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Month plan equivalent to $15 per month Required intro rate first 3 months only then full price plan options available taxes and fees extra. See full terms@mintmobile.com By 1960, Singleton had reached a crossroads. Despite his success at Lytton, he was passed over for the CEO position, and rather than settle, he made a bold decision. At the age of 43, he and colleague George Kozmetsky, who taught business management at mit, decided to invest their resources to start a new electronics company. At 43 I think about this all the time when people say they're too old to start a company. You're not too old. Go build. With an internal capital of 450,000, they launched what was originally called Instrument Systems. Their first acquisition was a small electronics company, which gave them a manufacturing facility and a small team of employees. In October 1960, the company name was changed to Teledyne Tele, meaning at a distance, and Dyne, meaning power, a name that Henry decided on after much thought. Teledyne stock went on the market in 1961, with Arthur Rock, who would later become famous for backing intel and Apple helping in the ipo. The early days weren't easy. Cash was tight and Singleton had to get creative. One technique he used was borrowing against the physical inventories of the companies that they had acquired. As Russ Kiernan, whose optics company was acquired by Teledyne in 1963, recalled Henry knew Kiernan Optics had sizable inventory of expensive equipment and tooling. We priced each individual item and were able to raise a considerable sum for the corporation. This made us all feel good. That is, until we learned our facility had to make monthly payments on the loan. Those early financial gymnastics reflected Singleton's scrappy approach to business building. He understood that sometimes you have to get uncomfortable to create something great. Singleton was also refreshingly direct in his business dealings. For example, during negotiations to acquire Kiernan for stock, the Teledyne share price declined slightly. After they had agreed on terms, Kiernan requested a renegotiation, but Henry quickly responded, you wouldn't be making that request if the price had gone up. That was the end of that conversation. Singleton's no nonsense approach extended to all aspects of business. When Kiernan later asked if Teledyne's legal team could handle dissolving his original corporation. Singleton simply said, oh, we can dissolve it ourselves. Kiernan thought this was a bit strange, but proceeded with the task, having his secretary do the research and obtain the necessary forms. They accomplished the disillusion quickly. A total cost of just $37 in forms with no legal team needed. It was a valuable lesson in eliminating unnecessary expenses that he never forgot during his 18 year career with Teledyne. While building Teledyne in the early days, Singleton maintained the technical focus from his years at Hughes and Lytton. While rivals hesitated, Henry Singleton stood at the edge of a massive wave he believed would reshape global technology semiconductors. Not only was he right, but this would also be one of the biggest technological trends. And he surfed it. This reminds me of something that Brad Jacobs said in our episode. I think it was 190. One of the most valuable pieces of advice he ever got from his mentor Ludwig Jesselson was you can mess up a lot of things in business and still do well, as long as you get the big trend right. And Charlie Munger talks about this idea, surfing in poor Charlie's Almanac. And here's what he says. When technology moves as fast as it does in a civilization like ours, you get a phenomenon that I call competitive destruction. You know, you have the finest buggy whip factory and all of a sudden in comes this little horseless carriage. And before too many years go by, your buggy whip business is dead. You either get into a different business or you're dead. You're destroyed. It happens again and again. And when these new businesses come in, they are huge advantages for the early birds. When you're an early bird, there's a model that I call surfing. When a surfer gets up and catches the wave and just stays there, he can go on a long, long time. But people get long runs when they're right on the edge of the wave. Whether it's Microsoft or Intel or all kinds of people, including National Cash Register. In the early days, this surfing model comes up over and over again. Timothy Eaton rode the wave of small department stores becoming large. Estee Lauder rode the wave of women getting freedom to look good. Cornelius Vanderbilt rode the wave of steamships until he spotted a better one with railroad. A lot of advantages come from just getting the major trend right. And Henry Singleton would nail the semiconductor trend. As he explained in a Forbes interview, we went into semiconductors in 1960, even though we were in the midst of a business crisis at the time. We did it because of our conviction that it was necessary for a long term future growth and not because of any conviction that we would immediately make huge amounts of money. This conviction paid off in 1965 when Teledyne won a major contract against much larger competitors like I, IBM and Texas Instruments. This digital system could read information about navigation, mission history and maintenance needs, essentially creating the black box technology that became standard in aviation. The victory sent Teledyne's stock soaring from $15 to $65 a share in just one year. This jump gave Singleton the inflated currency he needed to accelerate his acquisition strategy. And accelerate it he did. By the end of the 1960s, Teledyne had purchased 130 companies. But these weren't random grabs. They were strategic moves to build a technological ecosystem. At first, Singleton acquired companies related to Teledyne's military and government business. But as they grew, he expanded to other industries to reduce reliance on government contracts. In a later Forbes interview, he reflected, Teledyne is like a living plant with our companies, the different branches and each putting out new branches and growing so that no one business is too significant. Among the acquisitions were companies like Ryan Aeronautical, which made an unmanned aircraft Kieran Optics, which produced the windows for the Apollo spacecraft through which astronauts saw Earth from space for the very first time. And specialty metal companies like Vasco Metals and Hua Chang, which made critical materials for aerospace and defense. What made Singleton's acquisition strategy truly remarkable wasn't just the number of companies that Teledyne bought, but how he found them and what he did with them afterwards. While many conglomerates of the era were grabbing anything they could get their hands on, Singleton was methodical. He wasn't looking for flashy names. He wanted solid, profitable businesses with strong market positions and technical expertise that could complement Teledyne's existing operations. The companies Teledyne acquired typically shared a few common traits. They were well managed, operated in specialized technical niches related to electronics or semiconductors, and had healthy profit margins. Importantly, they operated in fields that Singleton, with his technical background, could understand and evaluate. Good friend of mine says there are riches in niches and this is something that Singleton used to his advantage. But where did he find these gems? Often they were small, family run businesses started by veterans who had returned from World War II, gone to college on the GI Bill, and built successful enterprises based on technical skills they had developed during or after their Service. By the 1960s, many of these founders were reaching a point where they were considering succession plans or seeking a capital partner to grow further. These entrepreneurs had built impressive specialty businesses, but often lacked access to capital markets that could fuel their next phase of growth. This created a perfect opportunity for Teledyne, which could offer them liquidity, resources and a place with a larger technological ecosystem. Once acquired, companies typically retained their original management teams. Singleton recognized that these founders knew their businesses far better than he ever could. Instead of imposing a heavy corporate hand, he gave them autonomy while providing financial discipline and strategic guidance. As one former Teledyne executive put it, Henry believed that people were the most important factor in business and they had to be given a chance to do their job. Why bother them if they're doing their job? He would say. This approach created a web of technically advanced companies, each operating largely independently but connected through Teledyne's financial control. In some cases, companies were combined where synergies existed. Others were renamed for brand unity. But many continued to operate just as before, with the same management and same products. Except now that Teledyne handled tax filings, regulatory compliance and capital allocation. Each company was its own profit center, left alone until problems arose. Singleton explained how things work like we go to an extreme in splitting businesses up so that we can see problems which would be passed over in companies where the units are larger by our plans. No one business all by itself will become too large. Let's pause here for a second. You can see how Singleton's model of running Teledyne influenced Berkshire Hathaway's approach. Acquire a company, maintain a separate profit and loss statement, leave management alone and have them send profits back to headquarters for reallocation. Warren Buffett was an admitted Singleton admirer. And we can see how Teledyne's decentralized structure with centralized capital allocation became central to Berkshire Hathaway's playbook. There are differences, however. What made the Teledyne system so powerful was how knowledge flowed between companies. When Teledyne acquired a business, they gained technical expertise, industry relationships and market insights. These companies often serve as launching pads into adjacent markets that Teledyne might not have otherwise entered. Their own managers would even spot and recommend additional acquisition targets in related fields. An engineer in one Teledyne company might develop a component that could be used by another Teledyne business. A sales team might discover a market need that could be filled by combining technologies from multiple Teledyne units. This cross pollination allowed Teledyne to expand in ways that competitors couldn't match. For many founders who sold to Teledyne, the acquisition represented both the culmination of their life's work and a new beginning. They received Teledyne stock that would appreciate dramatically while their businesses gained resources and connections that allowed them to grow far beyond what might have been possible alone. One of the most significant acquisitions in Teledyne's history came in 1966 with the purchase of Vasco Metals. Not only was it the largest acquisition Teledyne had made to date, but it brought something even more valuable than its profitable specialty metals business, George Roberts. Roberts, incidentally authored Distant Force, the book on which much of this episode is based. The book is about $1,400 and hard to find, so heads up. The other book that I used a lot of for this episode was Outsiders by Will Thorndike, which if either of.

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Series and more Roberts and Singleton shared history. They had become roommates in the U.S. naval Academy in 1935. Their past diverged after, with Roberts pursuing metallurgy while Singleton focused on electronics and computing. With the Vasco acquisition, Roberts joined Teledyne as president while Singleton took the role of CEO and Chairman. This marked a pivotal transition. With Roberts handling the day to day operations, Singleton could focus on what he did best, capital allocation. This partnership worked brilliantly because of their complementary skills. Roberts was a detail oriented operator with deep technical knowledge in metallurgy and manufacturing. Singleton was a visionary strategist with a gift for financial analysis and capital deployment. Together they created a leadership dynamic few companies could match. Their different backgrounds helped Teledyne expand beyond electronics into materials science, aerospace components and industrial products, diversifying while maintaining focus on specialized high value products. As Jack Hamilton, who ran the specialty metals division, put it, we specialized in high margin products that were sold by the ounce, not the ton. By 1970, Teledyne was a technological juggernaut. In just a decade, it had grown from a small electronic startup to a diversified company. Glamour it with over 130 companies under its umbrella. If you thought they were indiscriminate in their acquisitions, you'd be wrong. Not only did they know what to acquire, but more importantly, they knew what to avoid. George Roberts summed up a key capital allocation principle by saying this. The only way you can make money in some businesses is by not entering them. They strategically acquired important technically oriented subcontractors who served the prime contractors. That way, if a large contract were abandoned, wouldn't hurt Teledyne too much. And they purchased these companies using Teledyne's highly valued shares, often trading at 40 to 70 times earnings. They more than doubled the share count in the late 60s. But the financial results that followed more than made up for the share dilution. They increased sales by 374%. In the same period, net income increased by over 400%. Then suddenly the game changed. And when it did, Singleton stopped making acquisitions on a dimension. It was as if he'd seen something others hadn't. There was a whole team of people at Teledyne who had been taking care of the acquisitions, helping find these companies, working through the acquisition process, integrating them, and they were just laid off all at the same time. Singleton had made a complete strategic pivot. All the focus that used to go towards acquisitions now went to internal management and cost control. Through the 70s, Singleton and Roberts pruned underperforming divisions, streamlined operations, and focused on cost control and free cash flow. When I asked Charlie Munger to describe Singleton over dinner one night, he looked at me and said one word, rational. Singleton wasn't following a rigid playbook. He was intelligently adapting to changing conditions. Singleton went on to explain it like I believe in maximal flexibility, so I reserve the right to change my position on any subject when the external environment relating to any topic changes, too. He went on to say, I do not define my job in any rigid terms, but in terms of having the freedom to do what seems to me to be in the best interest of the company at any time. Now, if you're listening to that, like me, it sounds a lot like Charlie Munger, who said, there was no master plan at Berkshire. We were just opportunistic. And as you probably already noticed, there's a lot of parallels to Singleton, Buffett and Munger, Berkshire Hathaway and Teledyne. So what had changed? The conglomerate boom of the late 60s had driven acquisition prices to levels that Singleton considered completely irrational. Companies that Teledyne might have acquired for 8 to 10 times earnings just a few years earlier now commanded multiples of 15 to 20 times earnings or even higher. At the same time, Teledyne's own stock was tanking. The conglomerate boom of the 1960s turned to dust, while other companies were priced too high. This period marks a fascinating parallel in business history. The late 1960s is also when Warren Buffett decided to close his investment partnership because he was, quote, out of step with present conditions, meaning he had no ideas. The market was frothy. So here you have both Buffett and Singleton recognizing the same reality. For a while, Singleton could have used his frothy shares to acquire companies, but that advantage had disappeared. In fact, the share price was so high. When Teledyne was doing these acquisitions, he thought of it as funny Money. In a 1978 interview with Forbes magazine, Singleton explained his thinking. There are tremendous values in the stock market, but in buying stocks, not in entire companies. Buying companies tends to raise the purchase price too high. Don't be misled by the few shares trading at a low multiple of 6 or 7. If you tried to acquire those companies, the multiple is more like 12 to 14. And their management will say, if you don't pay it, somebody else will. And they're right, somebody else does. That wasn't just Henry being conservative. He was thinking about opportunity costs, too. He went on to say, I won't pay 15 times earnings. That would mean I'd be only making a return of 6 or 7%, and I can do that in treasury bills. While other conglomerate CEOs continued to buy companies at these sky high prices to maintain the illusion of growth, Singleton had the discipline to stop and walk away completely. It wasn't that he had just lost his appetite for growth. He had simply found better opportunities and the biggest one, his own stock. But before that, we need to take a quick look at another industry Teledyne entered just before they stopped their acquisition frenzy. Insurance. Beginning in 1967, Teledyne began acquiring insurance and financial businesses, including Fireside Thrift, United Insurance, Trinity Universal and Argonaut Insurance. This pivot was remarkably similar to what Warren Buffett was doing at Berkshire Hathaway around this exact same time, buying insurance companies and using the insurance float as a form of low cost capital that could be invested for higher returns. In fact, Berkshire Hathaway bought their first Insurance Company in 1967 as well. Insurance companies collect premiums upfront but pay claims later. In the interim, they can invest this float and keep the investment returns. For a brilliant capital allocator like Singleton, insurance companies were a perfect vehicle. They generated steady cash flows and provided a pool of capital that could be invested according to his vision. But Singleton wasn't content to follow the conventional wisdom about how insurance company portfolios should be invested. During the 1968-74 period, when most investors considered bonds safe and stocks risky, Singleton took the opposite view. He instructed his insurance companies to move away from fixed income securities and toward equities when the stock market was depressed. And not only that, he built a concentrated portfolio. Charlie Munger said of Singleton's investment approach, like Warren and I, he was comfortable with the concentration and bought only a few things that he understood well. Singleton invested heavily when he had an edge in 1972, Singleton saw an opportunity that would change corporate America forever, though few recognized it at the time. One morning, George Roberts recalled Singleton walking into his office around 8:30 and saying simply, george, we're going to make our bid for our stock at $20 a share. Roberts was stunned. Are we really going to do that? He asked. Singleton hadn't even hinted at such a move before, and he and George were in constant communication. Even Arthur Rock, who was involved in most of Teledyne's stock activities, was caught off guard. This was the beginning of what would become the most aggressive and successful stock buyback program in corporate history. The audacity is hard to overstate. In an era when virtually no companies bought back shares, Teledyne would conduct eight major share repurchases over the next 12 years, reducing the number of shares outstanding by more than 90%. In the first tender offer, they tried to buy 1 million shares at $20 each. What happened next shocked even Singleton. 8.9 million shares were tendered, and rather than scaling back, Teledyne took every single one. Singleton later recounted with characteristic understatement, we took them all at 20 and figured it was a fluke and that we couldn't do it again. But instead of going up, our stock went down. So we kept tendering, first at 14 and then doing two bonds for stock swaps. Every time the tender was over, the stock would go down and we'd tender again. Then two more tenders at 18 and 40. Wall street was shocked. Buybacks weren't just uncommon in the 1970s, they were practically non existent. Analysts had been trained to equate growth with acquisitions, not shrinking share counts. But Singleton's logic was mathematically irrefutable. Teledyne had issued stock at 20 to 25 times earnings during its 1960s acquisition spree. Now, in the bear market of the early 1970s, they could buy back the same stock at 8 to 12 times earnings. It was the perfect arbitrage across time. The impact on the per share metrics was explosive. In 1971, Teledyne earned $1.48 per share. By 1975, that figure had risen to $6.09, a 311% increase, while Total revenue and net income had only risen 56 and 77%, respectively. In just five years, Teledyne had bought back 56% of outstanding shares, and they were just getting started. Perhaps most impressive, Singleton financed the majority of these buybacks with cash from operations. When debt was used, it was quickly paid off from operational income. The company's no dividend policy redirected all cash to these repurchases. Eventually, the market caught on. Shareholders who stayed with Teledyne from the first buyback in 1972 achieved gains of approximately 3,000% by 1983, transforming many patient investors into multimillionaires. While Singleton's financial moves captured attention, what was less noticed but was equally important was the sophisticated operating system that he and George Roberts developed to manage their sprawling enterprise. For a corporation of Teledyne's size, they ran a remarkably lean corporate office. Fewer than 50 people at headquarters who focused primarily on planning, reporting and auditing the results of the individual companies they had acquired in the 1960s. In contrast to other companies that chased integration and synergy, Teledyne did the opposite. They broke the company into smaller parts to increase accountability. As William Thorndike noted, ironically, the most successful conglomerate of the era was actually the least conglomerate like. In its operations, Singleton created a system balancing local autonomy with central financial oversight. Every subsidiary had a president with real decision making power. But they also faced rigorous financial controls. The company also used a metric called Teledyne return, the average of cash return and recorded profit. Roberts went on to explain this. We'd say you reported a profit of a million dollars, but you only had half a million dollars in cash, so you only made $750,000. So tell us about the rest of the profit when you get it. This focus on cash, not accounting earnings, force Teledyne managers to think about the real economics of their business. You couldn't satisfy Singleton by merely showing good numbers on paper. You had to deliver cash in the bank. Cash was king for Teledyne because it was the fuel for Singleton's capital allocation machine. Without the substantial cash flows generated by Teledyne's operating businesses, the company couldn't have executed its ambitious share repurchase program, the place Singleton saw as the best opportunity most of the time for their excess cash. Their reporting system was also remarkably efficient. Teledyne's fiscal month ended on a Friday, and by Tuesday morning, reports from all 160 entities arrived. This let headquarters know exactly how the enterprise was performing without delay, something many companies still struggle with today. What made Teledyne's model particularly effective was how it structured leadership at the local level. Each unit head wasn't a manager, but a president. This wasn't mere semantics. Teledigm believed the companies should remain rooted in their communities, doing business with local banks and participating in local charities. The president title gave managers the stature they needed in these local matters. My feeling was that we needed to keep these companies where they were throughout the United States as part of their own communities. Roberts went on to explain, I felt it was important to give these managers the title of president of their company and thus give them the prestige and stature they needed to act in local matters. This approach created a federation of businesses that felt independent while benefiting from being part of something larger. Each president had real autonomy, but with Teledyne's financial backing and accountability systems behind them. Despite this autonomy, Teledyne didn't hesitate to exit businesses that no longer fit even successful ones. A striking example was the Packard Bell television division, when American TV manufacturers still dominated the US Market. Singleton anticipated the coming Japanese competition and exited the business entirely. This shocked industry observers. Packard Bell had a good market share and solid profits, but Singleton saw the economics changing before they changed, and he became the first American manufacturer to exit the industry, with others following over the next decade. Similar decisions were made across the Teledyne portfolio when margins compressed in certain industrial products due to intensifying competition, Teledyne didn't hesitate to divest those businesses and redeploy capital to higher return opportunities, which often in the rollercoaster economy of the 1970s, was their own stock. This willingness to walk away even from businesses with storied histories or emotional attachments on a dime demonstrated the clear eyed financial discipline that set Teledyne apart from many of its peers who often clung to underperforming businesses far too long. The contrast with General Electric is telling. While GE under Jack Walsh built layers of management and reporting requirements, creating a sprawling bureaucracy, Teledyne maintained its lean structure. Singleton refused to let his connection to individual companies be filtered through too many minds and levels of management. There were always direct relationships between corporate and each operating unit. The difference in approach had profound implications. Well, GE would eventually collapse under its own complexity and financial engineering. Teledyne's disciplined focus on real cash generation, operational autonomy and real time information created lasting value.

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Shane Parrish (39:20)

Focus on financial results, Teledyne took a remarkably long term view of talent development. The company sought to hire people who would make careers at Teledyne not just past for a few years. This was particularly evident in the TRAP program Teledyne Research Assistance Program, which Roberts and Singleton introduced in 1975. Under this initiative, Teledyne companies could propose research projects to be carried out with universities. If approved, these projects would be funded by the corporate office. Remember the Andrew Mellon Outliers episode? He did the same thing where he funded research through programs at universities that he could commercialize, which eventually culminated in Carnegie Mellon University. Over its 20 year life, Trapp supported 320 projects involving about 80 Teledyne companies and 112 universities, at a total cost of 14.2 million. The program helped Teledyne develop new products, manufacturing processes, and new markets. But it had another crucial benefit. It allowed Teledyne to identify talented students and university personnel who might become valuable employees, especially those interested in research. This approach to talent development stood in stark contrast to the more traditional hiring practices becoming common in corporate America. While many companies increasingly viewed employees as interchangeable parts, Teledyne invested in building deep institutional knowledge and technical capabilities while going after high agency people. The strategy paid dividends in multiple ways. Teledyne businesses developed reputations for technical excellence that helped them win contracts and commit and premium prices. They also attracted the engineers and scientists who wanted to work on challenging problems with deep domain expertise, and they retained key personnel who built careers at Teledyne rather than hopping between employers. In the end, what made Teledyne remarkable wasn't just Singleton's financial wizardry or Robert's operational discipline, but the seamless integration of the two. While most conglomerates of the era were ultimately dismantled or vastly underperformed the market, Teledyne prospered because it paired sophisticated capital allocation with lean, decentralized operations focused relentlessly on cash generation and shareholder returns. As the 1980s dawned, Teledyne stood as a monument to what disciplined capital allocation, decentralized operations, and visionary leadership could achieve. The Forbes annual report on American industry in January 1980 confirmed what many longtime shareholders already knew. Teledyne's performance was exceptional by any measure among over 1,000 major American companies. Teledyne ranked 12th in profitability, 15th in growth and 6th in market performance. In the multi companies category, Teledyne was first in return on equity, first in return on total capital and second in growth in earnings per share. Perhaps most telling was a detail that perfectly captured Singleton's approach. Teledyne released its 1979 earnings by January 8 and had the annual financial report to shareholders in the mail by January 30. Other companies took months to close their books. For Singleton, this wasn't just about speed. It was about knowing your numbers cold and respecting shareholders enough to give them information promptly.

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It was this respect for shareholders that led Singleton to separate out a Teledyne operating company called US Ecology, a nuclear and hazardous waste disposal business. This wasn't a distress sale or divestiture of an underperforming business. In fact, U.S. ecology was doing about $100 million in sales in its best year. But Singleton recognized two critical facts. First, public sentiment about nuclear waste disposal was deteriorating rapidly in the 1980s, creating potentially unlimited future liabilities. And second, not all Teledyne shareholders might want exposure to this now controversial business. Singleton's solution was elegant. Distribute shares of the renamed American Ecology directly to Teledyne shareholders on a one for seven basis. This gave shareholders a choice they hadn't had before. Those who believed in the business could keep their American Ecology shares while those.

Shane Parrish (43:40)

Who didn't could sell without having to.

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Divest their entire Teledyne position. The same year, Singleton conducted his eighth and final major stock buyback, acquiring 8.6 million shares at $200 per share, approximately $30 above the market price. This reduced Teledyne's outstanding shares to just over 20 million. The buyback was financed through internally generated funds and bank loans, $300 million of which were repaid in the same year. After this transaction, Teledyne Stock climbed to $302 per share by September, making it the highest priced stock on the New York stock exchange. From 1972 to 1984, Singleton had reduced Teledyne's outstanding shares by over 90%, creating extraordinary value for long term shareholders.

Shane Parrish (44:30)

By 1987, Singleton was 70 and Roberts was 68. Most of Teledyne's key directors and managers were over 65. The succession question loomed. Wall street began speculating. Would Teledyne be broken up? Taken private, sold? Singleton's response was characteristically patient. We're not particularly persuaded by quick temporary gains. We'd rather get something permanent and it takes time. If there's anybody who wants us to do Something real fast that's going to be astonishing in terms of increased earnings or something. I don't know how to satisfy such desires. When pressed about spinoffs to boost your shareholder value, he was blunt. You're thinking in the short term, I'm in the long term, so I wouldn't do anything like that. For a temporary rise in the stock price, he went on to say, you know, there are companies that will sell one division and buy another because today this division generally sports a low multiple and the one they're buying has a high multiple. And they think that may rub off on the whole company. That absolutely turns me off. The whole concept is repulsive. We don't do things like that. We look at the economic long term possibilities. Singleton was planning his exit, but he would do it his way, methodically, with an eye on permanent value rather than quick gains. In April 1986, at the annual shareholders meeting, Singleton announced he was giving up his CEO title. George Roberts would assume that role. In addition to his position as president, Singleton would remain chairman. He stressed that the realignment wouldn't mark any major change in Teledyne's management style, telling shareholders he anticipated they would continue working together as a team as they had for the previous 20 or so years. This was classic Singleton. No drama, no flashy succession announcement, just a quiet handover of operational authority to his trusted partner. The market barely noticed because the transition was so seamless, exactly as Singleton had intended. The first major initiative post transaction came in 1986 with the Spinoff of Argonaut Insurance. Teledyne had acquired Argonaut in 1969 for 87 million. At the time of the spinoff, IT traded at $20 per share with a market value of 234 million. DOL shareholders received one share of Argonaut Group for each share of Teledyne. By 1990, Argonaut was trading in the high 70s with net income of 89.7 million and earned premiums of 458 million. The Spinoff had been a success, allowing Argonaut to focus on its core insurance business while giving shareholders substantial value. That was followed in 1990 by another major spinoff. The board approved a plan to distribute the rest of Teledyne's insurance and finance subsidiaries to shareholders. Unitrend became the name for the new entity that combined United Insurance Company of America and its subsidiaries with Trinity Universal Insurance and Fireside Securities. These subsidiaries represented a combined annual income of 1.1 billion. Singleton became the chairman of Unitren and Roberts joined its Board. Most of the equity investments Singleton had made through the insurance companies. The highly concentrated positions went to Teledyne shareholders through these spinoffs. In investment circles, this approach was recognized as brilliant. Leon Cooperman, a long time investor in Teledyne, said this about number one, the company returned 18% on shareholders equity last year, compared with 15% for the stock market. Number two, the company is committed to enhancing shareholder value. It has bought back 2.3 million shares since 1986 and management owns 30% of the outstanding shares. So they think like owners. Cooperman also noticed that Argonaut's investment portfolio contained only government securities, high grade municipals and corporates with zero junk bonds, a testament to Singleton's conservative investment philosophy that had transferred to the spun off company. In 1989, Henry Singleton retired from Teledyne after 29 years. He was 73. Roberts became the CEO, while Singleton stayed as chairman for two more years. Unlike the sudden departure common at other companies, this transition had been methodically planned. Insiders weren't surprised. In 1991, Singleton stepped down as chairman to focus on his ranching interests. Though he remained on the board. For the first time, someone other than the founder chaired Teledyne's annual meetings. This shift marked the end of an extraordinary chapter. From nothing, Singleton had built a $3.5 billion enterprise while pioneering what later became standard practices, aggressive buybacks, corporate spinoffs, decentralized management, concentrated positions and deploying insurance float for investment. By 1993, both Singleton and Roberts had largely withdrawn from operations while remaining directors. Then came the real test. Could Teledyne's culture outlive its visionary creator? The real test of Singleton's legacy came in 1996 when Teledyne merged with Allegheny Ludnum after fighting off an unwanted suitor. In 1994, Teledyne found a partner that made sense. The merger was friendly. Richard Simmons, Allegheny's CEO, had known Roberts for years through metallurgic society. Singleton, though retired, sat with Roberts during the negotiations. Characteristically, Singleton focused on the one variable that mattered, share price. He ignored all these other peripheral issues that go into these negotiations like board seats and titles and management contracts. He just focused on one variable, share price. That is the variable I want to maximize. The new company was called Allegheny. Teledyne shareholders overwhelmingly approved, with 95% voting in favor. Simmons became chairman, while Teledyne's president, Bill Rutledge, became President and CEO. Allegheny Teledyne began trading on August 15, 1996 for 24,000 employees. The Teledyne name survived, but Singleton's Creation had evolved into something new. Henry Singleton died on Aug. 31, 1999, at 82. At his memorial service, Simon Ramo, who had recruited him to come west from MIT decades earlier, delivered a revealing eulogy. Rarely do you meet a total stranger and instantly know that you will admire that person, ramo said. He described seeing Singleton's academic record with perfect 100 scores in every course, three digits squeezed into the space for only two. Yet despite these achievements, Singleton had no ego, but rather the countenance of quiet dignity and gentleness and kindly intelligence. Ramos shared a story about Singleton's early investment in Apple. How, Henry, I asked him later, with all these new computer startups looking alike, did you pick Apple that emerged as a huge success with enormous gains for early investors? Well, sigh, he replied. I figured most of these millions of expected potential computer customers would at first be intimidated by computers. But could anyone be intimidated by a computer named Apple? Besides, he said, all the others except Apple, if they failed, would just walk away. Apple's founders, I noted, had mortgaged their homes to the hilt and borrowed heavily from their parents and their brothers and their sisters and their aunts and their uncles and their grandparents and their cousins. And they plowed every cent into the company. They just had to make good. This reveals Singleton's investment philosophy in its purest form, a combination of consumer psychology and founder incentives that cut through the noise to what would make a company successful. By the time of his death, the various entities that had emerged from Teledyne were all thriving. Roberts noted that before the spinoff of Argonaut in 1986, Teledyne's stock price peaked at $367 a share. By 1999, the combined value of all the companies was $691 per share, showing the lasting value Singleton had created. It's fitting to end this episode, I think, with a quote from Claude Shannon that appeared in 1976. In an interview with the LA Times, Shannon said this of Singleton. Singleton is extremely intelligent. He tries to work out the best moves. And maybe he doesn't like to talk too much because when you're playing a game, you don't tell everyone else what your strategy is. Wow, what an episode. It's hard to contain my excitement for Henry Singleton. I mean, I had heard about him before, but this deep dive really got me inspired in a lot of ways. I want to talk about a few of my reflections and then go into some of the lessons that we can learn and take away from Henry Singleton. So Henry Singleton put his mind to building a great company. And he succeeded. He ended with one of the best investment track records in history. And he accomplished this with disciplined capital allocation, patience, constant learning, surrounding himself with great people, structuring the organization for accountability and thinking long term, and ignoring generally accepted accounting principles and instead focusing on cash. Or, as he called it, the Teledyne return. Interestingly, most investors didn't get anywhere near the return that Teledyne got because they didn't have the patience. The market wasn't always rational. At one point, when people started to clue in to how the buybacks were affecting the per share earnings, the share price 4x in like three months. Wall street largely missed this too, because it didn't fit the mold of what conglomerates of the day look like. Okay, let's talk about some of the lessons that we can learn from Henry Singleton. First Outcome over ego While Singleton built a large company, he never cared about size for its own sake. Unlike today's empire builders who chase revenue and adjusted ebitda, he focused solely on per share value. Size wasn't about status, it was about optionality, giving him maximum strategic flexibility. Much like his approach to chess, to ignore the institutional imperative, Singleton refused to do things just because everybody else was doing this. He refused to do things that everybody else expected. When his peers were frantically acquiring companies in the 70s, he stopped completely. And yet, when conventional wisdom said that stock buybacks were Foolish, he repurchased 90% of Teledyne shares. His willingness to look foolish in the short term led to extraordinary returns in the long run. 3. The courage to be disliked Singleton was indifferent to criticism, especially when the math was on his side. While most people structure their entire careers to avoid being criticized, he made decisions that baffled Wall street and everybody else, including the business press. He avoided management conferences. He ignored consultants. He refused to provide earnings guidance. He optimized for results rather than approval. When his share buybacks confused analysts, he didn't even bother to explain himself. He just kept buying. 4. Maximum flexibility I reserve the right to change my position on any subject when the external environment changes, singleton said. He never locked himself into a rigid strategy, maintaining freedom to pursue whatever best served Teledyne's interest as conditions evolved. 5. He changed his mind when the facts changed. Singleton didn't just think differently, he acted differently. When acquisition prices became irrational in the late 1960s, he immediately stopped buying companies after making 130acquisitions. When his stock was undervalued, he pivoted to aggressive buybacks. When it's overvalued, he buys companies. 6. Riches in niches. Singleton focused on specialized, technically oriented businesses with dominant positions in small markets. He wasn't building a random conglomerate, but a federation of businesses with technical depth and pricing power. Most of them, to quote one of them, sold by the ounce, not by the ton. 7 Singleton stripped away complexity to focus only on the essential, whether it was cash returns or per share value. He identified the metric that truly mattered and optimized for it, relentlessly ignoring traditional status symbols and vanity metrics. 8. He thought in terms of opportunity cost. He compared all options against each other. I won't pay 15 times earnings, he said. That would mean I'd only be making a return of 6 or 7%. I can do that in T bills. Every capital allocation decision was measured against alternatives. 9 contrast Singleton wasn't just smart. He systematically applied his intelligence to business problems. The MIT mathematician and chess prodigy brought uncommon analytical depth to markets where most decisions were made by conventional thinking. 10. Accountability with autonomy Teledyne's operating system combined local business control with rigorous financial accountability. Subsidiary presidents had real authority, but they were measured on the Teledyne return, the average of the cash flow and reported profit, ensuring that they couldn't hide behind accounting tricks. 11 Avoiding stupidity is easier than seeking brilliance. Success often comes from avoiding mistakes rather than making brilliant moves, and one of the quotes from George Roberts really stuck out to me in this episode. The only way to make money in some businesses is not to buy them. Sometimes the best growth strategy is to decline an opportunity. And finally, 12 thinking long term in a market obsessed with quarterly results, Singleton focused on decisions that would compound value over decades. That gave him an enormous advantage and the freedom to make moves that appeared puzzling in the short term but proved brilliant over time. What a crazy episode. I can't wait to listen to this when it comes out. I had so much fun doing this and I'll see you next time. Thanks for listening and learning with us. For a complete list of episodes, show notes, transcripts and more, go to FS Blog Podcast or just Google the Knowledge Project. The Farnham Street Blog is also where you can learn more about my new book, Clear Thinking Turning Ordinary Moments into Extraordinary Results. It's a transformative guide that hands you the tools to master your fate, sharpen your decision making, and set yourself up for unparalleled success. Learn more at FS Blog. Clear RA.