized the US so much.
- [32:13]
Jasia Monk
There's another striking thing about the US economy that I've been wondering about, and I would love your help in thinking through this, which is that the United states has about 5% of the world's population. It has, I believe, about 50% of the world's stock market capitalism. When you look at U.S. companies, they make up about 50% of the global stock market. And this is partially because America has actually been astonishingly successful in keeping its share of global GDP, even as Europe's share of global GDP has declined very significantly over the last 30 years. America slightly declined, but didn't decline all that much despite the astonishing rise, rise of China and of other countries around the world. Is this sustainable? I mean, is it really imaginable that 25 or 50 years from now, half of the valuable companies in the world or half of the value produced by companies in the world still comes from the United States? I mean, what is it that has allowed the American economy to be so phenomenally productive? And don't we have to assume that some amount of reversion to the mean is going to happen at some point? And what would be the political consequences of that?
- [33:37]
Martin Wolf
Well, my assumption is that almost none of this is sustainable. And you have to separate out little elements. First of all, US has about a quarter of world GDP at money prices that has been roughly stable for the last 30 years or so. That's an achievement. But a lot of this has to do with the strength of the Dollar and the strength of the dollar is actually related to the strength of the US Stock market, which is a lot of what's driving up the dollars is the capital inflows. It's a very, very great enthusiasm about owning US assets and more more broadly because US assets look so impressive, because the firms. This is stock market is an important part of this because US firms look so impressive. Now the question is whether that is real. Let me just sustainable, let me just give some doubt on whether the situation in which people are pouring money into the US even more gross than is needed to fund the net deficit. These are net figures, the deficits and drives up the value of the dollar which drives up the relative size of US gdp. If we do measure GDP as I like to do, economists like to do in purchasing power parity terms, which is comparable real income. The US share doesn't look anything like as. As huge, much smaller than China. But I won't go into those differences because it's sort of bit wonkish. But anyway, why might not sustain? Well, I'll give you two reasons why it might not be sustained. First, this is not the first time that a country has had a stock market value which is wildly out of line with its relative gdp. The last country that had that was Japan in the 1980s. There was a period, I'm quite sure of this I can't give you the exact years because it's so long ago, when the Japanese stock market was more valuable than the American stock market. And I remember noticing there was a lot of discussion how could it possibly be sustainable. But this was the period when this famous story that the land on which the Imperial palace was situated was more valuable than the whole of California. And that was the most famous statistic about a super bubble in my lifetime because actually it was true that if you measured the value of Japanese land in Tokyo at that time, the value of the Imperial palace, which is quite large in Tokyo, was greater than California. And we as simple economists, I as in this said this is nuts. This is the biggest bubble in human history and something will give. And we know what gave. The stock market collapsed, land prices collapsed and Japan had essentially a 20 year deflation. Now I'm not saying that will happen, but I just remind you that the relative value of stock markets can be very, very crazy if there's a huge, huge bull market. And then that gets you to the American side. Obviously American corporates are strong in some sectors and that is true and real. So I don't want to say it's like Japan in the 1980s. But if you look at standard measures of value of underlying earnings, the Japanese, the American stock market is currently as highly valued essentially as it has been in any bull market since the 1880s. Right? As high as in 1929. As high in 1999. To all intents and purposes, despite all the problems we've been discussing, nothing affects this value. The implicit assumption is that the American corporate sector, and above all the tech sector, which plays such a big, will go out to get to earn ever greater monopoly profits for the indefinite future and will drive the market values of corporates, sustain these market values of corporates and the profit shares that underlie them. And all I can say is I find that given the politics of what's going in America, given, given the politics of the world in response to what's going on in America, and given the assaults on the rule of law, on research, and all the other things that are going on in America, I find that story really difficult to believe. And it seems to me one that people are holding to because it's played out very well in recent decades. But I would be very surprised 20 or 30 years from now we would still see this phenomenon. And maybe partly because the idea that AI will generate limitless profit booms for the tech sector will turn out to be as unrealistic as the Internet bubble turned out to be in the late 1990s, which, which was also turned out to be hugely exaggerated. And there might be perfectly good reason which the profits from AI will accrue to the users. The users will be everywhere, not just in the US and the companies that are investing zillions in the very expensive process of producing AI models will actually not get much of a return on them. And that's completely consistent, by the way, with what's happened in every major technological revolution in the past. Railways onwards.
- [39:37]
Jasia Monk
Thank you so much for listening to this episode of the Good Fight. This conversation went on for a good while longer. Martin and I took this conversation in a much more global direction, discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy, trying to understand why India is so far behind China, and getting to the bottom of why Martin is extremely pessimistic about the future of the European economy. Trying to understand why, according to Martin, the three most powerful blocs in the world are going to be China, the United States and India, but not Europe 50 years from now. To listen to this part of the conversation, please support this podcast, please go to yashamon.substack.com the good fight for 25% off. You will not regret it and it will make my day. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for listening to the Good Fight. Lots of listeners have been spreading the word about this show. If you two have been enjoying the podcast, please be liked. Rate the show on itunes, tell your friends all about it, share it on Facebook or Twitter. And finally, please mail suggestions for great guests or comments about the show to goodfightpodmail.com that's goodfightpod@gmail com.
- [40:54]
Martin Wolf
This recording carries a Creative Commons 4.0 International License.
- [40:59]
Jasia Monk
Thanks to Silent Partner for their song Chess Pieces.