The Geo-Politicization of Natural Gas

Summary

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The Geo-Politicization of Natural Gas

The HC Commodities Podcast
Host: Paul Chapman (HC Group)
Guest: Anne-Sophie Corbeau (Global Research Scholar, Center for Global Energy Policy)
Date: January 21, 2026

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Episode Overview

This episode delves into the ongoing and intensifying geopoliticization of natural gas markets, examining how 2025 unfolded, assessing major trends for 2026, and unpacking the consequences of political dynamics overtaking traditional supply-demand fundamentals. Host Paul Chapman and guest Anne-Sophie Corbeau explore the interplay between market forces and geopolitical shifts, and how these factors have shaped—and continue to shape—investment, trading, and global energy security.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. 2025 in Review: A Year Marked by Unexpected Turns

(02:25–07:47)

• Demand & Price Dynamics:

  • Global gas demand growth was muted, with Europe rebounding due to normalized weather and higher demand for power generation.
  • Loss of Ukrainian transit (15 bcm) put pressure on European supply.
  • European storage requirements spurred early price rises, but regulatory relaxation in February precipitated a price collapse.
    "It's a little bit like a soufflé—price collapse." – Anne-Sophie (03:38)
  • Geopolitical shocks (e.g., Israel-Iran conflict) triggered volatility, but ultimately, prices sank to near pre-crisis levels as new LNG supply arrived.

• LNG Supply "Wave" Begins:

  • Major new US projects—Plaquemines and Corpus Christi Stage 3—and projects in Canada, Senegal, and Mauritania came online.
  • LNG trade approached 600 bcm (up sharply after stagnation in 2023-24).
  • Asian demand, especially Chinese LNG imports, surprised to the downside (down ~13% in 2025).

2. The LNG Market—Boom or Bust Ahead?

(11:28–19:53)

• Two Schools of Thought:

  • Optimists: New LNG supply will be absorbed as prices fall, powering demand across Asia, India, and weather-driven rebalancing in Europe.

    "Demand will be there because... all these markets in Southeast Asia, India, etc... can now absorb the much cheaper LNG which is coming."
    – Anne-Sophie (12:01)

  • Pessimists: Demand won't keep pace, especially with Southeast Asia's affordability constraints and countries like Pakistan turning to renewables and coal.

    "Affordability is absolutely crucial… Do I really want to be that dependent on LNG? I mean, maybe not."
    – Anne-Sophie (16:03)

• Long-Term vs. Spot Market Reliance:

  • Southeast Asia and others hesitant to commit to long-term supply after 2022’s price spikes and supply diversions.
  • Diversification into coal and solar seen as risk mitigation against LNG price and supply shocks.

3. Geopolitics at the Forefront—Blockades, Sanctions, and Supplier Blocs

(19:53–30:16)

• Security of Supply Reigns:

  • The shift from purely economic to overtly political decision-making in procurement—country alignments fragment trade flows.
  • Political conditionals affect who can buy from whom and under what terms, complicating both risk management and market transparency.

• Scale of Upcoming LNG Capacity:

  • 400 bcm of new LNG export capacity FID'd at the start of 2025; ~60 bcm online in '25, ~340 bcm more by ~2031.
  • LNG trade could grow from 600 to ~800 bcm by 2030: “That’s a plus 50% increase in capacity.” (21:45)

4. Regional Deep Dives

China—LNG Demand, Pipelines, and Strategic Uncertainties

(23:35–30:16)

• 2025 saw a significant drop in LNG imports, though overall demand grew slightly.

• Chinese gas demand growth is primarily in residential and industrial, with power generation a minor share (~3% but large in absolute terms due to China’s scale).

• Domestic gas production remains robust, and pipeline imports from Central Asia and Russia are at capacity.

• Geopolitical risks:

  • US LNG suspended, heavy reliance on Qatari supply, exposure to Middle East instability.
  • Diversification to Russian LNG and potential for Power of Siberia 2, but wary of overdependence.

  “If LNG demand in China drops in 2026, that is a real big problem. I don't see that happening because... the increase in pipeline supply from Russia, that is not going to materialize again.”
  – Anne-Sophie (24:10)

Europe—Between American Energy and Regulatory Ambitions

(31:43–39:58)

• Enormous increase in US LNG imports; dependence has shifted from Russian to American supply.

• Tensions over US-EU energy relations, with “aspirational” but likely unreachable targets for European US energy purchases.

• The need to balance (and survive) between the US “petrostate” and China as an “electrostate.”

• Regulatory clashes (e.g., Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive—CS3D) are complicating future relationships with exporters like Qatar.

  “We have sort of traded, you know, one dependency for another.”
  – Anne-Sophie (33:06)

US—Export Boom or Political Bottleneck?

(40:54–47:08)

• Surging LNG exports, but risk of US administration weaponizing energy exports for domestic or foreign policy reasons.

• Political uncertainty (especially with elections) threatens the stability and predictability of US LNG outflows—potential for sudden export bans or regulatory clampdowns.

• Internal gas price volatility and supply outlooks increasingly tied to factors like AI-driven demand and weather.

  “The risk has transferred from getting your curves wrong to getting your political analysis wrong, and I just find that a pretty dangerous way of managing price risk.”
  – Paul Chapman (46:54)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

| Timestamp | Quote | Speaker | |-----------|-------|---------| | 03:38 | “It's a little bit like a soufflé—price collapse.” | Anne-Sophie | | 12:01 | “Demand will be there because... all these markets …can now absorb the much cheaper LNG which is coming.” | Anne-Sophie | | 16:03 | “Affordability is absolutely crucial… Do I really want to be that dependent on LNG? I mean, maybe not.” | Anne-Sophie | | 21:45 | “That’s a plus 50% increase in capacity.” | Anne-Sophie | | 24:10 | “If LNG demand in China drops in 2026, that is a real big problem.” | Anne-Sophie | | 33:06 | “We have sort of traded, you know, one dependency for another.” | Anne-Sophie | | 40:54 | “If I were to take you back to 2016… 80% of it would be focused on… supply and demand curves… Today it seems like it’s 90% politics.” | Paul Chapman | | 46:54 | “The risk has transferred from getting your curves wrong to getting your political analysis wrong… a pretty dangerous way of managing price risk.” | Paul Chapman |

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Thematic Summary—Geopoliticization: The New Normal

• Markets No Longer Just Markets:
  The era when prices were set primarily by supply, demand, and weather is over; statecraft, sanctions, and alliances now have equal or greater weight.

• Trading & Investment Uncertainty:
  The locus of market risk has shifted; successful trading now hinges as much on reading political signals as on understanding fundamentals.

• Old Questions, New Stakes:
  Who supplies whom, under what conditions, and at what price—all now mediated by political priorities, not just economic rationale.

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Other Key Topics Covered (with Timestamps)

• [09:09] Oil indexation of Asian LNG contracts and market exposure
• [15:46–18:30] The psychology of buyers in Southeast Asia ("lasting memories" of LNG’s unaffordability in crises)
• [20:56] Breakdown of projected new LNG capacity and its potential implications
• [27:27–29:18] China's risk calculus vis-à-vis LNG suppliers and diversification moves
• [29:05] Structural differences in China's gas consumption profile
• [39:58–41:02] Europe's challenge: diversifying beyond fossil fuel and not becoming overly reliant on China for electrification components
• [44:44] US gas price drivers and the mix of factors potentially driving domestic price spikes
• [47:08] The political calculus of potential US export bans—pipeline versus LNG

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Conclusion

Tone:
The episode maintained an analytical yet conversational tone, balancing deep expertise (Anne-Sophie’s data-rich perspective) with candid, sometimes wry commentary (Paul's pragmatic, occasionally skeptical observations). Both participants repeatedly emphasized the historical magnitude of ongoing structural shifts and the new centrality of geopolitics in natural gas—warning that the ground is shifting beneath the feet of investors, traders, and policymakers alike.

Memorable final sentiment:
"The risk has transferred from getting your curves wrong to getting your political analysis wrong...a pretty dangerous way of managing price risk.” (Paul Chapman, 46:54)

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For those seeking a deeper view of the intersection between natural gas, global politics, and market structure in 2026, this episode offers a masterclass in current challenges, future risks, and the vital importance of understanding geopolitics as the new engine of energy market volatility.

Transcript

[A]

Foreign.

[B]

Welcome to the HC Commodities Podcast, a podcast dedicated to the commodities sector and the people within it. I'm your host, Paul Chapman. This podcast is produced by HC Group, a global search firm dedicated to the commodities sector. Today we're talking the geopoliticization of natural gas. Natural gas had a challenging 2025 for traders and investors alike. Why was that? And what are the most consequential stories in natural gas for 2026? Have we shifted from a world where it's supply and demand that drives prices to where it's politics? And what does that mean for investors and traders? Returning to the show is Anne Sophie Kober, global Research Scholar at the Centre for Global Energy Policy. As always, you can really support the show by leaving us a positive review on the platform. You're listening on Spotify or Apple or even YouTube. It really helps us expand our audience and continue to get great guests. And as always, I hope you enjoy the episode. And Sophie, welcome back to the show.

[A]

Surroute. Thank you.

[B]

So we are talking about natural gas and what the most consequential stories for 2026 will be. And I guess an overarching headline of this is really a continuing geopoliticization, to use your phrase, of natural gas and how consequential that is to the story. To get there, we probably need to do a quick review of 2025, where gas prices ticked up over the lows of 2024. But it seems like it, in some ways, it was the dog that didn't bark. You know, if I cast our mind back to this time last year, there's a lot of concern around volatility, a lot of danger to the upside. You know, some of that might just have been we were conditioned coming off the back of 21 to 23 of just kind of just how volatile the markets were.

[A]

But.

[B]

But a lot of people lost a lot of money trading natural gas last year. It was a hard year. Can you just, I guess, tee up as much as you can what happened in 2025 and kind of, you know how the year played out? I know that's a very big question.

[A]

Yes, absolutely. And thank you again for inviting me. I think 2025 may be a year where actually global gas demand didn't grow that much. Funny enough, it has been growing in Europe because there has been a return of normal weather. And we have also seen an increase in gas demand in the power generation. And maybe this is what has to some extent contributed to the increase in gas prices at the beginning of last year. So if you Want to go back to early January 2025. I mean, first of all, we had lost the Ukrainian transit, so the Russian gas transiting for Ukraine, that disappeared. So that was about 15 billion cubic meters that Europe no longer got on top of. That storage level was a little bit lower compared to previous. And many people were concerned about to what extent we would be able to refill gas storage, especially because at that time there was the gas storage regulation, which required gas storages in Europe to be 90% full by the end of the year, or rather November 1st. And combined with a certain number of stakeholders, trading companies, taking very long positions and betting that of course, Europeans would be ready to pay a lot like they did in 2022. Well, everything collapsed in mid February when suddenly the regulation on storage was relaxed. And you can really see that, you know, between I say November 2024 and mid February 2025, there is this gradual increase in terms of gas prices. And as soon as the relax of the. It's a little bit like a souffle price collapse. So we went roughly roughly up to €58 per megawatt hours, and we dropped to, you know, the mid-40s. And then after that, a little bit later, there was a Trump's liberation day and we lost another €10 per megawatt hour. So at that point, you know, European gas prices and of course, you know, I mean, they are driving Asian spot prices as well. But European gas prices started to be in the mid €30 per megawatt hour. Of course, they increase when there was this conflict between Israel and Iran mid June. But after that, let's face it, I mean, we have had a fantastic moment of stability from the middle of the summer up to actually when we started withdrawing gas from storage. And the funny thing is that as soon as we started withdrawing gas from storage, which is usually the moment where there is a little bit of tension, prices have dropped further. They went to below €30 per megawatt hour. So almost not quite back to where we were at the beginning of 2024, which was a moment where, you know, gas prices were really becoming low. And that was a sign that finally we are starting to see the results of the incoming LNG wave, which is starting to hit the market. But if we press on the pause button, we have all to agree that gas prices are still much higher than what we add in the kind of normal period like 2015, 2019, when they were, you know, in the five to eight dollars per MMBTU. So like 15 to 20 Euro per megawatt hour we are still in like, okay, right now we are increasing again above €30 per megawatt hour. But with a very, well, not very, with a tight market. Yeah, we are not out of the woods yet. The second thing which was very interesting of course in 2025 was yes, finally the supply wave is starting. It has beautifully started in the United States with two projects starting so Plaquemin and Corpus Christi, stage three. And we had also Canada lng, which has started as well as Senegal, Mauritania. So this has contributed to finally having quite healthy increase in LNG trade last year. I think we are probably now just below 600 billion cubic meters. So that's good. Especially after two years in 2324, where actually the increase in LNG trade was not that much and just a few million tonnes of very, very small increases. And also the remarkable thing was, was that in Asia demand didn't grow so much and in particular in China it has dropped. And when I am looking at the beginning of 2025, I can note that people were a lot more optimistic about Chinese LNG demand growth, which was usually seen as positive. And actually it has dropped by about 13% or 10 million ton in 2025, which is not something that people were expecting. So this is because demand was. Demand was very, very minimum, slow and we had very healthy growth in production and pipeline supply.

[B]

Yeah, and we're going to answer, kind of go, go through the different regions and the fundamental market, but also the geopolitical overlay, you know, as we look forward to 2026. But that was a fantastic synopsis and analysis of 2025. A couple of comments there and a question. One would be, it seems like every surprise caught those traders off guard, right from the change in regulation through to the global phenomenon of a shooting war in the Middle East. And you know, the next day prices drop and then as you say, the ramp up to winter, that's starting to draw on those inventories again, another drop. And at every stage you've seen significant losses for the most part in general by trading houses, hedge funds, all the rest of it. Right. It was a tough year in natural gas. There are obviously some successful winners out there. But in general, on balance, one question I remember in the spring last year you also had a huge dip in oil prices were in the low 50s. That had a commensurate knock on, on LNG contracts into Asia because many of them have, as I understand it, index to oil prices, that that itself was also causing significant pain. Is that a fair statement? And could you unpack that a little bit on the LNG side.

[A]

I don't have all the details about that. However, it's really worth noting that when you have a long term contract which is indexed on oil prices, usually the indexation is on several months. So that whatever happens on the upside or downside in terms of the price movement is actually average. So it's really totally different compared to what you can see on spot markets when you know, when you have an increase or drop. I mean you can see that immediately, but this is totally different. So I'm not quite sure that this has played so much. I think what was really, I mean to some extent worrying or maybe not worrying market players was more what was coming from the Trump administration and this constant desire from President Trump to see prices, oil prices going down to $50 oil. And we have seen that in particular comments from the oil patch which doesn't seem to be so happy because you know, in the US oil price is coming down to $50. I mean that's not so good for drilling. So you know, when you are looking at a certain number of comments, you know, for example the Texas Quarterly reports, you can see that there is a little bit of annoyance. Fortunately for the oil and gas producers in the US well while oil prices have been generally going downward, gas prices have been going upwards. We have a lot of movements as well. I mean we have seen a hell lot of movements in terms of Henry up gas prices and we continue to see them actually.

[B]

Yeah, yeah, the average was sort of three and a half dollars but actually the range was two to ten. Right. I mean there was some volatility there. Okay, so let's as we sort of stand here today and taking the threads from last year which was this, the ramp up in LNG finally having an effect. Yes. Demand normalization in Europe with weather but against a backdrop of very weak growth and some obviously power generation. There's an AI story coming in here in the US and we'll come on to the US and competition there. But an underwhelming story in demand in Asia, if I've got that all sort of correct. Let's stay on that LNG side. As 20, 26 and beyond unfurls is the main dominant story here. A heck of a lot of LNG coming online trying to find a home.

[A]

Absolutely. And I think this is on everybody's mind and I should say that we are really seeing, you know, two different camps. Those who are saying don't worry, okay, there is plenty of LNG coming but demand will be there Demand will be there because, hey, remember, we have had relatively high gas prices. So, you know, all these markets in southeast Asia, India, etc. China, I mean, they have not grown to their potential. They can now absorb the much cheaper LNG which is coming. We are seeing this AI story which is not only influencing electricity demand in the United States, but also in many other countries. I mean, a good example is Japan, Japan's new energy strategy. They have a Plan A which is consistent with, you know, eating their greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. And we have a Plan B which is, you know, what happens if we don't. And the funny thing is that all my Japanese friends have told me exactly the same sentence, the same quote, which is, okay, Plan B, which is actually forcing eventually an increase in LNG demand in Japan is actually Plan A. So in Japan, you know, they are much more careful about saying, okay, LNG demand is going to drop. Now it's worth noting, however, in Japan that we have the biggest nuclear power plant which is coming back. So that is also an important signal. But in general, so everybody is looking at this camp, is looking at healthy gas demand, LNG demand growth in China, in India because of city gas distribution, in Southeast Asia because of electrification, and also because gas production is declining. So, you know, all these markets in Asia should be supporting most of the growth with potentially, you know, a little bit of an upside in Europe. So this is a camp which is saying, no problem, this supply is going to be absorbed. And maybe you can have a sub scenario there, which is, well, actually we all know that lng, there are always delays. So maybe this supply buildup is actually going to be slower than what people anticipate, which will also play in that category because then, you know, if there is much less supply coming or at a slower pace, then of course it's easier to absorb. And in the opposite camp, there are those people who are saying, well, there's a lot of supply which is coming and there is no way this is going to be absorbed. I mean, in Europe, you know, we have probably reach our peak. China, I mean, China's LNG demand has peaked in 2021. We are in 2025, and we are nowhere near 2021 levels. Okay? So that's a bad sign over bad signs. Also the fact that yes, there is potential demand in Southeast Asia, but let's face it, when you are looking at gas demand in Southeast Asia, gas demand has not been growing. LNG imports have only been growing, cause of declines in natural gas production. And when you are looking at Pakistan. So Pakistan is a particularly interesting case because Pakistan, if you remember what happened in 2022, they had long term contract and because of some of the clauses in the long term contract the LNG that they had contracted was actually sent to Europe because of course that meant much higher margins and I think, you know, that was not a good signal. This is listing giving some very bad lasting memories on okay, so LNG was never affordable nor available and what if that happens again? And now we are seeing that Pakistan has been investing massively in solar and they are renegotiating their long term contract with Qatar with any. And with the view that okay, you know, maybe they are not going to take that much LNG going forward. So when you are starting trading houses, especially for trading houses. Yes. No, I'm, I'm not, I'm not going to give any names but yeah, people.

[B]

People can Google it.

[A]

Ye, exactly. People can Google it. That's definitely publicly available. But the point is, you know, if you are in Southeast Asia, affordability is absolutely crucial. You have seen what has happened in 2022. You know that you are not going to contract all the LNG on the long term basis. You are going to still remain exposed to spot because you have no idea what your future demand is going to be. And when you are looking at that you're thinking wow, do I really want to be that dependent on lng? I mean maybe not. The energy and resources sector is experiencing unprecedented change. To help navigate this change and capture its opportunities, HC Group launched Enco Insights.

[B]

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[A]

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[B]

The stakes are high and insight matters. Learn [e-mail] just to pass this a little bit right so and we'll come on to this. So there's obviously there's natural gas demand and there's what slug of that is LNG and I guess we need to help me separate those two. But what are we saying here that there's going to be a preference given the volatility given the experience in general in the early 2000s for I'd rather go with a long term contract with a NOC because there they've got a different suite of lenses and goals than a merchant and I can more reliably rely on that production. Is that, is that the outcome of this or is it something is it, no, I don't even want to be exposed to lng. I'd rather try and hook up to some Russian gas pipelines or whatever it might be.

[A]

Well, I am rather saying, you know, they might actually go for a mix between coal and renewables. And this is the kind of threat that everybody in the gas business should be concerned about. Because I mean, look at China for example. What did happen when gas prices increased? Well, of course they contracted quite a lot of natural gas. And you know, I mean Chinese companies, they have relatively good negotiating power but they have also been increasing coal like crazy because coal is domestic coal. Security of supply, I mean that's quite important. So what if instead of having this beautiful story that LNG is going to displace coal and this is going to be a beautiful world and we are going to reduce also a 2 emissions, you know, people are kind of thinking, well I do prefer to keep coal and invest in additional renewables of course, rather than investing in LNG because okay, right now we seem to be going for much lower gas prices. You never know. But what if at the beginning of the2030s, which is almost tomorrow, we are going through another cycle of craziness and especially given this increased politicization of LNG with this country not exporting to this country and bans and sanctions, et cetera going around. I mean this is what I think people in Southeast Asia have in their minds. Yes, they could be contracting on a long term basis with large companies, but this is precisely what for example Pakistan has been doing with Qatar. I mean the contract is, it's an oil linked gas contract. However, I mean they have right now too much lng so they are trying to resell it. So it's not sufficient that you have price which is stable. In that case they have simply decided to invest a little bit more into other energy sources.

[B]

And this is the meta challenge of the commodities sector really at the last year and beyond which as soon as you move outside of and we've seen these distortions as a result of sustainability, right? But as soon as we move into a world of security, of supply being the most important element, then suddenly you get this automatic geopolitical politicization of gas. But then it also starts getting wielded as a tool as well. And we get this blockatization and I'll trade, as you said, I'll trade with these group, but not with these group. These guys align to my political views, these people don't. And it all starts fracturing these markets and your capacity to do Risk management gets challenged, we'll end up back at that point. Just, just on that LNG front. Can you give us some sense of scale about how much more LNG is going to come online toward the end of the decade? And is it going to be so much that it kind of washes away these temporal concerns over switching between coal and renewables and all the rest of it?

[A]

So if I'm looking at the total capacity which was under construction FID at the beginning and starting at the beginning of 2025, we had about 400 billion cubic meters. So now about 60 BCM of LNG export capacity has come online last year. So we are left with about 340bcm, which includes project like Mozambique LNG, the last two trains of Arctic LNG 2. So you can consider these are a little bit more uncertain the rest of the pack. So maybe let's say that we have at least 300 billion cubic meters of LNG export capacity coming to the market, but by the beginning of the 2030. So 2031, 2032. So that's what we are looking at now as I mentioned, how much is.

[B]

That in context of demand?

[A]

Sorry, yes, let me come to that. So as I mentioned, LNG trade is I think roughly roughly at 600 billion cubic meters in 2025. So that's quite a healthy number. We are looking at a plus 50% increase in terms of capacity. Taking into account that of course LNG trade and production is probably going to decline coming from a few other countries like those which have been seeing declining LNG exports over the past years, like Trinidad and Tobago, Indonesia, Egypt right now is almost no longer exporting. So there would be a compensation. But most forecasts, the shallow ies, et cetera, are looking roughly, roughly at LNG demand big at about 800 billion cubic meters by 2030. So we have quite a bit of.

[B]

Growth in front of us, adding 50% of current capacity. You know, that is a huge amount coming online. There's a lot of hope pinned on demand there and that's obviously displacing coal and other more hydrocarbon intensive and you know, polluting fuels, but also on growing demand itself. And AI is sort of the God of the gaps in this case, you know, where it, it solves all equations when you plug it in for X. Right, we'll see. But you know that, that, you know what? Well let's, let's now look at that demand picture. Right, okay. So let's start before we come to Europe, which has real elements of this geopoliticization let's talk China, Asia in general, when you come back to China, a 13% drop in demand.

[A]

LNG. No, no, LNG. LNG imports, not demand. Demand has run by a few billion cubic meters, but that's not a good signal.

[B]

Yeah, okay, so exactly, that's my question. So, okay, so demand is kind of anemic. And obviously, as I understand that you're going to, you know, supplies around the world, flows around the world have shifted. They've now got, you know, there's proposed new pipelines and stuff from Russia. What is that LNG story for China? Do you see that continuing to drop as precipitately as it did in 2025? I mean, that would have real consequences for all this investment going into LNG.

[A]

If LNG demand in China drops in 2026, that is a real big problem. I don't see that happening because there is one crucial element which is going to be missing, which is the increase in pipeline supply from Russia. Power of Siberia 1 is right now at capacity 38 billion cubic meters. There was a 8 BCM import increase in 2025 that we are not going to see again. So this pipeline has had capacity. Central Asian gas exports are struggling, especially coming Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. So unless Russia is sort of backfeeding, you know, sending gas to these countries so that they can continue to export to China, we shouldn't see a lot of upside there. The real danger, I think, and something that people have not really well understood, this is coming from domestic gas production. And domestic gas production has been exceptionally healthy over the past years. And I don't think people had really that on their radar. I mean, I do remember when I was looking at that years ago, people were thinking eventually this growth is going to slow down, etc. Well, it does not. And this is not only because President Xin Jinping is telling the NOCs, you should win more. We need more gas. I think there is a real question mark about this is actually growing healthily in China and this is helping them continuing to meet their demand. And the real question is therefore, okay, so assuming that gas production continues to grow at the same rate, what is going to be the evolution of natural gas demand over the coming few years? And well, most of the demand is driven by residential sector, industrial sector. Where I see the most disagreement is on the fate of the power generation. It's not growing so much there. I mean, people tend to forget that the role of natural gas in China is completely different compared to that in other places. What however, is the only strong signal for demand has been what has been happening with LNG trucks. So there have been a lot of energy trucks in China. This is, you know, a real sort of game changer. So unless the government says, okay, actually we don't really want to increase that demand too much. So we are going to play with, I mean, you know how it works in China. We are at the beginning of the new five year plan. So, you know, if something is being said at the top level is going to trickle down for the provinces and then things will happen. What is important is again coming back to the geopolitics. In 2025, China stopped importing US LNG because of the trade disagreement, the tariff disagreement. Then in June, China realized that I am importing a lot of LNG from Qatar. And Qatar is in this kind of explosive region where, you know, suddenly there was a mini war between Israel and Iran. And right now we have a lot.

[B]

Of issues, concerns currently being evacuated and. Yeah, yes, exactly there on February 2nd.

[A]

So, you know, people are tending to forget that, you know, there is about 110bcm of LNG which is going through the Strait of Hormuz. And if there is something happening or for XY reason, there is, you know, a missile landing on Rastafari, this is not going to be pretty. And there was definitely, you know, full of rockets landing on Doha last year. So, you know, you put everything together. You are like, if I am China and I am the largest LNG importer in the world, I do have a problem with LNG exporter number one kind of concern. I mean, I do love, you know, LNG exporter number two, but they are in a complicated region. LNG exporter number three, Australia, I have had issues with them in the past. I actually stopped importing coal from them. Ouch. Where does that leave me? Okay, maybe I'm going to see LNG exporter number four, which is Russia. I love them. I am actually taking a lot of their sanctioned LNG cargo at a discounted price and maybe eventually I am going to take more gas from them for this power of Siberia 2 pipeline because actually they are dying to send all that gas to me at a relatively cheap price because I can negotiate that very, very well and we have no choice anyway. So, you know, if I wear China, I would start thinking about that. However, the big problem with all that strategy is that that would make China more reliant on Russian gas and they don't want to be too dependent on one supply source. But yeah, China has options.

[B]

So how does China, you Mentioned there. How does China use natural, like natural gas differently to what we say of assume? Is it all just industrial consumption? Is it household consumption? Just on that piece, it's quite a.

[A]

Lot of residential industry. But the thing is that, I mean the percentage of gas used in power generation is very small. It's 3%, but it's 3% out of 10,000 terawatt hours. So in BCM terms this is significant, but it's not that gas has a very strong role to play right now in the Chinese power sector. And when you are looking at the amazing growth in terms of renewable at a very strong growth in terms of nuclear and strong growth also in terms of hydro and the fact that coal is still playing a very dominant role and gas, if it's so cheap, it's really at the margin. Well, I wouldn't bet so much on the very strong growth in terms of gas demand in the power generation. And very striking, which is, you know, the kind of shiny part of the demand picture in China.

[B]

Hello, I'm David Hunt, founder and managing director at Hyperion Search. Founded over a decade ago, Hyperion Search has helped organizations from major utilities to startups recruit their leadership teams and key individual contributors to accelerate both their growth and the energy transition. Our three main verticals are in renewable power, energy storage and the mobility. The energy transition and the talent that delivers it has been our passion since day one. To find out more, visit hyperionsearch.com or listen to my Leaders in Clean Tech podcast available on all platforms. And we see sort of the same, you know, obviously on the oil side, we're seeing them build up their strategic reserves. You know, the, clearly the number one goal on that administration or in Xi Jinping's government is, is security of supply. Right. And, and you're talking about balancing, but again it's that, you know, you're, you're not necessarily making economic decisions, you're making geopolitical decisions. And again, that becomes very hard to forecast. I assume that will give the US exporters significant concern. I mean, yes, they complained about the Biden administration pausing of, of permits, but you know, causing spats with, and we're, you know, China and now Europe probably gives them a pretty big, you know, late night boardroom concerns about actually their, their big strategy paying off.

[A]

Well, I mean, if I take a step back and you are starting to talk about China, I mean the thing is contracts have been signed with Chinese stakeholders, but you know, even though there are no longer US LNG exports to China, the contracts are still valid. So LNG is being dumped somewhere else. And this somewhere else is actually very often Europe. So these contracts have not disappeared. However, what has been happening over the past year with the halt of US LNG export to China and the fact that it has happened already a few years ago, is actually sending a pretty bad signal for additional LNG contracts being signed between Chinese companies and US companies. But when you are looking at the US sending more gas to Europe, I mean, what is really important is the fact that Europe has become very dependent on US LNG. In 2022, when Russian pipeline gas to Europe was curtailed, what basically saved Europe was LNG. I mean, we got an additional 50 billion cubic meters of LNG that year. And crucially, our dependency on LNG has been increasing. 2021, we were importing in European Union countries about 80 bcm of LNG. 2020, it was one hundred and forty five. So we have doubled. But within that US LNG was about 80 billion cubic meters. So this is a very important dependency. I mean, roughly, roughly US LNG now represents between 20% and 25% of our imports. So we have sort of traded, you know, one dependency for another. And we have noticed, I think, that the relationship between EU countries, the new US Administration is not particularly great. I mean, I think the Danbury deal was a good example. European countries are expected to buy for $750 billion of U.S. energy. Nobody really understand what is behind that deal. That deal is called aspirational. But the point is it's absolutely impossible for Europe to reach these numbers. I mean, Europe importing around 80, $90 billion of US fossil fuels in 2024. So how are we going to triple that? Especially when prices, oil prices, gas prices are declining? I mean, this is very simply unreachable. However, this is giving a fantastic opportunity for the US Administration to come back again and again and again to European countries and say, oh wow, you are not buying enough U.S. energy. So, you know, so what about you actually embattling a certain number of the regulations that you wanted to put in place or you have in place, like on US Tech, on methane emissions, corporate sustainability, due diligence directive, et cetera, et cetera. So just forget about all your regulations. We don't want them. You are not buying enough US energy, so you need to do something instead. It's fantastic negotiating position.

[B]

But you know, again, if I'm that US LNG exporter, do I want, you know, it sounds fantastic to buy all that gas off me, but do I want my commodity weaponized and used as a Cudgel in a world where as you've highlighted, albeit it would be a serious rent between the US and Europe. But Greenland might solve that itself. Right. And you know, again, we're sort of talking mid Jan here and who knows what's happening. And you know, I don't think it's being alarmist saying that there aren't significant concerns, you know, for Europe, but we have this wave of LNG coming. Europe could, okay, presumably an increased price, but could compete for Qatari LNG other supplies to meet their demand, which isn't growing.

[A]

Yeah, no, our demand is definitely not growing and it's true that we could basically go to the categories. We'd be absolutely delighted. You may have noticed that the relationship with the categories are not particularly great ever. First of all, because, you know, during the crisis the Qataris were pretty insistent on the fact that, you know, the Europeans needed to sign long term contracts and the Europeans were not particularly keen to sign long term contracts. I think we had. When Minister Habeck visited Qatar, the Qatar authorities were not particularly happy when he said, well we need maybe you know, 5 to 10 year contract. No, no, they want like a 20 year contract. Even 27 year contract have been signed. So you know, they have different mindset and also they don't like the CS3D, the corporate sustainability to diligence directive. This is something that they hate profoundly because of the potential penalty. So that would be a totally different thing to do. But it's true however, that quite a lot of this, the LNG coming from Qatar, which is coming to the market over the next few years, is not contracted. So it could be contracted if we were really that desperate by Europeans. But what do you do with all the existing contracts that companies have with US lng? I mean it's kind of funny, right? Or it's actually not so funny. But in 2021 and before we were extremely reliant on Russia, Russia, Russia invaded Ukraine, we decided to basically cut progressively our dependency on Russian fossil fuels. Now what happens if the US takes over Greenland? I don't know. I mean our European head of state just going to sit there and smile, which is pretty much what has been happening over the past year. Or are they going to say, okay, we can no longer be too dependent on US energy, so forget about Thonberry and everything and, and we are just going to also reduce our dependency on US energy which basically means you need to very, very fast reduce your tendency on fossil fuel fuels which is actually aligned with the green deal and the net zero ambitions of Europe. But when you are trying to disengage yourself from the overwhelming petro state that the US is then you are going to become a little bit more dependent, depend on electrification. And electrification that means becoming more dependent on the electro state. And the electrostate is China which is controlling, you know, the solar panels, batteries and all these things, you know, the electric vehicles opposite. This is a different. Yes, this is a different one. And Tatiana, my colleague, Tatiana and I, we published a paper just before Christmas which was, you know, EU in an electrostate and petrostate world where we were, you know, looking at how Europe could potentially navigate and not be basically smashed by the two superpowers. You know, we are really caught between these two superpowers which are completely divergent strategies. And how can we navigate becoming less dependent on fossil fuels while not being too dependent on other Chinese technologies? And we need to invest very wisely there and it's not easy and I'm not, not completely sure that Europe can do it because as you might know, I mean in Europe we are very good at regulating stuff, at announcing grandiose plans etc, and a few years later when you actually ask what has happened with all those grandiose plants, you know, the battery factories and the gigafactories of electrolyzers, etc. Well, not that much but hey, who knows, you know, maybe how so politicians are going to grow spine. I mean I am not very hopeful because one of the key countries in Europe, France, is an absolute disaster when it comes to government. I mean we are supposed to have a government. I mean the government is only dealing with the budget right now, which we have not even managed to achieve over the past year. So I have stopped counting the governments that we have and maybe we are not going to have a government for very long. So it's not a particularly happy story.

[B]

But hey, well, war and you know, proxies to it are the mother of invention and innovation.

[A]

Exactly.

[B]

But just to test the height. Well, just a statement on that. Right. Actually what sort of the deep irony is the black box of China is more intelligible for market participants right now than the US is. Right. And that is the, the real challenge here. And I got, I guess I want to test this hypothesis because it strikes me that if I'm a trader right now, you know, or a merchant or a major, whatever I'm doing and I'm sort of thinking about my LNG strategy, my investment, you know, if I were to take you back to 2016, January 2016, Ansafi, you know, and we were having this conversation. My suspicion is that 80% of it would be focused on, on contracts oncoming supply, supply and demand curves.

[A]

Right, absolutely.

[B]

And 20%. 20% politics. But today it seems like it's 90% politics.

[A]

Yeah, I mean if I were back to my previous job at bp, you know, I mean, where what I was doing was, I mean, on one side, you know, the energy outlook and well, also for, you know, inside stakeholders as short term and midterm forecast. I mean, short term and midterm forecast were essentially fundamentals, you know, what's happening, oil, nuclear, etc. Etc. I mean, now I say it's a lot more about geopolitics. What is the next crisis and how do we prepare for it? That's the game right now. And this is what everybody, I think, in the trading houses are doing. I remember at the FT conference in Lausanne last year, you know, one of the CEO of the big trading houses did joked saying, well, I think, you know, we in Geneva are now going to be working in the afternoon so that we are aligned with, you know, US working hours. Because everything is happening in the United States. And what you have to follow is true social. Yeah, well, maybe it's white, those, they.

[B]

Care, you know, the CEOs, the heads of. We've just done an episode with Ronan Rechteiner talking about the privileged few that have these trading platforms that can deal with this level of volume volatility. Right. But it's fascinating to say that those heads of those trading houses, all of them have been in and out of the White House over the last few months, you know, sat around a table with, alongside the heads of oil companies. Right. They're now material players here and whereas a decade ago they certainly would, you know, they wanted nothing to, they didn't want to be anywhere near D.C. right. For a variety of reasons. But it just seems to me, I don't want to be alarmist, but you know, for my economics reading and all the rest of it, all these distortions, all of the, you know, all of this is degrading a free market. Right. So even to the point that today, four years, five years or four years later, the same events happen, right. Russia invades Ukraine today. Are those, you know, would there be the immediate price signal response that there was back then? You know, the robustness of these markets to respond is degrading because you've got governments, you know, weaponizing, geopoliticalizing natural gas. Right. It's now a cudgel of foreign policy. Not a, not a, you know, A commodity of domestic consumption if you'd like. So it just seems to me that that's a really dangerous world for natural gas to be in. But if I'm sat there as a trader.

[A]

Complicated one. Yeah, it's a complicated one. And last year I, you know, I was a little bit depressed so I wrote this piece, the Future of LNG Trade. Inflexible, inefficient and polarized with a question mark. But still, you know, when I was thinking, okay, so US is no longer exporting to China. Europe is going to stop importing from Russia. We have problems because of, you know, the Qataris don't want to export to us if we continue with COCS3D while the Qataris are insisting a lot on long term inflexible contracts. So some of their buyers don't really like it. So for example, the Japanese have pretty much stopped importing. Qatari LNG myth and regulation. I mean, is it going to create a world where you have clean LNG and dirty lng? I mean so many things happening and so many uncertainties, some of which you cannot control. I mean, you know, how do you control what is happening with Venezuela? What is going to happen in Iran the next few weeks, months, years? I don't know.

[B]

And this is where like to make money in this market and this is, you know, again, it kind of becomes a negative cycle. Right? I mean, you know, I would assume you're either getting lucky or you've got inside information on political decisions, you know, like.

[A]

But they are also the very crucial fundamentals and I think a very crucial question that everybody has right now is what is going to happen to the US gas price? Because this is what is driving the cost of the marginal LNG cargo? And this is, and that is very important.

[B]

Yeah. So this is the narrative.

[A]

There is, this is not only AI this is a mixture of a lot of things. This is a mixture of, you know, I mean, everybody says, or at least all the optimistic people are saying we have tons of gas at 3, $4 per MMBtu in the United States, no problem at all. The resource is infinite. And people are starting to say, well actually, you know, we think that tier one spots, you know, I, we are getting to the end of them now, we need to get additional resources, etc. What if, you know, the price of oil is dropping to $50 per barrel. This is also not so good for the economics of drilling, etc. Etc. And what if you have a combination like we had in 2020, one of a few factors which are all going into the same direction. So you have AI, you have increase in LNG exports from the EU us You have maybe cold weather or very good weather for sustained periods. You have issues with nuclear, with hydro and you combine everything and then suddenly you get, you know, to 6, 7, $8 per MMBtu in the United States. And what does the MAGA government do?

[B]

Yeah. Then you've got, I mean, we just, I don't know, it's out yet as we talk. But we've done an episode with Mike Howard, CEO of Howard Energy, a big midstreamer here, the largest private midstreamer, talking about using Texas as a microcosm. Some of the challenges here, but like, yes, in an affordability election in November, you know, it again, we're in a world here where unilateral government, you know, administration intervention through using whatever tool they can and then, you know, it gets, just goes to the courts and you've, you've essentially got the status quo you want for the period that you want. You could see a ban on exports, right?

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

In that world. I mean, all of these. But again, it's, I just find it fascinating all of the, the risk has transferred from getting your curves wrong to getting your political analysis wrong. And I just find that a pretty dangerous way of managing price risk without sort of, you know, as we saw. Right. Bets being made on Polymarket about snatching Maduro the, the day before. You know, what's going on there. Right.

[A]

And I don't want to get two things there. I mean, the first question is, you know, what do you cut? I mean, do you cut pipeline exports to Mexico? And let's not forget that Mexico is heavily dependent on U.S. pipeline gas. 75% of their gas is coming from the U.S. of course, that makes complete economic sense. Or do you cut LNG exports? I would bet they would be going after the Mexican pipeline exports, which of course, you know, would translate into additional LNG import requirements for Mexico. So that would be one thing and that, that's very important. But the second thing is also much more than natural gas. I think electricity is going to be an. Electricity costs are going to be a decisive factor for the midterms. And this is what everybody is looking at right now. And especially, you know how this data center frenzy is translating into higher electricity costs.

[B]

Yeah. Well, the, the New York Times and WaPo and Stuff are full of stories of local city mayor signs up with data centers, gets lots of money for two years and then suddenly it turns into complete nightmare.

[A]

Right.

[B]

In fact, it happened in a county over where where we have a place, you know. Luckily they decided not to go ahead with it but yeah, I find it fascinating. Well, I'm sorry we're going to miss each other at the Qatar LNG event in early Feb, but I will be there and hopefully we'll see each other at the FT Commodity Conference. I, I don't think I'm going to make it to, to Bangkok for Gaztec this year but I know you're on the board of Gaztec and I know there's obviously, I guess at the moment there's call outs for papers and so forth if you want to mention that briefly.

[A]

Yeah, no, absolutely. I mean the call for papers is going to end early Feb, but it's always a little bit extended and I am definitely looking forward to having great papers because with everything which is happening on the markets right now in terms of geopolitics as well, I mean there should be really good paper. It's both technical and commercial but give. But I am a little bit more commercial. I really want to see great papers.

[B]

Fantastic.

[A]

Well do submit your abstract.

[B]

Yes. Yeah. And I might pen one myself on the talent challenge in LNG and natural gas. But anyway, well, answer fee. It's been a real pleasure once again. Thank you for the insight and analysis and I'm sure and I hope we can have you back on this time next year and see where we landed up in 2026 and at this point as you hired.

[A]

Absolutely.

[B]

It's anyone's bet.

[A]

Yeah. Thank you for inviting me. It was a pleasure.

[B]

Thank you for listening. To find out more about HC Group, our global offices and our expertise in search within the commodities sector, Please visit www. HCgroup.global.