The Lawfare Podcast: The Defense Tech Paradox, with Susannah Glickman

December 10, 2025
Host: Olivia Manis
Guest: Susannah Glickman (Assistant Professor of History, Stony Brook University)

Overview

This episode dives into the rapidly evolving relationship between the U.S. government, Silicon Valley, and the burgeoning sector of "defense tech" amidst the second Trump administration. Drawing on Susannah Glickman's recent article in the New York Review of Books, the conversation explores the paradox at the heart of contemporary defense tech policy: companies claiming to revitalize U.S. industrial capacity while their methods may, in fact, systematically undermine it. The discussion chronicles the history of defense industrial policy, the rise of Silicon Valley in military affairs, the influence of financialization (venture capital/private equity), and the implications of recent executive branch interventions.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Defining the New "Defense Tech" Sector

• Who are the new players?
  • Defense tech is no longer just the defense "Primes" (e.g., Lockheed Martin); now includes Silicon Valley-style companies like Palantir, Anduril, and Shield AI.
  • These new firms differ in origin, culture, and financial backing compared to traditional defense contractors.
  • Glickman notes:

    “These new tech defense firms are a product of industrial policy that the earlier defense firms wanted for themselves... coming out of institutional experiments like In-Q-Tel, and out of Silicon Valley startup culture proper.” (06:04)

• A broad and amorphous field
  • Not all defense tech firms are politically or culturally aligned, though many dominate current headlines and policy influence.

2. The Defense Tech Paradox

• The core contradiction:
  • Firms call for "reviving American industrial policy"—insisting on their efficiency and innovative edge—while deploying models (venture capital, private equity) that undermine stable, long-term industrial development.
• Historical reversal:
  • Glickman frames today as a reversal of the Cold War era:

    “We’ve flipped from companies that say they're not doing industrial policy but really solicit it, need it—to companies that say they're doing it... and in fact undermine the conditions through which that might be possible.” (09:26)

• Gendered and self-mythologizing rhetoric:
  • Tech leaders invoke “great man” narratives (Oppenheimer, the Manhattan Project) to legitimize control over national defense—skewing historical reality.

3. Critique of Financialization

• Venture capital and private equity (PE):
  • Glickman explains:
    • VCs expect quick returns, seeking to pump up valuations, IPO, and cash out—ill-suited to decades-long defense investments.
    • PE’s “efficiency” often means cost-cutting, debt-loading, and short-term value extraction (12:30).
  • Quote:

    “Private equity has been very, very successful in the Trump administration at getting important appointments... Steve Feinberg, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in charge of restructuring the Pentagon in his mind.” (15:23)

• Critics from within:
  • Some defense tech leaders echo left-wing critiques of Primes’ bloat, stock buybacks, and lack of innovation—despite being “even more financialized.”

4. Technological Myths: "Software-Driven Reindustrialization"

• Glickman calls this “a marketing term” (16:03), primarily pushed by Palantir, that elevates the importance of AI and software as the next industrial revolution.
• Questionable substance:
  • “It's rarely precisely defined, but it does invoke Palantir's strengths... It's very unclear what that would actually mean.”
  • Purports that software optimization will maximize “lethality” and military effectiveness.

5. The Great Man Theory and Historical Revisionism

• Leaders frame defense advances as the work of individual “founders,” not institutions:
  • Glickman:

    “Shankar retells the entire history of the 20th century as a story not of the strong state, not about infrastructure... but actually about a bunch of founders.” (18:22)

• **Reality: American defense is deeply rooted in state action, broad industrial mobilization, and public funding—not just private genius.

6. The Historical Roots of U.S. Defense Industrial Policy

• Military Keynesianism:
  • U.S. government used military spending for economic stimulus and infrastructure since WWII, creating powerful welfare apparatuses within defense. (20:37)
  • This persisted, though “hidden and anemic,” through the postwar era, surviving through constant reinvention.
• Reagan, Clinton & Defense Consolidation:
  • 1980s/90s policy choices (deregulation, private equity, “the Last Supper” consolidation) led to giant, sclerotic defense monopolies.
  • The rise of legal loopholes and declining government oversight opened the door for financialized, tech-driven firms to step in.

7. Government-Tech Cross-Pollination

• Programs like In-Q-Tel and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) emerged to leverage Silicon Valley for military innovation.
  • In-Q-Tel acted as a government-backed VC, securing lucrative contracts for startups—but “lots of skepticism about whether the tech actually ends up in the intelligence community.” (39:10)
  • Expansion in the Obama era; further acceleration and political embedding in the Trump and Biden administrations.

8. The Trump Administration’s Disruptive Approach

• Privatization and “Breaking Things”:
  • Core government functions in R&D and standard-setting (e.g., NIST, NOAA) are being hollowed out and replaced or outsourced to contractors.
  • The tech-company “move fast, break things” ethos is directly imported into Pentagon decision-making.
  • “They’re destroying a lot of the research infrastructure... shutting off all these grants across agencies that these companies have relied on for so long.” (45:49)
• Software-as-a-Service Risks:
  • Embedding private software in defense systems means the companies could “shut off” functionality—raising national security risks and alienating allies.

  • “You’re hoping Alex Karp isn’t going to shut off whatever service... It’s just kind of a—I can understand [Europe’s] position.” (46:51)

9. Equity Deals vs. Industrial Policy

• Bespoke “private equity”-style deals:
  • The administration now takes stakes in companies like Nvidia, Intel, MP Materials—less about sectoral reform and more about patronage and executive flexibility.
  • “These deals... appear to be more like a patronage network and more of a way to allow the executive branch and Defense Department to run around Congress.” (50:33)
• Contrast with postwar industrial strategies:
  • “The Chips Act... at its heart was, ‘we’re going to revive this sector.’” Today’s approach is piecemeal, opaque, and unaccountable.

10. Lessons from and Misunderstandings About China

• Deep misunderstanding of Chinese industrial policy:
  • U.S. PE/VC leaders see “state capitalism” and believe it mirrors their own approach—while missing China’s use of coordinated, long-term R&D investment and fierce regional competitiveness.

  • “They are not afraid to discipline capital, which is not at all what’s happening here.” (54:24)

11. A Fragile and Contradictory Coalition

• Conflicting interests among defense tech’s rising coalition:
  • Silicon Valley globalists, regional manufacturers, and right-wing factions may share a short-term agenda but are fundamentally misaligned on long-term outcomes.
  • “What all these groups have been very good at is exploiting legal loopholes, lack of oversight, unwillingness to enforce laws and regulation.” (56:55)
• Uncertain future:
  • Glickman concludes:

    “I see a lot of different contradictions and... potential clashes... But the thing we can say for sure is things are happening very quickly and it’s very uncertain... institutions can be remade and the future is open.” (58:39–59:46)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the core paradox of defense tech:

  “Now we have the inverse... companies saying, ‘we really need to do industrial policy,’... when in fact what they’re doing is undermining the possibility of doing industrial policy.” — Susannah Glickman (09:26)

• On the marketing of “software-driven reindustrialization”:

  “If I’m going to be completely honest, I think it’s a marketing term that the Palantir guys came up with. They love these flashy... whole 18 Theses things.” — Susannah Glickman (16:03)

• On the new great man myth:

  “Shankar... retells the entire history of the 20th century as a story not of the strong state, not about infrastructure... but actually about a bunch of founders.” — Susannah Glickman (18:22)

• On private equity’s influence in defense:

  “Private equity has been very, very successful in the Trump administration at getting important appointments... Steve Feinberg, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in charge of... restructuring the Pentagon.” (15:23)

• On the outsourcing of government functions:

  “They’re privatizing more and more functions or not replacing them at all.” — Susannah Glickman (49:42)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• 03:19 — Setting the scene: Defense tech and the Trump administration
• 06:04 — How "defense tech" differs from legacy defense primes
• 08:34 — The paradox of industrial policy: revival or undermining?
• 10:44 — Critique of financialization & PE in defense tech
• 16:03 — The myth of 'software-driven reindustrialization'
• 18:22 — Great man theory and the mythologizing of defense history
• 20:37 — Overview of military Keynesianism and U.S. defense industrial policy
• 32:33 — The story of defense sector consolidation
• 39:10 — In-Q-Tel, DIU, and Silicon Valley’s increasing entanglement
• 45:03 — The Trump administration: move fast, break things, privatize
• 50:33 — The Nvidia deal and case-by-case equity interventions
• 54:24 — Comparisons (and misconceptions) regarding “state capitalism” in China
• 56:11 — Is the current defense tech coalition sustainable?
• 58:39 — Final thoughts: uncertainty, instability, and the opportunity for change

Conclusion

The episode offers a sweeping historical and political diagnosis of how the U.S. is reconfiguring its military-industrial nexus via Silicon Valley culture and financialization—abandoning the foundations of durable, government-coordinated industrial strategy. Glickman warns that while the “defense tech paradox” is lucrative for its architects, it breeds instability and undercuts the very ambitions it advertises. The future is uncertain, with deep-seated contradictions and a rapidly shifting landscape—posing both peril and opportunity for those intent on remaking institutions.

For a deeper dive, see Susannah Glickman's article, “The War on Defense Tech,” in the New York Review of Books.