Podcast Summary: The Interview (BBC World Service)

Episode: Boris Johnson and Sir Tony Radakin: Ukrainians are heroes
Date: February 25, 2026
Host: Laura Kuenssberg
Guests: Boris Johnson (Former British Prime Minister), Admiral Sir Tony Radakin (Former Head of the British Armed Forces)

Overview

This episode features a significant conversation about the trajectory, lessons, and future of the Ukraine war, with Boris Johnson and Admiral Sir Tony Radakin—the Prime Minister and top military leader in the UK at the war’s outset. They recount the pivotal moments leading to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (February 2022), reflect on the West’s responses, and critically analyze ongoing dilemmas around support for Ukraine and how the conflict might eventually end.

The tone is reflective, forthright, and at times frustrated, as both guests express admiration for Ukrainian resilience and critique Western hesitation, arguing that delays and ambiguities may have emboldened Russia. The discussion moves from vivid recollections of crisis leadership to urgent arguments about current strategy and the difficulties of negotiating peace.

Key Discussion Points

1. The Night the Invasion Began

• Immediate Response (04:08 – 05:57)
  • Both Johnson and Radakin describe receiving the pre-dawn calls confirming Russia’s invasion.
    • Johnson (04:17): “It was about 4 in the morning...the National Security Adviser rang me to say it was happening. We’d been expecting it...I uttered some sort of expletives and then got on with it.”
    • Radakin (05:10): “Our intelligence...had been saying that this was going to happen for months...there’s a calmness because it’s happened and, okay, now what are we going to do about it?”
  • Both note the UK and US sensed what was coming, while some European allies were in denial, causing an initially weak Western response.

2. Western Naivety, Missed Opportunities, and Putin’s Calculus

• Retrospective Critique (06:55 – 10:57)
  • Johnson and Radakin assess how the West’s ambiguity and inaction—especially after Crimea (2014) and Syria—helped encourage Russian aggression.
  • Johnson (09:33): “The failure to do anything in Crimea in 2014 was tragic...I think that Putin was emboldened by Western failure in Syria...by what he’d seen in Afghanistan...I think the answer to your question is yes, [we enabled this].”
  • Johnson regrets that Western leaders never offered clear commitments to Ukraine’s NATO membership, leaving “endless fudge and obscurity.”
  • (11:19) “I do think we should have done more...there was this fundamental ambiguity and uncertainty about our attitude to Ukraine. And I’ve got to say I think that is still there.”

3. Zelenskyy’s Leadership and Ukrainian Resistance

• Defying Expectations (07:38 – 09:08, 20:14 – 21:54)
  • Admiration for Ukraine’s ability to hold Kyiv: Radakin is struck by the tough fight for Hostomel Airport, and by the iconic image of Russian armored convoys stalling.
    • Radakin (07:53): “The images...that were really striking was the battle over Hostomel Airport...the Ukrainians were magnificent.”
    • Johnson: “What happened was that the Russian plan was basically to take Hostomel, and...all the tanks and armor were going to come down...but because the Ukrainians fought so hard...the Russians couldn’t advance.”
  • Zelenskyy’s leadership:
    • Radakin (20:19): “It’s been utterly pivotal...you have to galvanize your country...maintain morale...carry on with the economy running...fight the war...It’s exhausting, and it takes an emotional toll.”
    • Johnson (20:49): “We should also be stressing what an incredible job the Ukrainians have done...Putin...has only been able to take less than 20% of Ukrainian land.”
    • Radakin (21:17): “Russia’s peak territorial gain was about 27%, now at about 19-20%—they gain less than 1% a year...enormous losses, now at 1.3 million either killed or injured. Ukraine is imposing that cost on Russia.”

4. Western Hesitation, Escalation Fears, and Military Support

• Supply Delays and Risks (15:13 – 17:41)
  • Kuenssberg notes the pattern: Zelenskyy requests weapons, the West hesitates, and eventually delivers after months.
    • Radakin (15:37): “There was always escalation anxiety...the UK led with NLAWs, main battle tanks, Storm Shadow...each time, the reported red lines of Putin evaporated...but if you’re in Kyiv, this feels like incrementalism...and it’s deeply frustrating.”
    • Johnson (16:21): “Of course [caution cost lives and prolonged the conflict]...we’ve always delayed needlessly...Just enough to stop them from losing, but not enough to help them bring the war to a successful conclusion for Ukraine. That’s the problem.”
  • War’s escalation—Radakin notes (17:41): Over 50,000 Russian drone attacks last year, more cruise and now ballistic missiles, devastating Ukrainian infrastructure with limited strategic impact.

5. Stalemate, Peace Prospects, and “Boots on the Ground”

• Ongoing Dilemmas (18:37 – 22:58)
  • Johnson proposes deploying European “peacekeeping” troops now as a signal, not as combatants:
    • Johnson (18:53): “If we’re going to have a plan for boots on the ground after the war...why not do it now?...these people wouldn’t be there in a war fighting capacity.”
    • He’s frustrated by fixation on escalation risk: (20:05) “The lesson of the last four years is that the person who benefits from that nervousness is Putin.”
  • On current European promises of increased defense: Johnson is skeptical, saying there’s “not much sign of it.” (19:48)
  • Stalemate and concessions:
    • Radakin stresses Zelenskyy has already offered an unconditional ceasefire—Putin is the blocker (22:17): “Putin will not change until the calculus is adjusted. It’s about getting Putin to the table because President Zelensky is already there and waiting.”
    • Johnson: “There is a delusion in the United States if they think that Putin wants peace...We will not end the war by asking Ukrainians to make further concessions...The way to end this thing is finally, psychologically, to convince Putin that he made a strategic category error...That project is over.”

Notable Quotes and Moments

• Boris Johnson’s critique of Western hesitation:
  • “We’ve always delayed needlessly. We’ve then ended up giving the Ukrainians what they’ve been asking for. And actually, it’s always served to their advantage and to the disadvantage of Putin.” (16:21)
• On Ukraine’s resilience:
  • Sir Tony Radakin: “The heroes and the people of Ukraine are just that.” (21:17)
• On Putin’s thinking:
  • Boris Johnson: “The thing that’s missing from all of this is Putin. We’ve heard nothing from Moscow to suggest that they want to agree such a plan. The way to end this thing is...to convince Putin that he made a strategic...error.” (02:55 / 23:04)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Start of substantive conversation – [01:47]
• Recollections of invasion night & early response – [04:08 – 05:57]
• Failures of deterrence, Crimea, Western ambiguity – [06:55 – 10:57]
• On Kyiv’s defense and Hostomel Airport – [07:38 – 09:08]
• On Western hesitation and escalation anxiety – [15:13 – 17:41]
• On prospects for peace, concessions, and Putin’s psychology – [22:17 – 25:06]

Episode Takeaways

• Both guests admire Ukrainian resilience and criticize the West for inconsistency and slowness in supporting Ukraine.
• They argue that Western ambiguity and fear of “escalation” empowered Putin, while robust, timely support would have better deterred aggression and saved lives.
• The current military stalemate and slow pace of Western aid risk prolonging the conflict indefinitely.
• Johnson and Radakin emphasize the importance of demonstrating unwavering commitment—potentially through symbolic peacekeeping deployments or accelerated aid—while maintaining that peace is impossible without “convincing Putin” that his plans have failed.

For listeners seeking a bracing, inside view of allied decision-making during the early Ukraine invasion, and a sharply argued critique of Western policy since, this episode provides candid insights and urgent lessons from two of the UK’s key wartime decision-makers.