The Lawfare Podcast: Unpacking Security Guarantees for Ukraine

Hosted by The Lawfare Institute
Date: August 28, 2025
Host: Anastasia Lopatyna (Ukraine Fellow at Lawfare)
Guest: Eric Ciaramella (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Overview: Main Theme and Purpose

In this episode, Anastasia Lopatyna and Eric Ciaramella delve deeply into the complex question of what security “guarantees” for Ukraine actually mean, both historically and in the current geopolitical context. They examine the legal, historical, and political frameworks behind U.S. and Western security commitments—from NATO’s Article 5 to bilateral alliances in Asia and informal arrangements with countries like Israel and Taiwan. The episode scrutinizes the credibility and limitations of various models, analyzing lessons for Ukraine as it seeks a robust deterrent against renewed Russian aggression, especially in the absence of immediate NATO membership.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Defining “Security Guarantees” Versus “Commitments”

• Modern discourse uses "guarantee" loosely, while formal policy language is vaguer—usually “commitment.”
• True "guarantees" are rare and typically restricted to treaty-level mutual defense obligations (e.g., NATO, Japan, South Korea).
  • Quote (Eric, 20:07): "There's no such thing as guarantees in the realm of international politics... Guarantee is a very narrow term that refers to treaty-level mutual defense agreements..."

2. Historical Models of U.S. Security Commitments

A. Bilateral Alliances in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan)

• Japan:
  • Treaty initially heavily favored U.S. interests post-World War II but evolved into a more mutual arrangement under domestic pressure in Japan.
  • Quote (Eric, 04:01): "It was all about granting the American military access to Japanese infrastructure and the ability to deploy from Japan... There were even provisions... to interfere in Japanese domestic politics."
• South Korea:
  • Security guarantee codified what was already military reality post-Korean War.
  • Significant because American forces were already present; not a blueprint for Ukraine, where direct combat involvement doesn’t exist.
• Taiwan:
  • Had a U.S. treaty for 20+ years, which was revoked upon U.S.-China rapprochement; replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act— a statutory but intentionally ambiguous commitment.
• Failures:
  • Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)—attempted Asian NATO—illustrates that formal treaties alone do not ensure credible deterrence.

B. Non-Treaty Assurances (e.g., Israel)

• The U.S. and Israel lack a formal defense treaty but have a robust relationship characterized by annual military aid and close cooperation.
  • Quote (Eric, 23:33): "The Israeli assurances eventually got written down in this memorandum of understanding in 1975, which was... vague, but probably more detailed than some of these treaties."
• Lessons applicable to Ukraine: focus on sustained, predictable aid and building one's capacity.

C. NATO’s Article 5 as “Gold Standard”

• The clause itself is purposely vague (“by such action as [members] deem necessary”), yet is viewed as the world’s premier security guarantee due to:
  • Decades of alliance-building
  • Constant joint training, contingency planning, interoperability, intelligence sharing, and presence of U.S. forces in Europe.
  • Quote (Eric, 42:01): "What makes it credible? So it's 70 plus years of work within the alliance, consultations at the leader level... and constant contacts at lower levels."

3. What Makes Security Commitments Credible?

• Not the text alone, but decades of actions: stationing of troops, integrated planning, large-scale joint exercises, and underlying shared threat perception.
  • Quote (Eric, 11:00): "It's not just a paper commitment. We have the forces on the ground and we think all the time and work together... about what to do in a time of crisis."
• Nuclear umbrella and arms control: U.S. provided nuclear deterrence to discourage proliferation among allies (e.g., South Korea, European states).

4. Congressional Oversight and Transparency

• U.S. history shows tension between executive-made security commitments (including secret agreements) and Congress’s demand for oversight (e.g., Symington Report, National Commitments Resolution).
  • Quote (Eric, 15:37): "A lot of these security arrangements... were very non-transparent... Congress, particularly the Senate, kind of stepped in and said, wait a second, we're worried about all these creeping commitments."

5. Application to Ukraine

A. Ukraine’s Unique Context

• The U.S. is not a belligerent in Ukraine’s war; there is no existing deployment.
• Ukraine seeks security guarantees as deterrence, but context lacks the existential shared Western threat that existed during Cold War alliances.
  • Quote (Anastasia, 08:41): "In the case of Ukraine, the Ukrainians are pretty much begging the US to get involved... there is a much less of an understanding that the European theater is a priority."

B. Israeli and Taiwanese Models—Lessons and Limits

• Israeli model: Effective aid and defense industrial support, but does not deter attacks (Israel is frequently attacked despite U.S. help).
  • Quote (Anastasia, 33:25): "The Israeli model is clearly and obviously not a deterrent. I mean, Israel gets attacked all the time."
• Taiwan: U.S. statutory commitment via the Taiwan Relations Act creates ambiguity, but not a guarantee. Its main deterrent is building its own capacity (“porcupine strategy”).
• A key commonality: both arrangements emphasize arming and developing the partner’s own military rather than direct U.S. combat involvement.

C. NATO-Like Guarantees for Ukraine?

• Attempting to invoke a “NATO-like” arrangement without Article 5’s true essence is misleading and inevitably weakens both the original and any new commitment.
  • Quote (Eric, 47:12): "NATO and Article 5 are unique and specific and have taken 70 plus years of constant policy work to maintain the credibility... Saying that it's going to be like this other thing... you're going to create a cheap knockoff."

D. Ingredients for a Credible Ukrainian Security Arrangement

• Robust, sustained Ukrainian military, capable of deterrence by denial—ability to prevent Russian advances without relying on Western intervention.

  • Predictable multiyear Western funding and arms supply, as well as industrial capacity-building (drawing on Danish and Israeli precedents).

  • Transparent legal foundations—preferably U.S. statute or full treaty, not low-visibility executive agreements.

  • Some Western training presence possible, but no foreseeable large-scale Western combat troop deployment.

  • Intelligence sharing, joint planning, and ready-made logistics for rapid material aid in case of renewed Russian aggression.

  • Punitive snapback mechanisms (such as immediate sanctions and weapons transfers) for deterrence by punishment.

  • Quote (Eric, 50:39): "The main pillar... has to be the Ukrainian army—a strong, flexible, well trained, well equipped Ukrainian armed forces that is capable of deterrence by denial..."

  • Quote (Eric, 54:47): "I don't think there is ever... a legally binding commitment by the United States or Europe to actually deploy their forces to Ukraine in case of a new invasion."

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the elusiveness of guarantees:
  • (Anastasia, 19:23): “People these days use the phrase security guarantee… governments don’t really use the word guarantee. They use the word commitment. And even then, nothing is guaranteed to anyone.”
• On executive-legislative divide:
  • (Eric, 15:37): "Congress wasn't seeing what was going on... You're getting us into all these different arrangements where... the US is on the hook for these huge commitments."
• On Article 5’s real value:
  • (Eric, 42:01): "Article 5 on its own doesn't really say that much. It's about all this constellation, this suite of activities that have brought all of us closer together in these 70 years..."
• On the problem of NATO alternatives for Ukraine:
  • (Eric, 49:50): "If we're going to be talking about building a security arrangement for Ukraine, it really needs to start from a clean slate..."
• On deterrence by denial and punishment:
  • (Eric, 57:19): "You have to have enough signaling that Russia understands there's metal behind this... Americans are going to keep supplying weapons... There’s another kind of deterrence, which is deterrence by punishment..."

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [01:21]–[04:01]: Limits of security guarantees; introduction of podcast and historical context for U.S. alliances in Asia
• [09:28]–[13:38]: American motivations post–WWII, credibility of early alliances, nuclear umbrella aims
• [15:37]–[20:07]: Non-transparent security commitments; Congressional responses and the need for legal clarity
• [23:33]–[31:44]: The Israel “model”—origins, mechanisms, and its lessons for Ukraine
• [34:28]–[40:33]: U.S. commitments to Taiwan; statutory ambiguity; building local capacity
• [42:01]–[49:50]: Why Article 5, despite vague wording, is credible; the impossibility of imitation; NATO's institutional strength
• [50:39]–[57:19]: Elements of a realistic Ukrainian security framework—prioritizing a strong national military, realistic aid, and limitations of Western direct involvement
• [57:19]–[60:52]: Final thoughts—creating a credible deterrent, specifics on snapback mechanisms, and the challenges ahead

Final Summary Takeaways

• A true “guarantee,” in the NATO sense, is more than words—it is the result of decades of joint investment, planning, and shared purpose, something not reproducible instantaneously for Ukraine.
• The most viable path forward for Ukraine is not a “copy” of NATO’s guarantee, but a robust, multi-layered package:
  • A capable, well-equipped Ukrainian military
  • Predictable arms/financial support akin to the Israel model
  • Intelligence sharing and readiness support from the West
  • Clearly signaled punitive mechanisms if Russia reattacks
• There is consensus that, for now, no Western state is prepared to make an ironclad, treaty-level pledge to fight for Ukraine.
• Legal clarity and Congressional involvement are crucial, enhancing commitment credibility and ensuring the longevity of any arrangement.

Listen to this episode for an in-depth, historically grounded look at why the words “security guarantee” mean less—and much more—than you might assume, and what it takes to make deterrence real for Ukraine’s future.