The Lawfare Podcast: Lawfare Archive – The Saudi-Iran Deal Featuring China

Original Episode Date: April 13, 2023 (featured November 23, 2025)
Host: Hae Min Hahn, with Scott R. Anderson (Lawfare Senior Editor) and Jonathan Lord (Director, Middle East Security Program, CNAS)

Episode Overview

This episode dives into the landmark restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, exploring the context and implications of China’s involvement as a broker. The discussion analyzes the significance of the deal for regional stability, the wider geopolitical chessboard—especially vis-à-vis the US and China—and the prognosis for the Gulf and broader Middle East. The hosts and guests untangle what normalization means, what’s new (and what’s not), and what to look for as the trilateral diplomatic process evolves.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. What Actually Happened: Normalization or Rapprochement?

• Restoration of Status Quo: The agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran primarily restores diplomatic relations to their pre-2016 status, with embassies re-opening and ambassadors returning.
  • Scott Anderson (04:53): “This past couple weeks is really the restoration of a status quo that existed up to about 2016… The key point being they’ve now agreed that they’re going to exchange ambassadors again, which is often considered sort of normalizing diplomatic relations... It's a notable step.”
• Levels of Relations: Anderson breaks down international law distinctions—recognizing countries, governments, and exchanging ambassadors, with this deal situated in the last tier.
• Significance: While symbolically important, such normalization does not automatically entail substantive cooperation or resolution of underlying issues.

2. Saudi-Iran Rivalry – Why Now?

• Historical Competition: Jonathan Lord emphasizes the “geopolitical tectonic plates” between Iran and Saudi Arabia, dating back decades. Their rivalry intensified after US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and escalation of proxy conflicts (Yemen, Houthis, attacks on oil infrastructure).
  • Jonathan Lord (08:04): “There has been ongoing competition between Iran and Saudi for an incredibly long time, well before even the revolution in 1979... The Saudis and other Gulf partners found themselves caught in the middle… didn’t want to be there anymore.”
• Regional Fatigue: Multiple proxy conflicts and sustained hostilities led to quiet, years-long attempts at rapprochement, with prior talks in Baghdad and Oman.

3. China’s Role – Diplomatic Victory or Optical Illusion?

• A Last-Minute Broker? The consensus is that China “swooped in” at an opportune time to host final talks, gaining PR value rather than fundamentally engineering the agreement.
  • Jonathan Lord (12:43): “There was at least 24 months of preparation… I got the sense that Beijing hosting this was almost a last minute good idea… in terms of the messaging.”
  • Scott Anderson (14:18): “The idea that this has been a colonial imposition and… a Kumbaya moment… is a very convenient rhetorical point for China.”
• Narrative-Building: China leveraged familiar anti-colonial, peace-maker rhetoric to position itself as a global stabilizer; interviewees note this messaging appeals to non-Western audiences but doesn’t alter the status of underlying regional disputes.
• Practical Limits: China’s value is in being an acceptable intermediary—especially for Iran, given US sanctions and lack of diplomatic contact—but it remains to be seen if China will enforce terms or exact consequences for violations.

4. US Role and the Regional Balancing Act

• Limited Leverage: The US can threaten or relax sanctions but cannot, under current circumstances, directly broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
• Diversifying Partnerships: Saudi Arabia seeks to hedge its security bets—retaining strong US defense ties but also signaling autonomy by working with China and pursuing independent military capacities.
• Tension of Interests: The US must navigate a policy fork—supporting autocratic partners for stability and arms sales versus human rights-driven restrictions, causing potential strategic drift.
  • Jonathan Lord (29:19): “We have a robust strategy and then half of a plan for implementation… So we're not gaining the influence of that presence. We've sort of forgotten, and yet we're also there expending the cost.”
  • Scott Anderson (37:07): “Pretending like it’s all a zero sum game is a really problematic way to think of it.”

5. Regional Reactions and Metrics of Success

• Two-Track Saudi Policy: Engaging diplomatically and economically with Iran while building up military capacity and partnerships (including possible overtures to Israel).
  • Jonathan Lord (26:35): “…there's a degree of two tracking going on… engaging both politically and economically with Iran… at the same time they're going to work very hard to build their own domestic military capacity.”
• Other States' Calculations: Gulf States, Israel, and regional actors prioritize threats differently—Saudis are more concerned by Iran’s regional influence than its nuclear ambitions, while others (the West, Israel) fixate on the latter.

6. China as Enforcer? Pain Points Ahead

• Unproven as Guarantor: China’s real test will be if/when the deal unravels, e.g., if Iran reneges or regional violence resumes—will China be willing or able to enforce terms or pressure Iran?
  • Jonathan Lord (19:57): “Right now they're in the process [of reopening embassies]… But the closure of Iran International… discussion about Iran ceasing smuggling… these are all nice things, but ultimately it encumbers a lot of work. And this could all go sideways potentially. And then is China on the hook for having negotiated a failed deal?”
  • Scott Anderson (49:14): “What happens the day that China actually needs to enforce an agreement or otherwise try to compel its partners to keep the peace?... Is there actually a real movement and shift such that they want to be involved in enforcing stability in this region?”

7. Oil, OPEC, and Economic Interests

• No Fundamental Divergence: Both China and the US are net energy importers, interested in low global prices, while Saudis (and OPEC) want high prices to fund economic ambitions (Vision 2030, etc.).
  • Scott Anderson (50:08): “I’m not sure China and the United States have wildly divergent interests in the oil domain as well… Saudi Arabia is often on the other side of that.”
  • Jonathan Lord (52:00): “Ultimately MBS and the Emirates particularly need to find a way to pay for all of this stuff… huge capital investments… require cash on hand.”

8. Yemen as Case Study – Collaboration or Competition?

• China’s New Leverage: If China can pressure Iran to curb Houthi attacks from Yemen, it would showcase real diplomatic efficacy beyond symbolism.
  • Scott Anderson (46:26): “Pulling China into the picture actually changes the calculus for Iran a little bit… China adds a lot to that formula.”
  • Jonathan Lord (45:33): “If China can play a role that’s positive, that helps end the internal conflict… I’m rather agnostic in terms of who can successfully negotiate what.”

9. What Would a Real Chinese “Inflection Point” Look Like?

• True Influence Markers: The hosts note that substantive Chinese influence would involve Gulf states shifting military dependencies away from US hardware/training, or China taking unpopular but necessary stances to enforce peace.
• Scott Anderson (54:38): “When you see them seriously make an effort to get off of [US defense dependencies], that's a sign that they're seriously realigning. Right now, the core parameters of the US relationship are still in place.”

10. Challenges for US Policy – Human Rights vs. Security

• Policy Dissonance: Bipartisan US unease about supporting autocratic regimes that commit human rights abuses (e.g., Jamal Khashoggi’s murder) is colliding with long-term security objectives—and arms sales have slowed.
• Partners' Frustration: Delay or denial of US military equipment leads partners to seek alternatives, potentially weakening US influence.
  • Jonathan Lord (57:54): “…foreign military sales to most of these countries has fallen through the floor the last ten years. And it’s not because they don't want to buy it. It's because politically we haven't wanted to sell it.”

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On China’s PR Victory:
  Scott Anderson (14:18): “China, I think, kind of made out like a bandit in this one because this is an outcome… that a lot of progress has been made towards [already]… China played a very convenient role, in my mind.”
• On Policy Narratives:
  Jonathan Lord (12:43): “All good policies tell a story. There has to be a degree of narrative, and I think this may not be the main story, but I think it's a helpful, compelling narrative for the actors here to play on for each of their benefits.”
• On the Zero-Sum Fallacy:
  Scott Anderson (37:07): “Pretending like it's all a zero sum game is a really problematic way to think of it… it's a good thing if we have another major power willing to invest resources in maintaining stability in the Middle East.”
• On Washington’s Dilemmas:
  Jonathan Lord (29:19): “We have a robust strategy and then half of a plan for implementation. But I feel like that's almost always the case, and that's where we are today.”
• On Human Rights vs. Partnerships:
  Jonathan Lord (57:54): “If not to be the partner of choice… [should] we need to see this region through the lens strictly of human rights and no sales until we see tangible improvement… we should have an honest conversation about that and then change our strategy to reflect that.”

Important Timestamps

| Timestamp | Segment | Key Topics | |-----------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| | 04:53 | What the Deal Actually Means | Diplomatic normalization, restoration | | 08:04 | History and Rivalry | Past conflict, JCPOA, escalation | | 12:43 | China's Diplomatic Role | Narrative, PR opportunity, limits of leverage | | 14:18 | “Is this Really a Win for China?” | Real vs. optical victory, regional dynamics | | 19:57 | Can China Enforce Its Agreements? | Limits, risk of failure, technical challenges | | 26:35 | Regional Reactions | Two-track Saudi policy, neighbors' interests | | 29:19 | US Policy Dilemmas | Implementation gaps, cost-benefit analysis | | 37:07 | Is It Zero Sum? | US, China, shared interests, stability | | 41:38 | Tech & Economic Competition | Huawei, investment vs. military alliances | | 42:08 | Case Study: Yemen | China's leverage, US/China cooperation | | 45:33 | China’s Efficacy: Yemen and Beyond | Mediation roles and limits | | 49:14 | China as Future Enforcer? | Unproven role, forthcoming tests | | 50:08 | Oil, OPEC, and Energy Politics | Economic interests, Vision 2030, sanctions | | 54:38 | What Would a Real Inflection Point Be? | Markers of Chinese influence, US security ties | | 57:54 | US Sales Policy & Human Rights | Declining arms sales, partners seeking options | | 61:03 | Will Iran Be in the Arab League? | China as enforcer, future risks |

Concluding Thoughts

The episode delivers a nuanced look at the Saudi-Iran deal, contending that while China’s involvement is a media coup, its role is as yet unproven—and may be tested if/when the deal faces stress. The US remains the Gulf’s indispensable security provider, but its influence is eroding as policy dissonance grows. The region is not simply swinging from the US orbit to China’s; rather, states are hedging, leveraging great power competition for their own benefit. What comes next hinges on whether China is willing and able to enforce peace—and whether the US can clarify and execute its strategy given its own political constraints.

For Further Reflection

• Does China’s diplomatic role mark a true realignment, or is it a convenient photo op?
• How will continued US ambivalence between security interests and human rights shape Middle Eastern alignments?
• What metrics—beyond public announcements—will reveal real shifts in regional security partnerships?
• Will China step into an enforcement role if the next regional crisis emerges?