The Lawfare Podcast: Are We Going to War in Iran?

Date: February 25, 2026
Host: Benjamin Wittes (Lawfare Institute)
Guests: Ariane Tabatabai (Lawfare Public Service Fellow), Eric Brewer (Nuclear Threat Initiative)

Episode Overview

This episode examines a critical and urgent question: Is the United States on the verge of war with Iran? Host Benjamin Wittes is joined by Ari Tabatabai and Eric Brewer to dissect recent developments in U.S.-Iran relations, focusing on U.S. military buildups, the state of Iran’s nuclear program post-“Midnight Hammer,” ongoing protests and regime repression within Iran, and the muddled messaging and decision-making from the U.S. administration—now under President Trump. The discussion tackles both the military and political dimensions, debates the utility and risks of force, explores nuclear diplomacy, and reflects on the significant changes in Iran’s domestic situation and U.S. policy.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Context: Why Is War on the Table?

Timestamp: 02:41 – 07:45

• The U.S. has begun a significant military buildup in the region, seemingly beyond what was seen during the prior “Midnight Hammer” operation (which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities).
• “Everything we're seeing move to the region ... this is a massive buildup that seems to be going beyond what we saw in Midnight Hammer.” – Ari Tabatabai (03:37)
• Two simultaneous “tracks”: military preparations and ongoing negotiations (led by Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy).
• The administration’s messaging is inconsistent: issues like nuclear enrichment, Iran’s missile program, support for proxies, and human rights/protests have all been cited as pretexts for action.

2. Is the Focus Nuclear, Regime Change, or Both?

Timestamp: 05:27 – 11:57

• The current U.S. posture suggests a shift back to focusing on Iran’s nuclear activities, sidelining regime change (for now).
• Confusion persists over U.S. goals: “There's been a lot of back and forth ... I'm not sure what the goal is in terms of the nuclear program.” – Ari Tabatabai (06:05)
• Trump’s team seems divided: is the aim total capitulation (on nukes, proxies, missiles), a more limited nuclear deal, or outright regime change?

3. The State of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Timestamp: 07:45 – 11:30

• Major facilities (Natanz, Fordo) are offline post-Midnight Hammer—reducing the immediate proliferation risk but creating uncertainty where enriched uranium is stored (possibly in deeply-buried tunnels).
• “The overall counter proliferation value [of a strike] is quite low … Parchin is a possible target, but the menu of targets is far less than it was.” – Eric Brewer (08:19)
• Iran’s focus has shifted toward rebuilding its missile program.

4. What Does the Administration Actually Want?

Timestamp: 11:30 – 16:10

• Lack of internal coherence; multiple power centers with different desired outcomes.
• “I think there is certainly a constituency that probably wants all of the big things ... and if we're not able to get that, then a war is acceptable.” – Eric Brewer (11:57)
• Interagency process is described as broken, with key stakeholders (especially civilian DoD officials) reportedly sidelined.
• Unclear whether planning includes only airstrikes or contemplates ground operations (likely just air/cyber for now).

5. Strategic and Historical Risks of Using Force

Timestamp: 17:22 – 25:55

• Iran’s repression of protests has put the regime in a vulnerable position—but historical precedents (Iran-Iraq War, 1980s) show that such moments may not be opportune for outside intervention.
• “When your adversary is in a moment of domestic weakness, it might seem like it's a good time to intervene. That is not necessarily true.” – Ari Tabatabai (21:13)
• Both guests agree: Military force should not be the principal tool for regime change—risks include chaos, nuclear security issues, and instability.

6. The Risk of Escalation and Iranian Response

Timestamp: 24:06 – 25:55

• Iran is signaling it may respond to even limited U.S. strikes with disproportionate force, treating any attack as a potential regime-change gambit.
• “Iran gets a vote in that strategy too ... if Iran thinks it’s in a ‘use it or lose it’ situation, it has more incentive to go big earlier.” – Eric Brewer (24:49)

7. The Role of Domestic Politics and Protests

Timestamp: 33:41 – 36:44

• Internal repression in Iran is not just a background issue; U.S. threats noticeably coincided with mass killings in Iran.
• Silos between nuclear negotiations and human rights are described as “a huge mistake” in the current context.
• “It’s a huge mistake to silo those two things ... the administration needs to think very holistically about this issue.” – Ari Tabatabai (35:54)

8. Iranian Public Opinion & Sanctions Relief

Timestamp: 36:44 – 39:23

• Reliable data on Iranian public sentiment is sparse, but both guests argue the population’s support for engagement and sanctions relief is lower than during the 2015 JCPOA period.
• The panel questions whether sanctions relief in exchange for a nuclear deal is still wise, suggesting a “reset” is needed in U.S. Iran policy.

9. Why ‘Siloing’ Nuclear Negotiations No Longer Works

Timestamp: 39:32 – 45:30

• Since the JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear capabilities have advanced significantly; additional knowledge and skills can’t be “unlearned.”
• The context has shifted: “The JCPOA is not adequate anymore … just because of how Iran’s program has evolved since then.” – Eric Brewer (42:09)
• There are no longer plausible internal reformers, and the domestic legitimacy of the regime has collapsed after the mass killings.

10. Is This All a Bluff or Will There Be War?

Timestamp: 49:13 – 52:30

• Significant U.S. military deployments may be intended more as leverage for talks than preparation for action—but that comes at great readiness and morale cost.
• “It’s a high cost to just kind of signal to Iran that it should get a little more serious about ... the negotiating table.” – Ari Tabatabai (52:21)

11. Legal Basis for War: Domestic and International Law

Timestamp: 52:39 – 57:58

• No strong international law justification for a U.S. attack; “the legal basis is tenuous both at a domestic level and at an international law level.” – Benjamin Wittes (52:50)
• Precedents (Libya, Kosovo) allow for limited action without Congressional authorization, but a major campaign would mark worrying “atrophy” in Congressional involvement.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Strategy:
  “Iran is kind of negotiating with a gun to its head, and the person holding that gun is kind of continuing to change the demands that they're asking of Iran. That’s not really a great way to negotiate.”
  – Eric Brewer [09:59]

• On the Use of Force:
  “Iran gets a vote in that strategy too ... if we strike ... Iran could respond. ... Iran’s strategy recently has been to try to convince the United States that it's going to go big.”
  – Eric Brewer [24:06]

• On Administrational Coherence:
  “I think the process itself is not set up to give the President ultimately all the information that he needs ... and when that side of the House is missing in action for whatever reason ... it's still not a great thing.”
  – Ari Tabatabai [13:02]

• On Trump’s Negotiating Style:
  “I'm not sure Trump holds that view. I actually think that Trump fundamentally wants a deal. ... But I think he just has no idea how to go about doing that.”
  – Eric Brewer [11:57]

• On the Legal Justification:
  “Last I checked, there was no exception to the UN Charter's prohibition of the use of force for situations in which you perceive your adversary as weak domestically.”
  – Benjamin Wittes [52:50]

Important Segment Timestamps

• Military Buildup Context – 03:37–07:45
• Administration’s Goals/Conflicting Messages – 11:30–16:10
• Risks of Intervention & Iran's Possible Reaction – 21:13–25:55
• On Siloing Nuclear from Protests – 35:54–39:32
• Nuclear Advances Since JCPOA – 42:09–45:30
• Legal/International Law Questions – 52:39–57:58

Conclusion

This episode delivers an in-depth, sober, and sometimes skeptical analysis of the current (2026) U.S.-Iran standoff, illustrating the dangers of unclear policy goals, the risks of misreading Iranian domestic politics, and the complex interplay between military and diplomatic maneuvering. The consensus among the panel: both military force and negotiations now require a higher degree of caution, clarity, and strategic thinking than the administration is demonstrating. The discussion underscores the dramatically altered context since the JCPOA era and the pressing need for a serious, comprehensive re-evaluation of U.S. objectives and methods.