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Quinta Juarez
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Laura Gamboa
I don't know if you knew this, but anyone can get the same Premium Wireless for $15 a month plan that I've been enjoying. It's not just for celebrities. So do like I did and have one of your assistant's assistants switch you to Mint Mobile today. I'm told it's super easy to do@mintmobile.com Switch upfront payment of $45 for 3 month equivalent to $15 per month Required intro rate first 3 months only, then full price plan options available, taxes and fees extra. See full terms@mintmobile.com I think activists in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa have been doing this kind of work for decades. And I think they have learned valuable lessons on how to mobilize, how to protect their movements, how to leverage political institutions. And some of these lessons have been hard learned, you know, like they have been costly mistakes that the United States does not need to make.
Quinta Juarez
It's the Lawfare podcast. I'm Quinta Juarec, a senior editor at Lawfare, here with Laura Gamboa, an assistant professor of democracy and global affairs at the University of Notre Dame. She studies democratic backsliding, specifically how opposition movements can resist encroaching authoritarianism, and what strategies are most effective in doing so.
Laura Gamboa
I think the worst possible world is where nothing happens. I think the second worst possible world is where individual groups are doing things separately.
Quinta Juarez
We spoke about what her research can tell us about backsliding and resistance under the second Trump administration. I want to start by asking you to give us a bit of a diagnosis. You're a political scientist. You study democratic backsliding and opposition tactics. So from your perspective, how healthy does US Democracy look today?
Laura Gamboa
Very unhealthy. Is A quick answer to that question. Democratic backsliding, usually I think about it as a slow process of democratic decay in which eventually the regime just ceases to be democratic and turns in some kind of form of authoritarian regime. And now, of course, everybody thinks authoritarian regime and they think about Cuba. But that's not what I'm having in mind right now. What I'm having in mind right now is something is a regime that has elections that somehow the opposition systematically cannot win. Right? Like where the state is weaponized against its citizens, where freedom of speech is very censored, where news outlets all of the sudden get shut down, or they cannot find paper or they cannot find licenses to broadcast these kind of things. And I think we're starting to see the first signs of that in the United States. It's very clear that the government is using the state apparatus to target citizens that disagree with them. They're starting with very vulnerable people in the country, non citizens. But they have made clear open threats to citizens as well. And these have come verbally in the global office laughing with Najibu Kele, or they have come as institutional attacks, these executive orders against law firms or the attacks against universities that pretty much seek to silence people into compliance. Right. And so I think, in general, my assessment of the US democracy is all my alarms are up. I am really, truly very concerned.
Quinta Juarez
And what you particularly look at is sort of how people respond to backsliding. Not only the sort of authoritarian push, but the other end, the question of how civil society and opposition politicians respond. Again, from your perspective, as someone who studies this, how do you kind of evaluate what the pushback has looked like in the US over the last few months?
Laura Gamboa
I'll start with the. I guess the bad news. I don't think it's a news really, but I think in general, unlike what happens in other countries, I think in the US this was particularly surprising. I think Americans in general are less attuned to these kind of threats. In Latin America, we have seen them all, so we're very tuned to these things. We see people being catched by masked unidentified officers and put into vans. And we know what this means and we know what this is. This is very clear for us. I think for Americans, this is not so clear in general. Of course, there's the academics and civil society activists and some politicians that are more attuned to this. I think there is also a kind of a blind trust in that the system will somehow balance out that prevail during the first months of the administration. I think that's ending right now. I think there's more leaders, especially Democrats, have been jumping into the mode of no, we really need to do something and we need to do it now. But in general, I think for at least the first, for January and February, what we saw was more of a, oh, this will balance out, like the system somehow magically will respond. And in my experience, systems do not magically respond. Institutions are only as strong as the people who support them. I think, particularly in the case of the United States, institutions might be a little bit more vulnerable in the sense that that because constitutions in Latin America have been written after dictatorships, we have put into place rules, very clear rules about certain things that here in the US are just vague, informal agreements. I think violating formal agreements is significantly easier than violating clear cut written rules. I think civil society was a little faster to respond and I think what they're doing is good. I'm hoping they're doing more than what we're seeing. I'm not connected to civil society organizations, so I don't dare to say whether they're doing it or not, But I hope that they are trying to build a more articulated movement around the protection of democracy that not only mobilizes demonstrations every weekend, but mobilizes like, trains people, creates other forms of resistance, connect with policymakers, so on, on and so forth. In general, what I have seen in my research is that unlike what happens with a coup, the erosion of democracy leaves oppositions with resources to fight back. Now, in the case of the United States, the undermining of the state has been particularly quick. Faster than it has been in El Salvador, faster than it was in Venezuela, faster than what we saw in Hungary. That being said, we still have like opposition, still has pockets of support. They have money, they have people in Congress, they have courts that are fighting back. So I think that as long as we have those things or as long as the opposition has those things, they can stop the erosion of democracy. Now, there's a couple of strategies that I think my work and other people's work has identified as more successful than others. The first thing that I would say is let's not do anything stupid. These resources are precious. Let's not risk them in terms of, let's not launch a failed coup, which is what we saw in Venezuela early in Chavez's government, or broadly exclusionary types of protests. I think there is a way to leverage the streets, there is a way to leverage Congress and the courts, but it needs to be done in a smart way. The second thing that I will say is we need to use them. Not using them is not an option. Right. So having those resources and not leveraging them is really not an option. I think waiting is the worst possible strategy because a lot of the people, what they say is, well look, let's wait until the elections next November and then we're going to have more numbers. I'm like, I hate to say this, but those elections might not be free and fair. Right? There's nothing that guarantees us that. I know we used to live in a world in which that was a somewhat a guarantee though I think if you live in some states in the United States that was less true. But today I don't think that that's a guarantee and I think we're going to have to fight to protect that. Likewise, I think it would be wise to start thinking about setting up mechanisms to compete or participate in a polity that is biased, that has institutions that are co opted. So I think we need to start thinking about mechanisms to protect our citizens to help those who are fighting. I think particularly for instance federal workers that decide to do lawsuits and things like that. How are we going to support them, how are we going to help them, how are we going to train them, so on and so forth, forth. I think that in contexts where elections are not free and fair, usually participating in elections and winning the election is not enough. Oftentimes you need to mobilize people to support the result. And again, I think civil society movements maybe already been doing those things and if they are, that's awesome. But if they're not, or if there is anybody hesitating, I think we shouldn't, I think we should be prepared to defend our vote and defend our institutions in the street. I think what we have observed in other countries, especially recently, is that the best form of contention is that that combines some kind of institutional space like an election with contention. It's not only going out on the street with a broad range of demands. It's is going out on the streets with a very specific, actionable, achievable goal. And I think those are the ones that are more successful.
Quinta Juarez
So I want to dig into the specifics here and what you found in your research. But before we do, I think it's probably it might be useful to kind of back up a little bit and clarify why is it helpful for Americans in this moment to kind of look at the US in comparison with other countries that have suffered from backsliding, Particularly here we've been talking about Latin America, although not exclusively Latin America. I've definitely been wondering whether sort of U.S. political analysts might be better served by looking to Latin America, given the kind of similarities in terms of, you know, presidentialist systems that are now kind of weakened in, in terms of democratic health. What do we gain from looking at things in that comparative perspective?
Laura Gamboa
I think the United States does not need to invent the wheel. I think these processes of democratic backsliding, they are things that are unique for each country. As I mentioned before, I think in the US There is a technological component to this that is relatively new, and then there is a speed at which it's happening that is also relatively unprecedented. That being said, everything else we have seen elsewhere, right? The weaponizing of the courts, the disappearing people, maybe not into other countries, though. We have also seen people being disappeared into other countries. I think activists in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, have been doing this kind of work for decades. And I think they have learned valuable lessons on how to mobilize, how to protect their movements, how to leverage political institutions. And some of these lessons have been hard learned. They have been costly mistakes that the United States does not need to make. There is a generalizable lesson. For example, early protection is best. The earlier you start to protect democracy, the better your chances are. There is a wealth of knowledge about how to leverage, how to best use Congress, how to best use the courts, but also how to protect them when they're ready to defend democracy. I also think, and I think this is particularly important for this country, that most transitions to democracy and most regimes that have successfully stopped democratic backsliding have done so. Building bigger tents, but building a big tent is hard. It's really, really, really hard because you have to all of a sudden jump on board with people. You may disagree. And there are ways to do that. There are ways to reach out. There's different people's different movements. So I think, in general, my sense, that the United States does not need to invent the wheel. I think there's lessons, important lessons that we have learned throughout to identify and react to these kind of threats.
Quinta Juarez
So let's get into the specifics. So you read in your book, you sort of compare case studies of Venezuela, which has a sort of case of backsliding where civil society was not able to prevent it, and then Colombia, where there actually was success in preventing against backsliding. And I found that comparison really useful in kind of conceptualizing what tactics might work and might not work so well. So talk me through that comparison. What were the different strategies that opposition groups tried and what worked and what didn't.
Laura Gamboa
Okay, so when I think about strategies, I usually think about them. I split two different aspects of them. The first one is what the strategy wants. So, broadly speaking, in Latin America, broadly speaking, in Turkey, what we observed is some oppositions wanting to just remove the executive. What we have is a very specific type of democratic backsliding in which the executive uses and abuses institution and institutional reforms to expand their powers. The opposition says, what we need to do is remove this person from office. Other oppositions, however, have said, no, this person was democratically elected. What we're going to do is we're going to hold the front until this person finish their term. Now, to achieve either goal, oppositions can use institutional strategies, Congress, courts, or elections, and extra institutional strategies, which means any strategy that happens outside Congress, courts, or elections. And what I argue in my book is that extra institutional strategies with radical goals, that is, strategies that seek to remove the executive from the streets via a coup, guerrilla warfare, protest, a strike, usually backfire. And they tend to backfire because the president was democratically elected. And so the opposition all of the sudden seems very radical. So the opposition loses legitimacy in front of both domestic and international audiences. They tend to backfire, too. In the book, I don't talk as explicitly about it, but other issues are chast because they tend to polarize people, which goes against this idea of building bigger tents and gaining allies and all of these things, but also because they give the executive the ability to rally around the flag and push for more aggressive reforms. So if you try to remove the executive, the executive feels threatened, and all of a sudden there is a backlash. Right? And so what we see in Venezuela is early on, between 2002 and 2006, the opposition, a very strong opposition, trying to remove Chavez from office with a coup. At first, with, like, a general strike that stopped the oil company on its tracks for a couple months afterwards, and then eventually, by refusing to participate in congressional elections with the idea that that would just delegitimize Chavez. And in general, what happens at the end is the coup gave Chavez perfectly legit reasons to purge the armed forces. The strike gave Chavez, again, legitimate reasons to remove, like, 60% of pedo employees and replace them with loyalists. Pedo is the oil company. And then the Boycott gave Chavez 100% Chavista National Assembly. You start with an opposition that had between 30 and 49% of the seats in Congress. They had influence over the armed forces. They controlled the oil company. They had some leverage over courts and oversight agencies and the ability to Mobilize millions of Venezuelans to the street. After all of these moves, the opposition is left with without the seats in Congress because Chavez gets 100% National assembly, without the Peresa, without the oil company or access to the oil company, which means without access to the money in Venezuela, without any influence over the armed forces. And eventually, because they don't control Congress, they lose their ability, their access to any kind of independent judiciary or oversight agency. And of course, once you have lost all of these resources, fighting back becomes significantly more complicated, which is what we have seen ever since 2006. The position actually has rebuilt itself. They have tried to participate in elections, but now they are just at a higher disadvantage. The alternative, I argue, is to use either institutional strategies with moderate goals, which would be legislating, litigation, electioneering, anything that uses institutions to stop specific reforms. The goal here is to separate the president being in power from the president advancing an authoritarian agenda, really, to make the comparison. In the US it wouldn't be stopping the president from implementing tax cuts, but rather stopping him from dismantling or giving access to unverified individuals, to Social Security. The idea is this institutional, this electioneering congressional usually is very good to delay. Obstructing is a good tactic to delay this kind of power grabs. Inevitably, it will inevitably take longer for the executive to do certain things. Not only that, but I think in general, acting in this way also helps gather evidence against this kind of moves, helps build a stronger sort of more bigger tent coalition, because you can kind of showcase what the concern is without necessarily alienating people who could potentially be allies in the future. But I also think it helps when allies in the public, because the longer these things take, the more scandals pop up. What I show in Colombia is that in general, the opposition used these kinds of strategies. They just used the Congress mostly to delay as much as they could to obstruct, to find procedural irregularities that they can then push into the Constitutional Court so that the Constitutional Court could rule against some of these reforms. And in doing so, they were not able to stop every single power grab, but they were able to make it smaller, less threatening. They were able to delay it in such a way that all of the sudden the Court was able to stop it, or it became so. For instance, the last one, which was Alvaro Ribe's attempt to get reelected twice, it went through the Congress, and then the courts stopped it. But even if the courts had not stopped it, the decision would have come out almost two or three months after the registration deadline. You know, like so. So I think delaying creates problems for the executive. And in general, it makes everything more costly. Like, even if it doesn't work, just, it just is harder for the executive to push forward the erosion of democracy. Now, there are times in which these kinds of tactics by themselves do not work. And so every once in a while you also need to mobilize people from the streets, but you need to do so very carefully, because what you don't want is to organize a demonstration, to have the executive repression protesters, even mildly, and for one or two protesters to respond with violence, because then you got it. It's a perfect excuse to repress, to crack down on the opposition. And so really what you have to do is again, build mobilizations that are well organized, that are well articulated, that have a clear objective. In Colombia, the best example I can think of was a movement, a pro democracy movement that brought together people who supported Alvar Uribe and people who did not like Alvar Uribe in defense of democracy. They stood in front of the Constitutional Court when they were making their decision with candles to illuminate the court, to make the right choice. I think in general, that's roughly the layout of the book and the argument. I think since then we have seen even better examples of how institutions and sort of social movements or civil society organizations can function together. And so it's kind of not necessarily what appears in the book, but I think we are seeing more since the book came out.
Quinta Juarez
Yeah. So what are some of those examples?
Laura Gamboa
Guatemala is a great example. So very much like the United States. Guatemala's government was captured by an elite in a pact of impunity and corruption. The way that pact functioned was that they co opted the oversight agencies, they co opted the courts, and then they were trying to control the presidency by eliminating any kind of real opposition candidate. They would accuse them of corruption or they would, you know, like invalidate their, their registration, like these kind of things. Until the only people competing for the presidency were people from the same pact, from the same coalition in 2023. That was what they were doing. Everybody was expecting that A member of the coalition is called the Corrupt Pact. That's how we know it would actually win. What they didn't think about was a very unknown candidate, Bernardo Revolo, who had like, I think a month before the election, if I'm not mistaken, I could be mistaken in the timing. He had like 3% support. Like it was very little. So they did, they figured they did not need to ban him from, from running or take away his registration or anything like that. They Allow him to run. Now, most people in those conditions would actually withdraw from the elections. They would have said, for me, participating in this election is legitimizing something that is not democratic, that is illegal. Are however figured, I'm going to participate, I'm going to get three votes, and that's that. Without knowing, he ended up getting enough votes to get in the run because the governing coalition was split between two candidates. And so somehow Arevalo got enough votes, got more votes than one of those candidates. Once in the runoff, then it's amazing because there's only one candidate, one opposition candidate. And all of a sudden all of these forces that could have been divided in any other scenario coalesce behind him and he ends up winning the election. Now, the governing coalition in Guatemala decided that they really didn't want to lose elections, so that they were going to mobilize every resource at their disposal to steal the elections. So they tried to steal the ballots, they tried to ban Arevalo's party, they tried to stop Arevalo from swearing into office. Every single effort. And at that point is when social movements kind of come into the picture and start mobilizing in defense of the election. And we're talking about peasant and indigenous movements as well as sort of more urban led movements that had different agendas, not necessarily the same agenda, but at that point in time, they came together to protect the election. And their most visible and their most stronger request was for Arevalo to be sworn as president. And they mobilized systematically and permanently for several days. They were very careful in avoiding violence or rejecting any kind of French violence that happened so that they couldn't be tagged as violent. And they were incredibly successful in maintaining this nonviolent appeal. So successful that the international community all of the sudden decided to start pressuring lawmakers in Guatemala and ultimately sort of the economic elites in Guatemala. This was particularly so with sort of the United States was an important actor in this. And so the Biden administration starts pressuring this economic elite and they're saying, look like he won the election. You cannot just not let him get power. And if you do, there are going to be consequences. And eventually that pressure breaks the coalition and you have a group saying, no, you know what, let him swear into office and we'll figure it out later, while the other one was like, no, we won't, and are ends up becoming president. But if are not participating in elections, they would have never had that kind of moment. And without the momentum, are would have never become present.
Quinta Juarez
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Quinta Juarez
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Quinta Juarez
We're drawn to nature. Whether it's the recorded sounds of the ocean we doze off to or the succulents that adorn our homes, nature makes all of our lives, well, better. Despite all this, we often go about our busy lives removed from it, but the outdoors is closer than we realize. With alltrails, you can discover trails nearby and explore confidently with offline maps and on trail navigation. Download the free app today. Yeah, I think the Guatemala example is a really useful one to think about here because as you say, there are a lot of similarities to what's happening in the U.S. but there are also some differences that are worth digging into. And one of them is that role of the international community that there's this kind of question in my mind as you were talking of, okay, so we have this instance in Guatemala, and it's a dynamic that we see elsewhere as well, where rulers kind of attempting an authoritarian consolidation can be held back if there's strong international pressure toward democratization and that that really made a difference in Guatemala. So then you can kind of turn that on its head and say, okay, so what happens if the hegemon that has been pushing for democratization is itself going through a period of democratic backsliding, which is obviously what is now happening in the United States. So I'm interested for your, for your read on how that might affect dynamics. It feels like we're maybe seeing the EU kind of step in and try to call the U.S. out for democratic backsliding. But of course, the EU plays a different role. The U.S. is in a different position in terms of, you know, it's less dependent on aid from others, so that there's not as much leverage. What does that look like, in your view?
Laura Gamboa
I think that there are domestic audiences. So ultimately, you don't care how the authoritarian coalition breaks as long as it breaks. Right. And so I think in this case, what you think about is a, how does this less direct, less overt and maybe less powerful international influence might help break the authoritarian coalition inside the government? Like, I do think that at some point, people like business owners that support Donald Trump are interested in keeping their business. And at some point, I cannot imagine that every single Republican member of Congress is on board with pretty much disappearing. Harvard. Like, at some point, I think there is a breaking point. Right. And so to the question about the international pressure, I think the international pressure is useful, A, in sending a strong signal, but B, I also think it's useful in that by not acquiescing to the administration, not only do they deny the administration legitimacy or the ability to say, see, we won, but they also create pressures inside the country that could potentially help break the authoritarian coalition. But I also think about domestic audiences. I think this message is from on both sides. The movement in Guatemala not only created pressures from the U.S. it also created pressures from below because more people were joining and joining and joining. And at some point this is impossible to contain. I think domestic audiences are also important. I think that visualizing the abuses of the administration is essential to get people that maybe wouldn't have been on board or maybe wouldn't join a protest against the administration, or maybe they, they, they, they would be ambivalent about what is happening or, you know, somebody who is close to me. I was talking about these, these interviews because I have an interview, I have another interview this week. And so I was talking about these, these interviews. And she was saying, but what is going on? And for me, it was like, what, what do you mean, what is going on? How is that you don't know? Well, it turns out that, you know, like, she doesn't, she's not a political scientist, she's not an academic, she's not a journalist. And politics is not at the forefront of her mind. And her life individually has not changed much. Right. And so I think. I think she's the medium voter. And so I think we need to be able to reach to these people, too. And the only way to reach to these people is to visualize the abuses as much as we can. And so I think those audiences are important.
Quinta Juarez
So there's a lot to dig into there, and I want to start kind of trying to apply it to the US Context in terms of what we've seen over the last few months. As you say, it feels like there was kind of an initial quiet when Trump came into office the second time around, possibly people just kind of waiting and seeing or who hoping that everything would turn out okay. And then as the administration has really dug in and started to be more and more aggressive in a range of areas, there's been increasing dissent in a range of ways. So we've seen an enormous amount of litigation in the courts, a lot of it quite successful. We have started to see more protests on the streets, particularly against Elon Musk. Recently, there have also been protests against the removal of these individuals from the US To El Salvador, particularly Kilmar Abrego Garcia, the Maryland man who was removed there by mistake. We've also started to see some stirrings of life in Congress, maybe not so much from Congressional Republicans, but from Democrats who had themselves been pretty quiet. There was a extremely long speech by Senator Cory Booker, who broke a very famous record set by the segregationist Senator Strom Thurmond for the longest speech on the Senate floor. Senator Chris Van Hollen traveled to El Salvador and interestingly kind of livestreamed himself doing it, which I thought was an interesting way of kind of trying to communicate to the public and was successfully able to meet with Abrego Garcia. So it seems to me like there's. There's starting to be more signs of life, for lack of a better term, in a sort of pro democracy movement. But I'm curious what you make of those dynamics and how you see them slotting into the kind of categories that you've described here.
Laura Gamboa
I think all of those are good. Let's just start by that. I'm saying I think the worst possible world is where nothing happens. I think the. The second worst possible world is where individual groups are doing things separately. Right. And so the best example I can think of is a joint speech or address that Donald Trump gave to Congress. And you had some people, some Democrats, that decided to boycott the event. You had others that decided to stand up in the middle of the event, and then they were kicked out. And Then you had others that had, like, these little signs. I don't think that any of them was successful or impactful. The news wasn't about them. I think the way to be impactful is to either miss the event, all of them together, or either all of them interrupt the speech one by one, or all of them do some kind of other performance in the middle of the speech. I think the worst world is not doing anything. I think the second worst world is to do something in that moment manner in which we all pull for each side. It sounds to me that there's some coordination. And of course, I will assume for the sake of my mental sanity, there's more happening behind the scenes that I can see. So I think there's some coordination. I worry a little bit because I still don't see coordination between sort of the politicians and sort of the social movement, the two massive demonstrations that we have had recently. But it might be happening, and I just don't know about it. Right. I think in an ideal world, these things end up somehow articulating each other. Right. And I think the next stage in which that will happen is in protecting the courts. So the courts is where a lot of these battles are being fought right now. And I think we will need both sort of Democrats and independents and non Trumpist Republicans or Trumpist Republicans that think that this is too much protecting judges and the judiciary altogether. Right. Because at the end of the day, they don't have the power of the sword. So I think the next stage in which this could happen is the courts. And the best example I can think of for that is actually not in Latin America. It's in Poland, where when PIs, the law and Justice Party, tried to forcibly retire certain judges, certain justices, and these justices refused to leave their office. Literally, that's what happened. There were crowds of people walking them into the freaking building and protecting the building. Like, you know, like, at some point you're gonna need bodies for this kind of thing.
Quinta Juarez
Yeah. So that brings up two things for me, so that go in different directions. So let's just take them one by one. First, on the. On the question of the courts, it actually occurs to me as you were talking that, you know, this issue of the courts may fall into the category of something that splits the kind of ruling coalition in the sense that obviously it turns out that a lot of sort of constitutional values in the United States are maybe less deeply held than we had hoped. But one thing that people tend to feel really strongly about is that you do what a judge tells you, that's just, it's very, very ingrained and I've seen a bunch of polling. I don't have it in front of me. But if a pollster asks, you know, what would you think if Donald Trump were to disobey an order of the court? Nobody likes that, not even Republicans. It's actually, it's really striking how unpopular that is. And then particularly among the sort of political and legal elite, that this idea of the courts is very, very prominent precisely because the conservative movement has put so much energy into building the courts as a space of sort of revolution, right leaning power. And so that Trump's attack on the courts is actually really potentially leading to a fissure in kind of the way that you're describing. Obviously, I guess we won't know until we see how this plays out, but it did make me think that that might be an example of kind of what you were describing.
Laura Gamboa
Yeah, I would agree. I think that that's a good window of opportunity to do that. That of course, requires a sticking in support of the courts. Even if you think the court is too conservative, even if you don't like the majority, even like I think at some point just protecting the court comes first. You know, I actually think the United States at the subnational level also has a good example of how this can happen. I used to live in Utah, very red Utah. And in Utah, local movements try to leverage the fact that there's a sizable group of Utahns, of Republican Utahs that are not Trumpist, really. Right. And so what they tried to do is actually register Democrats as Republicans, acknowledging that Democrats were not going to win elections in Utah. This is just not demographically possible. And so not yet at least. And so what they did is they registered enough Democrats that when and MAGA Republicans in Utah run a lot of their people for the primaries, but they were always running against a less MAGA Republican, a more traditional Republican, let's put it that way. And in such a way that when the primaries came, only one of those MAGA Republicans won across the state. I think that there are ways in which you can see slice the coalition to protect democracy. Right. Do Democrats like the Republicans that won't probably. They don't agree on policy at all. Is it better that somebody who disregards democracy? Absolutely right.
Quinta Juarez
And so that actually gets to the second point that what you're saying brought up for me, which is just the sheer size of the United States when you are talking about the difficulties of coordination. The US is orders of magnitude bigger in population and in like physical geographical size than in any of the other countries that we've been talking about here. It's just, it's a big place. There are a lot of people, they're very spread out. And you know, unlike some, though not all of the countries that we've been talking about here, there is a very decentralized system of government. And so I'm curious how that might affect your analysis of democratic backsliding here. Because on the one hand you could say, well, that means that you could have sort of, you know, areas of local control, areas of pushback like you're talking about there with Utahans who sort of supporting more traditional Republicans, pro democracy Republicans. On the other hand, one thing I've been wondering about is, you know, does that make it harder to organize? Does it make it harder to make sure that people can, you know, come out and protest in big groups? If people are so spread out, do we have any sense of how that might affect things?
Laura Gamboa
That's a really good question. The first thing that I will say is that although the countries that I am an expert on are smaller, we have seen democratic backsliding in a fairly big federal country like Brazil. Right. And in Brazil, between institutions and some mobilization from civil society, they were able to not only defeat Bolsonaro, but also kind of prevent a coup after the election and can protect institutions enough that when they got to the elections, the elections were minimally free and fair and they actually had a shot to defeat Bolsonaro. Unfortunately, I don't know enough about Brazil to be able to talk at length. Added the other thing that I will say is that I think it provides opportunities, but I also think it provides risks. So I think the opportunities is the fact that you have localized, you have other institutions you control, you have governorships, you have mayorships, you have legislatures that you can function with. I think my main concern about the federal nature of, of the US in particular is how elections are run. And on the one hand, I'm kind of glad that there isn't a centralized body controlling all the elections, because my guess is that that would have been a target already. On the other hand, I think that because elections are run locally and because for some reason in the US These seem to be very easily modifiable, very sort of not very well structured, not very well regulated bodies, organizations, then there are easy targets in particular states. Right. And so one of my main concerns for November is are we going to observe a relentless attacks against these kind of weaker organizations? Let me give you an example. So Mexico has Also seen a significant attack to their democracy. And they have a centralized electoral system, highly respected too, in as one of the most popular institutions in Mexico. And when the president tried to co opt it, when the president tried to reform it and kind of take the teeth out of it, there were massive mobilizations in protection of ine. But it was also harder, like you needed to reform the Constitution to be able to take over this body. Whereas in the US because I know this is a podcast about law, so I'm going to apologize with all the lawyers, but to me this feels very ad hoc.
Quinta Juarez
I think that's totally fair. I mean, it's one of the things about the US electoral system is like there are a lot of parts and it's very decentralized. And a lot of it is a person who is coming in on the weekends and is doing absolutely everything they can, but this is not their main job.
Laura Gamboa
Right, right, right. And so for me, because this feels like not as a structure, for me, this is easier to target. Right. And of course you can do it at a smaller scale because you only need to target Michigan and you only need to target Georgia. Like smaller states.
Quinta Juarez
Yeah. I mean, I feel like this is what I find so interesting about the comparative examples is that they are helpful in some ways and then in others, it's just so difficult to kind of get your hands around what we see and what we don't see. So one thing that I wanted to make sure that I asked you about was the Hungary comparison, which I feel like is something that comes up a lot. And I think in some ways it can. In some ways it can be helpful and in some ways it can actually obscure more than it reveals. So one of the main differences between Hungary and the US is that Hungary is a parliamentary system. And Viktor Orban was able to really consolidate control early on because he had this parliamentary supermajority. Their constitution is very easy to amend. And so all of those things are different. And I think that is worth keeping in mind. On the other hand, Hungary is also a bit of a cautionary tale because you write about how the opposition sort of does some of the things that you would recommend in terms of opposition strategy and tactics. And yet democratic backsliding has really progressed there and hasn't been stopped in a very concerning way. So is Hungary kind of a cautionary tale? What can we learn from that?
Laura Gamboa
I think both Hungary and El Salvador, I think El Salvador would fall in this category as well. As political scientists, I would say they are the cases that defy my Theory, because I think oppositions did everything right in these particular cases. I think there are a couple of things at play in Hungary and in El Salvador. I am not sure that they are not at play in the US So this is not a very happy note. The first thing is the speed with which they can do it. So sort of Orban started this process controlling parliament, so the executive and the legislative. He only needed to co opt the courts. And then he had the numbers in parliament to be able to reform the constitution and pretty much take over the courts very, very quickly. There was no time for the position to react. I think the same is true for El Salvador, I mean, in a different way. So Najibu Kele did not come with majorities in Congress, but he was lucky because very soon after he became president, like six months into his presidency, as Congress was literally obstructing his attempts to expand his powers, there was even that show off at the legislature in February. And that's part of the story too. But six, seven months into his presidency, Covid happens. And so Covid immediately demobilizes everybody. Congress and the courts did their best to prevent him from expanding his powers, but without the support of people willing to mobilize, this was really hard. So a Covid demobilized people. And then Najibu Kele was just incredibly popular. And so I think the opposition did everything right, but it was just not enough. Which is why I say, I think a more and more, I think about sort of the use of institutional strategies with moderate goals, this kind of legislating and litigation and elections in conjunction with movements. But I stress this. I think they need to happen. I think they need to work together. It's not like they happen in parallel, is that they're working together like one on top of the other one, to put it that way. But the other thing that I was going to say is I think there are other differences. Right. First, I think Donald Trump is not as popular as Najib Bukele. I think he's not as popular as Viktor Orban either.
Quinta Juarez
And Bukele's approval numbers are in like the 90s. It's pretty astonishing.
Laura Gamboa
Yeah, we'll need another podcast to discuss that and why we shouldn't follow that model. But then the second thing that I would say is I also think that unlike Hungary, in the United States, precisely because of that federal structure, but also because it is a presidential system, there are more pockets for the opposition. So I think there are lessons to be learned from these cases. And I think the pace at which democratic erosion has happened in the US is incredibly, incredibly concerning. And I will emphasize again the fact that there are things that are very new about the US case, like this takeover of data, which I think is absolutely frightening. But then I also think that the United States opposition has more resources just because it's a bigger country with more pockets of institutional more money in general, more resources for opposition members.
Quinta Juarez
On that mixed note of optimism and pessimism, let's leave it there. Lara Gamboa, thank you so much for joining.
Laura Gamboa
Thank you so much, Quinta, for inviting me.
Quinta Juarez
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Summary of "Lawfare Daily: Resisting Democratic Backsliding"
Release Date: May 8, 2025
Podcast: The Lawfare Podcast
Host: Quinta Juarez
Guest: Laura Gamboa, Assistant Professor of Democracy and Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame
In this episode of The Lawfare Podcast, host Quinta Juarez engages in a deep conversation with Laura Gamboa, a political scientist specializing in democratic backsliding and opposition movements. Their discussion centers on the current state of U.S. democracy, drawing comparisons with other countries that have faced similar challenges.
Laura Gamboa begins by expressing significant concern over the health of U.S. democracy.
[03:03] "Very unhealthy. Democratic backsliding... a regime that has elections that somehow the opposition systematically cannot win."
She highlights the erosion of democratic institutions, such as the government using state apparatus to target dissenting citizens, censoring freedom of speech, and issuing executive orders against law firms and universities. Gamboa warns that:
[04:44] "All my alarms are up. I am really, truly very concerned."
Quinta asks Gamboa to evaluate the pushback against democratic erosion in the U.S.
Gamboa observes that initially, Americans were less attuned to these threats compared to regions like Latin America. However, recent actions by Democratic leaders indicate a growing urgency:
[05:08] "In my research, unlike coups, the erosion of democracy leaves oppositions with resources to fight back."
She emphasizes the importance of not hesitating to use available resources, arguing against a passive approach:
[05:08] "Waiting is the worst possible strategy because those elections might not be free and fair."
The conversation shifts to the value of comparing the U.S. situation with other nations experiencing democratic backsliding, particularly in Latin America.
Gamboa asserts that while each country's experience is unique, valuable lessons can be learned from regions like Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa. These lessons include the importance of early protection of democratic institutions and leveraging political systems effectively.
[12:20] "The United States does not need to invent the wheel. There are lessons... to identify and react to these kind of threats."
Gamboa contrasts Venezuela and Colombia to illustrate different opposition strategies:
Venezuela: The opposition's radical strategies, including coups and strikes, backfired, leading to increased authoritarian control by Chávez.
[15:11] "In Venezuela, opposition strategies like coups and strikes led to Chávez purging the armed forces and consolidating power."
Colombia: A more measured approach using institutional strategies such as litigation and electioneering proved effective in mitigating some power grabs.
[23:44] "In Colombia, the opposition used institutional strategies to delay and limit executive power."
Guatemala: Highlighted as a successful example where coordinated opposition and international pressure prevented authoritarian consolidation.
[23:46] "Guatemala's opposition mobilized effectively, with international pressure aiding in the peaceful transfer of power."
Hungary: Serves as a cautionary tale where opposition efforts were insufficient against Viktor Orban's consolidation of power.
[52:30] "Hungary defied my theory; the opposition did everything right, yet backsliding still progressed."
A significant portion of the discussion revolves around the judiciary's role in resisting backsliding. Gamboa emphasizes the necessity of protecting courts as a bulwark against authoritarianism.
[40:14] "Protecting the courts is essential... the courts are where a lot of these battles are being fought."
She cites Poland's successful defense of its judiciary against attempts at forced retirement, underscoring the power of institutional resistance.
[43:18] "In Poland, crowds protected the judiciary, showcasing the importance of civic engagement in safeguarding institutions."
Gamboa discusses the unique challenges the U.S. faces due to its size and federal structure. While decentralization offers multiple entry points for opposition, it also presents risks, especially concerning local election administration vulnerabilities.
[47:45] "The decentralized system provides opportunities but also easy targets in particular states."
She warns of potential relentless attacks on local election bodies, which could undermine electoral integrity.
[50:38] "Because elections are run locally, they are easy to target, especially in smaller states."
The conversation delves into how the U.S.'s vast geography and fragmented political landscape impact the ability to organize resistance.
Gamboa notes that while decentralization allows for localized resistance, it complicates nationwide coordination necessary to counteract authoritarian moves effectively.
[50:57] "The U.S. electoral system feels very ad hoc, making it harder to mount a unified defense against backsliding."
In concluding the discussion, Gamboa offers a mixed outlook. While she remains optimistic about the resources and institutional supports available to the opposition, she underscores the unprecedented speed and technological aspects of backsliding in the U.S.
[56:15] "The pace at which democratic erosion has happened in the US is incredibly, incredibly concerning."
She calls for a coordinated effort between institutional strategies and social movements to effectively safeguard democracy.
[56:15] "Institutional strategies need to work together with social movements to stop democratic erosion."
Laura Gamboa: "Very unhealthy. Democratic backsliding... a regime that has elections that somehow the opposition systematically cannot win." [03:03]
Laura Gamboa: "Waiting is the worst possible strategy because those elections might not be free and fair." [05:08]
Laura Gamboa: "Protecting the courts is essential... the courts are where a lot of these battles are being fought." [40:14]
Laura Gamboa: "In Venezuela, opposition strategies like coups and strikes led to Chávez purging the armed forces and consolidating power." [15:11]
Laura Gamboa: "The pace at which democratic erosion has happened in the US is incredibly, incredibly concerning." [56:15]
This episode of The Lawfare Podcast provides a comprehensive examination of democratic backsliding in the United States, enriched by comparative insights from Latin America and Europe. Laura Gamboa's expertise underscores the urgency of coordinated institutional and civil society efforts to resist authoritarian tendencies, emphasizing that the health of U.S. democracy is at a critical juncture.
For more insights and discussions on national security, law, and policy, visit Lawfare Blog.