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Joseph Kellner
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Joseph Kellner
Delivery available for select devices purchased@boostmobile.com but ultimately, Putinism seems to present a clear answer to where does truth derive? Well, it is in the media. It's in the government. There's sort of a single voice that has now been consolidated a around the Putin government.
Tyler McBrien
It's the Lawfare podcast. I'm Tyler McBrien, managing editor of Lawfare, with Joseph Kellner, an assistant professor of history at the University of Georgia.
Joseph Kellner
The sense of Russia's identity and of its place and time. This sort of takes the crisis and says yes, this is just a ripple, but in fact this is the center of the world. And so all those things really appeal to people and appeal to people not just for narrow political reasons, nationalist reasons, but because it is something you can hang your hat on at some orientation in the dark.
Tyler McBrien
Today we're talking about Joseph's new book, the Spirit of Culture and Belief at the Soviet Collapse. So Joey, I want to start with some of the main arguments in your book, especially that of the movement, which you've termed the seeking phenomenon at the time of the Soviet collapse and transition. Could you speak a bit about the main thrust of the book? And also I'm really curious where the seeds of this idea came from for you?
Joseph Kellner
Sure. I'll describe the book first and then can return to the origins of it the central kind of hook of the book is that around the time of the Soviet collapse, there was a very, very public, visible flourishing of radical new worldviews and orientations. Spiritual groups, apocalyptic sects, alternative visions of science and history that all came out of the woodwork at once and from a country that had been officially atheist and fairly subdued in these regards. And so all of a sudden, people are amazed at where these people came from and how all these ideas were fostered in the Soviet period, underground, as it were. And so my book takes starts with what I've called the seeking phenomenon, this general, really, really frenetic search for new meaning and new orientation in the early 90s in Russia. And it asks, how did this happen in the sense of why these ideas, where did these people come from? And more importantly, why? Why at that historical moment are there so many people engaged in this mass search for meaning? And part of the answer lies in the specifics of the 1990s in Russia, which was a really extraordinary period of time. A crisis on a level that I think most Americans fail to appreciate. Not just a material crisis. So there was a material crisis, there was a economic contraction on the scale of the Great Depression in this country, really dramatic drops in health outcomes and life expectancy. So all the hallmarks of just an economic crisis, but there's also a moral crisis. Alongside that, there's a really sharp rise in violent crime, in drug and alcohol abuse. Advertising is plastered everywhere on what had previously been fairly stately, drab cities. Pornography is completely unregulated. And so it's difficult time to raise kids. It's a really troubling time on the moral level. And then all of that on the background of what five years ago had been a very high functioning superpower, a country that had won 20 plus Nobel prizes, that had competed at the top levels of international sport, a country that had led the world into space, had provided free education and housing and health care, guaranteed employment to 300 million people. And so the whiplash of a very short period of time, from say the mid-80s to the early 90s plus the economic crisis creates just a disorientation on a level that I think is difficult to wrap our heads around as Americans. And it is the new orientations that people are looking for. All of these things people are seeking. What they share is some kind of orientation in the world. There is no sense of the past or the future. There's no sense of who we are. And so people go seeking and the seeking phenomenon grows in that really particular crisis.
Tyler McBrien
Yeah, I think that I just want to jump in quickly and say that's one of the reasons why I love the book is because of. I think to a lay reader who just hears about the premise, there are a lot of counterintuitive things happening. I think for someone who's not as well versed in Soviet and post Soviet history, there's this idea that maybe the end of the Soviet Union would have been this great opening and a flourishing but, as you said. And also, you know, just the. But the nature of the collapse and the speed at which it happened created this disorientation and as you put it a few times, this loss of the past and the future that really comes through in the book. I want to get to that second part of the question, though, before we get into some of how this seeking phenomenon manifested in some of these colorful characters and movements. But to go back to that second part of. Of where this idea came from for you personally.
Joseph Kellner
So the origins of the book are kind of curious and very specific to Berkeley, California, where I did my graduate work. My academic supervisor was at the time, he was writing a book. He was very deeply invested in religion and belief. And he was writing a book that framed Bolshevism as a sort of apocalyptic section that emerged at a similar time of spiritual fervor in Russia leading up to the revolution. And Lenin is the prophet and the revolution as a sort of apocalypse. It's a very interesting book, very provocative book. I wasn't sold on it, necessarily, because I had never thought about religion and spirituality all that much, just because of my upbringing. It was not really on my radar. So in Berkeley, there's a splinter of. A splinter of the 60s left called the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, of course, and they run a bookstore, and they were hosting a talk by a North Korea apologist. I'm taking this in a strange direction. I didn't know that those existed. I didn't know. I'd never heard anyone sort of giving me the North Korean line on things. And so I went. And before this talk began, they played a video of their leader, who's a guy named Baba Bakian. And I don't remember what he was speaking on. He was standing in front of a curtain, no background. And when he began speaking in this video, I recognized first of all that he was very gifted at it. He spoke in sort of fully formed paragraphs, really rigorous logic. He was funny and he was personable when he needed to be. He could usher the crowd's anger really well. And I noticed that the crowd around me was completely wrapped, I mean, silent, inspired by this person. And in this moment, it really struck me how plausible it was that people, that masses of people move in mysterious ways. That belief, which is really hard to quantify and to observe, really might be an inextricable part of culture and of politics. Like, I saw the makings of kind of a political sect in the way that my supervisor was describing it. Not a successful one, but all the same, I was really moved by this experience. And I went the next day to my supervisor's office. I told him about this experience. And then he immediately started talking about his experience of the 90s in Russia and the spiritual fervor of that time, and how many people there were claiming to be the Second Coming and how many people were claiming utopian solutions to the crisis of the period. And so we sort of decided together that I would pursue it. I would meet these people, I would try to get some understanding of the spiritual element of the Soviet collapse. And so in that roundabout way, I became very invested in spirituality, in radical ideas and worldviews as kind of an important constituent part of history.
Tyler McBrien
Yeah, it really pushes the boundaries of what many people, I believe, think of as a dichotomy of science and faith, and also faith and politics and separating these things. But the book complicates these borders quite well. And it almost, you start to think, where does religion end and politics begin? And all of these parallels with political theology. So I think by way of opening up that conversation, I want to get to some of the case studies that you lay out in the book, structured around four case studies and a lot of colorful characters in between. So I just want to throw it up and you know, what were some of the movements or characters that are really exemplary of this seeking phenomenon that you're describing?
Joseph Kellner
Yeah, you're absolutely right that the boundaries of faith and science in particular get very blurred. And I think that's a product of having these people having grown up in a science state, a state that considered itself to be sort of the forefront of rationality and planning. And yet communism did require faith. And so, upon inspection, you realize that defining either religion or science is virtually impossible. And there's all kinds of creative recombinations of these things. And the seekers, as I call them, they come to all kinds of interesting combinations. These masses of people in the Soviet streets, in the metro stations, gathered in parks, they're really an eclectic mix. And that's one of the only qualities that they shared. The best catch all term is the Esoteric. So these are people who believe there's some truth in everything if only you look, these truths can be put to practical, everyday use. And so it serves to just seek and seek and talk and read and keep finding new ideas. That's the spiritual climate generally. And within that there are some dominant currents, like you suggest. And the book is a collection of case studies. I took up four currents that rose above the rest in some way, not because they won some contest of ideas, but together they capture or they relate to all the others. So the first chapter is on astrology. Astrology was truly a mass phenomenon, impossible to miss at this time. And the leaders tended to be trained scientists. So right there, this mixture of science and faith. The second chapter is on the Hare Krishna movement, which was very successful, very visible at the time, and in Russian's memory is kind of the shorthand for the movement. Hare Krishnas were just the face of this phenomenon for a lot of people. The third chapter was about apocalyptic sects. And there was one in particular that endured till 2015 when I was doing my research. They had a leader who claimed to be Christ, and they built a new Jerusalem of a sort in Siberia. They migrated from the cities to Siberia, and I was able to go there and live with them a while and write about their beliefs and their experience of the collapse. And then the final one, the most controversial, both at the time and probably for its inclusion in the book, is this hugely popular and radical revision of history called New Chronology. Best selling books that alleged, among other things, that Mongol invasion never happened, that the Old Testament was written after the New Testament. Total psychedelic rewriting of world history that possibly millions of people came to believe. I'm sure we'll return to New Chronology because this is the chapter that I feel like has garnered the most attention so far. People seem the most interested in. And it really is an extraordinary story, both the history he lays out and why so many people came to believe it. So those are the four chapters, and from there they touch on all kinds of other currents that interact with these.
Tyler McBrien
Yeah, as you mentioned, we'll definitely want to dive into that last chapter because unfortunately, I think readers or listeners rather, are getting a sense that this was not a phenomenon that is necessarily isolated to this period of the Soviet collapse. It may very well hold lessons for our moment in our current environment. But I guess by just digging in more of what united these groups, the esoteric, what were some of the questions that animated all of them? This search for meaning beyond that, or what were these groups searching for?
Joseph Kellner
I group the questions that they're asking into three categories, three baskets. And I emphasize questions because it really is less about what they find and what they believe than what they're asking and what they feel is important to know and understand about the world in this crisis. And here, too, like you suggest, this is where people start to see our own moment in the mirror. The questions that guided this search were of authority. So intellectual, epistemic authority. Who can we believe? Who can we trust? Where does good information come from? And at the time, there was basically a collapse in faith in the government. All of sort of published history came to look like whitewashed Soviet propaganda. People just didn't know where to look for authority. And so who should we believe? Where does truth derive? The second is questions of identity, which in the Russian context often takes a form of east versus West. Are we Westerners? Are we Europeans? Is there something distinctly Eastern about us? But more generally, what does it mean to be Russian? What is this country which suddenly has, at the time of the collapse, no identity in the world, no national anthem, no sense of itself? It's just what happens when the Soviet Union collapsed. You just end up with this sort of rump country called the Russian Federation. And so who are we? Questions of identity. And the last one is that all of these different currents concern themselves with the shape and the direction of time. Where have we come from? Where are we headed? What the Soviet Union had was a very clear sense of time and its arc and the direction of history. And when that is fully discredited, that, I think, is sort of the deepest measure of disorientation. And so people are looking for some sense, some shape of time that they can meaningfully affix their life to. Time is just a constant theme in all of these different groups, and one that I probably focus on the most, because it's just a very provocative and interesting way to think about faith and belief as well as politics. History.
Tyler McBrien
Yeah. That really brings forth the theme of the loss of both the past and the future. That comes through really intensely. I want to just trace the rest of the narrative here, at least in Russia. What became of this movement or these movements? Many listeners, when they think of the late 90s in Russia, they think of this sort of rugged capitalism that really takes root, the oligarchs taking over, and then eventually Putinism. So can you trace Putin's Russia back to this moment in terms of one led to the other? Or is it more so a story of displacement and Putinism starting to answer these questions for people so they no longer needed to participate in the seeking phenomenon.
Joseph Kellner
It's much of the latter, and that's a very astute observation, because Putinism really does have answers to these questions. And I'll return to that. There's no straight line from the seeking phenomenon of the early 90s to the present or to Putin era, which really starts at the immediate end of that decade. I think of it more as a consolidation, sort of a selection of ideas in circulation that consolidate into this new sort of state ideology. There's a really wonderful book called Revolutionary Dreams by Richard Stites that's a history of the 1920s in the Soviet Union, which was likewise a really intellectually vibrant experimental time in Russian culture. A lot of utopian visions of what Communism was supposed to look like and what the future held for Russia, which, as Stites has it, doesn't get replaced by Stalinism. But Stalinism makes its selections from the utopian visions on offer and essentially distills them to a single official version. And still utopian, still revolutionary, but repressive of everything else. And I think a similar pattern, you can see in the 90s, these people, they're not repressed in the same way, but all of these movements fizzled to a greater or lesser extent. I mean, Russians still love astrology. They're still Hare Krishnas. I was able to talk to these people. But ultimately, Putinism seems to present a clear answer to where does truth derive? Well, it is in the media. It's in the government. There's sort of a single voice that has now been consolidated around the Putin government identity. We are a distinct civilization from the west, with the west playing a sort of boogeyman in this long historical scope. Russia carving out a special mission for itself in the world, basically to preserve tradition and values and humanity where the west has discarded them. This is all the Putin vision of Russian identity. And then even on the level of time and history's direction, there is this neo imperialism, or whatever you want to call it, that Russia's greatness, having been temporarily suppressed, is inevitably returning. And so this ideology, paired with really strong control of media, of textbooks, has supplanted the kind of eclectic revolutionary dreaming of the 1990s.
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Tyler McBrien
Yeah, as you spoke about Putinism, it struck me that I guess the question I wanted to ask is, do all successful political movements need to have answers to these three buckets of questions? I'm thinking right now, and not to jump around too much, but a bit about Trumpism and the maga, right? And an article from earlier this year, I think from Naomi Klein and Asher Taylor, in which they sort of laid out this argument that if I'm not misreading it, that sort of, at least European fascism in the 30s and 40s gave some hopeful vision of the future, something of which they could not locate in modern day Trumpism. So setting aside whether or not that argument is compelling, do all successful political movements need to have these features? In other words, they need to have some sort of millenarianism and identity and, yeah, I guess. How far down the road of political theory are you prepared to take this kind of argument?
Joseph Kellner
I'll start more safely and narrowly because I'm not a political scientist. And as soon as I pronounce a general theory, somebody will come up with an obvious exception. But no question that the current political formation in this country, MAGA formation, responds to very similar questions. So in terms of the epistemic crisis, crisis of knowledge in the current day, it's no coincidence that conspiracy theory is a primary mode of discourse in the United States right now. This was very much the case in the 1990s in Russia, and there is a deep conspiratorial current within Putinism as well. Conspiracy theory, to me, is a mark of this kind of breakdown of shared authority. Identity crisis, I mean, is quite easy to define here. There's no agreement on what America is, what America was, what it stands for, what we call identity politics, is just raging through every political conversation. And so there's a very dramatic fight for what it is to be American. And I think that the MAGA movement has a far clearer answer to that than the senator or the Democrats in this country. It is an interesting exception or an interesting difference that Naomi Klein is right to point out that the vision of the future is a lot less clear. I would say that the primary current in not just here, but across the west right now is a sort of reactionary nostalgia. There are very few people who believe in the positive future. And I think what makes the 1930s so fascinating is that despite the economic crisis and despite the misery and the collapse happening all over the west, there are many visions on offer for the future. Fascism and communism the most prominent. But it is not the sense of hopelessness that seems to permeate our politics today. The best idea we can come up with is a nostalgia of a type, that there was time when we were great. And you just need to undo the various cultural perversions that have arisen since who knows when, the 50s or 60s, the 1860s. That's not a Clearly answered question, but there is not a grand vision of the future. It's still a vision of time, though, and it's still an answer to this question of time. The answer is simply that we just need to go back.
Tyler McBrien
Well, in keeping with these themes of disorientation and going back in time, I want to jump back to Anatoly Flamenco and ask you to elaborate on his work and why you included it. But I'm also really curious why you think this chapter in particular of this extraordinary conspiracy theory and his work has really resonated with people today in the present.
Joseph Kellner
Yeah, I mean, the book. So the book hasn't been out long, but the few responses I've had focus on Fomenko and it's not totally surprising. He's really an extraordinary figure and his theory, his new chronology theory is really extraordinary. And I will say right off the bat, it is not easy to summarize because it is, again, the word I always come back to is sort of psychedelic. It is not internally coherent. But my best attempt, Fomenko postulates, and he claims this is all based on hard science and astronomical observations. He's a mathematician, I should say he's trained as a mathematician and in fact he's a very accomplished world renowned mathematician. He posits that all of historical time can be broken into four pre classical antiquity, the classical period, medieval period and the early modern period. And if you cut these into four blocks and you shift the back three forward, that is to say, you take the pre classical period and you just move it forward 1500 years and you stack all them on top of each other. Remarkably, you find that our histories of these periods map onto each other perfectly. Which is to say he believes that history is actually only a thousand years long. Everything we know about history happened in the last thousand years and we have mistakenly made copies. We've separated them in time. We've confused, let's say the Roman Empire with the Byzantine Empire, which I guess they were the same, but in fact they are the same literally. We have shifted Jerusalem and Troy and Rome into three different cities, when in fact historically they're the same city. There's all these ways that he sees similarities that he assumes are the same. Are you with me?
Ben Wittes
Yeah.
Tyler McBrien
I was saying, listeners, if you're feeling disoriented, just wait.
Joseph Kellner
Yeah, so hold on, I'll get you there. The central historical actor in Fomenko's telling is a forgotten empire called the Slavic Turkic Horde, or the Great Empire, which ruled basically all the known world between the 14th and 17th centuries. And as I said at the beginning, he believes there was no Mongol invasion. In fact, the Mongols were part of this Slavic Turkic horde. When Marco Polo visited the magnificent Mongol capital, he was actually visiting Yaroslavl, a city on the Volga, which has been confused with Karakorum, confused with several other cities. More generally, his history Begins in the 10th century in Rome, which again, is the same city as Jerusalem and the same city as Troy. The general story of history is the ascent of this great empire, the Slavic Turkic horde, which lived in ethnic and religious harmony. Christian, I should say. The original world faith in this telling is Christianity. And only in the 17th century does this formation start to split up. Christianity splinters into Judaism and Hinduism and Islam. They're all derived from Christianity. And by about the 17th century, his history gets back in sync with our own. Before the 17th century, he basically makes total hash of what we know of the past and rewrites it in this way. Now, the conspiracy element is that all of this history has been obscured by the Romanovs, who usurped the throne of the great empire. And they did this with German help. And so there's a Western element here, Westerners who conspired with the Romanovs to bury the history of the great empire and to divide and conquer, to separate the Slavs from the Mongols, from the Turks, and so discord in order to gain power. This theory garnered millions of readers in the 1990s. Fomenko was all over the television, he was in every newspaper. And these books were the centerpiece of bookstores through the early 1990s. And so whether or not you follow me, and again, there's something ultimately impossible to follow about this theory. It became an orientation for a whole lot of Russians in the 1990s.
Tyler McBrien
Yeah, it sort of evokes for me an almost Adam Curtis like element. And that's why I was trying to sift through why, why this wouldn't be further destabilizing for people rather than offering them some sort of stability. Do you have a sense of that, of. Of why this wouldn't be. Actually causes more disorientation of actually everything you knew is collapsing. And then also, you know, these concepts of history are actually also on shakier ground than you thought. What is it doing for people that I think, you know, really made it a Sensation in the 90s?
Joseph Kellner
It's a great question, because for my rendition, and I should say the books themselves are not a whole lot clearer. They're huge volumes. He had dozens and dozens of books on different things and they're not easy to read. And so taken as texts out of context, it is hard to tell what they mean exactly. The most common answer among Anglophone scholars anyway is that it's just sort of a nationalist parable, that there is this great Russian empire that had been suppressed and suppressed by the West. I think that is not quite right. I think that oversimplifies Fomenko. What really matters is that at this time, you know, your question is, why didn't this disorient people further. But the disorientation was so deep and so total already that Fomenko is entering a context where people have no sense of their past or their future. The 1980s, so the Gorbachev period, period of glasnost and perestroika, the essential character of that period was of revelations about the Soviet past. So everything that had been suppressed, mostly the crimes of Stalinism, the Great Purges, the enormous human cost of collectivization, major historic crimes that had been swept under the rug to the extent that people had no confidence in historians to narrate the past. In 1989, I want to say they canceled the history entrance exam completely. So there just was not for high school students, an entrance exam to take because history had been rewritten so dramatically in previous years. Teachers were writing the newspapers outraged, because they'd been teaching lies to their students all this time. And so nobody had any sense of what the Soviet past actually was. It had all been trashed. And looking forward, the country is in such a deep crisis, and a crisis that we can now look back on as finite, but there's really no sense at the time of how deep it can go. There's no natural bottom to a crisis like that. And so it's not a matter of rewiring or rethinking history. It's that people are prepared to believe anything to an extent. And Fomenko is offering something coherent and some vision of the past that Russians can take pride in. There was this great empire. It was tolerant, it was peaceful, bears some resemblance to the Soviet Union, but that's a separate line of argument. And to the three questions I ask, Fomenko is an authority people trusted. He is a really accomplished mathematician, speaking in the language of math, which is completely impenetrable to you and me. And so you kind of take on faith that this guy must know what he's talking about. If he is so confident and he has so many numbers and formulas behind what he's saying. And then the sense of Russia's identity and of its Place in time. This sort of takes the crisis and says, yes, this is just a ripple, but in fact this is the center of the world. And so all those things really appeal to people and appeal to people not just for narrow political reasons, nationalist reasons, but because it is something you can hang your hat on at some orientation in the dark.
Tyler McBrien
So we've gone to some pretty heady places or psychedelic, as you put it, in terms of Manko in this conversation. So I want to ground us back into the present day as we near the end of the conversation. And I want to read just a quick line from a piece that you adapted your book from in Jacobin magazine. You sort of spin up this hypothetical toward the end where you write how easy it is to imagine that in the near future a patriotic shit stir might start feeding key documents of early American history, royal charters, Aztec codices, plantation records, ship manifests, Puritan sermons, into their preferred anti woke LLM toward a revisionist history of this country. And I gotta say, it is extremely easy to imagine that for me, at least it was for me. And I would be surprised if someone is not already doing that. So in thinking about this history and this period and the lessons that one can draw from it, how should we be thinking about the current moment in the U.S. what other than this kind of hypothetical, are you looking for in terms of where this is heading? And the second part of this question is, what can political movements learn to push back against periods of disorientation and misinformation and conspiracy theories? What can we do? If that's not too hard of a question?
Joseph Kellner
Well, I'll postpone my answer. I'll have to think about what we can do, because it is a tough one. It is easy to imagine. I'm sure people are doing that right now. And I think the other key part of that is that I'm sure people will believe it, because people believe what AI is telling them. We don't have sufficient critical reading of sources on the Internet. I mean, we haven't for a very long time. And so the parallels are very easy to draw. We definitely have a crisis of intellectual authority. Like I said, we have conspiracy theory rife in political discourse. We have no sense of our past, our future and so forth. The crisis is here in some respects. What's missing for now, I think, is a true economic crisis. I mean, all of the distorting effects in our politics are helped along by vast inequality. No question about that. There are already huge numbers of people in an economic crisis, but a true economic crisis which is always around the corner. We're always expecting debt ceiling crisis, AI bubble bursting, fossil fuel transition. All these things threaten the economic order as it is. I would expect to bring really dramatic transformation. And maybe that's not the boldest prediction, but I think the parallels with Russia in the 1990s are definitely there. How do we push back? How do we orient ourselves? How do we establish, and I think the. The first category of intellectual authority? How do we establish some kind of shared reference points in this country? Well, so the first thing I'll say is, and this is something I take comfort in and I try to convey to my students, is that nobody can tell the future, and historians least of all. It is very easy to draw trend lines downward from here. It is very easy to throw up parallels with the fascist turn in the 1930s. That is easy to do, and it's a whole cottage industry. But history is fundamentally unpredictable. There is no saying what happens next. And it's wholly plausible and with plenty of historical precedent that what looks like a completely unstoppable drift to the right or towards authoritarianism can fracture and splinter. And so I'm not hopeless, even if I don't have a clear vision of what the future ought to look like. I think that we have all of the crises of the Russian 1990s, minus maybe the economic. And getting on the same page requires, at a minimum, a very different relationship to the Internet. The Internet has such an atomizing effect on our public square, or what had been a public square. And so it may be that we need a crisis on the Internet, which I think is brewing. I mean, I think that we have a system where people are actually coming to really resent the Internet titans and actively looking for alternatives to having our information provided to us by algorithms by one major tech company or another. And so that formation isn't going to last forever. I don't know what comes after it, obviously, but I would like to think that it's a constituent part of the problem, and people are actually, and I'm basing this largely on students. People assume that students actually want to be on the Internet and want to be using AI for their work and want to be on their phones, and it's just not the case. There is a major backlash against the Internet, and I put a lot of hope in that. I put a lot of hope in a reaction to the atomizing and disorienting effects of the Internet. But I don't have a program for you, a political program.
Tyler McBrien
Well, if nothing else, maybe this conversation will once and for all put an end to the teleological view of history. But short of that, I just want to thank you for really fascinating, if at times unsettling, perhaps, conversation about a wonderful book. The book is called the Spirit of Socialism, Culture and Belief at the Soviet Collapse. Joey Kellner, thank you so much for joining me.
Joseph Kellner
Thank you so much, Tyler.
Tyler McBrien
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Joseph Kellner
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Date: November 6, 2025
Host: Tyler McBrien (Managing Editor, Lawfare)
Guest: Joseph Kellner (Assistant Professor of History, University of Georgia)
Topic: Kellner’s book—The Spirit of Socialism: Culture and Belief at the Soviet Collapse—and the explosion of spiritual and alternative worldviews in Russia during the 1990s
This episode explores the profound social, intellectual, and spiritual dislocation Russians experienced at the end of the Soviet Union and throughout the 1990s, as investigated in Joseph Kellner’s new book. Kellner and host Tyler McBrien discuss the “seeking phenomenon”—a mass search for identity, meaning, and authority in the wake of the USSR’s collapse—and how this period’s experiments shaped both contemporary Russian society and offer warnings for other societies confronting crises of authority and identity.
[02:29, Joseph Kellner]:
"There is no sense of the past or the future. There's no sense of who we are. And so people go seeking and the seeking phenomenon grows in that really particular crisis." (Kellner, 05:30)
[06:38, Joseph Kellner]:
"I saw the makings of a political sect in the way that my supervisor was describing it. Not a successful one, but... I was really moved by this experience." (Kellner, 08:19)
[10:37, Kellner]:
"The best catch all term is the Esoteric. So these are people who believe there is some truth in everything if only you look..." (Kellner, 11:15)
[14:25, Kellner]:
"It really is less about what they find and what they believe than what they're asking and what they feel is important to know and understand about the world in this crisis." (Kellner, 14:39)
[17:33, Kellner]:
"Putinism seems to present a clear answer to where does truth derive? Well, it is in the media. It's in the government. There's sort of a single voice that has now been consolidated around the Putin government... Identity: we are a distinct civilization from the west... a special mission to preserve tradition and values..." (Kellner, 18:12)
[25:59, McBrien; 26:59, Kellner]:
"There are very few people who believe in the positive future... the best idea we can come up with is a nostalgia of a type, that there was a time when we were great." (Kellner, 28:22)
[29:52, Kellner]:
"The most common answer among Anglophone scholars anyway is that it's just a nationalist parable... I think that over-simplifies Fomenko. What really matters is that... Fomenko is offering something coherent and some vision of the past that Russians can take pride in..." (Kellner, 35:30 & 36:35)
[38:09, McBrien; 39:34, Kellner]:
"...the Internet has such an atomizing effect on our public square, or what had been a public square. And so it may be that we need a crisis on the Internet, which I think is brewing... There is a major backlash against the Internet, and I put a lot of hope in that." (Kellner, 41:40–42:05)
On the depth of Russian crisis:
“Disorientation on a level that I think is difficult to wrap our heads around as Americans.”
(Kellner, 04:45)
On the mixture of science and faith:
“Upon inspection, you realize that defining either religion or science is virtually impossible. And there’s all kinds of creative recombinations of these things.”
(Kellner, 10:51)
On nostalgia vs future visions in politics:
“There are very few people who believe in the positive future... the best idea we can come up with is a nostalgia... that there was a time when we were great.”
(Kellner, 28:22)
Host humor:
“If you’re feeling disoriented, just wait.”
(McBrien, 31:55, as Fomenko’s theory is explained)
On unpredictability:
“Nobody can tell the future, and historians least of all. ...It’s wholly plausible and with plenty of historical precedent that what looks like a completely unstoppable drift to the right or towards authoritarianism can fracture and splinter.”
(Kellner, 41:07)
The conversation maintains a thoughtful, probing, yet accessible tone. There’s a blend of deep historical insight, personal anecdote, and occasional wry humor (especially in discussing outlandish conspiratorial theories). Both host and guest pull current analogies without alarmism, emphasizing the complexity and unpredictability of cultural history.
Kellner’s study highlights that profound societal disorientation yields all kinds of radical experiments with belief, history, and identity—experiments that can be both creative and dangerous. The episode urges listeners to see the Soviet collapse not just as a “Russian” story, but as a potent warning and guide for many modern societies facing their own crises of meaning, authority, and truth.