Lawfare Archive: Russia and the American Far-right, with Marlene Laruelle

Summary

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The Lawfare Podcast

Episode: Lawfare Archive: Russia and the American Far-right, with Marlene Laruelle

Date: November 30, 2025
Host: Olivia Manis
Guest: Marlene Laruelle (Professor, Director of Illiberalism Studies Program at GWU)

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Overview

This episode revisits the persistent and evolving relationship between Russia and the American far right. Host Olivia Manis interviews Marlene Laruelle, a leading expert on illiberalism and nationalist movements, to unpack the financial, religious, ideological, and historical ties connecting far-right actors in the United States and Russia. Drawing on recent DOJ indictments, historical examples, and the shifting political landscape, the discussion critiques assumptions about the nature and direction of Russian influence, explores the mythos of Russia as a bastion of “traditional values,” and evaluates the real threats posed by these transnational networks.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Historical Evolution of US Far-Right & Russia Connections

[04:16–07:37]

• Initial Contact (1990s):

  • The relationship began after the fall of the Soviet Union, when figures like David Duke (KKK) saw post-Soviet Russia as a “pool for the white race.”
  • Early interactions included underground subcultures: skinheads, neo-Nazi groups, and the Christian right.

• Intellectual Bridges:

  • Alexander Dugin (mostly European connections) and Sergei Glazyev (linked with the US movement via Lyndon LaRouche) played roles as ideological connectors.

• Institutionalization (2010s):

  • Shifted from fringe to more organized connections with Russian presidential administration involvement.
  • High-profile alt-right figures such as Richard Spencer, Jared Taylor, and media personalities from Breitbart and Fox News engaged with Russian elites or spent time in Russia.
  • Dugin’s “Fourth Political Theory” was widely disseminated among the US alt-right.

Quote:

“The story has been growing over the last 30 years, but it’s really the 2010s...that’s when it’s really becoming much more than just fringe.”
— Marlene Laruelle [06:54]

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2. Influence vs. Confluence: Rethinking the Narrative

[08:18–10:07, 38:49–39:52]

• Overstated Influence:

  • Laruelle contends that discussions of Russian “influence” on the US far right are exaggerated. Direct ties are marginal compared to the scale of domestic far-right activity.

• Confluence Concept:

  • Prefers the term “confluence”—mutual and situational alliances, rather than unilateral influence.
  • US far-right actors seek connections for their own reasons; Russia is a “brand” serving as a symbol of rebellion against liberalism.

Quote:

“The US far right has its own agenda...they who decide to reach out to Russia, not necessarily Russia reaching out to them.”
— Marlene Laruelle [09:05]

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3. Pan-White/Christian Nation Ideologies & Russian Brand

[11:38–14:09]

• Myth of Russia as a White Bastion:

  • Rooted in older European and American rightwing thought (e.g., Francis Parker Yockey’s “Imperium” and “Euro-Siberia” fantasies).
  • Dugin’s works repackage Nazi and occult narratives for this audience.

• Conservative/Traditional Values:

  • Putin’s regime projects “traditional values” as a cornerstone of soft power—appealing not just to white supremacist groups, but to conservative elements worldwide, including the Global South.

Quote:

“Russia has become a brand. It’s a brand of resistance, of rebellion against liberalism.”
— Marlene Laruelle [09:24]

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4. Internal Contradictions: Nationalism, Critiques of America, and Geopolitics

[15:56–18:55, 20:27–22:58]

• Nationalism is nuanced and can be both pro- or anti-government, and even anti-state depending on whether the state aligns with notions of ethnic “purity.”
• Geopolitical events (e.g., Crimea, Ukraine war) have driven wedges within and between far-right groups in Russia, the US, and Europe.
• Some US far right support Ukraine as a “white” nation; others are pro-Russia due to global elite conspiracy beliefs.

Quote:

“Geopolitical relations are not always overlapping with ideological ones...sometimes one is saying the contrary to the other.”
— Marlene Laruelle [22:16]

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5. European vs. American Far-Right: Different Scales & Institutionalization

[22:58–24:53]

• European far-right parties have a much more institutionalized relationship with Russia (official meetings, party agreements), unlike the more fringe, informal American connections.
• Mainstream European parties have sought Moscow’s support and recognition, which is rare in the US context.

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6. Mainstreaming of Far-Right Narratives in US Conservatism

[24:53–27:45]

• The “mainstream” right and the radical far right are increasingly blending, particularly post-2010 with factors like social media, the Trump movement, and figures like Tucker Carlson.
• Pro-Russian narratives have penetrated farther into US mainstream conservative circles, blurring old boundaries.

Quote:

“Dissociating what is mainstream conservatism and what is far right has become much more difficult in the US as it is in Europe.”
— Marlene Laruelle [26:53]

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7. Financial & Media Connections: A Decentralized, Opaque Network

[27:45–32:08]

• Financial ties are notoriously difficult to unravel—a web of state media, “ideological entrepreneurs” (e.g., Prigozhin, Malofeev), intelligence agencies, and indirect proxies.
• Transactions sometimes go through media companies, offshores, cryptocurrencies, subcultures (e.g., MMA, video games).
• Decentralization provides plausible deniability—Russian state actors signal priorities, but don’t micromanage or coordinate every connection.

Quote:

“It’s not Putin or even the government that are micromanaging...it’s much more decentralized than just imagining that, you know, Putin takes all decision and micromanages everything.”
— Marlene Laruelle [30:56]

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8. Religious Connections: Russian Orthodox Church & US Christian Right

[32:08–36:28]

• Early 1990s: US Christian right groups proselytized in Russia.
• 2010s onward: Religious diplomacy, with the Russian Orthodox Church embracing anti-liberal, conservative alliances with American evangelicals.
• Organizations like the World Congress of Families serve as linchpins, frequently lobbying together.
• Not limited to fringe actors—outreach has included mainstream figures, such as meetings with US presidents.

Quote:

“It's a really interesting relationship...in the early 90s, it’s really the US Christian right which arrived in Russia and was proselytizing...then in 2010s...the Russian Orthodox Church realized that they have a certain power that they can talk to US Christian right.”
— Marlene Laruelle [32:37]

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9. Ideological Labels: Caution Against Overusing “Fascism”

[36:28–38:49]

• Not all right-wing or illiberal actors fit the academic definition of fascism.
• Using the term too broadly obscures nuance—some relationships are genuinely fascist, but others are merely “illiberal” or conservative.
• Russia tailors its “anti-liberal” message to diverse audiences, including those on the political left and in the global South.

Quote:

“Russia is talking so many different ideological languages...to all those who are opposing liberalism, but for different reasons.”
— Marlene Laruelle [38:04]

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10. Key Threats: Domestic Amplifiers vs. Foreign Plots

[39:52–43:41]

• The conversation pivots to whether these transnational connections threaten US democracy.
• Laruelle argues the real threat is domestic: US polarization, social media failures, and unaddressed grievances create fertile ground for exploitation.
• Russian interference amplifies existing divisions but is not the core cause.

Quotes:

“The threat is domestic...we need to address grievances of voters and take them seriously to decrease the threat at home. And in that case the external connection will become very secondary.”
— Marlene Laruelle [40:14]

“It [Russia's strategy] will be increasing...the more we will be dominated politically and polarized by social media, the more there will be actors, both external and domestic, who will overuse these tools.”
— Marlene Laruelle [42:45]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “It’s important to realize that US far right has agency...not seeing that something that comes from Moscow and then it works on the ground.” — Marlene Laruelle [09:05]
• “The notion of conservative values matter, but also the notion of refusing liberalism and naming liberalism as the enemy is really an important intellectual link for all these groups.” — Marlene Laruelle [13:53, 28:32]
• “Dissociating what is mainstream conservatism and what is far right has become much more difficult in the US as it is in Europe.” — Marlene Laruelle [26:53]
• “For me, the domestic element is the core one...the amplification mechanism is at home, it’s our own social media.” — Marlene Laruelle [40:25]
• “Russia is talking so many different ideological languages to all those who are opposing liberalism, but for different reasons.” — Marlene Laruelle [38:08]

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• 03:28: Introduction to Marlene Laruelle and topic overview.
• 04:16–07:37: Historical evolution of US-Russia far-right ties.
• 08:18–10:07: Influence vs. confluence discussion.
• 11:38–14:09: Pan-white, pan-Christian myth and traditional values as soft power.
• 15:56–18:55: Contradictions in far-right nationalism and geopolitics.
• 21:18–22:58: Ukraine war’s impact on far-right alliances.
• 22:58–24:53: Differences between European and American far-right connections to Russia.
• 24:53–27:45: Mainstreaming of far-right talking points in US conservatism.
• 27:45–32:08: Financial connections and the decentralized support structure.
• 32:08–36:28: The Russian Orthodox Church and religious networks.
• 36:28–38:49: Nuanced use of the term “fascism.”
• 39:52–43:41: The real threat: US polarization as amplifier.

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Conclusion

In a detailed, historically grounded conversation, Marlene Laruelle underscores that US-Russia far-right connections—while real and at times alarming—are neither monolithic nor driven solely by Russian design. The relationship is best understood as a “confluence” of mutual ideological interests, symbolic utility, and opportunistic networking. Financial and religious ties support this web, but institutional boundaries have eroded, blurring the lines between the fringe and the mainstream. Crucially, Laruelle warns that it's the domestic fissures and grievances in the US that make foreign interference effective—highlighting the urgent need for introspective, homegrown solutions to extremism and polarization.

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Transcript

[Olivia Manis]

Nearly every News alert in 2025 has raised questions, some old, some new, about the law and national security. And now you get the chance to ask Lawfare directly. It's time for our annual Ask Us Anything Mailbag podcast, an opportunity for you to ask Lawfare this year's most burning questions. You can submit your question by leaving a voicemail at 202-643-846, or by sending a recording of yourself asking your question to askusanythinglawfairmail.com by December 16th.

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[Isabella Arroyo]

I'm Isabella Arroyo, intern at Lawfare, with an episode from the Lawfare archive for November 30, 2025. On November 21, social media platform X began rolling out a new transparency oriented feature allowing users to see what country an account is based in. Though X has acknowledged that the location feature could potentially be affected by recent travel, temporary relocation, or virtual private network usage, the publication of users accounts seems to have revealed that a number of accounts focused on U.S. politics and purporting to be published by Americans actually originate abroad in countries such as Russia, India and Bangladesh, as reported by the BBC. While some of these accounts may be part of more concerted and traditional nation state influence activities, many location fakers are just individuals trying to earn more money from monetized accounts by posing as Americans. So far, such accounts appear to have disproportionately targeted the American right and often voiced support for the MAGA movement. For today's archive I selected an episode from November 29, 2024, in which Olivia Manus and Marlene Laruel discuss the financial, ideological and historical connections between the American far right and Russia, as well as the distinction between confluence and influence, white supremacist notions of a pan white nation embodied by Russia, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in fostering connections, and more.

[Olivia Manis]

I'm Olivia Manis, associate editor of lawfare, with Marlene Laruel, a research professor of international affairs and Political science at the George Washington University and director of GW's Illiberalism Studies Program.

[Marlene Laruelle]

I think the notion of conservative values matter, but also the notion of refusing liberalism and naming liberalism as the enemy is really an important intellectual link for all these groups.

[Olivia Manis]

Today we're talking about the connection between the US Far right and Russia, with an indictment released by the Department of Justice in September alleging that Tenet Far Right Media Group received funds from Russia and alt right figures like Steve Bannon openly expressing admiration for Vladimir Putin. I talked with Marlene to better understand the financial, ideological and historical factors in play. All right, so maybe you can start by giving us a little bit of background on these connections, on these connections between Russia and the far right in America. When did they kind of start being a part of the public discourse?

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah, indeed. It's not a new relationship. Right. It had several periods of time. In fact, it began the direct, at least relationship really began in the early 90s once the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia opened for foreigners. We know that already in the 90s there was some Ku Klux Klan figures like David Duke, who was traveling to Russia to celebrate it as a kind of pool for the white race. We had skinhead groups spreading their culture in Russian big cities. We had Russian section of, you know, blood and honor, OB88, all the big kind of US and British skinhead structure. And we had also the first translation arriving from English to Russia. And we already had the Christian right proselytizing in Russia as early as the early 90s. But for very long that relationship, it stayed, stayed at the kind of fringe level. You know, it was underground subculture, sports, soccer fan, white frog, skinhead. And then two more intellectual figures already emerged in the early 90s. One is the infamous Alexander Dugin, but he was mostly connected to European far right, not to the US one. And another key figure is Sergei Glazyev, who after became pretty close to putting a figure he was not in the 90s, and he became very close to Lyndon LaRouche. So another type of us far right, then we have a Second period in the late 2000, early 2000, when the Russian Orthodox Church is reaching out to the Christian right. And so that is also kind of the religious line. And then the third period is really the 2010s when the relationship got upgraded to a higher level in Russia, with the presidential administration getting involved and many more actors being engaged in the bilateral relationships. So still representative of the white supremacist traveling to Russia, the alt right. We know that, for example, Richard Spencer was interested by Russia. His former wife translated things from Russia. Jared Taylor from American Renaissance traveled to Russia. Several figures from Breitbart from Fox News also traveled to Russia. Some even took jobs in Russia. And for all this American alt right, it's really Dugin, who was a key figure because one of his big theoretical books called the Force Political Theory got really widely translated in many languages, but especially in English, and was really republished on many of the alt right website. Dugin was also interviewed by Alex John. And so that's how really it's the 2000 and tens that are the core of the relationship. We know that Bannon mentioned Dugin several times, and they had the same kind of network in Europe, and that goes until a few months ago. Tucker Carlson interviewing dugin in early 2024. So the story has been growing over the last 30 years, but it's really the 2010s that's. So it's really becoming much more than just fringe.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah, definitely. And I think in the 2016 election, it especially became. It really became a part of the public discourse with election interference. And people began kind of pointing out these connections that you've kind of delineated for us. I think it's interesting because it has been such a big part of the public discourse. But in one of your papers, I think you do kind of talk about the difference between influence and confluence. And I wonder if you kind of could explain the difference between these two concepts and whether or not the connections between the far right and Russia are kind of overstated in popular discourse.

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah, in fact, I think they have been overstated. Right. For two reasons. The first one, as I said, of course, this connection, they do exist. But if you look at the whole spectrum of what is the US Far right and what is the Russian far right, the bilateral relationship, it's still very marginal because all these groups in their everyday action and thinking, they are mostly focused on domestic issues. And it's only a very small minority of them that is interested in engaging on international topics and international connections. So the relationship exists. But if you look at the whole spectrum. It's still very minor for both of them. And the second point is that there is a danger of talking too much about an influence from Russia on US Far right, because it would imply a kind of unilateral direction in the relationship, while in fact, it's going both ways. And that's why I prefer this notion of confluence, because it tells you that you have actors on both sides who decide jointly to share narratives and discuss with each other, engage with each other, but it's an axis of convenience, not an influence from one over the other. Right? So the US Far right has its own agenda, it has its own agency, and it's often they who decide to reach out to Russia, not necessarily Russia reaching out to them. So I think it's important to realize that, in fact, for the us for part of the US Far right, Russia has become a brand. It's a brand of resistance, of rebellion against liberalism. So you may have US actors who themselves decide to connect with Russia or decide they don't want it because it's too toxic. So we need to give back agency to the US Far right in connecting or not connecting with Russia and not seeing that something that comes from Moscow, and then it works on the ground.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah, I think that's a fantastic point. And it's not realistic or correct to suggest that the far right is just this sort of passive force that absorbs whatever is kind of thrown at it. Right. It has its own interests, and there are domestic sort of considerations as well, which I think you've pointed to. So I kind of want to delve a little bit deeper. I want to delineate the different kind of connections throughout our conversation, kind of breaking them down into financial connections and into religious connections, and then also into ideological and sort of intellectual connections. And I think I'd like to start with that last one, because I think you've kind of hinted at it already. These sort of ideological or political intellectual connections. You've already pointed to Bannon, you've pointed to Dugin, and these are big names, right? These are ones that most people in both Russia and America are familiar with Bannon, in terms of his promulgating far right narratives, in terms of often praising Russia and Putin and then Dugin for his kind of perceived connection to nationalism in Russia. So I think one thing I want to really dig into is one of the more troubling elements of the Russia far right connection, which is the idea of a pan white nation. And it seems like some extremists in America see Russia as kind of emblematic of this pan white nation or, or of creating a pan white nation. Can you provide a little bit of background on this?

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah, absolutely. This vision of Russia, the kind of, you know, the last place for the white race to survive. In fact, it was already present, as I said, in David Duke's trip in the 90s. But in fact it's even connected to an older tradition that come from Francis Parker Yochy and his book Imperium that was published just after the end of the Second World War. And it has a lot of echoes today with another notion that is the one of Euro Siberia, that is this idea of, you know, large continental space that would be populated by white conservative Christian people, which is of course a totally mystical vision of Russia because Russia is a very multi ethnic nation, but that the way it is projected. And, and it's a notion that was advanced by a French far right thinkers called Guillaume Fai and he traveled to Russia in the 90s, but he was also very influential on the US alt right. So he's really one of this European figure that make the connection between Russia and the US And Dugin himself has been publishing a lot of books since the 90s to know what there's about, you know, rehabilitating all this Nazi occultist theory about Aryan race, the space of Tule, hyperborea, so all these kind of Nazi concepts about white race. And that has been kind of very much, kind of in resonance with a lot of what the tradition of the US far right. But I think more broadly it's telling us a lot about this feeling that there is maybe not necessarily a pan white, but a pan Christian, you know, European nation that you can find in Europe, in Russia and in the US and they are all united in their kind of conservative Christian identity against the world of people of color. So it's a very ethnicized but transnational vision of what is uniting us and Russia beyond the geopolitical opposition.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah, can you talk a little bit more about this notion of traditional, or I think you said conservative values because Putin has often talked about traditional values. Right. And some see this as kind of euphemistic for arch conservativism, for returning to a previous time, a previous era, rejecting modernism, rejecting liberalism to some degree. So do you think this appeal to traditional values, this contributes to kind of how attractive he is to a lot of far right groups?

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah, absolutely. It's one of the big soft power narratives coming from Russia. It has a huge appeal, but not only to US or European far right, but Also to the Muslim world, to some constituencies in the Global South. And it's this notion of traditional values, the way it's used by Russia. It's still very weird in terms of content. Right. Because you can read it as a kind of, you know, moderate conservatism, just kind of sensitive and not very favorable to LGBT rights. You can read it in a much more like affirmative conservatism, for example, anti abortion or something like super reactionary. So you have all this kind of graduation about the level of conservatism or reactionary thinking that come around. And it's not only about sexual identity, gender relations. It's also a conservatism in the sense of preserving the homogeneity of the nation. And in that case it's connected to nationalism or ethno nationalism. And also refusing the kind of liberal tradition of self criticizing our own culture, for example, what Europe did in terms of colonization, and so refusing all these elements that we see now in our society about, you know, trying to realize that if the west has been the dominant force in the world historically, we need to be self critical toward ourselves. So it's a refusal of all these elements that come indeed from contemporary liberalism. And that's why also I think the notion of conservative values matter, but also the notion of refusing liberalism and naming liberalism as the enemy is really an important intellectual links for all these groups.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah, for sure. I mean, it sounds like, you know, what you're getting to is there's a profoundly reactionary element here. Right. Which is reactionary to liberalism, to neoliberalism, to, you know, to globalization. To what extent can we necessarily classify a lot of these far right groups as nationalists? Necessarily? Because it seems like a lot are very critical actually of America. So maybe you could speak to that and talk a little bit about the variation and how they relate to America as a concept and how that kind of ties into their connection with Russia.

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah. The notion of nationalism is in itself super complex. Right. So it can be an ethno nationalism, like very much for the ethnic group that is anti patriotic because they consider that U.S. or America. I mean, the U.S. government is not defending the ethnic nation. So you can be ethno nationalist and kind of anti your own government. You can be both in the same time and you have the same nuances. In Russia, you had nationalist group that were super critical of the Putin's regime because they were seeing it as too much Eurasian, open to ethnic diversity, and they wanted something much more kind of ethno nationalist. And you have those Russian far right who embraced Putin's narrative of diversity and Russia, the empire, the successor of the Soviet Union. So all these nuances, they are there and you can see them in the group and in the relationship they have. Sometimes it doesn't seem to very clearly overlap. So sometimes it's not the core ideological links that explain the relationship. It can be just personal friendship or some European connection. But of course, for the US and Russia, one of the key tension they have is that they may agree on this core ideological idea that there is a pan white or pan Christian nation that is fighting against liberalism and against people of color, but at the same time they have geopolitical tensions. Right? So when for the Russian nationalists, very often the west is seen as the enemy. And so they need to make a difference between, okay, our enemy is the liberal west, but not the conservative west. And the same on the US Side. For some groups, they were very pro Putin in the 2000, and then after Russia first war with Ukraine and annexing Crimea in 2014, they had to withdraw because there was too much geopolitical tension and they didn't want it to look like they were betraying American interest. So all these elements, they are creating tension in the relationship. In fact, it was very visible in, in Tucker Carlson interview of Putin where Putin was very critical of the role of the US in the world. Why, of course, Tucker Carlson was coming with a kind of, you know, America first and make America great again. And so the relationship is complex and it's not an easy one for both sides of the relationship.

[Olivia Manis]

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[Olivia Manis]

Right? I mean, it sounds like there are a lot of internal contradictions that both sides kind of have to grapple with. Maybe we could talk a little bit more about two things. One, I think you mentioned Ukraine, which I would be really curious to see how you think this plays into that relationship, if it's made it more difficult or how far right groups in the US are reacting to that. And then from a historical perspective, I wonder if we could delve a little bit deeper into, you know, the historical precedent for this in that Russia has kind of always tried to stir up tensions in America. And I wonder how this plays into kind of like a long term strategy. If it is a long term strategy. Maybe on the former point, like, how does Ukraine play into this?

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah, so Ukraine is also. It's a kind of paradoxical situation because from the US far right perspective, you have some groups that are pro Ukrainian because they see Ukraine as a kind of white race also nation fighting for its ethnic survival. And you had some far right guys who went to fight on the Ukrainian side and also a lot of European far right fighters on the Ukrainian side, because the European far right is as divided as the US far right on the Ukrainian issue. And then you have the other side that is part of the US far right who consider that Ukraine is just the victim of liberal global elites and therefore Russia is in its right to defend itself. So the war in Ukraine has really divided both the US and the European far right into the kind of pro Russian or pro Ukrainian narrative. And so depending if they want to focus on the geopolitical relationship or more on the ethnic survival aspect, that may explain if they will go for Ukraine or if they will go for Russia. So it's pretty complex. And that tells you that geopolitical relationship are not overlapping with ideological one, Right? They may, but sometimes one is saying the contrary to the other.

[Olivia Manis]

You've pointed to something else, which is that there are certainly connections between the European far right and the American far right, but they don't always have the same interests. Right. And so what is the difference maybe between the relationship that the European far right has to Russia versus the relationship that the American far right has to Russia. How, how do those relationships kind of differ?

[Marlene Laruelle]

So the American far right is still much further away from Russia than the European far right, which is very closely connected to the Russian one. So it's a big difference in scale, right? The Russia European far right connection, they are deeper, people were visiting each other much more. There was a lot of translation, joint. Even if of course, after February 2022 and Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine, it declined because Russians couldn't travel anymore to Europe. Everything Russia related was under sanction. It was becoming too toxic. And also a big difference between the U.S. russia and the Europe Russia far right relationship is that the Europe Russia one has been much more institutionalized. You have more mainstream far right party that had very official meeting in Moscow. Marine Le Pen, for example, from France met directly with Putin. The fpo, the far right party in Austria has an agreement with the presidential party in Russia, United Russia. Matteo Salvini Ligas in Italy also had very institutionalized relationship. We know that the AfD people in Germany were also having official meeting in Russia. So it's a totally different dimension that you wouldn't find on the side of the US Russia far right relationship, which is much at a lower level of institutionalization and much more fringe than what you can find in Europe.

[Olivia Manis]

Absolutely, yeah. On that institutionalization point, I think maybe now would be a good time to talk a little bit about kind of disaggregating the American sort of alt right and far right from mainstream conservatism in the US how is the far right and the alt right different from the mainstream sort of right wing party in the US Especially in relation to their connection with Russia. How do they kind of diverge?

[Marlene Laruelle]

So that's a great question. And of course it's a question that is evolving because the situation has been evolving a lot these last decades. Right. For very long it was clear that you had a kind of fringe radical far right that had relationship with Russia, but that, you know, the core of the Republican Party, for example, was always by tradition, super anti Russians voting, you know, laws against Russia, putting Russia under sanction. So it was really two dissociated world. In fact, it's only in the 2010 when the Christian right reconnected with Russia and with the Russian Orthodox Church around the conservative values. Yet you could feel that even inside the kind of official Republican Party and kind of mainstream conservatism, you had some figure who were thinking, well, okay, maybe we are geopolitically in competition, but we like Putin and his traditional values and so on. So that was the first kind of moment of really the kind of pro Russian narrative arriving into something that was much more mainstream. And then in a sense, with the Trump phenomena, it got totally mixed, right? Because now it's much more difficult to identify very clear boundaries between what you would identify as far right and what you would identify as mainstream conservatism and Republican Party. So around Trump and the MAGA movement and the role of Tucker Carlson, you had a kind of entry of some far right topics and relationship to Russia becoming much more mainstream. So if you look at what is happening at the Congress, you would still have a majority of Republican being like, super critical of Russia by tradition. But you can feel that the boundaries have been evolving, right, not only on this geopolitical issue, but more globally. Dissociating what is mainstream conservatism and what is far right has become much more difficult in the US as it is in Europe. It's the same phenomenon of kind of fluidity of narrative, social media influence, conspiracy theories circulating, which were very French before, and who kind of got mainstreamized by Elon Musk and other actors of the social media world. So it's much more difficult now to identify. But clearly, and we will see how it will be evolving now that we will have a second Trump administration, how the relationship to Russia and the relationship to Ukraine will be impacting the concrete policy work of the Congress. That will be interesting to see because it could go both directions. You could have continuing to have some voices that seems to be pro Russian on some aspect, but at the same time, continuing sanction and kind of pushing for geopolitical competition. So it's still a very fluid and open space. And I'm not sure we really know how it will be evolving in the first coming months.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah, I think what you're pointing to is there's no longer such a clear delineation. I think. I think this is a good point at which we can kind of segue a little bit away from those more sort of ideological, less concrete connections and kind of move to maybe some of those connections that we actually see actual policy or like, financial connections, which are actually concrete. So in the financial realm, we've had some DOJ indictments kind of that have alleged that Russia has been kind of funneling money into far right groups. And so to the extent that it's doing that, we've seen media, what are the main Channels. It's doing that through. Is it mostly media groups or are there other avenues? It's exploiting those financial connections that it's kind of sending money to support var. Right. Groups.

[Marlene Laruelle]

So it's quite complicated because of course, it's not very visible to external eyes. And also because in Russia, it's a huge web of support and it's largely decentralized. So there is no one source of funding and decision making in Russia in relation to US or European far right. And you have different groups working with different groups abroad. They sometimes don't know what the other are doing or they know, but they are competing with each other. So it's pretty difficult to kind of identify exactly who is doing what. So we know that it can be going through state media company like Russia Today. It can be going through what we call ideological entrepreneurs. So people who have their own pocket of money and act as private entrepreneur, but in the name of the bigger Russian cause and to build their own influence. So we all knew about Evgeny Prigozhin media empire. It can be Konstantin Malofiev, who is one of these other ideological entrepreneurs working mostly with the European far right. And it can be the intelligence agencies. Right. The security services. And in that case, they work with proxy with different offshore structure. And so then it's very difficult to identify even if you are on the receiving side. Right. The US Side, you may not know who is funding you exactly. Because there are so many proxies and kind of screens that doesn't allow you to really identify the source of. And then we know that there are a lot of also relationships that are purely transactional, Bitcoin exchanges, going through some subculture video games, mixed martial arts. So there are probably a lot of flaws going on, but we don't really see them. And we are even not sure US Actor themselves who are receiving this money, understand that money is coming from Russia. So it's a pretty complicated hub.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah, I mean, I think the classic image is like Vladimir Putin ordering money is sent to so and so group. Right. But you're pointing to the fact that it's much more diffuse, much more difficult to pinpoint, which I guess in many ways makes it more difficult.

[Marlene Laruelle]

You see that the Russian political regime, it's functioning by what we call signaling. So the presidential administration sends signals about what matters, but then they are not micromanaging. Right. They let a large group of factors which can be inside the state structure or outside transforming the signals into concrete policy. But it's not Putin or even the government that are micromanaging that and first it gives them plausible deniability and then it costs less money. Then if this actor fail, it's not the responsibility of the Russian state in itself. So that's why it's, it's much more decentralized than just imagining that, you know, Putin take all decision and micromanage everything.

[Olivia Manis]

Right. Which, which makes it a lot more difficult to kind of, you know, pin down or you know, I guess in the case of intelligence, stop entirely. So, you know, I think that, that that sort of decentralized nature is something we maybe can't, can't understand entirely in the US or in a democratic nation. Right. Where in theory we're supposed to be controlling how, how funds are being distributed. So yeah, it seems like there's just like a plethora of these financial connections, many of which we don't know about.

[Marlene Laruelle]

Right.

[Olivia Manis]

The DOJ diamond is the exception, not the rule. Moving from the more financial concrete components of this relationship, I want to kind of go back to something that you mentioned earlier, which is the religious connection, which it seems like you believe is much stronger than a lot of these other connections. So can you talk a little bit more about the religious connection and specifically the Russian Orthodox Church and how that plays into this?

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah, so it's a really interesting relationship because there you see that it has been a kind of back and forth movement. It's not one has been influencing the other, it has been going both ways. Right. So in the early 90s, it's really the US Christian rights which arrived in Russia and was proselytizing and making policy and business connection. And then in 2010, so at the moment we're here, we are in kind of Obama presidency. Progressive LGBT rights are a big issue that suddenly the US Christian right realized that you have this huge contrast between Obama's policies and what Putin is building around the kind of Christian conservative values. And at the moment where the Russian Orthodox Church realized that they have a certain of power that they can talk to US Christian. Right. And so a lot of all these conservative institutions in the US defending the so called natural family are becoming really super pro Russian. And the key power broker has been the World Congress of Families, which is originally a US institution, but it has been since then really developing a lot of networks in, in Russia and in all the kind of Eastern European, post communist world. And then a lot of other association, the American Family Association, Liberty Council praising Putin. And then there was even some visits, so some very high level officials from the Russian Orthodox Church visiting American evangelics in the US in the 2000, going to some Presbyterian churches in Texas, even having meeting with former US President George W. Bush. So that relationship was a pretty strong one around, united around this kind of conservative values. And we saw it up to Trump first presidency, where for example, at the National Prayer Breakfast, you had really important Russian delegation that were there both to talk about conservative values, but also to do business or to develop networks. And I think that will continue because it's a super strong move movement in the US and in Russia. And it's a way to not to be too fringe and too radical and not to be too top level official relationship, which is difficult because of the geopolitical relationship. So it's just at the right level, enough institutionalized, but not too much to be one of the way the two countries and the two far rights can talk to each other.

[Olivia Manis]

Religion is, you know, obviously has often traditionally been used to establish those transnational connections. Do you feel that that connection, the sort of religious one, is strong enough to kind of create larger institutional connections, that is the ones you point to in Europe to kind of actually start influencing policy or are they kind of purely relegated to the religious space, do you think?

[Marlene Laruelle]

So here also it's evolving, it's clearly relegated. That's my impression. At the same time, they are more and more working together, you know, borrowing mechanics, ideas, lobbying strategies to develop. And so you can see it has been getting more and more influenced, even if because of the geopolitical tension now it's more difficult to articulate publicly, but the relationship is still there. And I think at the moment where the geopolitical tension will be less visible, you know, in case we would get a ceasefire, for example, in Ukraine, I think we will see that relationship reemerge and being a pretty kind of strong links between both countries. It's also a way to do lobbying, you know, and business. Without saying it like that.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah, yeah, definitely. Moving away from the religion point, I think one word, you know, I'm thinking about, you know, both the right in, in Russia and the right in America. And Russia more largely, I think the word fascism has been used a lot to describe the far right in America. And then also increasingly some people are calling Russia a fascist state. Do you think that that's an accurate, an accurate term to kind of describe these two groups and their communications and the kind of platform that Russia is encouraging in the U.S. is it accurate to call it sort of a fascist movement that connects these two?

[Marlene Laruelle]

So I think we should be careful when we use the term Right. Because it's a very heavily loaded term and it has been, I think, overused. And it's dangerous if it's overused because then we are losing the nuances that we need to have. So, yes, some of these groups are fascist by their ideology, both on the US side and on the Russian side. And we should name them because they fit the kind of academic definition of fascism, so we should use that. But the global relationship is much more than that. Right. The religious relationship cannot be only labelled fascist. It's more complicated than that. And then this kind of mainstream conservatism against everything identified as liberal and progressive. I'm also not sure we should be calling it fascist. Fascist should be reserved to really vary some specific groups. So you have, yes, you have a fascist connection and you have a religious and a mainstream conservative connection. And even more globally, Russia is talking so many different ideological languages. Russia is also talking to the left in Europe. Russia is talking to the global South. So Russia is talking different ideological languages to all those who are opposing liberalism, but for different reasons. So we can use fascism, but for very specific relationship. Otherwise I think we should be more careful. And that's why I'm personally using this notion of illiberalism to describe the key element that unified all these groups is that it's against liberalism. Right. It's a critique of liberalism which can come from the left, from the right, and when it's from the right, it can come from a mainstream conservative up to the radical fascist groups.

[Olivia Manis]

Yeah. Which I think goes back to your point about influence versus confluence. Right. There are factors domestically and in all nations that Russia might try to exploit, or that it has its own interests, that it brings together these two strands. Rather than a clear unidirectional influence, it's a bi directional thing. And there's not a clear, necessarily as clear a sort of influence as some people would make, would make it out to be. So, you know, on that point, I kind of want to start thinking about, you know, the future. You know, I think we've already tried to sort of delineate the complexity of this relationship and the fact that it's not, it can't be simplified to, you know, Russia wants something and it's, it's getting people in the United States to do it. But I do wonder if you think, nonetheless, these connections pose a threat to our democracy. Are they part of an overall strategy of undermining democracy through disinformation, interference?

[Marlene Laruelle]

Yeah, and of course, that's a great question, and it's a super Sensitive one, because it's both a question of how we interpret, but it's also influencing what can be the policy to counter this relationship. And so my interpretation is that the threat is domestic and so we should focus on domestic issues and not on the external threat. The external threat in itself or this transnational connection, they are not dangerous in themselves. If at home there is no pressure and tensions, they become dangerous because we have tension at home. So for me, the domestic element is the core one. We need to address grievances of voters and take them seriously to decrease the threat at home. And in that case the external connection will became very secondary. So for example, there was a lot of debates about how to fight Russian so called disinformation, propaganda, interferences, whatever the terminology was used. But the amplification mechanism is at home. Right? It's our own social media. So if you don't begin by a huge discussion about how do we regulate social media and Silicon Valley big tech, discussing how to stop Russian interference is a very secondary element. You need to begin with what is happening at home. For me, that's the core element. And is that an overall strategy of Russia? Yes, it is. But Russia is having multiple strategies of weakening the liberal hegemony. Some of these Russian strategies are legal, you know, using United Nation platform, creating the BRICs, you know, talking to the global South. So some of Russia's strategies are legal. It's just playing with what the international system is. And some are what we call hybrid warfare that are much more kind of illegal or using the kind of gray zone of our liberal system. But for me, the core is really that we need to look at what is happening in our own countries and in that case the external relationship. Yeah, of course they play an amplifying role. They are an echo chamber, but they are an echo chamber of something that is domestic before.

[Olivia Manis]

All right, so fortifying our own institutions, fortifying our own sort of mechanisms for dealing with internal divisions, it seems like, is what you see as key. That said, do you feel like these connections, I mean, let's say we continue en route, let's say we don't address these internal divisions, let's say we don't sort of fortify our own institutions, whether they be sort of in terms of regulating social media, regulating big tech, do you see these connections as growing stronger or weakening over time, or do you think it's kind of impossible to predict that?

[Marlene Laruelle]

Well, I would imagine they would go stronger because I think the more there will be division in our own societies, the more actors who want to challenge the liberal world order will be using the chaos we have at home and the division we have at home. And it will be not only Russia, can be China, Iran, a lot of other countries. So I think there are a lot of actors in the world now that like this kind of chaotic atmosphere and who are used to play very transactional policies and kind of aggravating division because that serves their own strategic interests. So I think it will be increasing and the more we will be kind of dominated politically and polarized by social media, the more there will be actors, both external and domestic, who will overuse all these tools to kind of advance their own political projects against the liberal one.

[Olivia Manis]

I think that's that's a really good note to end on. So thank you.

[Marlene Laruelle]

Thank you so much.

[Olivia Manis]

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