The Lawfare Podcast: Adam Chan on the FCC’s Growing Role in National Security

Date: September 10, 2025
Host: Scott R. Anderson (Lawfare Institute Senior Editor)
Guests: Adam Chan (Chair, Council on National Security & National Security Counsel, FCC), Brandon Van Grack (Lawfare contributing editor)

Episode Overview

This episode explores the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) expanding and increasingly critical role in national security. Adam Chan, chair of the FCC's Council on National Security, joins Scott R. Anderson and Brandon Van Grack to discuss regulatory reforms, cross-agency collaboration, and how the FCC is adapting to address threats—particularly those emerging from China and other adversarial powers. The episode details new rules on equipment authorization, lab certifications, foreign ownership disclosures, and actions in emerging technologies like connected vehicles and drones.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Adam Chan’s Background and Role at the FCC

• Chan’s background: Former staffer on the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, experienced in surveying national security authorities across the US government ([04:00]–[05:23]).
• New FCC roles: Serves as the lead advisor on national security to FCC Chairman Carr and chairs the newly-established Council on National Security—a cross-bureau body to align national security policies internally ([05:47]–[08:41]).
  • "Traditionally, the way it's worked is it's been sort of divided mostly by kind of, you know, type of telecom... My role, I sort of look at sort of all the different things the different bureaus and offices at the FCC are doing that touch on national security." – Adam Chan [06:20]

2. The FCC’s Historical and Modern National Security Mandate

• Founding purpose: Chan highlights that the FCC’s original mandate (1934 Communications Act) placed national defense as a primary purpose ([11:27]):
  • "Section 1 of the Communications act, that sort of grants the FCC broad... regulatory jurisdiction... the sort of two purposes... were... to increase access to communications technology, but the second was for the purposes of national defense." – Adam Chan [11:40]
• Scope of authority: The FCC governs not just radio and telecom but also licensing for satellites, submarine cables, and connected devices—a reach that intersects closely with national security ([12:30]–[15:15]).

3. Key Security Initiatives and Reforms at the FCC

a) Council on National Security Goals ([16:42]–[20:31])

• Three focal points:
  1. Mitigating supply chain dependency on foreign adversaries.
  2. Reducing cyber vulnerability and espionage.
  3. Advancing US leadership in strategic future technologies.
• Unified regulatory agenda: The Council ensures consistent frameworks across FCC bureaus and integrates with enforcement.
  • “Chairman Carr calls this ‘ending the end run around our rules.’” – Adam Chan [18:46]

b) International and Interagency Coordination ([21:28]–[23:18])

• Global standards engagement: The FCC collaborates with State and international organizations such as the ITU and pushes allied regulators to adopt similar rules (notably on submarine cables).
• Diplomacy & harmonization: US influence in standard-setting and mutual recognition is a priority.

c) Specific Regulatory Actions & Rulemakings

i. "Bad Labs" Rule ([24:01]–[31:48])

• Problem: Most equipment (75-80%) certified for US sale is tested in labs located in China; some labs were found to be owned by prohibited entities like Huawei ([02:02]; [31:48]):
  • “We discovered that actually something like 75 to 80% of the testing... is done in China, which is really... most national security professionals, you know, their jaw sort of drops as I say that, given how sensitive this function is.” – Adam Chan [02:02]/[31:48]
• Solution: Rule now prohibits use of test labs and certification bodies owned/controlled by “prohibited entities” (as defined by US ‘bad guy’ lists), and proposes further bans on any labs located in foreign adversary countries.
  • New lab rules go into effect September 8; will trigger removal of non-complying labs ([56:56]).

ii. Foreign Ownership Notification Reforms ([36:26]–[43:44])

• Shift in reporting: Moves away from general foreign ownership disclosures to a focus on “foreign adversary” links—defined as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela.
• Increased transparency: Disclosures will become public, more comprehensive, and harmonized across FCC license types.
  • “Having a sort of publicly available list... can hopefully both inform us as well as inform industry ... and for members of the public and consumers as they're making decisions.” – Adam Chan [44:15]

iii. Connected Vehicles (“Automated Vehicles”) Policy ([45:22]–[52:43])

• Context: Commerce Department rules prohibit transactions involving connected vehicle systems tied to foreign adversaries, moving due to national security risks.
• FCC’s role: Must add these systems to the “covered list” based on Commerce findings—blocking future authorizations of adversary-linked connected vehicle technologies.
  • “We’re statutorily obligated to add to the covered list any equipment that's found to pose unacceptable risks to the national security...” – Adam Chan [49:19]
• Industry impact: Glide path provided—authorized devices before cutoff will remain legal, minimizing immediate disruption.

iv. Drones (UAS) and NDAA Mandate ([52:43]–[56:28])

• Market background: Chinese military company DJI controls 70–80% of the US drone market; identified as a major security vulnerability.
• Congressional action: NDAA required evaluation—if agencies don’t act, FCC must add DJI, Autel drones to the covered list, likely banning future sale or import of their new models.
  • “Is it a good idea to have a Chinese military company have millions of drones flying around the US? Certainly a lot of national security professionals have said otherwise.” – Adam Chan [53:38]

4. Upcoming Priorities ([56:56]–[58:07])

• Implementation: Finalizing rules on bad labs, connected vehicles, drones; enforcement actions; new focus on space sector and supply chain security.
• Harmonization and collaboration: Continued efforts to bring regulatory frameworks in line within FCC bureaus and with allied agencies.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the surprise of Chinese dominance in device testing:
  "Most national security professionals, you know, their jaw sort of drops as I say that, given how sensitive this function is."
  — Adam Chan ([02:02]/[31:48])

• On the FCC’s foundational role in national security:
  "The sort of two purposes of Section 1 were, one, to increase access to communications technology, but the second was for the purposes of national defense."
  — Adam Chan ([11:40])

• On enforcement integrating with rulemaking:
  "Chairman Carr calls this ending the end run around our rules."
  — Adam Chan ([18:46])

• On focus shift to adversary-linked foreign ownership:
  "Having a sort of publicly available list... can hopefully both inform us as well as inform industry ... and for members of the public and consumers as they're making decisions."
  — Adam Chan ([44:15])

• On US drone market dependency:
  "DJI, the Chinese military company, controls something like 70, 80% of the US drone market, which... is it a good idea to have a Chinese military company have millions of drones flying around the US?"
  — Adam Chan ([53:38])

Important Timestamps

• 02:02 — The shocking scale of China’s dominance of US device testing labs
• 05:47 — Establishment and mission of the Council on National Security at FCC
• 11:27 — FCC’s founding mandate and role in national defense
• 16:42 — Council’s priorities: supply chain, cyber vulnerabilities, strategic competition
• 24:49 — Explanation of "bad labs" rule and the device authorization process
• 31:48 — Discovery of problematic foreign lab ownership (e.g., by Huawei)
• 36:26 — Shift in foreign ownership disclosure requirement
• 45:22 — FCC’s role in the regulation of automated/connected vehicles
• 52:43 — Action against Chinese drone makers via the covered list (NDAA effect)
• 56:56 — Looking forward: enforcement, rule finalization, and industry impacts

Final Thoughts

Adam Chan provides a clear-eyed and pragmatic breakdown of how the FCC is rapidly evolving into a key national security actor—using legacy authorities and modernized rules to push back against adversarial influence, especially from China, across critical technology sectors. The agency’s technical role now comes with profound national and even international security implications. This episode is essential listening for anyone trying to understand the new contours of the US regulatory and security landscape for communications and emerging technology infrastructure.