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- [00:01]
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- [00:30]
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- [00:34]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
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- [00:38]
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- [00:42]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
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- [00:43]
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- [00:49]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
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- [01:05]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
It's not easy. You know, I'm still kind of believing that we are caught in the, in a perfect storm of aggressive Russia and United States that's reconfiguring its role in, in the world. And unfortunately we are, you know, we are at the front line. If, if Europe or the west would be challenged, it's very likely that we would face it.
- [01:26]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
For first, it's the Lawr podcast. I'm Katyna Schmatyna, Yuri fellow at Lawr Institute with Gabrielius Lansburgis, former Minister of Foreign affairs of Lithuania and Vitis Yurkonis, Associate professor at University of Vilnius.
- [01:42]
Vitus Yurkonis
Clearly Kremlin doesn't understand anything else but power and that needs to be our response. Like we cannot, we don't have the luxury to actually think that. Like we'll talk to him, open his eyes and like he will understand. No, he wouldn't.
- [02:03]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Today we are talking about Lithuania security perspective as a NATO member bordering Russia and Belarus. Today we are turning our attention to NATO's eastern flank, to Lithuania, a country with deep historic memory of Russian Soviet occupation, resistance and now a frontline democracy, watching Russia's war in Ukraine from close proximity. And I would like to set the stage from big picture and ask a question. How would you describe the current atmosphere in Lithuania? Has the perception of security changed since the full scale Russia's invasion of Ukraine? And I would like to start with Vitus, since you have the firsthand experience working with Ukrainian refugees and civil society.
- [02:54]
Vitus Yurkonis
Thank you for having me Here indeed the situation is tense in the region. I mean it's obvious because of the war, it's obvious because of all sorts of provocations which are happening, like airspace being violated, cyber attacks, instrumentalized migration and whatnot. Obviously it's also like led by disinformation, discreditation and all sorts of like other information like warfare kind of to also infuse psychological like effects to the Lithuanian society. Also to spread the divide and rule, sometimes hatred against migrants or like, I don't know, like some liberal groups if you will. I mean the pattern of what Kremlin and Lukashenko's regime is doing is somewhat similar, though it might vary depending on situation. If we talk about the mood of the society, my understanding and my feeling is that the peak of stress and big, big concern was just before the full scale invasion because there was a lot of uncertainty what is going to happen, how it is going to look like. And I think the resilience and the ability to defend themselves was the inspiration for Lithuanians that Ukraine managed to defend itself, even being not at the best odds, so to say. And we have noticed an immediate huge, huge solidarity with the Ukrainians, like hosting the refugees coming from Ukraine, assisting the society, the military, state institutions. Lithuanian society has been incredibly like generous donating money to all sorts of like civic initiatives. I think the best known initiative is Blue Yellow which provides also military equipment to military units. So it has been an inspiration. It managed to like calm down some because when you are able to respond, when you are able to act, I think it diminishes your stress somewhat. So we do have ups and downs, waves of attack in this psychological warfare. So obviously I think part of the society is generally concerned when Gabriela Slandsbergis, our foreign Minister of Foreign affairs, like in the previous government was like trying to address issues that we need to be prepared. Very fast they were passing the society which were saying like you are dragging us into the conflict, which was a totally misread thing. That was an alert to the Europeans and to Lithuanians in general that it's serious. But the source of the aggression, the source of war, all sorts of provocations were, are and I am afraid will be coming from Moscow and Minsk. And I think that Gabrielius was certainly right to say that we need to show that we are prepared as Euro Atlantic community, but also as the society because it also has a preventive like effect where the enemy might count a couple of times whether and do the cost benefit analysis, whether it's worth it. On the other hand we see that in the Baltic Sea region, there's Sweden, Finland, which joined the NATO alliance. And I think from that standpoint, it's also showing that other countries are stepping up, those who used to be neutral, and they understand all the threats coming from the east. So I think that there are like some pluses, some minuses in terms of the dynamics, but the general attitude that Lithuanians are ready to respond back, they understand the gravity of the situation, but there's no panic whatsoever.
- [07:22]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Gabriel, I am honored that you found time to join the conversation, and I'm looking forward to drawing from your expertise in diplomatic service and in the government. So since Russia's endeavors in Ukraine, did you see any policy shifts in Lithuania, like in the policy circle or some action taken by the Ministry of Defense?
- [07:49]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
Well, clearly there have been changes, you know, just. Just to name a few. So we are, you know, we started somewhere at 2% of spending on, on defense at the beginning of the war, and we're now, well, at least, you know, officially the government claims that we are roughly around 5%. So, you know, so that's, that's one, one example of how things are changing. I believe that again, coming from what Vitus said, that indeed the stress has subsided and the population is a lot more calmer than it has been at the beginning of the war. But it also reflects in the way that the government makes decisions. So during the first days of war, you could feel that you could push almost any decision through the parliament. The government would debate almost constantly in order to make sure that we are, we are prepared as much as we can be. Now everything is much more back to normal. So the debates on the parliament are more difficult. The discussion is much more polarized. That means that there are people who would say, well, maybe we shouldn't be doing this. Maybe we should be doing something completely different. And that is, for me at least, is a bit concerning because even though Ukrainians have been able to, well, to save us from the war in a way, but as I say, we're not out of the night yet. There are still not. We shouldn't be prepared to see the light of the dawn very soon. And that means that we still need to be preparing, we still need to be doing as much as we can, taking in Ukrainian lessons, building up anti drone defenses and so many other things, because nobody, nor in the military, in political sphere or anywhere could be saying that or should be saying that, well, tomorrow will be safer. Unfortunately, most of the people say something different, that, well, Putin, most likely, he's going to escalate. We've seen that happening, like the drones in Poland, the jets in Estonia, the drones that stopped the airports in Nordic countries. I mean, these things continue. And they are going to continue. And we have to answer the question whether we are getting prepared for these sort of eventualities. And it's, you know, I mentioned one thing as, you know, being prepared from the military perspective, so, you know, being able to shoot down. There's also another element, you know, are we able to make Putin pay for it? You know, are we prepared to, you know, to issue costs in some way for, you know, for these drone operations or not? And are we able to make decisions where it matters? So these questions, unfortunately, are not yet answered. Hopefully we have enough time.
- [10:40]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
I wanted to encourage our audience to check out Gabrielius Landsbergis personal website. And as far as I remember, last time I checked, you had this logo which says, I'm Gabrielius Lansbergis, and I refuse to de escalate. And I also know that you wrote memoirs or, like, reflecting.
- [11:01]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
Still working on it.
- [11:02]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Okay. Yeah, but looking forward to reading those. I had a meeting on the Hill the other day, and the question I was asked whether Russia is launching drone attacks on NATO to convey message such as, do not send weapons to Ukraine. You might need them yourself. And I wanted to redirect this question to both of you. Do you believe Russia might attempt to extend its aggression to the Baltic states, moving beyond Ukraine?
- [11:29]
Vitus Yurkonis
Well, that's a question which has two sides of the litecoin one, which is if they are trying to intimidate us, the question is not only on the one which is sending that signal, but on the other on the receiver's end, how are we responding? And Gabriel saluted to that. It's just like, so what are we doing? Any response asymmetrical? I remember my former boss, David Kramer, was working on a book. I don't know, maybe he has written it. Like, what does it mean? Like, when someone in Washington says that this is not acceptable? Right. It's just like, what kind of practical consequences do that entail? Right. So it's important to respond so that the signal is received by the one, like, who's sending us that signal. The other thing is, I believe Kremlin, its modus operandi is always testing the boundaries, how far they might push. You know, it's just like saying, oh, that was an accident. Oh, we didn't notice. Oh, like, it's not us. And all that jazz. I mean, we've seen that many, many times with the green Man. It's not us, you know, with MH17, it's not us with like all sorts of. It's not us. Right. And we need to very clear, you know, especially when we know who did that, so that we say that and that then there's a response. Otherwise, if we choose to kind of, let's not escalate, you know, by not saying the truth, I think that this is, certainly has opposite effect, which is encouraging Kremlin to actually be more aggressive and push the boundaries even further.
- [13:26]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
I will just add a couple of things. One is that Putin is feeling the bite of the war probably for the first time in three years. He's actually having to pay the price for the war because of Ukrainian long range attacks. That means that a regular Russian in Moscow, St. Petersburg or somewhere further from the center understands that, okay, there is a chance that Ukrainians can inflict harm on us. And they are. And it feels so for him now, without the full scale or much larger mobilization in Russia, for him, it's very difficult to change the situation in Ukraine. The only hope is that Ukrainians will just get tired first. That is his hope. So how do you change balance then of the war? So then you, you figure out new axis of attack and this is where Western Europe or West as such comes into play. And this is why in my assumption, we are seeing these escalations with drones and whatnot. Meaning, and your question was very right, that probably his attempt could be to put enough pressure so that the debate, the national debate would start in the capitals of Western Europe that maybe we are assisting Ukraine too much. Because you see, we might ourselves find ourselves at war and therefore we cannot do much and we need to defend ourselves. That could be his attempt. I'm not sure whether it still remains to be seen whether he's successful or not, especially with escalation. But we have to keep that in mind. And honestly my advice would be to prepare for that and send a preemptive signal that look, you know, this is not going to work. You know, we are going to support Ukraine and we're not getting, you know, we won't be afraid of your, of your escalation. Now the second thing is again, in many cases when we see Russian escalation, you know, people would say, well, I mean, if we are, you know, should we be taking down his jets? And Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO said, well, if they don't pose any threat, then you know, that we, we will not be taking them down. Kind of, I agree with Vitus that Basically, this invites further escalation for Putin is a sign of weakness. And basically, okay, guys, you cannot do anything. That means that I can. I can continue and he will continue. But there are ways. How can we answer? And they are asymmetric. You know, there are ways from, you know, for example, you know, we have all sorts of cyber capabilities that could turn off the lights in the airport that, you know, that houses the jets, you know, and one day is just unable to take off because, you know, it's just. It's just not working. You know, there have been some interesting major operations in, you know, in Middle East. And, you know, if suddenly, you know, Russian generals or whoever would have to start checking their mobile devices to be sure that they suddenly, you know, they wouldn't be exploding in some way. You know, there are ways how to send a message without shooting a rocket at Russian city. And I think that that way west could manage escalation quite well if we.
- [16:48]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Talk about Lithuania or Russia's interest towards Lithuania and sort of having Kalingrad as a neighbor or. I came across certain investigative journalist reports about Russian sabotage, training attacks on Klaipeda port potentially, or whatever Russians are up to again, like on the Kaliningrad side or in Belarus, for that matter. And I realized that drone attacks aimed at Poland is something that hits headlines right now. It's in the news. But what kind of attacks or hybrid attacks or operations Lithuanians are experiencing as we speak?
- [17:29]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
I think.
- [17:30]
Vitus Yurkonis
Well, there were headlines when the cables were torn in the Baltic Sea. Right. And that was affecting the entire Baltic Sea region, which in fact encouraged more closer regional cooperation on security regions. So I would say, on security issues. So I'd say we managed to get out of the situation even more coordinated and resilient, though we shouldn't fall asleep, we should continue. Because I remember one of the advisors of Gabrielis previously was always mentioning this. Take the Nordic Baltic countries alone in terms of their budgets. Take it into the perspective and compare that with the budget of Russia. And then you see that sometimes maybe you don't even need some of the other EU countries that, like, we are capable to actually respond, especially since Finland and Sweden joined. But there were all sorts of provocations before. I mean, it's not that it started as of February 2022. Let me remind you, the grown soldier story. Like it is what, 2007, 2008 perhaps? Right. So when some youth groups were beating, like smashing windows in the streets of Tallinn, cyber attacks were happening. I wonder if that kind of event unfolded now, whether it would not be perceived as the Article 5. Right. Again, in 2005 or something like that, when we were already a member state of like NATO, a military jet just like fell down in the territory of Lithuania. I can go on and on. I mean, let's even like remember the interference into the domestic affairs and that Lithuania was the first country to impeach its president because of the ties and influences related to Kremlin. So I mean the spectrum of all the provocations like is very wide now. Obviously the cyber attacks, like all the propaganda, all of that which is in basically in the manual of Kremlin trying to affect previously. We were also blackmailed because of our energy, because of our economic ties. And I think that Lithuania was among the very first who decided that we might face short term costs which are going to be higher, like we're going to spend more now just to make sure that we are not becoming victims of that kind of blackmail. And now we are not in this energy circle of brel like as of this year, which was a huge, huge effort, as some politicians were like saying, that was our last battle regarding our independence. Obviously, given the circumstances now in the war in Ukraine, most probably not the last battle, but it was certainly a very, very important one because when we joined the eu, one of the requirements was to basically shut down our nuclear power plant and from 100% self sufficient country on energy resources, we became 100% dependent country. So it was a long way and Lithuania had to adapt a lot of measures to be much more resilient, much more independent and this fight continues.
- [21:31]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Guberrilius, I wanted to talk with you about the alliance politics and are there any changes to the NATO policies in the light of second Trump administration? And have you observed any change to Lithuania, US relations, any shifting priorities, or what's your perception of the U.S. commitment to European security more broadly?
- [21:57]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
Well, that's an important question. I think that to evaluate even the last 10, well, somewhat 10 months after the inauguration, if we try to evaluate Even the last 10 months, we are seeing certain shifts, you know, in the attitude even within the new administration. The biggest underlying problem the way that I see is that we've ended, I believe that we ended a time of strategic clarity when it comes to US Commitment. And we've entered a stage which we could call or entering a stage that we would, could potentially call the ambiguity. I think that the most important phrase that has been said in that regard was when Secretary of defense or war Mr. Hexseth mentioned that Europe can no longer depend on us for its security. It was never explicitly explained as to what it really means. I mean, apart from the clear and understandable request for Europe to take a greater role in defending itself, in paying more for its defenses, that's all understandable, but my worry is that this message can be read in certain ways also in Moscow that when Europe yesterday announced that, well, European Commission announced that, that Europe would be ready to defend itself by 2030. So in combination, Putin is reading, okay, so this is my timeline then. Americans are changing their, their position. Europeans are not yet ready. So I have to figure out things by, by 2030. So this is, you know, this is what makes me a bit uneasy while watching the whole situation now when I say that things are still even with this administration. Things are changing and not yet certain. For example, the way that attitude towards Ukraine has shifted. At first it was Russia first, Ukraine second. Now looks like it has flipped, at least for the time being. We're waiting for a meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky in upcoming days. Again, we will see how that, how that works out. So, I mean, so that kind of, in general there's, you know, this, this, this changing environment. But, but in general, I'm a bit worried that it might give, give some wrong ideas to, to Putin that the US Is no longer as interested or as, as committed to US Defense that he has been in, in the past. Secondly, you know, from practical perspective, there have been changes. So one of them is what is called the Baltic Security Initiative. There was a special line in the Pentagon's budget which has foreseen several hundred million dollars. So not a huge amount, but still quite significant for three Baltic countries that could be spent on procuring defense equipment in United States. And as per last decisions made by the Pentagon planners, this has been cancelled. It still has not yet gone through all the procedures in the House. But again, most likely that this is very likely that it's not going to come back. And last point of this is that everyone in Europe is waiting for what is called the US Force Posture Review that will define how many and which of US Troops will remain in Europe and in what proportions. Again, we are watching that very closely. Some experts are alluding to the possibility that the Baltic states might see a diminishing in US Numbers, US Troops numbers in our territory, which again, I think would be a worrying signal, even though in some cases the numbers might look like they are symbolic. But then again, Putin is looking for a trigger. Symbolic gestures might convince him that it's, you know, they're enough for him to make a move. So it's not easy. You know, I'm still kind of believing that we are caught in a perfect storm of aggressive Russia and United States that's reconfiguring its role in the world. And unfortunately, we are, you know, we are at the front line. If Europe or the west would be challenged, it's very likely that we would face it first.
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Gabrielius Landsbergis
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Gabrielius Landsbergis
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- [30:27]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
I wanted to talk about the debate about the prospect of peace deals. Peace talk on like Ukraine, Russia, war and maybe more broadly because I think Lithuania has this unique experience and vantage point like you have the right to speak from your past record of relations with Russia, how a deal could look like. And more importantly, do you think Russia would stop if it gets some territories, some concessions? I came across some academics or some Western analysts who would argue that it was Ukraine's fault or Western fault that Russia felt triggered and threatened and hence had had to adopt more like an aggressive foreign policy policy. So again, not to put words in your mouth, but I wonder what's your perspective on that? And I'll make sure we discuss the Lithuanian historical experience of dealing with Russia.
- [31:27]
Vitus Yurkonis
Well, it's a complicated question. If we are trying to bring parallels from the past, there are a lot of instances and examples to compare. I think that if we talk about any negotiations, the fundamental question is trust. This is what we need to answer. Do we trust the other side? You know, there are books written. I mean I'm lecturing Arts of negotiation so I can talk on and on regarding that. But you know, like bargaining with the devil, do we argue? So one theory says like one School says that we cannot and we should not because it's only encouraging bad behavior. The other like would argue that we should because especially when the costs are very high. I mean, whatever the case is, at some point you might be negotiating with the other side, which is evil, which has evil intents, but then you approach these negotiations extremely ready. One of the former FBI negotiators, Chris Voss, has written the book Never Split the Difference and he was a negotiator, like negotiating with the terrorists. So it was his daily life basically to negotiate. So it is possible and it's sometimes very, very much needed. But you need to be prepared and have the institutional memory. I think that at the moment it would be better to bring some comparisons with what is happening in the region. We do have some sort of negotiations. I don't know if we can even call it negotiations, but some sort of process regarding the release of political prisoners in Belarus, the neighboring country, the ally number one of Russia. Well, from the cost benefit analysis, like Washington and general Euro Atlantic community might have a lot, a lot of leverage and not so much in terms of costs, strictly speaking. And I think Belarus could have been a low hanging fruit where Donald Trump's administration might have entered this with the full power, sending a very clear signal that there are no jokes, sending the signal to Putin that we are going to be super hard. So now the question is what kind of signals Vladimir Putin is receiving from these negotiations, from this process. Because in his eyes, obviously Lukashenko is certainly not very strong leader or a country which has plenty of resources. And if we come to this kind of negotiations, sanctions are soft. That is going to be the signal that Vladimir Putin is going to be reading. So I think that the current sanctions regime, it needs to be strengthened. We need to deepen, broaden, make sure that whoever who collaborates with companies or with the individuals who are under sanctions, that there are criminal cases, we need to be supporting Ukraine and increase our support. That is going to be like a proper signal and that is going to provide us with the negotiation space. Otherwise we are going to be entering this from the soft position. That's how Vladimir Putin would be reading it. Yeah. At the moment Vladimir Putin is dragging foot. Obviously he is not interested, as far as I can tell, in any peace deal because he keeps bombarding civic objects and he wants to make sure that Ukraine is hurt as hard as it gets. And he might be still driving through because we are hearing about the possible peace deal for what, almost a year. Right. And casualties in Ukraine or like we hear about it daily. I don't exclude the possibility that we might at some point start negotiations, but we need to come much better prepared to it than we are at the moment.
- [36:12]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Gabrielius, I wanted to address the same question to you and also was wondering if you could share some insights from your diplomatic career dealing with Russian delegations or any, you know, impressions or insights you had at that time.
- [36:26]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
Well, I mean, there have been quite, quite minimal interactions throughout my time. I think that I've. I've encountered Russian delegation probably just once during the OSC meeting in December 2021. So a couple of months before, before the war, where Minister Lavrov declared the. The goals, the strategic and geopolitical goals of Russia, they sounded very ominous, and I think that they are, in most of the case, have not changed. Basically, the underlying goal is a withdrawal of NATO from, you know, up until 1997 borders. So that means that no NATO in Lithuania, no NATO in Poland, and, you know, it has to retreat, leaving the territories in gray zone or basically just leaving the territories of the countries up to Russia to take. That could be their thinking. Additionally to what you asked before, I think that it's an important question to tackle this. The question whether Russia's interests have been affected or hurt somehow, and it was provoked. I think that we need to address this, and I call this weaponized victimization, where you use a term, you present yourself as a victim, a. A perpetual victim. And Russians have been exceptionally good at that, you know, all the way from the Second World War. Even when, you know, when Stalin held in his fist, you know, big, big chunk of Europe, he still was presenting himself that, well, you know, according to per capita people lost, you know, he would need to go all the way to Portugal in order to compensate, you know, how much Russians lost, how many people did they lose and how much did they sacrifice for the, you know, for them, for the victory against Nazism. So, and it's, you know, it's. It's a continuous trend, you know, an empire that, you know, that was the first to begin the wars, that was first to begin the, you know, the Second World War with its attack against Poland, you know, after the agreement with Nazi Germany, you know, suddenly they become the biggest victim and we all tend to forget, you know, that, you know, or at least not that it's impolite to remind them that basically you are the culprit. You know, the reason why countries want to join NATO because Russia has been aggressive then Russia has been aggressive against Chechnya. That forced many countries in the Eastern flank to, you know, to fast forward their accession to NATO after 2008, you know, that was, has been, you know, even pushed further. 2014, again you see NATO, NATO forces being ushered eastwards. And so the story goes. But then again, we've always presented with this argument that somebody is a victim and that somebody is Russia. Unfortunately, in many cases, I'm hearing the very similar arguments that are being made by China. The hundred years of humiliation, everybody harmed the big countries and now the only thing that they can do is fight back and kill innocent people. In order to amend the harms that have been done, I think it requires a very strong pushback, this weaponized victimization. And yeah, so I don't buy it at all. You know, I think that the blame is squarely in Russia's court and I think that it will, you know, for all our sake, I believe that they will lose the argument and the war. Now, about the question that we just answered about, you know, do we trust Putin? There's also additional, another part in this, whether Putin trusts us. And I believe that, well, trying to imagine a person who is spending his days in bunker not trusting almost anybody in his circles now for him to believe that any sort of, for example, ceasefire agreement that he would sign with Ukrainians, with the support of, I don't know, some Western countries, that this would somehow hold, you know, I would never imagine him believing that. And probably this is the reason why he refused a ceasefire when it was proposed by President Trump and demanded and agreed with by Ukrainians. And he said, well, the only thing that I would agree is the peace that solves the core issues of our dispute with Ukraine. Right. So the establishment of Kyiv Rurik empire and all the other things. So basically he wants to go all the way, basically by denying Ukraine its right to exist, even though the ceasefire looked like a deal that he could take. You take the ceasefire, you reconstitute your army and then you figure out things from there. But since he doesn't trust the ceasefire, he wouldn't trust the ceasefire. That means that it's not in his interest to have it because, you know, he cannot remove the troops. You know, he needs million troops to just to hold the front. And he knows that as long as his fire is there, he will be stuck in those trenches and just watching every day for Ukrainian drones. So that means that he's, you know, he's, he doesn't see a way, he doesn't see a way out unless, unless he is able to take, take over, to take over Kyiv. That is that is my calculation.
- [41:55]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Micis, I see you have a comment or reaction to that.
- [41:58]
Vitus Yurkonis
Yeah, I started like with trust and Gabrielius like also followed up on this. There might be some sort of misinterpretation. I think that and sometimes we hear this argument as if, you know, no, Vladimir Putin is simply mental. I don't want to give him any excuses or say that this entire situation is because he misperceives the reality. I mean facts are clear in terms of the responsibility. The Budapest memorandum who signed that all parties, Russia being one of them, signed Budapest Memorandum basically ensuring that Ukraine borders are secure if it gives away the nuclear weapons. Right. And us was part of that deal. And it's not that we are talking about the second World War, we are talking like it happened, not that far. Vladimir Putin was back then alive and he clearly remembers that. So then Minsk dialogue, which is very recent and Vladimir Putin was active already and we can look like going para by para like that, like how many points which were as if agreed were violated. So in a way we are ending up that clearly Kremlin doesn't understand anything else but power and that needs to be our response. Like we cannot, we don't have the luxury to actually think that like we'll talk to him, we'll open his eyes and like he will understand. No, he wouldn't for multiple reasons. And therefore basically at the moment the only answer is help Ukraine and prepare for the worst case scenario to defend yourself.
- [44:12]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
So when I bring up some historical parallels or when I talk about the NATO expansion and European Union enlargement, I do not suggest to get lost in some historical details, but I would love to hear your perspective and your. I believe that you're witnesses of Lithuania's passed towards NATO membership and EU membership. And if you could just share again any observations, any policy discussions or activist efforts for that matter. In the 90s or late 80s, what brought Lithuania Lithuanian sovereignty was not a given, it was taken and there was a fight behind it. And as far as I know, there was also quite a fight for Lithuania joining European Union. So what was the rationale behind it for Lithuanian side and how did it look like?
- [45:08]
Vitus Yurkonis
Well, first of all, I think that there's the historical memory, like our grandparents do remember not only what was happening during the Soviet occupation, but what was happening in between the first and second World War and especially during the like very start of the Soviet occupation. Kremlin is presenting as if like in 1945, like our part of the like Europe was liberated. In fact, for us it was the second occupation, like Nazis ended. The Soviets started like, and we had massive deportations, basically every third family, if I'm not mistaken, like face these repressions. We had an armed resistance, very strong one at all odds, basically because unlike, you know, Chechnya, we don't have mountains. And even despite all odds, the armed resilience was taking place from 1945, basically for almost 10 years, which was almost a miracle. And initially, like the Forest Brothers were relying on the support from the west, saying, well, clearly they would not allow this occupation. Clearly they understand. But due to the geopolitical circumstances, even if the Americans didn't recognize legally the occupation, de facto, like we were occupied and it took us generations to recover. There was a movement, underground movement, like all sorts of varieties, starting with the Catholic Church chronicles, like some printed underground press music, rock, jazz, basketball. Those who haven't watched this, there's a wonderful movie, the Other Dream Team, where like Lithuanian basketball club was competing with the military, like basketball club from Moscow Ceska. And it embodied some sort of like struggle. So there were all sorts of inspirations which eventually became a movement, a political movement called Saidis, where one of the leaders was Gabrielus grandfather, like Professor Landsbergis. It was not easy. But I think Gabriel also remembers that I don't know if you were part of that Baltic chain where like 2 million people from Lithuania to like Estonia, from Vilnius to riga and Tallinn, 2 million people were holding hands like to commemorate the Molotov Ribbentrop tact and that demand that this historical mistake would be, would be fixed. So I was a kiddo back then, what was like, I mean, less than 10 years old. And that was a huge, huge inspiration showing that the incredible you opportunity to fight back in peaceful protest. And it was like brick by brick dismantling the Soviet Union. So I think that there's, in our historic memory, there's a strong focus on resilience, on fighting even at odds, and a general understanding that freedom is not for free, that you need to fight it. And sometimes it means sacrifices. And honestly, in 1991, like a number of Lithuanians were killed because they were standing like defending the TV tower. Meanwhile the Soviet army was going on it with tanks shooting into the peaceful protesters. So there's always a price, but we are grateful and thankful for those who sacrificed that. And it's sort of an inspiration but also a responsibility for our generation to keep going.
- [49:42]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
I will maybe just add a couple of points. So one is so 1989 and 1990s for the west was definitely not about the Baltic independence. It was. These were the years of German reunification, and most of the effort, of diplomatic effort by the Western leaders, United States and Germany and France and United Kingdom, has been devoted to reunify Germany. Part of the thinking was, as far as we know now from the documents, kind of, that the leaders were thinking about what to do with Eastern Germany once it's reunited with the west, and maybe what to do with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This is where the Western reach has ended. Now, from the Lithuanian perspective, the understanding was that if we don't make a step, if we, you know, kind of. Because the door has opened, right, the empire is falling. If we don't make a step, we might be left behind. All the changes that are happening in the west. And interestingly enough, that our interest, Lithuanian interest, was to squeeze through the opening that has been made available while the leaders of the west actually had the different interest. And therefore now, paradoxically, we do remember. I think it's quite important to remember the letters of French and German leaders then to Lithuania, to Lithuanian leadership, asking them to stop their work on Lithuanian independence because they were worried that, well, maybe it's in the best interest of everyone to save Russian empire from falling. Well, Warsaw Pact, you know, kind of, that was a dumb thing, you know, the Germany, okay, that is reunited, but what happens if Russian empire falls? They did not have an answer. And therefore, you know, Lithuania declared its independence in 1990, the first country in, out of the, you know, out of the occupied Soviet Republic. So basically we were the part of the empire, not like Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary. So we were the first ones. Not even the Baltic countries followed us. But we started the discussion that basically, this is it. You know, we want to be free. We are free people. We elected a parliament that is, you know, that is democratic and recognized, and we declared our independence. And now it's up to the west to make their move. And it took almost one and a half years for us to wait for the recognition which came after the failed putsch in Moscow, where basically Soviet empire was dissolved officially then. And then others declared their independences and so on and so forth. So then kind of the whole. The whole situation changed. But if you count the years, Lithuania has been independent the longest, and I'm rather proud about it.
- [52:56]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
Well, that is a great place to live it on. An uplifting note. Gabrielius Vitis, thank you so much for this rich conversation.
- [53:06]
Gabrielius Landsbergis
Thank you for the questions.
- [53:07]
Vitus Yurkonis
Thank you.
- [53:11]
Podcast Host Katyna Schmatyna
The Law Firm podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad free versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare Material supporter through our website lawfairmedia.org support. You will also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters. Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for our other podcasts including Rational Security, Allies, the Aftermath and Escalation. Our latest Lawfare Presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine. Check out our written work@lawfaremedia.org the podcast is edited by Jen Patya and our audio engineer. This episode was Kara Schillen of Goat Rodeo. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening.
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