Lawfare Podcast Archive: The Trump Administration’s Latest Moves to Dismantle the Iran Nuclear Agreement

With Peter Harrell and Richard Nephew
Original Air Date (Archive): June 8, 2020
Re-broadcast: January 17, 2026
Host: Margaret Taylor

Episode Overview

This episode examines the Trump administration’s final moves to dismantle the Iran nuclear agreement (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), focusing particularly on the withdrawal of sanctions waivers for non-Iranian companies working at Iranian nuclear sites. Host Margaret Taylor is joined by Peter Harrell (Center for a New American Security) and Richard Nephew (Columbia University), both veterans of U.S. Iran sanctions policy, to discuss the sequence of U.S. policy changes since 2018, their impact on Iran’s nuclear program and regional security, and the prospects for reviving the agreement in a post-Trump administration.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Background: U.S. Withdrawal from the JCPOA (05:09–07:58)

• Richard Nephew’s “Two Minute History”: Recaps the Trump administration’s approach after May 2018, when the U.S. exited the JCPOA.
  • Full re-imposition of pre-JCPOA and new sanctions in two waves (Aug & Nov 2018): Targets included nuclear reactors, shipping, banking, and oil purchases from Iran.
  • "The best way I can think of describing it is that in November of 2018, we returned to the situation we had in November of 2013. It's as if five years had simply not happened." (Richard Nephew, 06:09)
• Purpose: “Maximum pressure” meant to force Iran to negotiate a new, tougher agreement.
• Result: By May 2019, Iran had not returned to the table, so oil waivers ended and sanctions tightened.
• Iranian Reaction: Initially muted, but by May 2019 they began breaching JCPOA nuclear constraints, increasing uranium stockpiles and centrifuge use.
• Consequence: Iran’s “breakout time” (ability to enrich enough fuel for a bomb) dropped from 12 months to a few months.

2. The End of Waivers: Technical & Strategic Impacts (07:58–13:56)

• Peter Harrell explains May 27, 2020 Sanctions Waiver Withdrawals:
  • Until this move, international experts (mainly Russian, Chinese, and British companies) were able to work on Iran’s nuclear sites for oversight and containment (08:35–10:51).
  • Waivers terminated after a 60-day wind-down.
  • Companies risk sanctions if they don’t stop by late July 2020.

“As part of the JCPOA ... it would actually be useful to have international experts involved in Iran's limited nuclear program as a way of containing that program and ensuring there was a degree of international oversight.”
(Peter Harrell, 08:52)

• Richard Nephew on International Reactions:
  • British and Chinese companies likely to withdraw; Russian companies likely to continue despite U.S. threats due to longstanding resistance to U.S. pressure.
  • U.S. Treasury ambiguity: Some leniency to avoid disrupting U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation domestically.
  • Real effect: Largely symbolic and about prestige, not direct nuclear nonproliferation.

"It's not as if these waivers were going to be instrumental to Iran getting nuclear weapons or not. ... It really is more of a prestige and a propaganda issue for the United States than it is for an actual concern of nuclear proliferation."
(Richard Nephew, 12:53)

3. Impact on Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time and U.S. Strategy (13:56–17:20)

• Iran has indeed reduced the breakout time, consistent with reporting that it had been cut in half; Nephew agrees with that assessment (14:42).
• For Trump officials, the shorter breakout time isn’t alarming because:
  • The U.S. "retains the physical capacity to destroy Iran's nuclear program if we need to" (15:26).
  • Framing by the administration: The JCPOA only kicked the problem down the road; now, “a decisive president can try and deal with the problem as opposed to his predecessor.” (15:49).
• But unresolved concerns persist:
  • If negotiations fail, regional instability and other states’ reactions are unpredictable.
  • The danger that Iran will decide security requires actual nuclear weapons, especially after seeing U.S. approaches to Libya, Syria, and North Korea.

"The real problem, and what they haven't yet answered is, okay, but then what?"
(Richard Nephew, 16:40)

4. Economic and Political Efficacy of “Maximum Pressure” (17:20–21:39)

• Harrell assesses impact of sanctions:
  • Economic effects: Even more profound than expected—oil exports dropped from ~2 million to a few hundred thousand barrels/day; deep recession, fiscal crisis.
  • Policy results: Negative. Iran is now more aggressive regionally and is resuming nuclear activity. No signs of improvement in behavior.

“We are not seeing positive policy impacts out of Iran. ... Withdrawal from the JCPOA has certainly changed Iran's behavior, but to date, it's basically only changed Iran's behavior for the worse.”
(Peter Harrell, 20:54)

• Divergent Administration Goals:
  • Some seek a comprehensive agreement including regional/rights issues, others seem to push for regime change (as suggested by some statements by Secretary Pompeo).
  • Obama’s approach prioritized constraining the nuclear program first; Trump’s does not.

5. European Allies: Stuck on the Sidelines (28:30–31:55)

• European governments (France, Germany, UK) are deeply frustrated with the U.S. exit but opted not to fight restored U.S. extraterritorial sanctions, despite legal mechanisms to do so.
• Efforts at humanitarian channels have largely failed; Europe has no leverage with Iran or the U.S.
• Triggering the JCPOA dispute mechanism was mostly symbolic, as Europe has so far avoided taking further action.
• Outcome: “Our European allies have become largely spectators in this.” (Richard Nephew, 31:52)

6. Prospects for a Biden (or New) Administration to Revive the Deal (31:55–38:32)

• Peter Harrell: A Biden administration could, in theory, re-execute the Obama playbook and revive waivers, but tight timelines (Iranian presidential elections, U.S. domestic politics), accumulated distrust, and opposition from regional actors (Israel, Saudi Arabia) would make it difficult.
• Richard Nephew: Possible to negotiate for stricter terms, but only by offering more incentives (e.g., opening/removing some U.S. embargoes that remained under the JCPOA). However, three years of hostility and mutual provocations (Soleimani’s killing, attacks in region) mean political space for diplomacy is lacking.

“You have to specify what additional nuclear things you might want ... but in exchange, you'd have to be willing to give up something which probably comes in the form of sanctions relief ... expanding what the Iranians potentially could get.”
(Richard Nephew, 36:15)

7. Reflections on U.S. Economic Statecraft & Overuse of Sanctions (38:32–44:32)

• Nephew: U.S. sanctions remain remarkably powerful, even when applied unilaterally—but overuse risks undermining both the efficacy of sanctions and the global economic primacy of the U.S.
  • Adversaries and even allies are seeking alternatives to the dollar and U.S.-centric financial systems.
  • “With great power comes great responsibility” (41:44) (Spider-Man referenced by host)

“If we overuse our sanctions tools, we potentially damage our ability to use them in the future. ... That does potentially say something about the US ability to influence its friends and partners in the future and to affect policies around the world.”
(Richard Nephew, 40:47)

• Harrell: U.S. policy circles may soon renew debates on whether sanctions are actually effective in achieving broader policy goals, given policy failures not just on Iran, but also on Venezuela, North Korea, and Russia.
  • Recent calls in Congress (especially among progressives) for reassessment or reform of sanctions, particularly in humanitarian contexts (COVID-19 pandemic).

“We have proven that they are effective in an economic sense. ... But ... we're not seeing policy success in Iran ... or in the use of sanctions on Venezuela, ... North Korea, ... Russia. … I think we're seeing the beginnings of some debate about whether this is actually serving US goals.”
(Peter Harrell, 42:28)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On U.S. “Maximum Pressure”
  "From May of 2019 until today, we've put as much economic pressure as we possibly can on the Iranians." (Richard Nephew, 07:30)
• On Regional Security
  "What if other countries in the region get very spooked as to what they're seeing from Iran? What if the Iranians decide that their security would be much better with nuclear weapons than without?" (Richard Nephew, 16:51)
• On European Position
  "Our European allies have become largely spectators in this." (Richard Nephew, 31:52)
• On Sanctions Overuse
  "If we overuse our sanctions tools, we potentially damage our ability to use them in the future." (Richard Nephew, 40:47)
• On U.S. Economic Power
  "With great power comes great responsibility. I'm with you on that, Spider Man. He knew what he was talking about." (Margaret Taylor, 41:44)

Key Timestamps by Segment

| Timestamp | Segment / Topic | |-----------|-------------------| | 05:09–07:58 | JCPOA withdrawal history & consequences (Nephew) | | 07:58–13:56 | Specifics of waivers & international impacts (Harrell & Nephew) | | 13:56–17:20 | Impact on Iran's nuclear breakout time & admin logic (Nephew) | | 17:20–21:39 | Economic effects and failures of maximum pressure (Harrell) | | 28:30–31:55 | The European response, effectiveness, and positions (Nephew) | | 31:55–38:32 | Paths and challenges for reviving the deal (Harrell & Nephew) | | 38:32–44:32 | Sanctions overuse, broader statecraft reflection (Nephew & Harrell) |

Tone & Style

The conversation is sober, analytical, and pragmatic, reflecting the Lawfare Podcast's seriousness. The guests blend technical expertise with plain English to explain complex topics, and the host occasionally injects light touches (e.g., Spider-Man reference) to keep the discussion accessible.

Summary Takeaway

While U.S. sanctions are still highly effective in economic terms, the Trump administration’s strategy has not fostered improved policy outcomes—the opposite, with heightened nuclear risk and regional instability. Reviving the JCPOA will be a heavy diplomatic lift for any future administration, complicated not just by technicalities, but also years of accumulated mistrust, regional politics, and shifting global attitudes toward American economic levers. Both guests call for a renewed, clear-eyed debate in the U.S. about the limits and responsibilities of sanctions as foreign policy tools.