Lawfare Daily: Emily Hogue on Russian Mobsters at the Front

Date: November 19, 2025
Host: Benjamin Wittes
Guest: Emily Hogue, Clemson University

Episode Overview

In this episode, Benjamin Wittes speaks with Emily Hogue about her recent Lawfare articles covering the recruitment of Russian organized crime figures—mobsters, including those convicted of heinous crimes such as murder and cannibalism—to serve in the war in Ukraine. The conversation explores the state’s use of prisoner-soldiers, the reintegration of these individuals into society, and the evolving, uneasy alliance between organized crime and the Russian government. Hogue also discusses the limits of this alliance, the stability of the state, and the long-term risks for Russian society.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Russian State Recruitment of Prisoners for the Front Lines

[03:43-07:12]

• Russian prisoners, many serving time for violent crimes, have been released and sent to fight in Ukraine.

• This policy is partly designed to make the war “invisible” to most Russians, by shielding the urban elite from conscription and instead sending marginalized populations—including prisoners and ethnic minorities.

• Notable Quote:
  "Prisoners are sort of an available vulnerable population that the Russian state can kind of draw on to avoid a mass conscription... The use of prisoners, though, presents a particular difficulty in that when...they come back and go on to commit new crimes that then make the war become visible again."
  — Emily Hogue [05:45]

• The reality: The practice leads to the release of violent offenders back into Russian society, generating fear and visible crime.

2. Nature of the Released Prisoners

[07:12-10:46]

• There have been very few restrictions on who is eligible for recruitment:

  • “Murder is not a bar. Terrorism is one. Occasionally certain kinds of sex crimes are not permitted, but they often ignore that.” — Emily Hogue [07:32]
  • Even cannibals have reportedly been recruited and pardoned for serving in the war.

• The state’s intent is twofold: fill depleted front lines and, ultimately, empty prisons.

• The downside is the return of hyper-violent individuals to Russian streets, leading to significant numbers of violent, sometimes highly sensational crimes.

3. Social Contract & Societal Impact

[12:04-13:50]

• Russian elites, particularly ethnic Russians in cities like Moscow, are being sheltered from mass mobilization.

• The return of violent ex-prisoners—including cannibals—undermines the state’s message that it has restored order compared to the chaos of the 1990s.

• Notable Quote:
  "It really doesn't help that some of them are cannibals."
  — Benjamin Wittes [13:08]

• The tradeoff shifts the burden of war from the general populace to the most marginalized—and makes postwar society more unstable and fearful.

4. Organized Crime's Changing Relationship with the State

[14:21-23:07]

• Not all criminals are eligible for release: life-without-parole organized crime leaders from the 1990s are excluded, as their prior resistance to state control remains a threat to regime legitimacy.

• 1990s mobsters who would not submit to state authority are considered too dangerous, even compared to murderers or cannibals.

• Notable Quote:
  "They are a threat not just to sort of individual Russians, but to the idea of a Russian government."
  — Emily Hogue [16:06]

• The lines between acceptable and unacceptable organized crime are drawn less on brutality, more on willingness to operate within the "rules" and submit to state authority.

5. The Modern "Rules" of Organized Crime

[21:35-23:59]

• Russian organized crime now operates under a tacit set of rules:
  • Less public violence.
  • Don’t attract attention from law enforcement.
  • Operate under the radar; as long as activities don’t challenge the state, tacit tolerance is possible.
• The state and organized crime maintain a symbiotic relationship: criminals gain protection and a stable environment for profit, while the state uses their capabilities for its own ends.

6. Russian State as a "Hobbesian" or Criminal State

[27:17-29:55]

• Wittes draws an analogy to Hobbes’ Leviathan and sociologist Charles Tilly’s theory that state formation often arises from protection rackets.
• Hogue argues Russia is peculiar in that the organized crime infrastructure persists as such even after state consolidation—making the state itself function more like an ongoing protection racket.
  • Notable Quote:
    "It became something that remains organized crime and remains part of the state at the same time in a sort of not fully integrated way."
    — Emily Hogue [28:33]

7. Corruption and Implications for State Functioning

[33:50-35:32]

• The continued overlap between state institutions and organized crime means Russian governance is deeply corrupt and “illegal” at its core.
• Corruption and the impossibility of equal legal treatment undermine state legitimacy and create inefficiencies (e.g., inflated costs for projects like the Sochi Olympics).

8. Threats to State Legitimacy and Stability

[36:11-38:40]

• The release of prisoners has brought back memories and patterns of 1990s lawlessness, threatening Putin’s claim of restored order.
• Public outrage has forced changes in policy (e.g., switching from widely-publicized pardons to more opaque releases).
• There are signs the social contract between the state and organized crime is under pressure.

9. The Wagner Group, Prigozhin, and "Caesar Crossing the Rubicon"

[40:23-43:59]

• The state’s reliance on private military contractors (PMC) like Wagner introduces new instability.
• Prigozhin’s march on Moscow (the “Caesar crossing the Rubicon” moment) exposed the state’s weakness: there was little organized resistance.
• The state's eventual violent removal of Prigozhin revealed its darker nature, but also its limits.
  • Notable Quote:
    "It looks sort of like a failure...it sort of suggests the inability of the state to operate through more traditional means."
    — Emily Hogue [43:59]

10. The Fine Line of State Violence and Visibility

[44:35-47:11]

• The regime prefers to keep organized crime’s violence invisible; public, theatrical violence (as in high-profile assassinations abroad or dealing with traitors) is used as a calculated message.
• For organized crime, public violence implies a breakdown of the tacit alliance and is deeply undesirable for both sides.
  • Notable Quote:
    "How you deal with a traitor is, I mean, publicly and dramatically so...So everybody knows."
    — Emily Hogue [47:11]

11. Long-term Risks: Return to 1990s Lawlessness?

[47:32-48:20]

• Both the state and organized crime have a vested interest in avoiding a return to 1990s-style chaos, which made life uncertain and dangerous for everyone—including criminals.
• Increased visible violence, rising contract killings, and more brazen criminal acts signal a potentially unraveling deal.

12. The Problem of Disaffected Veterans

[50:20-51:53]

• There’s acute awareness among Russian elites about the risks posed by large numbers of disaffected, war-hardened veterans (similar to post-Afghanistan and Chechnya wars).
• The state has made attempts to co-opt these veterans but with only limited success.
• Notable Quote:
  "They're getting, you know, a large population of disaffected young men with guns."
  — Emily Hogue [51:53]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Emily Hogue on the use of prisoners:
  "It's sort of people acting with a sense of total impunity who go on to commit some fairly heinous violent crimes...then sent to a war where they are further brutalized...and then they come home with a sense of total impunity for crimes that they commit." [03:43]

• On cannibals at the front:
  "There are, bizarrely, at least three cannibals that have been given pardons for participating in Ukraine, which is the wildest number it could be, I think." — Emily Hogue [07:32]

• On the enduring role of organized crime in the Russian state:
  "Organized crime didn't cease to be organized crime as it kind of consolidated into the state. It didn't morph into something that looks exactly like a state..." — Emily Hogue [28:33]

• On the risk of destabilization:
  "A return to sort of the era of the 90s, which was when the Mafia was at its height, isn't that appealing either." — Emily Hogue [48:20]

Useful Timestamps for Key Segments

• The use of prisoners at the front: [03:43–10:46]
• Social contract and public anxiety: [12:04–13:50]
• Organized crime’s pact with the state, and the exceptions: [14:21–23:07]
• Rules of “acceptable” organized crime: [21:35–23:59]
• Russian state as protection racket: [27:17–29:55]
• Corruption and weakness: [33:50–36:11]
• Wagner/Prigozhin challenge: [40:23–43:59]
• Managing criminal violence versus state violence: [44:35–47:11]
• Return of 1990s chaos?: [47:32–48:20]
• The challenge of reintegrating veterans: [50:20–51:53]

Episode Tone

The conversation is serious, analytical, and at times darkly humorous, especially when the realities of cannibals and mobsters in a modern war are discussed. The tone underscores the gravity and paradoxes of the contemporary Russian state, its relationship with violence, and the perilous bargains it is making in the context of war.

Conclusion

Emily Hogue’s research underlines the perverse incentives and dangerous bargains shaping contemporary Russia’s strategy in Ukraine and its uneasy partnership with organized crime. While the current arrangement staves off broad-based conscription, it risks unraveling the very legitimacy and stability the regime claims to have restored after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As criminal violence grows more visible and disaffected veterans return, both the state and the underworld face uncertain—and potentially dangerous—times ahead.