Lawfare Daily: The Latest in Iran, with Richard Nephew

Summary

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The Lawfare Podcast: The Latest in Iran, with Richard Nephew

Date: January 13, 2026
Host: Ariane Tabatabai
Guest: Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University and former Deputy Special Envoy for Iran

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Episode Overview

This episode delves deeply into the latest developments concerning Iran—historic protests, shifting US policy under Trump’s second administration, the June 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, proxy wars, regional alliances, and the evolving dynamics with Russia and China. Ariane Tabatabai and Richard Nephew analyze not just the factual timeline, but the strategic and bureaucratic currents shaping the responses within Iran, the US, and the broader region.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Protests in Iran: Scale, Regime Response, and What’s Different

Timestamps: 01:06 - 08:57

• Scale and Context:

  • Ongoing nationwide protests, the biggest since 2022, including within regime strongholds like the Bazaar. Internet shutdowns and harsh crackdowns highlight the regime’s self-preservation instincts.
  • “These are...the largest protests Iran has experienced since 2022.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 02:05)

• Root Causes and Public Sentiment:

  • Nephew identifies several crises: economic mismanagement, corruption, crime, and unfulfilled aspirations of an educated, worldly population.
  • “We are now seeing all the contradictions of the Iranian system laid completely bare: the inability to manage the economy, the corruption, the crime, the human rights violations...” (Richard Nephew, 05:11)

• Limits of Optimism & Regime Resilience:

  • The regime retains a monopoly on violence and a historically demonstrated capacity to survive unrest, using escalating repression as necessary.
  • “The Iranian system knows how to sustain itself and is prepared to take action to sustain itself...they have still both a monopoly of violence and a willingness to use it in excess of what people are prepared to tolerate.” (Richard Nephew, 07:13)

• Risks Post-Regime:

  • Nephew warns that even if the regime falls, the future may not be brighter for Iran—hardliners or even more repressive actors may take power, or chaos could follow.
  • “The current system is terrible, but...it can always get worse.” (Richard Nephew, 08:03)

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2. Trump Administration’s Response: Military Options & Restraint

Timestamps: 08:57 - 13:17

• Trump’s Rhetoric vs. Reality:

  • While Trump talks tough, history suggests the US favors limited special-ops or targeted strikes over regime change or full-scale invasion.
  • “We are not seeing a resumption of 2003 era massive invasion, occupation force.” (Richard Nephew, 09:48)

• Comparison with Venezuela:

  • The Venezuela operation removed Maduro but left the regime. Nephew describes this as a “leadership change, but not a regime change.” (Richard Nephew, 10:32)

• Likely US Actions:

  • Most plausible actions in Iran: one-off military strikes against regime or IRGC targets, show of force, but avoidance of escalation.
  • “You could imagine the US or the US plus Israel potentially taking action that would target regime officials and those sorts of things to try and enable protesters to rise up.” (Richard Nephew, 11:37)

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3. Iran’s Nuclear & Missile Programs: After June Strikes

Timestamps: 13:17 - 18:55

• Impact of the Strikes:

  • The June 2025 strikes destroyed major nuclear facilities, notably at Natanz and Fordo, setting back the “big program.”
  • “The big program was badly damaged...probably a year or two away from being reconstituted.” (Richard Nephew, 15:59)

• Nuclear Weapons Risk Remains:

  • Iran possesses enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) to make nuclear weapons quickly in a more covert manner.
  • “The ability to produce weapons is probably still in the neighborhood of a couple of months.” (Richard Nephew, 16:01)

• Limits of ‘Mowing the Lawn’:

  • Nephew criticizes the recurring “mow the lawn” approach—periodic strikes don’t solve the deeper strategic challenge, especially given uncertainties in intelligence and Iran’s capacity for covert work.
  • “It presupposes the ability of intelligence to accurately identify all the places where Iran might have nuclear material...if that fails to be true, then we're in a world of hurt...” (Ariane Tabatabai, 21:00)

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4. US Strategic Uncertainty & Bureaucratic Shifts

Timestamps: 18:55 - 23:34, 54:51 - 60:05

• Unclear Iran Policy:

  • The Trump 2 administration appears to lack a coherent Iran framework—reactive, not proactive; more improvisation than strategy.
  • “It’s not really clear to me what our Iran policy is beyond...one-off statements here and there.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 23:34)

• Bureaucratic Politics:

  • Contrast between Trump’s first-term ideologues who prioritized regime change to current more tactically-minded officials open to deals and sanctions relief.
  • “I am more skeptical that it’s something that they consider is important and what they would be prepared to trade for it is different.” (Richard Nephew, 55:36)

• On President Trump’s Apparent Priorities:

  • “He would like to do a deal with Iran and...help them prosper. So that is actually one of the few things that he's been fairly clear and fairly consistent on...” (Ariane Tabatabai, 58:58)

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5. Regional Power Projection: Iran’s Proxy Network and Israeli Counter-Campaign

Timestamps: 23:34 – 30:10

• Proxy Networks Overestimated:

  • Iran’s control over its network of proxies (e.g., in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza) is less than often assumed—alliances are transactional and prone to fragmentation.
  • “It was always a more loose knit organization of co-interested parties that were prepared to take Iranian support but not necessarily take Iranian orders.” (Richard Nephew, 28:15)

• Effectiveness of Israeli Campaigns:

  • Israeli operations since October 2023 have degraded key proxy and IRGC capacities.
  • The main question is whether Iran will shift its focus to missile programs for deterrence.
  • “We may be seeing that answer because...they've been doing is concentrating on the reconstruction of the missile program as a way of trying to be able to overwhelm regional missile defenses and to threaten Israel in particular.” (Richard Nephew, 29:27)

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6. Regional Dynamics: Abraham Accords and Gulf–Israel Cooperation

Timestamps: 36:26 – 41:56

• Durability of Accords:

  • The Abraham Accords were never just about countering Iran; for the Gulf states, normalization with Israel was a regional integration goal.
  • “There was more durability behind the Abraham Accords than just a countering Iran alliance. And that’s actually a good thing.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 38:51)

• Gulf States’ Independent Path:

  • Gulf Arab states are increasingly skeptical of tying themselves to Washington’s Iran policy, preferring autonomy, given doubts about US security guarantees and decisions.
  • “They don’t want to link themselves to a policy with regard to Iran that they think is going to get them in trouble...that we’re not going to be there to support them.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 40:42)

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7. Russia and China: Transactional Partners, Not True Allies

Timestamps: 42:01 – 48:20

• Russia-Iran Relationship:

  • The Ukraine war led to more visible military and drone tech exchanges, but Russia remains uncommitted to Iran’s broader ambitions.
  • “Russia is 100% prepared to utilize the support it gets from Iran, but...it’s not going to do anything to support the Iranians, at least of any substance.” (Richard Nephew, 45:17)

• On China:

  • China continues to purchase Iranian oil but primarily for reasons of price and convenience, not deep alliance.
  • “They [China] do need to buy some amount of Russian just given the volume differences. But they could have done more substitution if they wanted to.” (Richard Nephew, 47:16)

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8. How Does the Iranian Regime See Its Options?

Timestamps: 48:20 – 53:50

• Lessons from Venezuela and US Signaling:

  • Nephew suggests that US actions—such as willingness to do business with remnants of the Maduro regime—tell Tehran the US can be negotiated with if Iran has something it values.
  • “You can pretty much get anything. And that is a thing that is available to us if prepared to do deals.” (Richard Nephew, 53:02)

• Implications for Nuclear Choices:

  • Recent events may reinforce Iranian perceptions that only a nuclear deterrent—like North Korea’s—is sufficient to prevent US intervention.
  • “All point in direction: Go get nuclear weapons as fast as you possibly can...” (Richard Nephew, 49:46)

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Notable Quotes & Moments

• On Regime Survival:

  • “It can always get worse and that there are people inside that system who would be 100% prepared to take ownership and leadership in a way that would involve even more repression.” (Richard Nephew, 08:03)

• On US ‘Mow the Lawn’ Approach:

  • “My lawn gets mowed regularly; it does not, however, have the ability to covertly plan to grow grass on my driveway and evade the detection of me and my lawnmower.” (Ariane Tabatabai, 20:40)

• On Proxy Alliances:

  • “All of us were overestimating the nature of these alliance structures...” (Richard Nephew, 28:20)

• On US Appetite for Regime Change:

  • “I think that you ask any secretary of state going back that long, that was absolutely something they wanted to see. The question is whether or not it's something we were prepared to action.” (Richard Nephew, 55:18)

• On Trump’s Consistency:

  • “He would like to do a deal with Iran and that if they do so, he would be prepared to help them prosper. So that is actually one of the few things that he's been fairly clear and fairly consistent on...” (Ariane Tabatabai, 58:58)

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Episode Timestamps & Sections

• [01:06–08:57] Protests, Regime Resilience, and Possible Outcomes
• [08:57–13:17] US Policy, Military Options, and Comparison to Venezuela
• [13:17–18:55] The Nuclear Program After June Strikes
• [18:55–23:34] Strategy Uncertainty, ‘Mowing the Lawn’ and Bureaucratic Politics
• [23:34–30:10] Iran’s Proxy Model: Myth vs. Reality
• [36:26–41:56] Abraham Accords, Regional Alliances, and US Credibility
• [42:01–48:20] Russia & China: Transactional Relationships
• [48:20–53:50] Iranian Strategic Thinking: Security and Deterrence
• [54:51–60:05] Bureaucratic Politics: Who Drives Iran Policy?

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Final Thoughts

This episode is a master class in separating headlines from structural reality. Nephew and Tabatabai deliver candid, sometimes sobering, but clear-eyed views about Iranian resilience, the mixed results of US and Israeli military adventurism, and the limits of alliances and “maximum pressure.” Both warn against magical thinking—about regime collapse or magic-bullet policies. Instead, they urge real analysis of goals and strategies, emphasizing how far uncertainty, transactional politics, and risk aversion drive decision-making on all sides.

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Transcript

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[Richard Nephew]

I wish I would stop.

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I was thinking so much.

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[Ariane Tabatabai]

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[Ariane Tabatabai]

Diplomatic deals or military operations may not be as successful in a narrow sense of addressing a nuclear issue. And this takes me back to the.

[Richard Nephew]

Question of what should be the objective of the United States. You know, is this a time where you need to contemplate something much more aggressive in terms of limiting this regime's ability to develop those weapons? Is that the kind of path that.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

You want to pursue, especially if there are protests ongoing?

[Podcast Host]

It's the Lawfare podcast. I'm Ariane Tabatabai, Public Service Fellow here at lawfare, with Richard Nephew, senior Research Scholar at the center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and former Deputy Special Envoy for Iran during the Biden administration.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I cannot believe the ongoing protest activity is going to suggest to the Russians.

[Richard Nephew]

You know, this is a relationship we.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Need to invest in.

[Richard Nephew]

I, I think more than anything, if.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

They were already kind of lukewarm, they're.

[Richard Nephew]

Going to remain such until they see what comes out of this, until they see what comes out of potential military strikes coming from the US Or Israel with regard to the missile program, so on and so forth.

[Podcast Host]

Today we're talking about Iran and taking stock of the Trump administration's policy toward the country. We recorded this podcast on Thursday, January 8th, as we were beginning to record, we learned that the Iranian regime had shut down the Internet in response to the protests across the country. The shutdown has now gone on for days, and the regime has ramped up its crackdown. The number of protesters killed and arrested by regime forces have gone up drastically. The latest reporting puts those numbers at more than 500 killed and 10,700 arrested. These are the numbers as of this morning. This is January 12th, Eastern Time, and they will likely continue to go up by the time you listen. There is now reporting of diplomatic outreach from Iran to the US as the regime's leaders continue to respond to President Trump signaling that he may intervene in Iran should Tehran continue to kill protesters. Let's start with the ongoing protests. You know, this is not the first time we've seen such activity. These are, though, the largest protests Iran has experienced since 2022, and it seems to be expanding into even regime stronghold, including the bazaar. So that's noteworthy. Meanwhile, President Trump has been floating around the idea of taking action in Iran should the Iranian regime continue to crack down on protesters. And this is all happening in a very unusual and very complex context for the United States, which includes, obviously, most recently, the deposition of Venezuela's dictator Maduro, who is an Iranian partner. We also have an administration that's been more openly talking about military action that has certainly shown over the past year that it is inclined to take action where other administrations in the past would not have done so or would have been would have thought twice before undertaking that type of action, including in the context of Iran. And lastly, you know, the strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities over the summer. So I want to ask you to unpack two sets of questions here to begin with. And the first is about the protests themselves. You know, it's fairly, it's not that early, but it's fairly early to be able to tell where these are going. And again, this is a regime that is very well acquainted with protests. It has an advanced machinery that is designed to repress and suppress, and it's never shied away from killing, torturing, arresting people to secure regime stability. So how do you see these protests and the response so far as different from or similar to what we've seen in the past? And can you give us some indicators for what you are watching for as these protests continue? And then the second, the second set of questions I want to address are, what do you make of the Trump administration's response to the protests so far? Again, the president is using more stronger language. How much stock do you put into that? And what would a US Involvement look like if the administration were to actually do what it says it would be doing?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

The optimist in me wants to say.

[Richard Nephew]

Okay, this is the beginning of the end, that we are now seeing all the contradictions of the Iranian system laid completely bear the inability to manage the economy, the corruption, the crime, the human rights violations, the subjugation of a population.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That is incredibly sophisticated, incredibly worldly. You know, understanding where Iran's government is in the world and not particularly liking their place in it.

[Richard Nephew]

That's the population that Iran's leaders are dealing with here.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And all that adds up to my.

[Richard Nephew]

Mind to be the case for, for why this might be different and why we might actually see the final fracturing of this particular system.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think it's worth saying just to.

[Richard Nephew]

Be transparent in all respects.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That's a good thing, right? The idea that the current government of.

[Richard Nephew]

Iran could collapse and that the result could be an improved situation for the Iranian population, I think we should accept it as an unambiguous good.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

The realist in me, though, has got some concerns, and it's got some concerns on two levels.

[Richard Nephew]

Concern number one is, as you were.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Describing, Ari, that we have seen this.

[Richard Nephew]

Before and so has the Iranian government.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And while it is absolutely true that the pressure that is building on the.

[Richard Nephew]

Iranian government appears to be as significant as any that the Iranian government has experienced in the last four decades of.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Existence, the reality is that they also.

[Richard Nephew]

Know how to handle it. And we have not yet seen the full Iranian playbook come out. We might be seeing that today. Just before we started recording, there were reports on Twitter that the Internet is now out in Iran. That's the kind of thing you would expect to see as a first step towards a broader crackdown. We have indications that there has been violence used to repress people, but not the full apparatus of state repression that you and I would both expect.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And so realist point to me, number.

[Richard Nephew]

One, is, boy, we do know that the Iranian system knows how to sustain itself and is prepared to take action to sustain itself. And because we haven't seen it yet, that doesn't mean that it's not coming. And that if and when the Iranian state chooses to repress people as forcefully.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

As they can, past history would suggest.

[Richard Nephew]

That they have the ability to persevere and that they have still both a monopoly of violence and a willingness to use it in excess of what people are prepared to tolerate.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So that's, that's concern number one. Concern number two is, you know, even if there were to be a crack.

[Richard Nephew]

In the regime, it's not entirely apparent to me that that results in a better outcome for the Iranian population. I know that's a, that's a dangerous thing to say, but, but, but hear me out.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

You know, the, the reality is that the current system is terrible, but the pessimist that I have to be says.

[Richard Nephew]

It can always get worse and that.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

There are people inside of that system who would be 100% prepared to step.

[Richard Nephew]

Take ownership and Leadership in a way that would involve even more repression, more fundamental changes to the system as well.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And so the reality is we may be at the precipice of something very.

[Richard Nephew]

Good, but I think that we've at least at this moment still got as much chance of being at the precipice of either a clampdown that the regime itself is able to bring to bear or something much worse emerging from it. And that's the nature of these kinds of, of inflection points.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So all that adds up to me to being again, a willing optimist, wanting.

[Richard Nephew]

To see that the possibility curve is being positive here, but being really concerned about what also might be coming as people who have a lot of power, a lot of authority and a lot of stake in the system cling to that and refuse to give it up.

[Podcast Host]

Okay, so that's a really good kind of, I think, overview of what we've seen so far, what we're expecting in Iran now to bring us back to the sort of D.C. side of things. Right. What do you make of what President Trump has said about how the US Might respond to the protests if he were to take action? What range of options exist to him? Which ones have we seen used before and which ones seem like unusual and would be a point of departure from previous policy?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Yeah, I think it's worth, especially after Venezuela when people are now inclined to.

[Richard Nephew]

Think that the US Is going to be prepared to use military force much more aggressively, be prepared to take significant, significant action describing his regime change, those things.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Let's take a half step back, let's pump the brakes and let's actually say.

[Richard Nephew]

What we have seen this administration do when it comes to military force.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

We're still in the area largely of.

[Richard Nephew]

Special operations, still in the area largely of one and done kinds of operations. We are not seeing a resumption of 2003 era massive invasion, occupation force.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And in fact, if you look at.

[Richard Nephew]

The Venezuela case right now, the administration.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Is going to great lengths to say.

[Richard Nephew]

How prepared they are to put troops on the ground, how prepared they are to escalate, but they haven't done it. And instead what they have done is a special forces based operation that removed.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

One person and his wife and now.

[Richard Nephew]

They are seeking to do a deal with the remaining government, not actually executing a regime change, because you can't look.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

At the vice president of President Maduro.

[Richard Nephew]

Now being put in charge as a regime change. You can look at it as a leader, leadership change, but not a regime change.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And I think if you look at the June operation against Natanz and Fordo.

[Richard Nephew]

If you look at some of these other operations, either Nigeria or you're looking in the Red Sea vis a vis.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

The Houthis, all that adds up to.

[Richard Nephew]

Yeah, this administration is prepared to use.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Force, but it still is in a way that minimizes risk, still is in.

[Richard Nephew]

A way that minimizes exposure, still in a way that doesn't overly commit the United States.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that is what informs my thought.

[Richard Nephew]

About what they'd be prepared to do in the case of Iran. I think the Israelis were prepared to.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Do a multi day, multi week operation.

[Richard Nephew]

To eviscerate the Iranian nuclear program. The United States was prepared to do one operation and call it quits. And that's what we did. The President came out basically while the.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Planes were still in the air, flying.

[Richard Nephew]

Back to the United States and said, now we should have a ceasefire.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

My sense is that that is the.

[Richard Nephew]

Same sort of pattern that we'd see here if the United States were to be willing to use military force to basically carry out the threat that was presented by the President.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That we're talking about something that is.

[Richard Nephew]

Much more in the area of an oper as opposed to a campaign. You could imagine the US or the US plus Israel potentially taking action that would target regime officials and those sorts of things to try and enable protesters to rise up. And it would be seen in that light that we are going to clear space such that protesters could operate.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So could that involve something as daring as a military operation to capture Khamenei?

[Adam Grant]

I guess.

[Richard Nephew]

Could it involve military operations to kill.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Khamenei or top regime officials? That strikes me as a little bit more likely, especially because, unlike in the case of Maduro, it's not at all.

[Richard Nephew]

Apparent to me that if you removed Khamenei, you would really fundamentally change what's going on inside of Iran and what the leadership would actually look like, which may have a peril here with Venezuela. So I think there is a possibility of military force. I think that'd be the only way to truly honor the commitment that the President appears to have made about responding forcefully.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think it's much more likely that lower force options are on the table.

[Richard Nephew]

Where you'd imagine something potentially targeting IRGC.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Naval forces or a demonstration strike that potentially involved industrial facilities or oil and gas facilities, or something that would show.

[Richard Nephew]

The Iranian government that they've gone too far and or provide support to protesters.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think the idea would be to.

[Richard Nephew]

Demonstrate willingness to continue, but not necessarily to advance.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And then really it's a question going Back to the first topic of what protesters and what regime security officials are.

[Richard Nephew]

Prepared to do in response to answer whether or not that would be something that's meaningful or just something that's more of a test and demonstration activity.

[Podcast Host]

So you mentioned the strikes over the summer. I'm going to turn to that topic and the nuclear program because at the same time as all of this stuff is going on, the president has been making some statements about potentially eliminating Iran's nuclear and missile programs should Iran continue rebuilding its capabilities that were degraded over the summer. So we're now about 6ish months after the 12 Day War, and this was one of the major things that happened in foreign policy land in the first year of Trump's return to office. I know a lot of information isn't available publicly, but I would be very interested in your sort of assessment of where you think the program is today. I mean, tactically, the operations were very successful. Quite impressive. Right. But where does it leave us in terms of whether or not we have actually meaningfully degraded Iran's nuclear capabilities? I know you have a more, you know, you have an interesting view, I think, of the role of military, the use of military force on Iran's nuclear program that is different from some of our colleagues, one that I happen to share. So I would like to hear more of your thoughts of whether that has, what you've seen so far has changed any of your assessment or whether it's actually reinforced what you believed before.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Well, now, hold on. How could the president say that he would take action to stop Iran's nuclear program?

[Richard Nephew]

Because it was completely obliterated, right? There isn't a nuclear program anymore.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I mean, look, I think this is the problem, frankly, with the June operation is that I wouldn't necessarily have undertaken.

[Richard Nephew]

It at the moment in which we did.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But once the military operation's undertaken, I.

[Richard Nephew]

Think, frankly, you have to ensure that it's actually successful. And that's the problem that I have with what happened in June, is that.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

There'S still a lot of open questions.

[Richard Nephew]

As to what the Iranians possess and.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

What they're able to do with it.

[Richard Nephew]

Especially when it comes to the highly enriched uranium that they still possess.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that, you know, any reasonable estimate still has to believe that they could.

[Richard Nephew]

Produce up towards of, you know, 10, maybe even a little bit more nuclear weapons out of, if they chose to do so.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And to be able to do that pretty quickly. I mean, I think everyone gets hung up on the fact that Natanz and.

[Richard Nephew]

Fordo and all these other nuclear facilities were destroyed.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that that was truly significant in terms of setting back what I call.

[Richard Nephew]

The big nuclear program, right?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

The ability to take dirt and to.

[Richard Nephew]

Make it into nuclear weapons from start to finish.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But what was left in Iran is.

[Richard Nephew]

More than sufficient for the Iranians to move forward with something much more crude and to do something in a much quicker sort of way.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

People who are much more expert about weapons production than I have said that.

[Richard Nephew]

Essentially can make uranium metal out of a college level laboratory. And the Iranians absolutely have a college level laboratory.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So in terms of base facts of.

[Richard Nephew]

Where I think we are, I think.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Look, the big program was badly damaged.

[Richard Nephew]

It's probably a year or two away from being reconstituted.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But the ability to produce weapons is probably still in the neighborhood of a couple of months. And it goes back to the question for the Iranians of, you know, are they willing to take that risk and.

[Richard Nephew]

Do they think that there's, there's benefit in doing so?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

You know, what are we seeing in terms of reconstitution right now? Look, we're, we're seeing them excavate the facilities where that HEU is located at Isfahan and potentially at Natanz as well. We're seeing them continue to construct facilities.

[Richard Nephew]

That potentially could be used for nuclear activities, including potentially a facility at Parchin, which is the place where they've tested components, non nuclear components for weapons production.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So all this adds up to me to being a still real clear and.

[Richard Nephew]

Present threat that Iran could pursue nuclear weapons.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So this goes back to the question of, all right, so what do we do about that?

[Richard Nephew]

Right?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And as you and I talked about before, I was completely on board the.

[Richard Nephew]

Idea that we might have to use force to deny Iran the ability to produce nuclear weapons.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But when you have a ceasefire, end.

[Richard Nephew]

The conflict before a troop battle damage assessment is done, what you've actually done is a couple things. One, you've limited your ability to actually complete that mission and you've exposed the limits of what your operations potentially could do. And I think the Iranians now have a sense that if they go deeper in Esfah and other places, they can still produce their weapons components.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that's dangerous.

[Richard Nephew]

That's dangerous for all of us.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And so then the question is, can.

[Richard Nephew]

We mount another attack? Can we achieve this via diplomatic means? Is there a combination of sanctions levers that convince the Iranians to back away?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But, well, that's a lot harder to do when you've already demonstrated the limits.

[Richard Nephew]

Of your military option.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And this is part of the reason why it had to remain in the deck.

[Richard Nephew]

It had to be something to be prepared to do.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But it's not the first card you.

[Richard Nephew]

Want to pull, especially when there was still a possibility of a deal.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think what's interesting, I'd be curious your thoughts on this, too, is from a broad strategic standpoint, you know, what.

[Richard Nephew]

Is our priority when we're looking at Iran right now.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Right. You know, if you would ask me.

[Richard Nephew]

A few years ago, I would have.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Said we have a still reasonable chance.

[Richard Nephew]

Of preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I'm not so sure that that's true now, and I have a lot of anxiety that it is. So that suggests to me that, you know, diplomatic deals or military operations may not be as successful in a narrow.

[Richard Nephew]

Sense of addressing nuclear issue.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And this takes me back to the.

[Richard Nephew]

Question of what should be the objective of the United States. You know, is this a time where you need to contemplate something much more aggressive in terms of limiting this regime's ability to develop those weapons?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Is that the kind of path that.

[Richard Nephew]

You want to pursue, especially if there are protests ongoing, notwithstanding all those risks?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So, to me, I think that the military action in June, it absolutely addressed some of the problems that we have. But as we're already seeing what the Israelis worried about Iranian missiles, we're already seeing with regard to reconstitution options, it didn't address it all together. And now we're kind of in a place where you have to think about.

[Richard Nephew]

What your options are and what your actual goals are in dealing with the Iranians.

[Podcast Host]

Yeah, that's right. And what's been striking to me is that Steve Wytkoff, who is not only responsible for leading the negotiating team, is kind of stretched all over the map right now. Right. He's responsible for Ukraine settlement and Israel, Gaza and God knows what else. And we're not really seeing that much, at least that has been reported publicly in terms of progress in that space. There's been some indications that there were negotiations on deportations. Right. So repatriating Iranians, several hundred of them who, you know, had illegally entered the country or for other reasons. But that the nuclear issue doesn't seem to be kind of front and center as it was in Trump one even. And it seems to me that the president himself has kind of resigned himself to this notion that we're just going to mow the lawn if we need to every now and again, which I think was something that previous administrations had tried not to get to that point of having to do this every six or 10 or 12 months. And it seems to me that this is kind of where we are now. Where, to your point? I don't know that we've answered a bigger strategic question. I don't think we have. And we're just kind of going to tackle the issue every time it resurfaces and the steady state changes a little bit, but it's unclear whether we're willing to take the next step of kind of figuring out and then what. Right?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Yeah, well, that's the thing, too. I mean, I've always hated the mow the lawn analogy from a bunch of different directions, but one of the things I hate most about it is how it actually obscures the challenge that we face rather than illuminates it. My lawn gets mowed regularly. It does not, however, have the ability to covertly plan to grow grass on.

[Richard Nephew]

My driveway and evade the detection of.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Me and my lawnmower. And that's the problem. That's right. But this is the problem that we come to with this entire theory is it presupposes the ability of intelligence to accurately identify all the places where Iran.

[Richard Nephew]

Might have nuclear material and the ability.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

To produce nuclear weapons components and to address them. Well, if that's not true, if that fails to be true, then we're in a world of hurt and it's just worth noting. Again, I agree with you. The tactical sophistication of the operations that took place in June, it was something to behold. On the other hand, I absolutely expected it, and I'm sure you did, too. Again, as people who have been involved in these activities and these plans before, I would have been stunned if it hadn't been successful with the target set that was identified. These were well profile targets. We knew where they were, we knew.

[Richard Nephew]

How to hit them.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

We understood what our operational plans were. All those things are pretty straightforward. It's scenarios 2, 3, 4 and 5 where I think we've got tremendous uncertainties. And again, it doesn't help if you have already demonstrated what you're actually capable of doing. So I really do think that while what was done had an impact, like you said, the big strategic question of what the nuclear program is and what it's going to do and where that needs to rank in terms of prioritization, that to me is open. You know, we might find ourselves in a world where the Iranians have tested at some point and we're having to struggle with what is our new policy with respect to run now, I still think we're going to be concerned with what the Iranian government's up to we're still going to be worried about their missile program.

[Richard Nephew]

We're obviously going to be worried about their nuclear program.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

We're obviously going to be worried about their regional activities. But you know, the solution set that we'll have to deal with the Iranian nuclear program will be fundamentally different after that day. And I put it to all of us, is it not fundamentally different now? And does that not require us to have a real think what's our ranking and prioritization? The Obama administration, we prioritize the nuclear issue both because we thought it was achievable, it was the nearest term strategic risk, the United States. And it was something that we thought we could actually push back in a.

[Richard Nephew]

Meaningful sort of way.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

If that's not true, but you still have all the same worries and concerns that you've got with respect to the current government of Iran, well, then that means you have to think about your.

[Richard Nephew]

Option set and think about what your.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Choices are and then decide are you willing to make the commitments necessary to address that as a problem. And that's where, again, I remain really fuzzy, especially after Venezuela, as to whether or not this administration means it when it says it about being concerned about.

[Richard Nephew]

Regimes like the Islamic Republic.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And I also remain very concerned about the alliance structure, given everything else that's going on. So I do think that we still got some big problems here, but we don't necessarily have all the tools that.

[Richard Nephew]

We had a year or two ago to address them.

[Podcast Host]

That's been one of the interesting things between Trump 1 and Trump 2, where in Trump 1 we at least had a very clear framework for what the administration thought the major issues were and how it prioritized them. And we could argue, and we did at the time, that it was a bit too broad and it was everything and nothing in a way, but at least it was clear and coherent. I think today it's not really clear to me what our Iran policy is beyond. Again, kind of these one off statements here and there. But okay, speaking of regional activities, let's turn to that. So, and I want to separate here Israel's counter Iran campaign from the Gaza stuff. Obviously there are linkages, but we could just spend hours on each of them. So let's just stick to the Iran side of things to the extent possible. So, you know, Israel over the past, well, since October 7th has really degraded what we used to call the Iran threat network. So the network of proxies and terrorist groups that Iran works with and the IRGC itself, its capabilities, its Leadership, again, tactically. Right. Really impressive stuff. Fairly successful logistically as well. I'm interested here again in your thoughts on the kind of strategic success of the campaign. How do you assess Iran's ability to project power in the region today? And then I think this is especially interesting in light of Maduro being ousted. To your point, you know, the regime is still there, and that's very important. It's the individual that is gone. But does that, you know, Iran and Venezuela and Iran, Hezbollah and Venezuela have had a very close partnership. What does that look like? What are things you're watching for in light of the news here? And what can the US do, and what should it do to continue to degrade these capabilities and to prevent their reconstitution down the line?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Yeah, it's funny, I've been musing about this a lot, especially after the apparent failure of the Venezuelan military to prevent.

[Richard Nephew]

Their president from being taken out of the country.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That's a big deal. If that kind of thing happened in.

[Richard Nephew]

Any other country, you would imagine there would be a lot of questions that would be being asked about exactly how.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That was to take place. And I think part of the answers.

[Richard Nephew]

Come back to the sophistication of US Operations and the ability of the US to both plan and execute a sophisticated military operation.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But again, as the press report indicates, there were some potential glitches there, too. So even we, of course, are always.

[Richard Nephew]

Subject to risk, which is something that we have to bear in mind as people talk rather cavalierly about US Military options they can miss. And there are accidents there, too.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But the reason why I think about that as a point of departure is just like with the June actions against, against Iran from Israel and the United States, there was kind of an expectation that Russia and China were going to somehow step in and help the Iranians. Frankly, I never thought they were. And that's because my actual estimation of the nature of that alliance is much more transactional, much more limited. I mean, you've written about this even years ago, about there is a relationship.

[Richard Nephew]

There and it potentially could have gotten.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Much stronger, but we're kind of seeing that it's fairly limited. We're seeing it's fairly limited between Russia, China and Venezuela. And I think you can make that same little argument about this axis that axis implies, based on historical comparison, some sort of significant coordination and cooperation. When you use the word axis, you're.

[Richard Nephew]

Thinking the axis powers during the Second.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

World War, those sorts of things. But it's kind of interesting that analogy may be correct. It's Just not correct in the way.

[Richard Nephew]

People think about it.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Because the Axis powers in the Second World War actually didn't get along all that well. They were terribly fractured. They didn't coordinate things all that well. I think that the Germans probably had a pretty negative opinion of Mussolini and the Italians especially given the nature of.

[Richard Nephew]

The operations that took place in the Balkans and other places.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So all this adds up to maybe all of us were overestimating the nature of these alliance structures, the nature of these relationships. And certainly I think that's the case in the common parlance when people think about Iran and its proxy networks, they think of this closely interrelated operational network in which the IRGC tells them go and they all go and then they report back and it's very closely knit at times there may be more elements of that. Soleimani probably had a stronger ability to do that than previous or after his death, the IRGC commanders that have been in charge. But all of this though to me is indicative of really the problem for Iran, which is it was always a more loose knit organization of co interested parties that were prepared to take Iranian support but not necessarily take Iranian orders.

[Richard Nephew]

And we saw this with Hamas well before October of 23.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So I think what that adds up to is the Iranians probably have been overestimated in their ability to truly utilize their proxy network. That doesn't mean it wasn't dangerous. That doesn't mean it wasn't violent. That doesn't mean didn't pose a threat to the United States and our interests and those of our partners and allies. But I do wonder whether or not we have both over subscribed how much control these people are under from Tehran and the degree to which their operational.

[Richard Nephew]

Removal affects Iranian thinking.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

My own sense is the Iranians at.

[Richard Nephew]

This point see a lost investment, they.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

See a lost opportunity, they wish they hadn't lost it. But that doesn't necessarily mean that they say, well now we've given up on.

[Richard Nephew]

Our dreams of what we're going to be able to do in the region.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think more than likely than anything else, they are reevaluating whether or not.

[Richard Nephew]

Their overall strategy of defense and depth.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Made sense, forward defense made sense, using proxy networks the way they did made sense, and then going to try and decide what is a more effective strategy. We may be seeing that answer because part of what they've been doing is concentrating on the reconstruction of the missile.

[Richard Nephew]

Program as a way of trying to be able to overwhelm regional missile defenses and to threaten Israel in particular. But also the United States.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So all the way coming back to. I do wonder, and I think we should maintain a healthy amount of skepticism.

[Richard Nephew]

About the actual durability of these alliance structures and whether or not alliance is even the appropriate word, rather than partnership, you know, co interested parties or something.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Similar to kind of imply there is a thing there, there's a relationship there, but it's not nearly as rich as other alliance structures, like, for instance, the.

[Richard Nephew]

United States with NATO, at least until previously, and other alliance structures that might exist.

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[Podcast Host]

I want to come back to Russia and China in a second because there's, there's a little bit to unpack there too. But before we do that, but during the first Trump administration, we got the Abraham Accords and then in the Biden administration, which you and I served until at least October 7. But even after that, we really tried to kind of continue that integration between Israel and the Gulf, but also Israel and the region more broadly. And I'm curious how you assess that sort of effort today. You know, two things have changed, right? Since then, at least two things have changed. Israel, following its intervention in Gaza, has become a bit more isolated than it was three years ago. Second, again, the degradation of Iranian capabilities and Iran's proxy network, frankly, means that the Gulf doesn't necessarily have as many. You know, there was one common adversary at the time that we could focus everybody and rally everybody around, even if they didn't necessarily see eye to eye on everything. With those two things, with those two developments, do you think that kind of integration is still something that can be done? The Trump administration is trying to kind of refocus everybody on Iran and to get everybody to row in that direction again. But how successful do you think that's going to be?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

It's a great question. Look, I think if I go back and think about the beginning of the accords, it was always that the Israelis and to some extent the United States spoke of them as creating a regional partnership to confront Iran.

[Richard Nephew]

I think that was something that Mike.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Pompeo and Brian Hook and some of those guys in the first Trump administration thought was part of that arsenal and.

[Richard Nephew]

Something that they could pull together. Eliot Abrams, other people who are in.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That first Trump administration, but the Emiratis in particular, they never talked about the.

[Richard Nephew]

Abraham Accords as being a Iran focused effort.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And when the topic came up, they basically would say, wow, this is about.

[Richard Nephew]

Our relationship with Israel, not about any other party.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And at the time, I think people.

[Richard Nephew]

Said, wow, they have to say that.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think it's probably true, right, that there was a counter Iran function to.

[Richard Nephew]

Israel, to be sure.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But I'm not actually as convinced that they didn't also just want to reconcile what otherwise seemed like a historical aberration.

[Richard Nephew]

That at this point needed to be addressed.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that's not necessarily the case with.

[Richard Nephew]

Everybody in the region.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But I do think that actually suggests that there was more durability behind the Abraham Accords than just a countering Iran alliance. And that's actually a good thing. I don't think people should look at that and say, oh, that means the partnership went down. No, actually that suggests that what we actually wanted to see, what US Policy has been for a long time, is to try and see a reconciliation in the region, to allow for countries in the region, our partners in the region, to be able to work together and to have Israel's place in the region.

[Richard Nephew]

Accepted and agreed and understood and all those other things.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think what has been made manifest over the course of the last few years is two facts. One, there are still reasons why countries in the region are concerned about that partnership and that normalization process with Israel.

[Richard Nephew]

And I think the Gaza conflict obviously made that much more difficult for some of those countries. Saudi Arabia at the top of the list.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And as I look forward to it, I still am hopeful that the reason why people wanted to reconcile with Israel, which is because it is the right and sensible thing to do, will remain the objective and will eventually allow us.

[Richard Nephew]

To overcome those issues.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Because the second point is, is I don't think that Gulf Arab states in particular see eye to eye with the.

[Richard Nephew]

United States or Israel when it comes to Iran anymore. And that was made very clear to.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Me in the Biden administration the first.

[Richard Nephew]

Couple of months when we took a trip out to the region and met with Saudi, Emirati and other officials, you.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Know, they were, while preserving the confidential discussions, I'll just say, you know, they were very skeptical of U.S. policy. And that wasn't a criticism of Biden. It was a criticism of the the U.S. i received a litany of why we had been making mistakes in the region that went all the way back to the first Bush and continued all.

[Richard Nephew]

The way through to the then President Joe Biden.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And I think that is actually where a lot of people in Gulf Arab states are, is they don't want to link themselves to a policy with regard.

[Richard Nephew]

To run that they think is going.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

To get them in trouble. They think it's going to result in a regional conflict and that we're not.

[Richard Nephew]

Going to be there to support, support them.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that's where you see some grumpiness still about the attack on Opcake and.

[Richard Nephew]

Our lack of response, the attack on Emirati oil tankers and lack of response.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And not to mention all the minor.

[Richard Nephew]

Other incursions that have taken place.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So the way I look at it at this point is I think you could still see future growth of normalization, the Abraham Gord structure and those sorts of things. But I think the broad counter Iran effort, I think that started going away well before January, June, well before the response to Hamas and Hezbollah and other sorts of groups. And I think as much as anything, it's because Gulf Arab states had made the decision they need to have their.

[Richard Nephew]

Own path in dealing with Iran because they don't necessarily believe the United States will be there to have their backs and they don't trust our decision making when it comes to it.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And I think that's still where their.

[Richard Nephew]

Heads are, at least at the moment.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Until we can convince them that we.

[Richard Nephew]

Are in a position where we're going.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

To do the same kinds of policy choices they want us to have, which are not seeing a future risk of conflict, not future risk of attack, but.

[Richard Nephew]

Also making sure that we're going to be as committed to the partnership as we should be.

[Podcast Host]

Yeah, that's great. So let's turn back to Russia and China. Here we're almost three years after the Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine. As we discussed a bit earlier, there's been efforts to kind of bring that war to an end. But the war really flipped the script of the Russian Iranian relationship for at least a while. And as Russia became more reliant on Iran in a way that it hadn't been previously. Right. Previously it was kind of the big brother in the relationship on the nuclear front. Given its place on the UN Security Council as a permanent five member and then relying on Iranian UAVs and Iran's UAV infrastructure throughout the war, it seemed like the relationship was growing into depth and possibly in breadth. You already expressed some skepticism that that relationship has really kind of changed fundamentally, but you know, into what I guess in the Biden administration we used to call, you know, it's sort of turning into a fulsome military partnership as opposed to a marriage of convenience, which is what it was before. The thing that I want to hear from you though, is whether you think that the relationship has changed in the sense of Iran's place and the relationship evolving and growing as a result of the war in a, in a permanent, or whether you think this was just a blip that, you know, Russia needed UAVs Iran had UAVs and could give them for cheap and could give the kind of capacity building part of that to Russia. And now that Russia has those things and it doesn't necessarily need Iran as much anymore that we're going to go back to how things were before or whether you think this is the new normal for that kind of partnership.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Yeah, I'll give you my sense. But you know, I'm conscious, I'm literally talking to someone who wrote a book on this, like nothing that. That away.

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Yeah.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Many years ago, years ago still. I mean, I mean, so here's my two cents. You know, I think going back a long time, it made absolute sense to see the relationship as the Russians would. They wanted to work with the Iranians, but they were prepared to dime them.

[Richard Nephew]

Out if it was of interest in terms of getting something they wanted more. Most of the time that was getting some cooperation from the United States.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And so, so again, you can.

[Richard Nephew]

Historically, they probably delayed significantly the construction of Bushir. Now the Iranians also delayed the construction.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Of Bushir both in terms of their.

[Richard Nephew]

Own ability to help support it as.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Well as their insistence of using the original Bushir footprint as opposed to just knocking it down and starting over something else. I mean, so there's a lot of different reasons why Bushir was slowed down, but it absolutely had to do something.

[Richard Nephew]

With the US Russian relationship. And you can look at whether or.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Not we're talking about air defense systems and military cooperation. There's a number of different cases which the Russians were prepared to tell the.

[Richard Nephew]

Iranians no to something if we said.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That that was important because they wanted.

[Richard Nephew]

Something more important out of us.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So the real question was whether or not, like you said, the Ukraine war changed that and whether or not we saw that the Russians now understood that they had a relationship partner that they should invest in, cooperate with and so forth. To my mind, the June conflict absolutely proved, nope, we're still in the same place we were. That Russia is 100% prepared to utilize the support it gets from Iran, but.

[Richard Nephew]

It'S not going to do anything to support the Iranians, at least of any substance. So, yeah, they'll have a meeting at the UN Security Council.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Ulyanov will say nasty things about the United States at the IEA Board of Governors.

[Richard Nephew]

That's all well and good, but in.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Terms of the actual practical effects of.

[Richard Nephew]

This, this, I think that they still don't care one bit about what happens inside of Iran.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And I actually thought for a while that with Assad's departure, that The Iranians might become more important to the Russians.

[Richard Nephew]

That they might say, okay, well we've.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Lost Assad, we don't think we're going to get along great with the Shira.

[Richard Nephew]

Guy, maybe we'll be able to have a better relationship with the Iranians.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But if that's in fact still the case, it's not been manifest in what.

[Richard Nephew]

The Russians have done, which is only the most fleeting amount of support, support being given. I think you, by the way, you can make the same argument with regard to China that they're still prepared to.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Engage in transactions, still bear, bear to buy their oil, but at a steep.

[Richard Nephew]

Discount and you know, not to the exclusion of working with others too.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So I think this remains a one directional relationship still fundamentally, and I cannot believe the ongoing protest activity is going to suggest to the Russians, you know.

[Richard Nephew]

This is a relationship we need to invest in. I think more than anything, if they.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Were already kind of lukewarm, they're going.

[Richard Nephew]

To remain such until they see what comes out of this, until they see what comes out of potential military strikes coming from the US or Israel with regard to the missile program, so on and so forth.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And you know, maybe that changes if the Ukraine war ends, but again to me it's now a 30 year pattern.

[Richard Nephew]

So I'd be really surprised if it did change.

[Podcast Host]

On the piece about China, there was some reporting that, you know, I think it was in Reuters talking about China potentially replacing oil coming from Venezuela with Iranian crude. Can you talk a little bit about what that might look like and how much stock again we should put into this?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Yeah, they might. I mean, I think the bigger problem that we've got right now is, you know, the Chinese approach to buying oil has been to buy from lots of different places as part of a relationship management. There's a particular reason why they had.

[Richard Nephew]

To buy Venezuelan or a particular reason why they had to buy Iranian or.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

For that matter even buy all of the Russian.

[Richard Nephew]

I think they do need to buy some amount of Russian just given the volume differences.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But they could have done more substitution.

[Richard Nephew]

If they wanted to.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And right now we're in much more of an oil glut. There's a lot more oil on the water that potentially the Chinese could pick.

[Richard Nephew]

Up if they needed it.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But Chinese demand appears to be slowing.

[Richard Nephew]

At least according to the smart oil.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Economists that I talked to. And the Chinese themselves at this point have got their pick of options. And so mining my guess at this point is that if the Chinese decide to substitute Venezuelan for Iranian, it won't be because those are the last barrels.

[Richard Nephew]

They can get their hands on.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

It'll be more because they see either convenience or some degree of political leverage.

[Richard Nephew]

Maybe vis a vis the United States.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Or probably more likely discounts. Because at the end of the day, where the Chinese prepare to go is.

[Richard Nephew]

Who'S prepared to sell the oil at the cheapest price. And I think that's still going to.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Be prevailing notion in China until they have some broader strategic political reason to do differently.

[Podcast Host]

Staying on the topic of Venezuela. So if I can ask you to kind of channel everything you know about Iranian perceptions of the world and their place in it, if you're sitting in Iran and you're watching what's going on with Venezuela and adding on all the other things we talked about at the beginning, right, President Trump talking about potentially taking over Greenland and Canada is the 51st state and all of those things. Things. How are you seeing the US Standing in the international order? How are you seeing your own best ability to protect regime stability and security, which is kind of like the thing that they need to do the most. Right? They believe they need to do the most. Because from where I'm sitting, it seems to me that if you're watching everything and you're sitting in Iran and your name is Khamenei or someone within IRGC leadership, that all of this is just indicating to you that you need to actually acquire a nuclear weapon to protect yourself. How do you see this?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Yeah, it's funny. I think we're giving them two contradictory.

[Richard Nephew]

Impulses all at once. I mean, absolutely, the capture of Maduro and the differentials that they have seen between Kim Jong Un and Assad and.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Gaddafi and all the other examples where they look at places where. Where nuclear weapons are and where nuclear.

[Richard Nephew]

Weapons aren't and decide to make that choice. I mean, they all point in direction. Go get nuclear weapons as fast as you possibly can and suggest that that would be a level of deterrent that would keep the United States potentially away.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

You know, I still think that's probably part of their strategic conversation. I think that even less than that, they probably are thinking we'll be able to prevent future Israeli operations if the Israelis have to truly wonder whether an incoming missile is a conventionally armed one or a nuclear armed one. And I think even more than the.

[Richard Nephew]

U.S. i think at this point they believe that they are just massively vulnerable to Israel, and they manifestly are, but.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Also believe that as compared to the.

[Richard Nephew]

United States, both given distance and size, that we are potentially less deterrable than what Israel is And I think there's a way interesting conversation about what a Israeli Iranian deterrence relationship could look like. And I think part of the reason why Israel is so committed to not having to face that and why we.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Are also committed to not having to face that is we don't really like.

[Richard Nephew]

What those answers start to look like. And I think that's highly problematic. But if you're an Iranian strategic thinker, you might think that there is some value to doing that.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think the flip side is if you are the Iranians, you also, though, look around the world and you say, man, if it wasn't for these protests, we'd be sitting okay here, right? You're probably saying the US at this point has tarnished itself itself. We couldn't gather a coalition to do.

[Richard Nephew]

Anything vis a vis Iran.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

It's not like we're going to have some grand blockade, that we're going to.

[Richard Nephew]

Get a whole bunch of NATO allies to join and support. That's not going to happen and probably wouldn't have happened anyway, but sure as hell isn't going to happen.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Now, you know that we're not going.

[Richard Nephew]

To be able to work out something with the Russians and Chinese that's going to address the Iran problem because the.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Russians, Chinese won't play ball.

[Richard Nephew]

But also it's just not where we're putting our energy either in terms of China, where we're focused on trade, or Russia were focused on Ukraine and the broader relationship.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So on a diplomatic, political, economic front.

[Richard Nephew]

I think you're feeling pretty good.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And then you look at the military options again, you go back to the limited nature of what we prepared to do. It's risky, it's dangerous. You're worried about it, but you still might think you could probably survive strikes.

[Richard Nephew]

That come from the United States.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But the most important thing, and I really think this needs to be underscored when it comes to Venezuela, the lesson the Iranians may be learning is, you know, he's prepared to do business. Marco Rubio is prepared to do business with the rump of the Maduro regime. And if you look at what actually we've said to the Venezuelans, or at least what we've said publicly about our conversations with the Venezuelans, it's our number one priority is oil. Our number two priority is oil, then facilitating some kind of transition with political prisoners being released and similar. But you'll note I said that second after oil again and then third, a real transition. So look, if you are, if you're the Iranians, you're probably sitting back and saying, you know, we probably could offer something to this guy, you know, he.

[Richard Nephew]

Isn'T committed to the overthrow of the.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Islamic Republic, and if we were to do a deal with him, how much could we potentially, you know, stave off.

[Richard Nephew]

That kind of risk?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And do we even necessarily need to offer the same sorts of things that were being demanded of us in previous administrations?

[Richard Nephew]

Maybe not.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

So I think the lesson from all of the this is that if you can get Marco Rubio willing to talk to the vice president for Nicolas Maduro about a kind of long term bilateral relationship in which the Maduro regime, the Chavez regime is allowed to remain in place and to govern Venezuela, you can pretty much get anything. And that is a thing that is available to us if prepared to do deals. So I'm not surprised at all to see the Iranians say, hey, maybe we should start negotiating. You know, to some extent they're probably wondering what took us so long and whether or not they can convince the president to stop short of the kinds of significant changes that otherwise might be demanded or a minimum steps on the big nuclear program and the missile program.

[Podcast Host]

On this note, and this is my sort of last and bonus question, I want to nerd out on bureaucratic politics a little bit with you because I know we both enjoy that. And you know, the interesting thing to me, again, a difference between Trump 1 and Trump 2 is that while in Trump 1, you had a very kind of like, solid lineup of officials, especially at the senior levels, who had a very long history of having very strong views about Iran, many of whom really wanted to see the regime go. This administration in Trump too has been a bit more divided. Right. Like, you have individuals who, again, have a very clear track record of they would like to see the regime gone 40 years ago. And then you have individuals who don't really care that much and they're more of a restrainer kind of, you know, know, like, we'll let people live their lives as long as we can meet our own national security interests and economic interests. How are you seeing that play out in this administration and how is it shaping Iran policy again, to the extent that we can actually tell?

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That's a great question. And you know, the nice one about this one, too, it's also a little.

[Richard Nephew]

Bit gossipy too, you know, which is always, always fun.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think if you go back to any US Administration, and frankly, as far as I can remember, you would actually be hard pressed to find any American official that didn't want the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to change.

[Richard Nephew]

I think everybody was united behind that.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I think that you ask any secretary of state going back that long, that.

[Richard Nephew]

Was absolutely something they wanted to see.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

The question is whether or not it's something that we were prepared to try and action. And the reason why we weren't prepared.

[Richard Nephew]

To action is because of all the potential risks and downsides, sides of whether IT work and other objectives and all those sorts of issues and questions.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

I'm not going to say that this current government doesn't want to see the Islamic Republic go, but I would say that I am more skeptical that it's something that they consider is important and what they would be prepared to trade for it is different. I would say that previous administration, certainly ones I served in, would have long preferred that, but they didn't think they had the tools and the ability to do so. So I think this group would, if they were offered sufficient oil deals, would be prepared to, even if they knew they could collapse the Islamic Republic government.

[Richard Nephew]

They wouldn't necessarily do so.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And I think that's just a fundamental phase shift in terms of their thinking and it goes back down to the level of people. So, you know, I don't think, but I don't know him personally, so I might be wrong. I don't think that Steve Wyckoff in particular has got a hard and fast desire for the Islamic Republic current government to change. I think Marco Rubio probably does. But the person who's actually in charge of US Iran policy at this point, from every functional perspective, is Steve Wyckoff. And based on what we have seen in terms of statements that have come out and descriptions the negotiating approach, there was a very strong inclination to try.

[Richard Nephew]

And have a deal with the Iranians.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

That would involve substantial sanctions relief and money flowing back to Iran that wouldn't necessarily even have the same level of.

[Richard Nephew]

Restrictions that we had in the JCPOA and much less any other kind of arrangement that could potentially been been reached.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And, you know, we saw that up until at least June it was Wyckoff.

[Richard Nephew]

Who was calling those shots and Rubio was not. And so from that standpoint, that's where you had all these offers that were going forward. And, and in my view it's part of the reason why the Israelis acted when they did is because they were concerned about those, those potential of a deal.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

But, you know, now I'm not so sure that that's the case. You know, I think is if we look at what the, what the administration is doing now, Rubio clearly is much.

[Richard Nephew]

More ascended and able to exercise his will, but at least only in the Western hemisphere.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that that really is a fundamental question I think we still have to ask, we don't really have an answer to, is whether or not we're seeing a real shift that is pronounced and prolonged in US Thinking that's potentially going to empower a much more traditional viewpoint.

[Richard Nephew]

With respect to the government of the.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Islamic Republic or not and whether or not the president's along with that too. Now, he said that he would like.

[Richard Nephew]

To push back on this regime if they hurt protesters.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

He's also said that he would like to make this government, this current regime, rich. And he has talked about making Iran great again. He has not talked about deposing the Islamic Republic in order to do that. He's talked about that even in the.

[Richard Nephew]

Context of the current guys in charge.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And I think all that is meaningful because to the broader bureaucratic politics, those are the people who matter at this point. There are lots of folks who are still potentially interested in working on day to day Iran policies, but we don't have any sense that there is an Iran policy process the way that there.

[Richard Nephew]

Was that is coming from the bottom up, involving ideas coming forward.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

It seems that it's much more top down. And so frankly, I think where we're at is it depends on who's going to be in those rooms and who at the moment have had their stars rise in the president's eyes and what.

[Richard Nephew]

His immediate inclinations are going to be.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And thus far, I think we have to say that is perfectly prepared to.

[Richard Nephew]

Do a deal with these guys if it is something that provides us economic interests.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And until we see that different and until we see that they're prepared to risk that kind of access and business interest, I think we have to assume.

[Richard Nephew]

That remains their prevailing thought process when they look at Iran.

[Podcast Host]

And what's interesting is that the president has been pretty consistent since his first administration. Right. That he would like to do a deal with Iran and that if they do so, he would be prepared to help them prosper. So that is actually one of the few things that he's been fairly clear and fairly consistent on when it comes to this issue set.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Yep. And not just this issue set, but you also can look at the offer that was made to Kim Jong Un about, you know, what it would take to potentially have North Korea be rich. And it wasn't an end to the Gulag system. It all came back to dealing with the nuclear issue.

[Richard Nephew]

And again, I think you can make.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

The same argument very much in the Iran case. If the Iranians right now were to say, we will not restart a nuclear program. We'll just maintain Bushira. That's all we're going to do. I'm not even sure the president would insist on inspections of the tunnels at us.

[Richard Nephew]

Come on.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

And that's a terrifying idea if you think about what the Iranians may be able to do with that material we've talked about. But it comes back to my mind as to whether or not he's as.

[Richard Nephew]

Interested in that as have been previous.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Administrations, or whether or not he's willing.

[Richard Nephew]

To take the winds that exist and to let things be. That's my inclination, based on what he said.

[Podcast Host]

All right, Richard, thank you.

[Ariane Tabatabai]

Thanks a bunch. Always good talking to you.

[Podcast Host]

The Lawfare Podcast is produced by the Lawfare Institute. If you want to support the show and listen the end at AD free, you can become a Lawfare material [e-mail] support supporters also get access to special events and other bonus content we don't share anywhere else. If you enjoy the podcast, please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for our other podcasts, including Rational Security, Allies, the Aftermath, and Escalation. Our Law Fair Presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine. Check out our written [e-mail] the podcast is edited by Jen Patia, and our audio engineer for this episode was Kara Schillen of Goat Rodeo. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening.

[Adam Grant]

Hey, it's Adam Grant from ted's podcast Work Life, and this episode is brought to you by servicen.

[Richard Nephew]

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[Adam Grant]

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[Ariane Tabatabai]

Com.