Podcast Summary: Lawfare Daily – The End of New START?
Podcast: The Lawfare Podcast
Episode: Lawfare Daily: The End of New START?
Date: December 4, 2025
Host: Ariane Tabatabai
Guests: John Drennan (Council on Foreign Relations), Matthew Sharp (MIT Center for Nuclear Security Policy)
Overview
This episode of The Lawfare Podcast dives deeply into the looming expiration of New START, the last remaining bilateral U.S.–Russia nuclear arms control treaty. Host Ariane Tabatabai is joined by John Drennan and Matthew Sharp to discuss what New START does, its political and diplomatic significance, the current obstacles to its renewal or extension, and the uncertain future of nuclear arms control.
With less than two months until New START's expiration, the conversation covers treaty provisions, the verification crisis, Russia’s one-year extension proposal, and the broader implications for arms control in a transformed geopolitical landscape.
Key Discussion Points & Insights
1. What is New START?
[02:38–07:13 | John Drennan]
- Scope: New START is the last bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia on strategic nuclear arms, focusing on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers ("the triad").
- Limits: Sets the lowest agreed numerical caps (central limits) but allows flexibility in force structure.
- Verification: Had an intrusive verification regime—on-site inspections, data exchanges, launch notifications, and a bilateral consultative commission (BCC) for issue resolution.
- Timeline: Signed in April 2010, entered force February 2011 for 10 years, extended once for five more years in 2021. Set to expire February 2026.
- Verification Breakdown: COVID-19 paused inspections in 2020; Russia refused inspections post-Ukraine invasion; Russia fully suspended treaty implementation (but not central limits) in Feb 2023.
2. Historical & Political Context
[07:29–11:44 | Matthew Sharp]
- 2010 Context: Obama’s Prague speech and new U.S. initiatives marked a return to diplomatic arms control after perceived Bush-era disengagement.
- Diplomatic Integration: New START, the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and NPT Review Conference offered strong US commitment to multilateral non-proliferation.
- Consensus: The 2010 NPT Review Conference reached rare consensus, with New START playing a supporting role in restoring U.S. credibility.
3. New START’s Role in the US–Russia Relationship
[11:44–19:43 | John Drennan]
- Reset Era: New START symbolized resets in the early Obama years, yielding stability amid strains.
- Post-2021: Pandemic hindered resumption of inspections. After Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion, relations soured further. Russia increasingly linked treaty implementation (especially BCC) to U.S. actions in Ukraine.
- Suspension: In Feb 2023, Russia suspended all verification, maintaining only the central numerical limits as a political gesture.
"The US approach historically has been to try to compartmentalize arms control from these broader issues... but the Russians kind of lashed them together in Ukraine."
— John Drennan [17:43]
4. Putin’s One-Year Extension Proposal
[19:43–20:42 | Ariane Tabatabai, John Drennan]
- Non-Legal Deal: Putin offered a political (not legal) deal to keep central limits for one year (no verification).
- No Treaty Extension: The treaty cannot legally be extended further; what's on the table is an ad hoc arrangement.
5. Weighing the Proposal: Cons
[21:16–25:24 | John Drennan, Matthew Sharp]
- Concession on Ukraine: Accepting could be interpreted as linking arms control with the Ukraine conflict.
- "Just Trust Us": No verification; must rely on Russia’s word—problematic given past compliance issues.
- Kicking the Can: Only delays the crisis a year, little room for meaningful arms build-up or de-escalation in such a short time.
- Norm Setting: Risks undermining U.S. leadership in arms control norms, especially with China watching.
"...if what was on the table was we're going to agree to separately maintain for a year our adherence to the central limits and nothing else, then... you're left without the tools to have confidence that you're getting what was on offer."
— Matthew Sharp [22:10]
6. Weighing the Proposal: Pros
[26:02–30:18 | Matthew Sharp, John Drennan]
- NPT Review Conference: Extension, even partial, would be beneficial ahead of the April NPT Review Conference, avoiding destabilization.
- Dialogue: Keeping lines open (data exchanges, BCC meetings) could prevent further breakdown and maintain a framework for future talks.
- China Angle: Maintaining some framework helps U.S. position in bringing China into arms control discussions.
- Domestic Narrative: Crisis resolution could have visible political benefits domestically.
"I would ... try to say yes to something that preserves at least elements of New START... with some pretty important caveats."
— Matthew Sharp [26:17]
7. Proposed U.S. Approach
[37:00–38:21 | John Drennan]
- Conditional Engagement: U.S. should not accept outright, but counteroffer to restore at least minimal verification (data exchanges, joint commission).
- Seriousness Test: Russia's willingness to engage would indicate seriousness about arms control.
8. Russia’s New Nuclear Delivery Systems
[39:00–41:30 | John Drennan, Matthew Sharp]
- Burevestnik & Poseidon: Announced "superweapons" don’t fit conventional treaty categories, highlighting how much the security environment has changed.
- Arms Control Implications: Reinforces need for updated frameworks and dialogue to cover new technologies.
9. The Future of Arms Control
[41:30–50:45 | Matthew Sharp]
- End of the Bilateral Era: Three-way nuclear balance with China complicates the old U.S.–Russia model.
- Technology Changes: Proliferation of civilian nuclear tech, AI, and information technology change what arms control is possible.
- Verification & Trust: New information technologies (e.g., commercial satellite imagery) offer new verification opportunities but also new risks (deepfakes).
- Political Process: Treaty ratification in the U.S. Senate has become more difficult; cycles are faster than 10–15 year treaties.
- Opportunity for Innovation: The next arms control frameworks will be multilateral, technologically advanced, and flexible.
"These are tools...not things you get attached to. But...if you lose this last one, all of that careful work done over 50 years to some extent goes with it."
— Matthew Sharp [44:12]
10. Domestic Capacity and Bureaucratic Hurdles
[50:45–55:19 | Ariane Tabatabai, Matthew Sharp]
- State Department Reorg: Cuts to arms control expertise and new broad mandates for leadership reduce focus and bandwidth.
- Interagency Coordination: Necessity for DoD, DOE, and interagency processes is even greater now.
- Acknowledgment: Despite challenges, committed experts persist.
11. Russian Perspective and Potential for Arms Control
[55:22–56:54 | John Drennan]
- Russia may be stalling in hopes of a more favorable political context in a year.
- Despite tension, both sides have practical reasons to avoid an arms race.
12. New START and Ukraine War
[56:54–59:21 | John Drennan]
- Inclusion of nuclear arms control in proposed Ukraine settlement problematic; risks in linking issues that the U.S. wants separate.
13. Resuming Nuclear Testing: President Trump’s Announcement
[59:21–65:09 | Ariane Tabatabai, Matthew Sharp, John Drennan]
- Announcement’s meaning unclear; probably refers to subcritical (not explosive) tests, not full nuclear detonations.
- Such moves would risk undermining the existing global norm against nuclear testing and could prompt unnecessary escalation or losses of technical advantage.
"It seems really like a mistake...to give up that advantage chasing something that we think less capable adversaries might be doing."
— Matthew Sharp [62:10]
Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
-
On the fragility of verification:
"The verification piece of the treaty has faced more difficulty than the central limits piece."
— John Drennan [06:04] -
On U.S. diplomatic objectives:
"We need to make sure that we're prevailing in that diplomatic encounter that has implications well beyond the bilateral relationship."
— Matthew Sharp [24:02] -
On new Russian systems:
"[Burevestnik] is capable of flying with its nuclear reactor forever and then can kind of drop out and strike targets... Poseidon is allegedly a nuclear powered drone torpedo hybrid... create a massive radioactive tsunami."
— John Drennan [40:30] -
On arms control's future:
"I feel like the future of arms control is actually pretty bright. It is different. But the objective here is to use diplomacy... to advance our national security."
— Matthew Sharp [45:18] -
On domestic constraints:
"There are only so many hours in the day. You know, these people are incredible, but, but they have to sleep..."
— Matthew Sharp [52:22]
Key Timestamps
- [02:38] – John Drennan explains New START provisions and timeline
- [08:20] – Matthew Sharp contextualizes New START in Obama-era arms control
- [12:21] – John Drennan on New START’s effect on the US–Russia relationship
- [19:43] – Putin’s proposal to extend central limits for one year explained
- [21:16] – Cons of a political extension (no verification, just “trust us”)
- [26:17] – Pros of extension: maintaining platforms for dialogue, NPT conference
- [39:00] – Russian “superweapons” and their implications for arms control
- [41:30] – The future of arms control: new challenges and opportunities
- [50:45] – State Dept. reorganization effects on arms control capacity
- [56:54] – New START’s implications for the Ukraine conflict
- [59:21] – Discussion of potential U.S. return to nuclear testing
Conclusion
The expiration of New START marks a critical juncture for U.S.–Russia arms control and global nuclear stability. The episode offers an accessible yet deeply informed analysis of the treaty’s history, negotiating context, breakdown, and the complex calculations involved in any next step. The conversation highlights both the grave risks of losing structured arms control and the hopeful creativity available for future diplomatic solutions.
Bottom line: The window for meaningful diplomacy is rapidly closing, and the choices made in the coming months will echo throughout global security for years to come.
For further details and links to key resources, visit Lawfareblog.com.