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Jeremiah Regan
Welcome to the Hillsdale College Online Courses podcast. I am Jeremiah Regan.
Juan Davalos
And I'm Juan Davalos. We're back with American foreign policy. On to lecture number nine, the last lecture, the Liberal International Order.
Jeremiah Regan
And this lecture sums up the course and leaves us where we are in America today. And because of that, it's worth looking back to where we started, with the Founding. There's an interesting affair from the founding era in which the Greeks sought independence in the 1820s from the Ottoman Turks. And they petitioned America, using the words of the Declaration of Independence, for aid, money, diplomatic recognition, and even troops and ships to help them throw off the Ottoman reign. Those letters were directed toward American Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, serving under James Monroe. And Adams responded with a practical and a principled rebuttal. First, it should be said that Adams expressed sympathy for the Greek cause and promised that America would recognize the Greek states should they win their independence. But he refused aid on two grounds. First, the practical. The executive in the American system is not the one who makes decisions about allocating money or troops. That would be Congress. And he points this out, he says, the President can't make this decision. Congress must make it, but they should not. And then we get into the principled objection, the taxes taken from American citizens, the men who serve in the American military, that blood and treasure is for the preservation of American lives and liberties. And so while we wish you the Greeks well, Adams said, we cannot assign American property or lives to your cause. You need to do that yourselves.
Juan Davalos
I've always enjoyed reading John Quincy Adams on foreign policy because I think from all of the precedents, at least in my opinion, he is one of the clearest expositors of the right view of foreign policy. So if you haven't read John Quincy Adams, I encourage you to do so. And that's a great summary for this course in general, because we started with that view of the founders and we followed through American history and how that view of foreign policy has changed. And then we get now in this lecture to the Obama, Biden and then Trump era, and we see that American foreign policy, especially we were talking in the last lecture of how we started getting into these wars in the Middle east during the Obama era, that turns into quite a disaster. We've all know what happened in Libya, and thanks to what seems like a good intention to get a dictator like Muammar Gaddafi out of power, ends up in that. Now we have slave trade again reintroduced in Libya. So there's. There's good intentions, but then there is the consequence of those intentions, and that's not always good.
Jeremiah Regan
It's worth reflecting on that for a moment in the declaration. Well, first let's say we can agree that Gaddafi was a bad man and a tyrant, but he produced a certain type of stability in Libya, which is gone now. In the declaration, it said that prudence indeed dictates governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes. And we could argue that Gaddafi represented heavy and permanent causes, not light and transient. But the long established part is worth understanding. The people of Libya for about 40 years were used to what they could do, what they couldn't do. And while very imperfect, the Gaddafi regime at least provided stability and protected people from the worst things humans do, like the slave trade. When he was gone, Libya got worse. And that's the problem with revolutions in general, and that's especially the problem with interfering in foreign affairs when you don't know what the outcome will be. Gaddafi bad, lack of Gaddafi even worse.
Juan Davalos
And that's when we turn to the first term of the Trump administration, when he tries to reverse that foreign policy and turn back to those principles of the Founding. At least that's what he claimed. In a speech in 2017, Donald Trump said, upon my inauguration, I announced that the United States would return to a simple the first duty of our government is to serve its citizens, many of whom have been forgotten, but they are not forgotten anymore. With every decision and every action, we are now putting America first. And that's sort of the founding for this America first foreign policy that Donald Trump is trying to institute. And he's trying to go back to those principles that the founding espoused to.
Jeremiah Regan
Learn more about current American affairs and the way that we can understand them. To increase your knowledge and your understanding and therefore your wisdom, we encourage you to continue learning with Hillsdale College online courses and use Hillsdale's other educational tools, such as Imprimis, our free speech journal. You can subscribe to Imprimis by going to Imprimis Hillsdale. Edu. That's Imprimis Imprimis Hillsdale. Edu.
Juan Davalos
Now let's turn to Lecture 9 of American Foreign policy, Liberal International Order.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
In this lecture, our last lecture, I'm going to try to take you up to the present day. That requires again going a little bit back in time. Now, as I said, Barack Obama, as a candidate in 2008, ran against the incumbent administration's foreign policy, and he was helped in doing so by the fact that his opponent was Senator John McCain, who ran on the Bush foreign policy. But in A way only more so, more aggressive, more interventionist, more ambitious. Now, one might say that the main reason Barack Obama got the 2008 Democratic nomination is that he was the only major candidate on that early debate stage who could plausibly say he had been against the Iraq War from the very beginning. The Iraq war was never popular with the Democratic base. In fact, you could argue that one of the reasons the Democrats lost the 2004 presidential election is that after flirting with nominating the extremely anti war Howard Dean, former governor of Vermont, they instead chose Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, who had voted for the war in Congress. Hillary Clinton as a senator, voted in favor of the war. So did Joe Biden. Barack Obama, alone out there as a state senator from Illinois, granted not an auspicious position from which to begin one's quest for national leadership, nonetheless spoke out against the war in 2002, before it had even started, and thus had credibility with anti war Democratic activists. Now, the war was broadly popular with the American people, at least in the beginning. Again, just like we've talked about in other contexts. The American people instinctively rally around the flag whenever their military is committed to action anywhere. And I think that is an admirable trait. But the American people also want to see results. And by 2008, certainly they were very frustrated with our results in Iraq. Not to say that they blamed the military, but I think they rightly blamed political leaders for biting off more than they could chew, for trying to do more than was achievable through US Arms, and for setting an ambitious foreign policy that exceeded either the grasp, that is to say, the capabilities of America, or the real needs of the nation.
Barack Obama (quoted)
Too many of our best have come home shrouded in the flag. They loved too many moms and dads and husbands and wives that answered that knock on the door that's hardest for any loved one to hear. And the rest of us have seen too many promises of swift victories and dying insurgencies and budding democracy giving way to the reality of a brutal civil war that goes on and on and on to this day.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
But not only did candidate Obama oppose the Iraq war, from his rhetoric, you might have concluded that he opposed the entire foreign policy of the Bush administration. One of his first, most notable forays into foreign policy as president was a speech in Cairo, which came to be known as the apology speech as part of an apology tour, that is to say, the new president went around the Middle east and the Muslim world essentially saying sorry on behalf of the United States for the various mistakes made during the course of the Bush administration and.
Barack Obama (quoted)
This cycle of suspicion and discord must end. I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
It was therefore reasonable to believe that his foreign policy would be entirely different. But as it turns out, it wasn't really. For one thing, President Obama expanded the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Now that, admittedly, is something he had indicated he would do as a candidate. He liked to contrast the so called right war, the war in Afghanistan, with the wrong war, the war in Iraq.
Barack Obama (quoted)
I first made this point in the fall of 2002 at the end of the speech that I gave opposing the invasion of Iraq. I said then that I certainly do not oppose all wars. Rather I oppose dumb wars, rash wars.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
But he also kept up the Bush policy of tracking down terrorists, of using drone and other strikes to kill terrorists and to eliminate their networks. He kept up America's involvement in the Middle east for a time, and he even expanded America's force presence in the Middle east, most notably with an air war in Libya in 2011. Now, here's where, at least for a moment, I'm going to be less descriptive and a little more analytical. I have to conclude that Libya in 2011 is one of the worst foreign policy blunders in American history. And I'll explain why. In 2011, something called the Arab Spring emerged again, if not a whole course, at least a whole lecture could be given on the Arab Spring, and we're not going to do that now. But to some eyes, it seemed to vindicate the Bush administration's central contention that the problem in the Middle east and the Arab world more generally, was dissatisfaction among the peoples with their hateful governments. The Arab Spring was touched off when a Tunisian street vendor, frustrated with mistreatment by the bureaucracy and the constant demand for bribes and harassment from police as he tried to make a living, literally set himself on fire and burned himself to death, touching off riots first in Tunisia and then throughout the Arab world. Many Arab governments fell, most notably the government of Egypt, a longtime US Ally, all the way back to those Camp David accords and its military strongman, Hosni Mubarak, who had to flee the country. The Obama administration was all for the Arab Spring and thought that maybe here finally was the wave of democracy that we had all been waiting for to sweep the Arab world and transform the region and its many countries. I don't know about you, but that doesn't sound too different to me than the Bush Policy. Well, in Libya, an Arab country basically right in the middle of North Africa, there had long ruled a strongman named Muammar Gaddafi and the United States had a bad history with Muammar Gaddafi. You can look this up. I'll just give a couple of the highlights including tussles over maritime rights and where territorial waters began. An end which the Reagan administration attacked Libya a few times in the late 80s, most notably in 1986, Air and.
Mark Levin
Naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities and military assets that support.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
Muammar Gaddafi's subversive activities. But also Libya was behind one of the worst state sponsored acts of terrorism in history, the bombing of pan AM Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed everyone on board a large 747. So the United States and Libya were not on great terms. However, in the middle of 2003 the United States caught the Libyans trying to import illicit nuclear materials for an illicit nuclear program. And the Bush administration made a deal with Libya. It essentially said, okay Mr. Qaddafi, we don't like you and you know why, but we'll let you stay in power. However, the price is you're going to give up this nuclear program and you're going to open up your country to intrusive inspections so that we absolutely know with certainty that you have no more nuclear program or material. Today in Tripoli, the leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Al Gaddafi publicly confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction programs in his country. And he did it. And we were confident that we had gotten rid of that nuclear program. All that remained was to keep our end of the deal. Well after the Arab Spring, a Libyan civil war broke out and Qaddafi's position became very shaky. And at the urging of his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Obama administration intervened in that war not with ground troops but with aerial bombardment. And that intervention eventually toppled the government of Qaddafi and resulted in his violent death. Now you may say that a man as wicked as Muammar Gaddafi deserved what came to him. And I'm certainly not going to stand up for him. I am going to say though that breaking a deal we had made certainly weakened our international position and worse. One of the core foreign policies of the United States since the beginning of the nuclear age is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology, a process also known as proliferation. Well it certainly didn't help our anti proliferation or non proliferation efforts to be seen Making a deal with a country when that country upheld their end of the deal. For us to renege on it only weakened our position with other countries with whom we are trying to strike similar types of deals. For instance, one bedeviling aspect of American foreign policy since at least the early 1990s has been the North Korean nuclear program. Officially, American policy is that North Korea should denuclearize, should give up its nuclear weapons, but just put yourself in the shoes of Kim Jong Un again. You don't have to sympathize with him or like him or think he's an admirable person. He's a wicked tyrant. Of course he is. I don't deny that for a second. But if you're him and you have nuclear weapons, what do you conclude from looking at what the United States did in Libya, made a deal, said, if you give up your nuclear weapons, what will let you stay in power, and then reneged on the deal? That's not an incentive for North Korea to denuclearize. In fact, years later, when President Trump was attempting a rapprochement, that's just a fancy word for better relations, reduction of tensions with North Korea, and he wanted to hold summits with the leader of North Korea, his own national security advisor said, we intend to follow the Libya model. This naturally alarmed the North Koreans and angered the president, but it took him about another year to fire John Bolton for that and other offenses. Now, Obama, as I said, ran against the Iraq war, and he did fulfill one of his promises. By 2011, he had pulled US forces out of Iraq, but left a strategic vacuum there, which allowed the rise of a even more radical group than Al Qaeda, known as ISIS or isil. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
Barack Obama (quoted)
The.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
The Levant is just a geographical term for the area that covers Syria and Lebanon. Anyway, this ISIS was an extremely radical group that favored an extraordinarily radical, puritanical and violent version of Islam. And it managed to take over a lot of territory. This was, I think, a black mark on the Obama administration's record. That is to say, it's one thing to end a war, to pull US Troops out where they're doing no good. But the way and the haste with which it was done created a vacuum that a group at least as hostile to US Interests as Al Qaeda was able temporarily to fill. As anyone in the Obama administration would tell you, they consider Obama's two terms to have had two signature achievements. The first term was the passage of the health care law, AKA Obamacare, officially known as the Affordable Care Act. But the main achievement of the second term was a foreign policy one and that is the so called Iran deal or JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. What is that deal? Well this is a perfect segue in a sense and we were just talking about non proliferation. There are as of now 8 or 9 depending on what intelligence you believe, states and the world that have nuclear weapons. US Policy is again to prevent, certainly to strive to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that is to say additional states gaining nuclear weapons. With perhaps one exception. The United States did cooperate with the British nuclear program in its early days and later cooperated more fully with the British nuclear program in terms of delivery systems, although not the actual warheads later on. But that's the one exception. And above all, the United States definitely does not want to see Iran get a nuclear weapon. Now the reasons, if you've been watching all the lectures in order, should be obvious. Iran has been an American enemy since 1979, took 52American hostages and held them for 444 days, is an exporter of terrorism around the globe. Just to give two highlights, was certainly behind the 1983 bombing of the barracks that killed more than 240 Marines and had definite and clear links to the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers. And those are just some highlights of Iran's activities against the United States. Iran is also hostile to our allies in the Persian Gulf. Above all Saudi Arabia very hostile to Israel. And the Iranian Navy threatens shipping in the Persian Gulf. Again, just some more highlights of Iran's record of anti American and threatening behavior. So you could see why the United States is very concerned that Iran not get a nuclear weapon. Well, the jcpoa, the Obama administration's self described signature second term accomplishment, was intended to be an agreement that would prevent that. Now it's very long and complicated. I'm not going to go into all the details. The basic point is it gets Iran to agree not to pursue certain technologies or to use certain technologies only in certain ways in exchange for various benefits.
Larry Arnn
Great books, great people, great ideas. Learning about these things is critical to being a well educated human being. And we can help with with the Hillsdale Dialogues. Each week Hillsdale College President Larry Arne joins radio veteran Hugh Hewitt to discuss topics of enduring relevance. And from time to time they also talk about current events, but always with an eye toward more fundamental truths. And they want you to tune in to a conversation like no other. The Hillsdale Dialogues are posted every Monday on the Hillsdale College Podcast Network at Podcast Hillsdale Eduardo. That's Podcast Hillsdale Edu or listen via Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube or wherever you find your audio.
Mark Levin
Hello America. I'm thrilled, thrilled to announce my new 10 part podcast series, Liberty and Learning with Mark Levin and Larry Arne. Join me and my dear friend Dr. Larry Arne, President of Hillsdale College, as we dive deep into the founding principles of our great nation. In these challenging times, understanding our history and the ideals of self government is more crucial than ever. We'll explore the core of America's current crises, the changes in our government and what it means for our lives and liberties. From education to borders, citizenship to the separation of powers, we'll cover it all. Tune in to Liberty and Learning with Mark Levin and Larry Arn of Hillsdale College. So subscribe now and join us on this wonderful journey to rediscover the principles that made America the freest, most prosperous nation in history. Don't miss it.
Jeremiah Regan
Listen right now to Liberty and Learning with Mark Levin and Larry arn@podcast.com that's podcast hillsdale. Edu or wherever you find your audio.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
But before I go on, I need to say something about the connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. Because while very different, they both work based on the same basic principle, which is splitting the nucleus of the atom of a heavy element, principally uranium. A nuclear reactor works by splitting that atom. The energy released heats up water, which turns into steam, which turns a turbine, which generates electricity. In other words, it's basically a steam engine with an incredibly complicated way of producing the heat that creates the steam. A nuclear bomb also splits atoms. An atom bomb or a fission bomb also splits atoms, but the energy released is released as explosive power, heat, shockwave, radiation, etc. The problem is that developing nuclear technology in order to make a reactor that works inevitably leads to expertise and knowledge that can enable the same people or country to build a bomb. If you know how to make one kind of fuel, you can in principle learn how to make the other. So it's difficult to lay down a bright line between nuclear power technology and nuclear weapons technology. The core problem with non proliferation as a policy should be obvious. If you're going to say to other countries, especially if you're a country that has nuclear weapons, hey, you shouldn't get to have nuclear weapons. Their obvious response is going to be, well, you have them, why shouldn't I? So if you're going to persuade a country to forego nuclear technology and the pursuit of nuclear weapons, you have to offer something in return. And the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, or npt, in fact offers something. It says, if you sign on the line on this treaty and swear never to get nuclear weapons, we're then obligated to help you pursue nuclear power. But that's a thorny question since, as I've said, the line between the two types of technologies is blurry and fairly thin. Iran has a nuclear program, has working nuclear reactors, does not, so far as I know, or US Intelligence has publicly disclosed, have nuclear weapons. What the JCPOA or Iran deal was intended to do, at least according to its authors, was to lock in the terms of this basic deal to legitimize Iran's pursuit of nuclear power and to gain additional guarantees from Iran that it would never seek nuclear weapons technology. Now, I talked about benefits offered in return. Well, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the outbreak of hostile relations between the two countries, the United States froze Iranian assets in our country. That is to say, we didn't steal them or take them, but we limited Iran's access to them. And this amounted to many billions of dollars, not just in cash, but in physical property and other assets. Now, Iran, naturally, ever since, has wanted all of those assets unfrozen so that they can collect and utilize them. And as part of the deal, we agreed to unfreeze many of them.
Barack Obama (quoted)
The United States and Iran are now settling a longstanding Iranian government claim against the United States government. Iran will be returned its own funds, including appropriate interest, but much less than the amount Iran sought. For the United States. This settlement could save us billions of dollars that could have been pursued by Iran. So there was no benefit to the United States in dragging this up.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
President Trump, as you remember, campaigned strongly against the Iran deal. It was one of his signature issues in 2016.
Mark Levin
But I look at Obama, I look at that deal where we gave to Iran $150 billion. They don't need to develop nuclear weapons. They can buy them.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
They can buy them. And one of the things he referred to over and over again was the so called pallets of cash. I say so called. But it really did happen. Well, part of the problem with the Iran deal, the main problem I would say, is that it sunsetted. That is it had an end date, a 10 year lifespan after which its terms would be void, after which, therefore, presumably Iran would be free to pursue a nuclear weapon. This was the main problem that the deal's critics had with it. This isn't a permanent solution to Iran seeking a nuclear weapon. It's at best a 10 year delay. @ any rate, the deal was completed in Obama's second term, never submitted to the Senate as a treaty, however, because the administration knew full well it could not get the 2/3 majority to be ratified. Thus, as a mere executive agreement, just like an executive order is easier to undo than a law passed by Congress, an executive agreement is easier to tear up than a treaty. And of course, President Trump did exit the agreement in the spring of 2018.
Mark Levin
After these consultations, it is clear to me that we cannot prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb under the decaying and rotten structure of the current agreement.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
Well, now, having come to President Trump by name, let's talk a little bit about the events that led to his election. Few American elections are ever decided solely or mostly on the basis of foreign policy. We talked a lot about Barack Obama becoming the nominee of the Democrats in 2008 because of his opposition to the Iraq War, and I think that's true. I think, though, that foreign policy had less to do with Obama's 2008 victory than with the financial crisis of 2008, in which the entire economy was melting down on the watch of a Republican president. Incumbent presidents tend to get punished for that sort of thing, as they should. Well, President Trump rode a wave of extraordinary domestic discontent to his 2016 victory. Again, I would say most of it economic. He did have, however, a critique of the prior 15 years or so of American foreign policy that if it didn't exactly carry him to victory, it dovetailed neatly with his economic critique of the same period. Basically, he said, we went into Iraq, we didn't win. We went into Afghanistan, and we didn't win. We've spent trillions of dollars in the Middle east and we have nothing to show for it. Both Democrats and Republicans, by 2010, certainly by 2015, had converged around the more unipolar, maximalist, interventionist, maintain American preeminence policy. And left untapped, perhaps left even unrealized to the political class, was a huge portion of the American public. Some third to half the country were completely dissatisfied with this foreign policy, but had no outlet, had no spokesperson. Remember that President Trump ran in an extraordinarily crowded field on the Republican side in 2016. He had 16 opponents. There were 17 Republicans running. And by my count, with the exception of Senator Rand Paul from Kentucky, nobody ran on a restrained foreign policy. All the rest of the candidates ran on something that looked like George W. Bush circa 2004, John McCain circa 2008, or Mitt Romney circa 2012. Only President Trump and Rand Paul ran against that consensus. And Senator Paul, for all his admirable qualities, didn't have the star power or generate the excitement that Trump did. And Trump obviously went on to win the nomination. So President Trump campaigned on a more restrained foreign policy to be less involved in the Middle East. He did, however, campaign on one great exception. That is, he said it would be a priority of his administration to defeat isis.
Mark Levin
We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones and unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the earth.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
And he pledged to do so with the minimum number of US forces, forces. And he fulfilled that pledge, and mostly on the strength of Arab, Kurdish and other local armies on the ground, with assistance from U.S. forces, but without U.S. forces fighting as the so called tip of the spear that is leading the battle from the front lines. Now, some are going to quibble that as long as there's one ISIS fighter anywhere, ISIS hasn't been defeated. I'm not going to get drawn into that argument. My point is, just look at a map. ISIS's plan was to create a new caliphate that covered as much of the Middle east as possible. If you look at the height of their extent of territory versus what they control now, you will see that defeat is not an improper word to describe what happened to them. If Trump had a slogan for foreign policy, it was a very simple one. Two words.
Mark Levin
America First. America First.
Lecture Narrator / Professor
Now you remember those words perhaps from an earlier lecture, the famous America First Committee that led opposition to American involvement in World War II. When Trump revived that slogan, it set off many of the same alarm bells amongst people who are very wary of the original America First Committee for being allegedly xenophobic, nativist and other perhaps even worse things. But all Trump meant by it is something very sensible and commonsensical, that the prime policy of any country, of course, should be to put its own interests first. The idea that policy could be made on any other basis seemed preposterous to President Trump and I think should seem a bit silly to the rest of us too. In fact, if you could interview Dean Acheson and the others who were so called present at the creation and say, why are you advocating for all of this internationalism, all of this international involvement, this foreign presence, these new treaty networks, et cetera, are you doing it out of the goodness of your heart? Are you doing it to be generous, good citizens? Or are you doing it because you think it benefits American interests? And of course they would have said the latter. They would have said what we are doing in this period, this immediate Post World War II, burgeoning Cold War period, is we are putting America first. We're doing what we have to do to protect American interests. The real question is, then, what's required in different circumstances? And Trump's answer was, again, implicitly, Trump is no one's idea of a foreign policy intellectual. It's hard to imagine him sitting down and scribbling out an essay for Foreign affairs or reading an issue cover to cover. But instinctively, his view was and is, the circumstances have fundamentally changed, and so that world order that was created in the 1950s may need to be adjusted to fit new circumstances. Hence, Trump was willing to be critical of NATO. He said, the purpose and value of an alliance is that we all pull together. But many NATO countries aren't pulling their fair share of the weight. They rely on America to spend 3 to 4% of its GDP on the military, while they spend 1% or less, despite making formal commitments to spend at least 2%. When disasters happen in their own neighborhoods, such as in the Balkans in the 1990s, rather than try to sort it out themselves, they call Washington and say, you come and do this. And Trump thought that that was an unfair burden on the American people, on the American taxpayer, and on the American soldier, and wanted to redress a balance. Where does that leave us as we come to the end of this course? I would say that that that old argument from the end of the Cold War that broke out in the early 1990s, what do we do now? Do we do more or do we do less? Do we not disengage but reduce our engagements with the rest of the world, or do we try to maintain our preeminence and even increase our engagement? That debate is still raging. It seemed to go underground in the 1990s when Bill Clinton, having campaigned on a restrained foreign policy, acted more interventionist than his campaign promises indicated he would. The debate seemed to be completely settled after 9 11, when both parties embraced a policy of interventionism with some differences and quibbles, no doubt. Obama's opposition to the Iraq war, et cetera. But for the most part, both parties embraced a policy of interventionism. What the Trump election and his popularity with millions of voters proved is that the appetite, the political appetite, the hunger for a more restrained foreign policy never went away among tens of millions of American people, and it's still with us today. This debate hasn't been settled. The Biden administration is pursuing a policy, if anything, more maximalist and interventionist than even the Obama administration, in which Joe Biden himself served as Vice president. It suffices to mention the war in Ukraine. And this may be the best place to end. If we're going to bring it back to the beginning and recall the principles our Founders laid out for us in lecture one, we would have to ask, what would they say about American intervention in Ukraine? I don't think this is a tough call. I think they would be bewildered at any argument that suggested we need to be involved in that conflict and insistent that we stay out of it. They might, and I'm sure would sympathize with the people of Ukraine. John Quincy Adams, whom we last referred to as the author of the Monroe Doctrine, gave one of the most famous speeches in American history on the floor of the house on July 4, 1821, in which he famously said that America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well wisher of the freedom and independence of all, but the champion and vindicator only of her own. And I think that thought is in perfect keeping with the founding principles. Remember that John Quincy Adams was himself raised by one of the American founders and traveled with his father abroad from a young age and became America's most practiced diplomat. We may sympathize with the Ukrainian people and their desire for freedom, or at least their desire for sovereignty, but we have to ask, what stake does America have in this particular fight? Russia is not the USSR anymore. It's not one of two poles in a bipolar world, the center of a great empire and an ideological state bent on world conquest. Moreover, in strictly geopolitical terms, I think the Founders would say Ukraine is very important to Russia and not that important to us. It's unwise for any country to get into a quarrel with another country over something that that other country considers a core vital interest, but which is peripheral to your own country. Imagine, for instance, Russia getting involved in Mexico or Canada. How do you think Washington, that is our capital, Washington D.C. would feel about that? I don't know what the future holds for American foreign policy. Right now. I think we're on a path on an unsustainable path in a direction that the Founders wouldn't approve of. The mere fact that it's unsustainable may mean that it inevitably has to be corrected. But it may also mean that before it's corrected, we stumble into some kind of disaster or catastrophe that could be very costly for our own country and for many millions besides. To have studied these things and even practiced in this area for so long inevitably means that you're going to form judgments. But still, I urge everyone who watched to think through these issues, study the events, study the documents that I've referred to, and try to make up your own mind about what you think is the right course for American foreign policy. And keep that in mind when you go to the polls to vote for your member of Congress, your two US Senators, and the next President of the United States.
Juan Davalos
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Episode: American Foreign Policy: The Liberal International Order
Date: October 22, 2025
Hosts: Jeremiah Regan, Juan Davalos
Lecture Narrator / Professor (unnamed)
This episode serves as the concluding lecture in the American Foreign Policy course, focusing on the emergence and evolution of the “Liberal International Order.” It traces U.S. foreign policy from founding principles through recent presidencies, examining the tension between interventionism and restraint. The discussion centers on how successive administrations—especially Obama, Trump, and Biden—have diverged from, or tried to return to, the Founders' vision. The episode critically evaluates major policy decisions (Iraq, Libya, the Iran nuclear deal, NATO, Ukraine), advocating for an informed, principled approach grounded in the nation’s original ideals.
"We cannot assign American property or lives to your cause. You need to do that yourselves."
— John Quincy Adams (paraphrased by Regan) [00:20]
Libya and the Arab Spring:
"Gaddafi bad, lack of Gaddafi even worse."
— Jeremiah Regan [03:10]
Lessons from the Founders and Prudence:
Campaign and Policy:
"I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect."
— Barack Obama [08:48]
Impact of Libya and Implications for Non-Proliferation:
Breaking a deal with Libya (Gaddafi’s denuclearization followed by U.S.-led regime change) damaged U.S. credibility in securing non-proliferation deals elsewhere (notably, with North Korea) ([12:11]).
Quote:
"Breaking a deal we had made certainly weakened our international position..."
— Professor [12:11]
Rise of ISIS:
The Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA):
Aimed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but heavily criticized for being temporary, not ratified as a treaty, and for unfreezing Iranian assets.
Obama on Asset Return:
"Iran will be returned its own funds... For the United States. This settlement could save us billions..."
— Barack Obama [24:00]
Mark Levin Critique:
"I look at Obama, I look at that deal where we gave to Iran $150 billion. They don't need to develop nuclear weapons. They can buy them."
— Mark Levin [24:31]
America First Foreign Policy:
"With every decision and every action, we are now putting America first."
— Donald Trump (via Davalos) [04:11]
ISIS Campaign:
"We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones and unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the earth."
— Donald Trump (quoted by Mark Levin) [28:33]
NATO Critique:
Rejection of Liberal International Order:
Drawing on John Quincy Adams’ 1821 admonition that America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy," the lecture argues the Founders would oppose current U.S. involvement in Ukraine—and would expect American diplomacy to respect prudence, vital national interests, and restraint ([34:29–36:37]).
"America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well wisher of the freedom and independence of all, but the champion and vindicator only of her own."
— John Quincy Adams (quoted by Professor) [35:49]
The episode closes by urging listeners to carefully study the documents and arguments themselves, and to approach questions of foreign policy thoughtfully as both citizens and voters.
"Try to make up your own mind about what you think is the right course for American foreign policy. And keep that in mind when you go to the polls..."
— Professor [36:30]
On Founding Foreign Policy:
"We cannot assign American property or lives to your cause. You need to do that yourselves."
— Jeremiah Regan (paraphrasing J.Q. Adams) [00:20]
On Libya:
"There's good intentions, but then there is the consequence of those intentions, and that's not always good."
— Juan Davalos [02:54]
"Gaddafi bad, lack of Gaddafi even worse."
— Jeremiah Regan [03:10]
On America First:
"With every decision and every action, we are now putting America first."
— Donald Trump (via Juan Davalos) [04:11]
On the Iraq War and its Lessons:
"Biting off more than they could chew, for trying to do more than was achievable through US arms..."
— Professor [07:31]
On Nonproliferation & Broken U.S. Promises:
"Breaking a deal we had made certainly weakened our international position..."
— Professor [12:11]
On Present Policy in Ukraine:
"I think [the Founders] would be bewildered at any argument that suggested we need to be involved in that conflict and insistent that we stay out of it."
— Professor [34:54]
The Adams Doctrine Revisited:
"She is the well wisher of the freedom and independence of all, but the champion and vindicator only of her own."
— John Quincy Adams (quoted) [35:49]
The conclusion asserts that American foreign policy continues to oscillate between interventionism and restraint, a debate still unresolved since the end of the Cold War. The course's final message encourages citizens to critically engage with these enduring questions, informed by the nation’s founding wisdom and an awareness of the real-world consequences of foreign intervention.
For further study: Listeners are invited to take free Hillsdale College online courses to deepen their understanding of American history and principles.