Lawfare Daily: The New Syrian Government and Its Problems

Summary

Summary of The Lawfare Podcast Episode: "Lawfare Daily: The New Syrian Government and Its Problems"

Episode Information:

• Title: Lawfare Daily: The New Syrian Government and Its Problems
• Host/Author: The Lawfare Institute
• Release Date: March 19, 2025

The Lawfare Podcast delves into the complexities surrounding the newly established Syrian government following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Hosted by Daniel Byman, the episode features an in-depth discussion with Middle Eastern Studies Professor Steve Heideman from Smith College. The conversation navigates through the political transition in Syria, the challenges faced by the interim government, the roles of external actors like Turkey and Israel, and the critical stance of the United States in shaping Syria's future.

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1. Introduction to the New Syrian Government

Steve Heideman provides an overview of the political landscape in Syria post-Assad regime. He emphasizes the unexpected rapidity of the regime's collapse on December 8 and the swift movements towards a political transition.

“We have the political framework for a transition in place. We have the security framework for a transition in place.”
(02:13 - 02:32)

Key Developments:

• Ahmed El Shara's Ascension: Leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, now acting as interim president.
• Political Framework: Agreement with armed factions, convened assemblies for transitional principles, and approval of an interim constitution.
• Security Framework: Establishment of a National Security Council and agreements with Kurdish forces in the northeast.

2. Concentration of Power and Authoritarian Concerns

While outward progress appears substantial, Heideman raises alarms about the concentration of power in President El Shara's hands, echoing authoritarian traits.

“While there’s been a lot of discussion of minority rights and tolerance and freedom and participation and accountability, what we’re seeing… leads us to be a bit wary about where the country is going.”
(06:00 - 06:10)

Concerns Highlighted:

• Centralized Authority: El Shara holds presidential and military command.
• Control Over Institutions: Significant influence over parliament and judiciary.
• Islamist Attributes: The transition reflects the ideological leanings of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, raising questions about future governance and social policies.

3. Comparing Syria to Turkey Under Erdogan

When asked about potential authoritarian models, Heideman draws parallels between Syria’s new government and Turkey under President Erdogan.

“The closest model that comes to mind really, is the way Turkey has evolved under President Erdogan… super empowered executive… surveillance and control of media…”
(08:22 - 09:51)

Key Similarities:

• Empowered executive branch with control over other government sectors.
• Intolerance of dissent and close surveillance of media.

Differences Noted:

• Ideological Commitment: El Shara’s government may adopt a more restrictive Islamic vision compared to Erdogan’s more economically liberal approach.

4. Recent Violence and Interim Government's Control

The episode covers the tragic confrontations that erupted following an attack by Assad loyalists against the interim government’s forces, resulting in over 1,000 fatalities.

“Episodes like this could happen again… return of Iranian intervention in some form which Israel would view as a significant threat.”
(09:51 - 10:13)

Analysis of the Conflict:

• Assad Loyalists' Attack: Approximately 4,000 former regime soldiers engaged in violence.
• Interim Government’s Response: Deployment of security forces to quell the uprising.
• Civilian Casualties: Significant loss of civilian lives, highlighting the government's limited control over armed factions.
• Implications: Demonstrates the fragility of the interim government's authority and the potential for recurring violence.

5. The Shara-Kurdish Agreement: Details and Implications

A pivotal moment in Syria’s transition was the agreement between the interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Mazlum Abdi.

“It acknowledges Kurds as full and equal citizens of Syria… removing any incentive that Turkey might have had to intervene militarily against the SDF.”
(20:45 - 25:43)

Key Points of the Agreement:

• Citizenship and Political Participation: Recognition of Kurds as equal citizens with rights to participate fully in Syrian politics.
• Integration of SDF Fighters: Although details remain unclear, the agreement aims to incorporate SDF members into a unified Syrian security sector.
• Turkey’s Influence: By stabilizing the relationship with the SDF, the agreement alleviates Turkey’s concerns over the PKK extension in Syria, reducing the likelihood of Turkish military intervention.
• US Involvement: US military advisement played a role, especially concerning the withdrawal of US forces as per the Trump administration's commitments.

Outstanding Issues:

• Autonomy for Northeast Syria: The agreement lacks clarity on the extent of self-governance for Kurdish regions.
• Integration Processes: Detailed mechanisms for integrating SDF fighters into the national military remain unresolved.

6. Turkey’s Role in Syria’s Political Transition

Heideman elaborates on Turkey’s strategic interests and its significant influence over Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction.

“Turkey has really moved very quickly to consolidate its position as really the preeminent regional actor with an interest in shaping Syria's political transition.”
(26:01 - 28:07)

Turkey’s Objectives:

• Regional Dominance: Aspires to lead Syria’s reconstruction efforts, leveraging its long border and pivotal position in northern Syria.
• Countering Kurdish Influence: Views the SDF as a proxy linked to the PKK, which has been a longstanding adversary.
• Military Interventions: Repeatedly intervened to prevent Kurdish consolidation, sponsoring various armed factions as proxies.

7. Israel’s Military Interventions and Strategic Interests

The podcast addresses Israel's active military involvement in Syria and its strategic calculations regarding the new government.

“Israel's strategy in Syria has been interesting and somewhat troubling… leads to the instability of Syria, which… has implications that may work very much to Israel's disadvantage.”
(28:25 - 32:59)

Israel’s Actions:

• Military Occupation: Secured significant territories in southern Syria post-Assad.
• Targeted Strikes: Degraded Assad regime’s military capabilities through hundreds of attacks.
• Community Outreach: Engaging with the Syrian Druze minority to form potential alliances.

Strategic Assumptions:

• Weak Syria Equals Security: Israel believes that a fragmented Syria diminishes Iranian influence and reduces security threats.
• Concerns Over Iranian Presence: A destabilized Syria could pave the way for increased Iranian intervention, posing a direct threat to Israeli security.

Internal Israeli Debate:

• Opposing Views: While current policies favor a weakened Syria, voices like former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert advocate for engaging with the new Syrian government to foster stability and improve bilateral relations.

8. The United States’ Role: Sanctions and Economic Recovery

The discussion shifts to the critical role of the United States in Syria’s future, particularly regarding economic sanctions and support for the interim government.

“The economic crisis that Syria is experiencing as perhaps the most significant threat to the progress of Syria's political transition.”
(33:37 - 36:22)

US Policy Under the Trump Administration:

• Sanction Stalemate: Reluctance to lift or modify existing sanctions, many of which were initially targeted at the Assad regime.
• Economic Implications: Continued sanctions hinder economic recovery, fueling public discontent and undermining political stability.
• Support for New Government: While acknowledging the interim government's anti-terrorism stance, the US has not sufficiently eased economic pressures to facilitate tangible improvements for Syrian citizens.

Recommendations by Heideman:

• Lift or Modify Sanctions: To enable economic recovery and stabilize the political transition.
• Comprehensive Engagement: Broader US support could enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the new Syrian government, preventing the resurgence of conflict.

9. Conclusions and Future Outlook

Professor Steve Heideman encapsulates the precarious state of Syria’s transition, balancing cautious optimism with significant concerns about authoritarianism, external influences, and economic instability. The episode underscores the intricate web of regional and international actors shaping Syria’s path forward and the pivotal role of economic policies in determining the success of the political transition.

“The inability of the interim government to support improvement in Syria's economy is increasingly going to become a target of popular grievance and popular anger.”
(36:22 - 36:32)

Final Takeaways:

• Fragile Transition: Despite structural frameworks, the concentration of power and limited control over armed factions present ongoing threats.
• External Pressures: Turkey and Israel’s strategic maneuvers, along with the US’s economic policies, will significantly influence Syria’s trajectory.
• Economic Recovery as a Cornerstone: Addressing economic challenges is essential for political stability and the legitimacy of the new government.

---

Notable Quotes with Timestamps:

• “We have the political framework for a transition in place. We have the security framework for a transition in place.”
  (02:13)

• “While there’s been a lot of discussion of minority rights and tolerance and freedom and participation and accountability, what we’re seeing… leads us to be a bit wary about where the country is going.”
  (06:10)

• “The closest model that comes to mind really, is the way Turkey has evolved under President Erdogan… super empowered executive…”
  (08:22)

• “Episodes like this could happen again… return of Iranian intervention in some form which Israel would view as a significant threat.”
  (10:13)

• “It acknowledges Kurds as full and equal citizens of Syria… removing any incentive that Turkey might have had to intervene militarily against the SDF.”
  (20:45)

• “Is Saudi's strategy in Syria has been interesting and somewhat troubling… implications that may work very much to Israel's disadvantage.”
  (28:25)

• “The economic crisis that Syria is experiencing as perhaps the most significant threat to the progress of Syria's political transition.”
  (33:37)

• “The inability of the interim government to support improvement in Syria's economy is increasingly going to become a target of popular grievance and popular anger.”
  (36:22)

---

This comprehensive summary captures the essence of the podcast episode, providing listeners with a clear understanding of the current state of Syria’s political transition, the interplay of regional and international influences, and the pressing issues that could determine Syria’s future stability.

Transcript

[Podcast Host]

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[Steve Heideman]

Episodes like this could happen again. We could see a similar kind of really fragmented, almost uncontrolled reaction if we see additional provocations from Syrians who remain loyal to the to the Assad regime.

[Daniel Byman]

Daniel it's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Daniel Byman, the Foreign Policy Editor of Lawfare, and I'm here today with Steve Heideman. He is a professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Smith College and a longtime observer of the Middle East.

[Steve Heideman]

Almost immediately on the heels of the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel intervened militarily and Syria now occupies significant territory in southern Syria and seems to be setting itself up as permanent or semi permanent presence in southern Syria.

[Daniel Byman]

Today we're talking about the new government in Syria and the many problems that Syria is facing. Steve the situation in Syria has been rapidly changing, not only with the overthrow of Bashar al Assad, but but in the months that have followed. Can you catch us up since the fall of the regime, how has the situation evolved?

[Steve Heideman]

Sure. I'm happy to be here with you, Dan. And I should say this is an especially auspicious day to be doing the podcast because this is the 14th anniversary of the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011. It began more or less on this day in 2011, and we're about three months into a political transition that I think very few expected and which, as you indicated, has brought an enormous change to Syria and a change that's unfolding very rapidly and is still quite fluid. I think on one level, if you look at what has happened in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, the progress that has been made in putting the pieces of a political transition in place has been quite extraordinary. Now, there have been acts of violence in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime. That's not unexpected. Last week we saw some especially tragic confrontations between remnants of the Assad regime and loyalists of the interim government, security forces of the interim government, in which many civilians were killed. But that was not typical for how the transition has unfolded. In general, what we've seen is pretty steady progress on the part of the acting president, Ahmed El Shara, the leader of this Islamist armed group, Hayat Tahrir Hashem, that played a leading role in the overthrow of the Assad regime. And Al Shara has really, I think, made quite steady progress in putting, as I said, the pieces of a political transition in place. He has secured the agreement of armed factions to his role as acting president. He has convened a large gathering of Syrians to talk about what the core principles are that a transition should be attentive to. He has selected a group of, of legal experts, Islamic authorities, to design an interim constitution that he's now approved. He has established what he calls a National Security Council to guide him in dealing with remaining security issues that the country faces. And there are quite a few. And very importantly, last week, he also signed an agreement with Kurdish fighters under the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria's northeast concerning their position in a future Syria, their integration into some new reformed security sector that is still very much in formation, but which has at least gotten something of a start. And these are all really very important benchmarks. In effect, we have the political framework for a transition in place. We have the security framework for a transition in place. On the other hand, if you look a little bit beneath the surface, what seems to be happening is that Ahmed Al Shara is designing a transition that will consolidate his authority as Syria's president. Throughout the five year transition period, he has not only put himself in the role of president, but commander in chief of the armed forces. And in the new constitution, the transitional constitution that was approved just a few days ago, he has direct or indirect authority over parliament, over the judiciary, and he has given himself in the new constitution, quite extraordinary power. So while we Watch events unfold in a fashion that appears, on one level, much more orderly than I think we feared, given how quickly the Assad regime collapsed. On the other hand, the system that's emerging is one that I think gives us cause for concern. It's a system in which power will remain heavily centralized in the hands of a president. It's a system that will unquestionably exhibit the Islamist features, the Islamist attributes that reflect the ideology of Hayet Tahriy Shem. And so, even though there's been a lot of discussion of minority rights and tolerance and freedom and participation and accountability, what we're seeing, I think, leads us to be a bit wary about where the country is going.

[Daniel Byman]

Let me follow up on that last point, and then I want to circle back to a few of your other observations. You're an expert on authoritarianism, and you've judged it in its various guises throughout the greater Middle East. Is there a kind of model you look at and say, you know, I think Syria under Ashara will look like this country or this leader in a couple years?

[Steve Heideman]

The closest model that comes to mind really, is the way Turkey has evolved under President Erdogan over the past decade or so, in which you have a really super empowered executive, super empowered president who has direct control over all of the other branches of government, the military, the judiciary, a government that surveils and controls the media very closely, a government that is relatively intolerant of dissent, and a government that pursues a fairly liberal free market style of economic policy. And we can't really say for sure that Syria will emulate in any way the Turkish model. But if I had to look for a comparison, that is the one that I would view as perhaps closest. The one really crucial difference I expect is that even though Erdogan himself is an Islamist, I think Ahmad Al Shara and some of those he's appointed to very, very senior positions in his government have an even deeper ideological commitment to a vision of Islam that may be even more restrictive, perhaps socially more regressive than that of Erdogan.

[Daniel Byman]

Steve, let me follow up on your point about the recent fighting. As you noted, some degree of score settling is inevitable after a brutal civil war. But the media reports put the number of deaths at over 1000 people. Is this the sort of thing that's likely to recur, and what's your sense of the causes of this particular fighting?

[Steve Heideman]

Well, let's recall, I think, first of all that this fighting got underway because a very large number of troops of former Assad regime officers and security officials launched a major attack against the forces of the interim government. The media reports indicate that there may have been as many as 4,000 Assad regime loyalists who participated in the initial operation that led to the kind of reprisals that we saw last week. And as that confrontation erupted, the interim government responded by dispatching its own security forces to the coastal region of Syria, which is the heartland of Syria's Alawi community, its minority Alawi community, the community to which Bashar al Assad himself and his father belonged. And in the course of confronting the Assad regime fighters who had launched this attack, we saw as well an enormous movement into the coastal area of fighters affiliated with other armed groups, other armed factions, as well as Sunni civilians from villages near where the confrontation was occurring, including villages that had experienced severe brutality at the hands of the Assad regime earlier in the Syrian conflict. And that turned out to be a formula, really, for massive abuses at the hands of those who moved into the coast to try to put down this uprising on the part of Assad regime fighters. And we know that there were, as you mentioned, perhaps as many as 1,000 people killed. We know that perhaps a quarter of those fatalities were caused by fighters loyal to the Assad regime. So the violence was not one directional in any sense, but it was a really important testing moment for the interim government. And in many ways, it failed the test, because what we saw in the fighting that occurred was the limits of the interim government's control over armed factions that had at least nominally pledged their loyalty to this new government, to Ahmad Eshara. In fact, as the fighting continued, it became clear that many of these armed groups were acting quite independently. They were committing grievous abuses against civilians. Some of the treatment of Alawi civilians that we saw was quite grotesque. And they conducted themselves in a way that I think demonstrated their complete lack of concern for accountability. They were clearly outside of any kind of chain of command. And the chief takeaway, I think, from that episode is how limited the interim government's control continues to be over the many, many armed factions that are still operating in Syria. And that's deeply troubling. There is a long way to go before any kind of centralized command structure will be in place in Syria. And so episodes like this could happen again. We could see a similar kind of really fragmented, almost uncontrolled reaction if we see additional provocations from Syrians who remain loyal to the Assad regime. On the other hand, it seems that the intent of the Assad regime fighters who launched this wave of violence was to spark a cascade of anti government violence across a much broader swath of Syria, perhaps even reigniting a full scale civil war. And that failed. It didn't happen. And I think we can take a very, very modest degree of comfort in the failure of this operation cause that kind of cascade. But still, the way the forces affiliated with the new government conducted themselves was was grievous and is something that that Ahmed El Shara himself is going to need to take very seriously to prevent future outbreaks like this.

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[Steve Heideman]

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[Daniel Byman]

So as that was happening and as I was starting to worry about Syria really going off a conflict cliff, as you also know, there was this deal between the Shara government and the Kurds. Can you talk a little bit more about that? And in particular, what did they agree to and what concessions, if any, did each side make?

[Steve Heideman]

Yeah, the relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces, Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces, the the units that the US has supported for the past seven or eight years because of their participation in anti ISIS operations in northeast Syria. The relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the interim government has been a difficult one. From the beginning. The SDF has hoped to negotiate a reintegration into Syria that would preserve a fairly significant degree of autonomy of self governance and would preserve the integrity of the SDF as an armed group. And from Ahmed Ashara's perspective, the only option that the new government in Syria was prepared to consider was the integration of the SDF fighters as individuals and the reassertion of the authority of the central government over the northeast, an area that has been outside of the government's control since about 2012. So the differences were quite significant. In addition, Turkey, bordering Syria to the north, views the SDF as an extension of a Kurdish era dentist group with which it has been at war for almost 40 years, the PKK. And so Turkey was threatening military intervention to suppress the sdf. And that created an additional, I think, source of pressure on the SDF to reach agreement with with the Syrian central government, with the interim government. And an additional factor I think that might have pushed the SDF toward this agreement is the engagement of the US military actually, because we're aware from media reporting that senior officials in the US military advised the SDF that this was the time for them to reach an agreement with the central government. Because the fate of US forces that have been in northeast Syria since about 2017 really could not be guaranteed. The Trump administration has committed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces. And so what we saw was a kind of coming together of a number of different factors that I think created the conditions that led to this agreement as to what it contained. It's a very broad, very general understanding. A document, an eight point document, was signed by Ahmed Al Shara and by Mazlum Abdi, the head of the sdf. And it contained a number of very general principles that reflected the willingness of Ahmed Al Shara to be responsive to the concerns of Kurds in the northeast. It acknowledges Kurds as full and equal citizens of Syria. It acknowledges the right of Kurds to participate as equal citizens in Syrian politics. Those were things that Kurds had not enjoyed under Bashar al Assad and his father. And so it really signaled, I think, a willingness on the part of the new government in Syria to accommodate some of the principal concerns of serious Kurds. What we didn't get any clarity about is how the two sides resolved their differences around the integration of SDF fighters into the Syrian military. We didn't get any clarity about whether the northeast would be able to be governed with any measure of autonomy. And so a lot of the really important details remain to be resolved or if they were worked out. We. We don't know how they were worked out. But nonetheless, I think the agreement did represent an incredibly important step forward. Not least, I think it meant the it removed any incentive that Turkey might have had to intervene militarily against the sdf. It brings the SDF into a nominally unified Syrian security sector with a lot of detail still to be clarified. And it removed in the process the possibility of a confrontation between forces of the interim government and the sdf. So it's a very important step, but with a lot still of ambiguity around important details.

[Daniel Byman]

I want to also discuss another major force that you've mentioned a couple times, which is Turkey. Could you describe how Turkey views the current government, as well as how Turkey might use its influence to try to change things?

[Steve Heideman]

Turkey has been one of the principal sponsors of the current government. It sees itself as the country that is best positioned to influence serious political transition. It sees itself as the country best positioned to play a lead role in Syria's post conflict reconstruction, if and when that eventually gets underway. And that has a lot to do with the role that Turkey has had in northern Syria pretty much since the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011. Syria has intervened militarily in northern Syria several times to prevent Kurds from consolidating control over a contiguous swath of territory on Turkey's southern border. It has sponsored a number of armed factions as its proxies in northern Syria. And it was very close in terms of intelligence sharing and other kinds of activities with Hayet Tahrir Hashem in the northwest of Syria, even though the relationships often were often complicated and not entirely collegial or cooperative. But because Turkey has such a long border with Syria because it has occupied such an important position in the north and sees Syria in many respects as its backyard. Because it has been so concerned about the potential threat from the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, Turkey has really moved very quickly to consolidate its position as really the preeminent regional actor with an interest in shaping Syria's political transition.

[Daniel Byman]

Let me follow up with really a similar question about Israel. Where we've already seen Israel intervene militarily in post Assad Syria. What role do you think Israel is likely to play in the coming months? And is that something that the US Government should be trying to influence one way or another?

[Steve Heideman]

Yeah, Israel's strategy in Syria has been interesting and somewhat troubling to watch as it's unfolding. As you mentioned, almost immediately on the heels of the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel intervened militarily in Syria. It now occupies significant territory in southern Syria and seems to be setting itself up as permanent or semi permanent presence in southern Syria. It has launched hundreds of attacks to degrade the equipment, the military equipment of the Assad regime. It has begun outreach to the Syrian Druze community on the grounds that this is a minority with which Israel could form some form of alliance. And all of that is premised on this assumption on the part of the current Israeli government that Israel's security can best be assured by the presence of a weak and fragmented Syria to its north. And that's a position that grows out of the decades and decades of antagonism and conflict between Syria and Israel in part, and it grows out of the understanding on the part of the Israeli government as well, that Syria's interim government is a Salafist jihadist government that will inevitably pose a threat to Israeli security. Now, what's troubling about this is that Israeli officials seem to feel that a weakened and fragmented Syria is in Israel's best interest. And yet a weakened and fragmented Syria is also one that is likely to invite the return of Iranian intervention in some form which Israel I think would view as a significant threat. A weakened and fragmented Syria is a country that Turkey would view with a great deal of concern and might take steps to try to intervene in to stabilize this country on its southern border. And so it really does seem as if the conclusion that Israeli officials have reached that the only path is for assuring Israeli security is through the instability of Syria, is quite short sighted and has implications that may work very much to Israel's disadvantage. And it's interesting because we're now beginning to hear that concern reflected within the Israeli political establishment as well. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, either today or yesterday, came out with a statement in which he called for. For improved relations with the new government of Syria, for recognizing the government of Ahmed Al Shara, and for beginning a process of engagement. And he expressed the sense that in its current policy, Israel is missing an historic opportunity to reset its relationship with Syria. So what the Israeli government is doing is contested among Israelis. It's an approach that is viewed with a great deal of concern outside of Syria. I think the one very important actor that seems to be supportive of Israel's policy is, in fact the United States. And I think that is a reflection of perspectives within the Trump administration that are closely aligned with those of the Israeli government, that once a jihadist, always a jihadist, that. That Ahmed Al Shara himself has a rather troubling past as a. As a former member of. Of Al Qaeda who fought against the US In Iraq, and that, therefore, Israel's interest in a weak and fragmented Syria is an outcome that plays to American interests as well. So I do think that the US has quietly up till now, been supportive of the approach of the Israeli government. And that, I think, gives Israel a great deal of license to continue its current policy. But as I said, it's a policy that I fear has implications that will backfire in quite serious ways over time.

[Daniel Byman]

Let me use our last bit of time here to talk more on the US Role. The United States, of course, has a series of sanctions it's imposed on Syria in the past, related both to the civil war and human rights, but also to narcotics and also to support for terrorism, and in general, has treated Syria as a hostile country, often with good reason. How should the Trump administration approach Syria? Should it be lifting economic sanctions? Should, in general, it be embracing the new government, or would you recommend kind of a wait and see sort of approach?

[Steve Heideman]

Well, whether the Trump administration moves to deepen engagement with the new Syrian government, I think addressing the issue of sanctions is really of crucial importance, because unless there is a process of economic recovery that feels tangible to Syrians, I think the prospects for a successful political transition become much, much more remote. I really do view the economic crisis that Syria is experiencing as perhaps the most significant threat to the progress of Syria's political transition. And so the reluctance of the US to address the issue of sanctions in a comprehensive way, most of which were imposed on the Assad regime, and that regime, of course, no longer exists, in my view, I think will become a significant obstacle to economic recovery and a significant threat to Syria's near term midterm stability and political progress. Now, the Trump administration, I think, has shown to date significant reluctance to address the issue of sanctions. It has not taken any steps, for example, to remove the designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terror, which was imposed in 1979. It has welcomed statements from Ahmed El Shada about his willingness to complete the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons supplies. It has acknowledged his statements in opposition to terrorism and to isis. So it is acknowledging that the new government is saying the right things. And yet when it comes to the economy, we really have not seen any movement at all from the Trump administration to ease conditions that would support Syria's economic recovery. And I think that's unfortunate because Syrians are very quickly asking themselves, am I better off today than I was under the Assad regime? Is this new government able to deliver on the critical economic concerns of me and my family? And the inability of the interim government to support improvement in Syria's economy is increasingly going to become a target of popular grievance and popular anger. And it's an issue that I think the Trump administration could do a great deal more to assist with.

[Daniel Byman]

Steve, that was extremely helpful. I appreciate your willingness to guide us through the most important issues facing Syria today. So thank you very much for joining us at Lawfare.

[Steve Heideman]

Well, thank you, Dan. I'm happy to talk with you.

[Daniel Byman]

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