The Lawfare Podcast

Episode: Lawfare Archive: Russia and the American Far-right, with Marlene Laruelle

Date: November 30, 2025
Host: Olivia Manis
Guest: Marlene Laruelle (Professor, Director of Illiberalism Studies Program at GWU)

Overview

This episode revisits the persistent and evolving relationship between Russia and the American far right. Host Olivia Manis interviews Marlene Laruelle, a leading expert on illiberalism and nationalist movements, to unpack the financial, religious, ideological, and historical ties connecting far-right actors in the United States and Russia. Drawing on recent DOJ indictments, historical examples, and the shifting political landscape, the discussion critiques assumptions about the nature and direction of Russian influence, explores the mythos of Russia as a bastion of “traditional values,” and evaluates the real threats posed by these transnational networks.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Historical Evolution of US Far-Right & Russia Connections

[04:16–07:37]

• Initial Contact (1990s):

  • The relationship began after the fall of the Soviet Union, when figures like David Duke (KKK) saw post-Soviet Russia as a “pool for the white race.”
  • Early interactions included underground subcultures: skinheads, neo-Nazi groups, and the Christian right.

• Intellectual Bridges:

  • Alexander Dugin (mostly European connections) and Sergei Glazyev (linked with the US movement via Lyndon LaRouche) played roles as ideological connectors.

• Institutionalization (2010s):

  • Shifted from fringe to more organized connections with Russian presidential administration involvement.
  • High-profile alt-right figures such as Richard Spencer, Jared Taylor, and media personalities from Breitbart and Fox News engaged with Russian elites or spent time in Russia.
  • Dugin’s “Fourth Political Theory” was widely disseminated among the US alt-right.

Quote:

“The story has been growing over the last 30 years, but it’s really the 2010s...that’s when it’s really becoming much more than just fringe.”
— Marlene Laruelle [06:54]

2. Influence vs. Confluence: Rethinking the Narrative

[08:18–10:07, 38:49–39:52]

• Overstated Influence:

  • Laruelle contends that discussions of Russian “influence” on the US far right are exaggerated. Direct ties are marginal compared to the scale of domestic far-right activity.

• Confluence Concept:

  • Prefers the term “confluence”—mutual and situational alliances, rather than unilateral influence.
  • US far-right actors seek connections for their own reasons; Russia is a “brand” serving as a symbol of rebellion against liberalism.

Quote:

“The US far right has its own agenda...they who decide to reach out to Russia, not necessarily Russia reaching out to them.”
— Marlene Laruelle [09:05]

3. Pan-White/Christian Nation Ideologies & Russian Brand

[11:38–14:09]

• Myth of Russia as a White Bastion:

  • Rooted in older European and American rightwing thought (e.g., Francis Parker Yockey’s “Imperium” and “Euro-Siberia” fantasies).
  • Dugin’s works repackage Nazi and occult narratives for this audience.

• Conservative/Traditional Values:

  • Putin’s regime projects “traditional values” as a cornerstone of soft power—appealing not just to white supremacist groups, but to conservative elements worldwide, including the Global South.

Quote:

“Russia has become a brand. It’s a brand of resistance, of rebellion against liberalism.”
— Marlene Laruelle [09:24]

4. Internal Contradictions: Nationalism, Critiques of America, and Geopolitics

[15:56–18:55, 20:27–22:58]

• Nationalism is nuanced and can be both pro- or anti-government, and even anti-state depending on whether the state aligns with notions of ethnic “purity.”
• Geopolitical events (e.g., Crimea, Ukraine war) have driven wedges within and between far-right groups in Russia, the US, and Europe.
• Some US far right support Ukraine as a “white” nation; others are pro-Russia due to global elite conspiracy beliefs.

Quote:

“Geopolitical relations are not always overlapping with ideological ones...sometimes one is saying the contrary to the other.”
— Marlene Laruelle [22:16]

5. European vs. American Far-Right: Different Scales & Institutionalization

[22:58–24:53]

• European far-right parties have a much more institutionalized relationship with Russia (official meetings, party agreements), unlike the more fringe, informal American connections.
• Mainstream European parties have sought Moscow’s support and recognition, which is rare in the US context.

6. Mainstreaming of Far-Right Narratives in US Conservatism

[24:53–27:45]

• The “mainstream” right and the radical far right are increasingly blending, particularly post-2010 with factors like social media, the Trump movement, and figures like Tucker Carlson.
• Pro-Russian narratives have penetrated farther into US mainstream conservative circles, blurring old boundaries.

Quote:

“Dissociating what is mainstream conservatism and what is far right has become much more difficult in the US as it is in Europe.”
— Marlene Laruelle [26:53]

7. Financial & Media Connections: A Decentralized, Opaque Network

[27:45–32:08]

• Financial ties are notoriously difficult to unravel—a web of state media, “ideological entrepreneurs” (e.g., Prigozhin, Malofeev), intelligence agencies, and indirect proxies.
• Transactions sometimes go through media companies, offshores, cryptocurrencies, subcultures (e.g., MMA, video games).
• Decentralization provides plausible deniability—Russian state actors signal priorities, but don’t micromanage or coordinate every connection.

Quote:

“It’s not Putin or even the government that are micromanaging...it’s much more decentralized than just imagining that, you know, Putin takes all decision and micromanages everything.”
— Marlene Laruelle [30:56]

8. Religious Connections: Russian Orthodox Church & US Christian Right

[32:08–36:28]

• Early 1990s: US Christian right groups proselytized in Russia.
• 2010s onward: Religious diplomacy, with the Russian Orthodox Church embracing anti-liberal, conservative alliances with American evangelicals.
• Organizations like the World Congress of Families serve as linchpins, frequently lobbying together.
• Not limited to fringe actors—outreach has included mainstream figures, such as meetings with US presidents.

Quote:

“It's a really interesting relationship...in the early 90s, it’s really the US Christian right which arrived in Russia and was proselytizing...then in 2010s...the Russian Orthodox Church realized that they have a certain power that they can talk to US Christian right.”
— Marlene Laruelle [32:37]

9. Ideological Labels: Caution Against Overusing “Fascism”

[36:28–38:49]

• Not all right-wing or illiberal actors fit the academic definition of fascism.
• Using the term too broadly obscures nuance—some relationships are genuinely fascist, but others are merely “illiberal” or conservative.
• Russia tailors its “anti-liberal” message to diverse audiences, including those on the political left and in the global South.

Quote:

“Russia is talking so many different ideological languages...to all those who are opposing liberalism, but for different reasons.”
— Marlene Laruelle [38:04]

10. Key Threats: Domestic Amplifiers vs. Foreign Plots

[39:52–43:41]

• The conversation pivots to whether these transnational connections threaten US democracy.
• Laruelle argues the real threat is domestic: US polarization, social media failures, and unaddressed grievances create fertile ground for exploitation.
• Russian interference amplifies existing divisions but is not the core cause.

Quotes:

“The threat is domestic...we need to address grievances of voters and take them seriously to decrease the threat at home. And in that case the external connection will become very secondary.”
— Marlene Laruelle [40:14]

“It [Russia's strategy] will be increasing...the more we will be dominated politically and polarized by social media, the more there will be actors, both external and domestic, who will overuse these tools.”
— Marlene Laruelle [42:45]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “It’s important to realize that US far right has agency...not seeing that something that comes from Moscow and then it works on the ground.” — Marlene Laruelle [09:05]
• “The notion of conservative values matter, but also the notion of refusing liberalism and naming liberalism as the enemy is really an important intellectual link for all these groups.” — Marlene Laruelle [13:53, 28:32]
• “Dissociating what is mainstream conservatism and what is far right has become much more difficult in the US as it is in Europe.” — Marlene Laruelle [26:53]
• “For me, the domestic element is the core one...the amplification mechanism is at home, it’s our own social media.” — Marlene Laruelle [40:25]
• “Russia is talking so many different ideological languages to all those who are opposing liberalism, but for different reasons.” — Marlene Laruelle [38:08]

Timestamps for Key Segments

• 03:28: Introduction to Marlene Laruelle and topic overview.
• 04:16–07:37: Historical evolution of US-Russia far-right ties.
• 08:18–10:07: Influence vs. confluence discussion.
• 11:38–14:09: Pan-white, pan-Christian myth and traditional values as soft power.
• 15:56–18:55: Contradictions in far-right nationalism and geopolitics.
• 21:18–22:58: Ukraine war’s impact on far-right alliances.
• 22:58–24:53: Differences between European and American far-right connections to Russia.
• 24:53–27:45: Mainstreaming of far-right talking points in US conservatism.
• 27:45–32:08: Financial connections and the decentralized support structure.
• 32:08–36:28: The Russian Orthodox Church and religious networks.
• 36:28–38:49: Nuanced use of the term “fascism.”
• 39:52–43:41: The real threat: US polarization as amplifier.

Conclusion

In a detailed, historically grounded conversation, Marlene Laruelle underscores that US-Russia far-right connections—while real and at times alarming—are neither monolithic nor driven solely by Russian design. The relationship is best understood as a “confluence” of mutual ideological interests, symbolic utility, and opportunistic networking. Financial and religious ties support this web, but institutional boundaries have eroded, blurring the lines between the fringe and the mainstream. Crucially, Laruelle warns that it's the domestic fissures and grievances in the US that make foreign interference effective—highlighting the urgent need for introspective, homegrown solutions to extremism and polarization.