Francisco Manaldi (2:34)

Yeah, well, it's hard to know exactly what he means, but let me give you sort of some bits of history that might illuminate whatever he's thinking.

Cooper Katz McKim (2:44)

Francisco says that the Venezuelan oil industry was developed in the 1920s led by what are today two companies, ExxonMobil and Shell. Exxon was American and Shell was Dutch and British.

Francisco Manaldi (2:56)

The contracts that these companies have basically authorized them to produce oil and pay royalties and taxes to the Venezuelan government were going to expire in 1983.

Darian Woods (3:06)

But in the mid-1970s, the Venezuelan government decided to take over the oil drilling themselves. They made the contract expire 7 and after some renegotiation paid the company's compensation.

Francisco Manaldi (3:19)

They were well compensated. In fact, it was not controversial at all with the oil companies.

Cooper Katz McKim (3:25)

What was controversial was what happened decades later. In the 1990s, Venezuela invited foreign oil companies back. Venezuela would still have its national oil company, but private firms like Chevron, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were invited to invest in what's known as the Orinoco belt. This is an area of Venezuela with large deposits of oil.

Francisco Manaldi (3:46)

Eventually, Hugo Chavez comes to power.

Darian Woods (3:48)

In 1999, Chavez, the predecessor to Nicolas Maduro, was elected as a far left president after years of economic stagnation.

Francisco Manaldi (3:57)

For the first five years, he doesn't touch the companies.

Cooper Katz McKim (4:01)

At this time, the foreign companies were still building out their rigs and their pipelines.

Francisco Manaldi (4:05)

Then he basically says to them, I'm going to change the contracts, I'm going to dramatically increase the government take and I will become a majority shareholder, the Venezuelan national oil company of those projects.

Darian Woods (4:20)

So it's basically the president strong arming the oil companies into giving up more of their profits. Sounds a little familiar. For some reason of the major American companies, Chevron accepted the deal.

Francisco Manaldi (4:32)

Basically they came to an agreement and in fact Chevron has been able to make money after they were partially expropriated. And, and so Chevron is today paradoxically the only licensed company to operate in Venezuela by the US government.

Cooper Katz McKim (4:50)

The other two major oil companies, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused to accept Hugo Chavez's ultimatum.

Francisco Manaldi (4:56)

And so Venezuela then basically expropriated them. And they offer a very low compensation compared to what was sort of the actual market values.

Darian Woods (5:09)

So, so they took Venezuela to international arbitration for disregarding their contracts. Exxon was awarded about a billion dollars and Conoco Phillips was awarded almost $9 billion plus interest.

Francisco Manaldi (5:22)

Venezuela has only paid a fraction. And this happened almost 20 years ago. Right. So Conoco is one of the largest creditors of Venezuela.

Cooper Katz McKim (5:33)

This leads to an important point. Francisco emphasizes that unlike what President Trump says, the oil in the ground owned by the companies, Venezuela always owned it. But Venezuela has been very slow and unwilling to pay back what it owes to Exxon and Conoco.

Darian Woods (5:51)

So after two rounds of Venezuela nationalizing the oil industry, first in the 1970s, then in the 2000s, you might wonder why American oil companies might want to be involved again. And you'd be right. As mentioned, there's been a deafening silence among energy executives after the apprehension of Nicolas Maduro. But what people like Donald Trump see is potential. Venezuela has huge oil resources, but doesn't pump out that much. At the moment, the estimates are around.

Francisco Manaldi (6:21)

A million barrels of oil per day. That's less than 1% of global oil production.

Cooper Katz McKim (6:26)

That's less than Algeria, which we don't usually think of as an oil superpower.

Francisco Manaldi (6:30)

Venezuela used to produce much more, more than 3.5 million barrels per day. And Venezuela could produce potentially technically, you know, 4 or 5 million barrels of oil per day.

Darian Woods (6:43)

Francisco says that at full capacity, Venezuela could probably produce more than Texas does today.

Cooper Katz McKim (6:49)

Now, Venezuela's oil does require more processing than oil from, say, Saudi Arabia. It's thick and sulfurous, what's called heavy sour crude.

Darian Woods (6:58)

That sounds like reviews of my stand up comedy set.

Cooper Katz McKim (7:01)

Ouch. Just keep workshopping your bits, Gary, and you'll get there.

Darian Woods (7:05)

Yeah, with enough dilutants, maybe I'll get a light sweet tea.

Cooper Katz McKim (7:09)

More processing. Yeah. Now the oil isn't the best quality, kind of like Canada's Tartar tar sands. But Francisco says that shouldn't obscure from the fact that Venezuela does have the capacity to be a major oil player again, like the top five in the world.

Francisco Manaldi (7:24)

Bottom line, Venezuela has plenty of oil. That's not the issue.

Darian Woods (7:28)

The issue is that Venezuela can't extract much of it. Francisco says the main reason for this goes back to an incident in 2002. The opposition organized a general strike across the economy, asking for Hugo Chavez to hold a new presidential election. Workers and executives from the state oil company were involved. So Chavez fired them.

Francisco Manaldi (7:49)

Day after day, he fired 20,000 of the 40,000 employees. Among them, almost all the top executives and the scientists, the geologists, the petroleum engineers, the more technical people. In fact, to give you one number, 95% of the PhDs working in the companies, which had a lot of of them, like more than a thousand were fired. And so that made the national company in Venezuela really decay and basically it got destroyed.

Cooper Katz McKim (8:24)

A few years after this brain drain, the US started imposing sanctions on the country for not cooperating on anti drug and anti terrorism efforts. But Francisco points out that the oil production cratered well before the big sanctions against Venezuela's oil company in 2019.

Francisco Manaldi (8:40)

For the most part, the collapse of the Venezuelan oil industry is a self inflicted wound. But in the last few years there is a component of US sanctions.

Darian Woods (8:50)

Assault on the wound, basically, yes.

Francisco Manaldi (8:52)

Not only assault, but they impeded a potential recovery, let's put it that way.

Cooper Katz McKim (8:57)

Yeah, it's hard to get investors and expertise to go back to Venezuela when there's U.S. sanctions.

Darian Woods (9:03)

All right, so Venezuela has a lot of potential to drill more oil, but political dysfunction has collapsed its capacity. Meanwhile, foreign oil companies worry about getting shaken down by the government in the future. That sounds like a pretty barren starting place to revive Venezuela's oil industry.

Francisco Manaldi (9:21)

Unfortunately, I'm not optimistic because of history and because of if there is no smooth sort of transition in Venezuela to democratic government and political stability, all big ifs, you will not see the kind of investments that will be needed to develop the oil sector and you will continue to see Venezuelans leaving the country.

Darian Woods (9:45)

Francisco himself left Venezuela for the US in 2012. He wants people outside of the country to know that Venezuela was once a relatively prosperous, relatively well functioning democracy for 40 years. The country's economic and political turmoil brought it down hand in hand.

Cooper Katz McKim (10:06)

This episode was produced by Cooper Katz McKim with engineering by Robert Rodriguez. It was fact checked by Julia Ritchie Caking Cannon edits the show and the indicator is a production of NP er.