The Lawfare Podcast: The Latest in Iran, with Richard Nephew

Date: January 13, 2026
Host: Ariane Tabatabai
Guest: Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University and former Deputy Special Envoy for Iran

Episode Overview

This episode delves deeply into the latest developments concerning Iran—historic protests, shifting US policy under Trump’s second administration, the June 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, proxy wars, regional alliances, and the evolving dynamics with Russia and China. Ariane Tabatabai and Richard Nephew analyze not just the factual timeline, but the strategic and bureaucratic currents shaping the responses within Iran, the US, and the broader region.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Protests in Iran: Scale, Regime Response, and What’s Different

Timestamps: 01:06 - 08:57

• Scale and Context:

  • Ongoing nationwide protests, the biggest since 2022, including within regime strongholds like the Bazaar. Internet shutdowns and harsh crackdowns highlight the regime’s self-preservation instincts.
  • “These are...the largest protests Iran has experienced since 2022.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 02:05)

• Root Causes and Public Sentiment:

  • Nephew identifies several crises: economic mismanagement, corruption, crime, and unfulfilled aspirations of an educated, worldly population.
  • “We are now seeing all the contradictions of the Iranian system laid completely bare: the inability to manage the economy, the corruption, the crime, the human rights violations...” (Richard Nephew, 05:11)

• Limits of Optimism & Regime Resilience:

  • The regime retains a monopoly on violence and a historically demonstrated capacity to survive unrest, using escalating repression as necessary.
  • “The Iranian system knows how to sustain itself and is prepared to take action to sustain itself...they have still both a monopoly of violence and a willingness to use it in excess of what people are prepared to tolerate.” (Richard Nephew, 07:13)

• Risks Post-Regime:

  • Nephew warns that even if the regime falls, the future may not be brighter for Iran—hardliners or even more repressive actors may take power, or chaos could follow.
  • “The current system is terrible, but...it can always get worse.” (Richard Nephew, 08:03)

2. Trump Administration’s Response: Military Options & Restraint

Timestamps: 08:57 - 13:17

• Trump’s Rhetoric vs. Reality:

  • While Trump talks tough, history suggests the US favors limited special-ops or targeted strikes over regime change or full-scale invasion.
  • “We are not seeing a resumption of 2003 era massive invasion, occupation force.” (Richard Nephew, 09:48)

• Comparison with Venezuela:

  • The Venezuela operation removed Maduro but left the regime. Nephew describes this as a “leadership change, but not a regime change.” (Richard Nephew, 10:32)

• Likely US Actions:

  • Most plausible actions in Iran: one-off military strikes against regime or IRGC targets, show of force, but avoidance of escalation.
  • “You could imagine the US or the US plus Israel potentially taking action that would target regime officials and those sorts of things to try and enable protesters to rise up.” (Richard Nephew, 11:37)

3. Iran’s Nuclear & Missile Programs: After June Strikes

Timestamps: 13:17 - 18:55

• Impact of the Strikes:

  • The June 2025 strikes destroyed major nuclear facilities, notably at Natanz and Fordo, setting back the “big program.”
  • “The big program was badly damaged...probably a year or two away from being reconstituted.” (Richard Nephew, 15:59)

• Nuclear Weapons Risk Remains:

  • Iran possesses enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) to make nuclear weapons quickly in a more covert manner.
  • “The ability to produce weapons is probably still in the neighborhood of a couple of months.” (Richard Nephew, 16:01)

• Limits of ‘Mowing the Lawn’:

  • Nephew criticizes the recurring “mow the lawn” approach—periodic strikes don’t solve the deeper strategic challenge, especially given uncertainties in intelligence and Iran’s capacity for covert work.
  • “It presupposes the ability of intelligence to accurately identify all the places where Iran might have nuclear material...if that fails to be true, then we're in a world of hurt...” (Ariane Tabatabai, 21:00)

4. US Strategic Uncertainty & Bureaucratic Shifts

Timestamps: 18:55 - 23:34, 54:51 - 60:05

• Unclear Iran Policy:

  • The Trump 2 administration appears to lack a coherent Iran framework—reactive, not proactive; more improvisation than strategy.
  • “It’s not really clear to me what our Iran policy is beyond...one-off statements here and there.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 23:34)

• Bureaucratic Politics:

  • Contrast between Trump’s first-term ideologues who prioritized regime change to current more tactically-minded officials open to deals and sanctions relief.
  • “I am more skeptical that it’s something that they consider is important and what they would be prepared to trade for it is different.” (Richard Nephew, 55:36)

• On President Trump’s Apparent Priorities:

  • “He would like to do a deal with Iran and...help them prosper. So that is actually one of the few things that he's been fairly clear and fairly consistent on...” (Ariane Tabatabai, 58:58)

5. Regional Power Projection: Iran’s Proxy Network and Israeli Counter-Campaign

Timestamps: 23:34 – 30:10

• Proxy Networks Overestimated:

  • Iran’s control over its network of proxies (e.g., in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza) is less than often assumed—alliances are transactional and prone to fragmentation.
  • “It was always a more loose knit organization of co-interested parties that were prepared to take Iranian support but not necessarily take Iranian orders.” (Richard Nephew, 28:15)

• Effectiveness of Israeli Campaigns:

  • Israeli operations since October 2023 have degraded key proxy and IRGC capacities.
  • The main question is whether Iran will shift its focus to missile programs for deterrence.
  • “We may be seeing that answer because...they've been doing is concentrating on the reconstruction of the missile program as a way of trying to be able to overwhelm regional missile defenses and to threaten Israel in particular.” (Richard Nephew, 29:27)

6. Regional Dynamics: Abraham Accords and Gulf–Israel Cooperation

Timestamps: 36:26 – 41:56

• Durability of Accords:

  • The Abraham Accords were never just about countering Iran; for the Gulf states, normalization with Israel was a regional integration goal.
  • “There was more durability behind the Abraham Accords than just a countering Iran alliance. And that’s actually a good thing.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 38:51)

• Gulf States’ Independent Path:

  • Gulf Arab states are increasingly skeptical of tying themselves to Washington’s Iran policy, preferring autonomy, given doubts about US security guarantees and decisions.
  • “They don’t want to link themselves to a policy with regard to Iran that they think is going to get them in trouble...that we’re not going to be there to support them.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 40:42)

7. Russia and China: Transactional Partners, Not True Allies

Timestamps: 42:01 – 48:20

• Russia-Iran Relationship:

  • The Ukraine war led to more visible military and drone tech exchanges, but Russia remains uncommitted to Iran’s broader ambitions.
  • “Russia is 100% prepared to utilize the support it gets from Iran, but...it’s not going to do anything to support the Iranians, at least of any substance.” (Richard Nephew, 45:17)

• On China:

  • China continues to purchase Iranian oil but primarily for reasons of price and convenience, not deep alliance.
  • “They [China] do need to buy some amount of Russian just given the volume differences. But they could have done more substitution if they wanted to.” (Richard Nephew, 47:16)

8. How Does the Iranian Regime See Its Options?

Timestamps: 48:20 – 53:50

• Lessons from Venezuela and US Signaling:

  • Nephew suggests that US actions—such as willingness to do business with remnants of the Maduro regime—tell Tehran the US can be negotiated with if Iran has something it values.
  • “You can pretty much get anything. And that is a thing that is available to us if prepared to do deals.” (Richard Nephew, 53:02)

• Implications for Nuclear Choices:

  • Recent events may reinforce Iranian perceptions that only a nuclear deterrent—like North Korea’s—is sufficient to prevent US intervention.
  • “All point in direction: Go get nuclear weapons as fast as you possibly can...” (Richard Nephew, 49:46)

Notable Quotes & Moments

• On Regime Survival:

  • “It can always get worse and that there are people inside that system who would be 100% prepared to take ownership and leadership in a way that would involve even more repression.” (Richard Nephew, 08:03)

• On US ‘Mow the Lawn’ Approach:

  • “My lawn gets mowed regularly; it does not, however, have the ability to covertly plan to grow grass on my driveway and evade the detection of me and my lawnmower.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 20:40)

• On Proxy Alliances:

  • “All of us were overestimating the nature of these alliance structures...” (Richard Nephew, 28:20)

• On US Appetite for Regime Change:

  • “I think that you ask any secretary of state going back that long, that was absolutely something they wanted to see. The question is whether or not it's something we were prepared to action.” (Richard Nephew, 55:18)

• On Trump’s Consistency:

  • “He would like to do a deal with Iran and that if they do so, he would be prepared to help them prosper. So that is actually one of the few things that he's been fairly clear and fairly consistent on...” (Ariane Tabatabai, 58:58)

Episode Timestamps & Sections

• [01:06–08:57] Protests, Regime Resilience, and Possible Outcomes
• [08:57–13:17] US Policy, Military Options, and Comparison to Venezuela
• [13:17–18:55] The Nuclear Program After June Strikes
• [18:55–23:34] Strategy Uncertainty, ‘Mowing the Lawn’ and Bureaucratic Politics
• [23:34–30:10] Iran’s Proxy Model: Myth vs. Reality
• [36:26–41:56] Abraham Accords, Regional Alliances, and US Credibility
• [42:01–48:20] Russia & China: Transactional Relationships
• [48:20–53:50] Iranian Strategic Thinking: Security and Deterrence
• [54:51–60:05] Bureaucratic Politics: Who Drives Iran Policy?

Final Thoughts

This episode is a master class in separating headlines from structural reality. Nephew and Tabatabai deliver candid, sometimes sobering, but clear-eyed views about Iranian resilience, the mixed results of US and Israeli military adventurism, and the limits of alliances and “maximum pressure.” Both warn against magical thinking—about regime collapse or magic-bullet policies. Instead, they urge real analysis of goals and strategies, emphasizing how far uncertainty, transactional politics, and risk aversion drive decision-making on all sides.